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KunstlerCast 344

from KunstlerCast - Conversations: Converging Catastrophes of the 21st Century

1h 2m 50s

KunstlerCast 344

Dr. Tim Morgan argues that the economy is fundamentally an energy system, not a financial one, where all value arises from energy use. Money is a claim on energy output, not an intrinsic asset. The core of economic stability lies in the energy cost of energy (eco), which rises with complexity and eventually limits growth. As fossil fuel reserves deplete and extraction costs rise—especially in shale oil—energy-based economies face structural constraints. The U.S. has responded to these limits with massive debt accumulation, using monetary expansion to sustain a false growth narrative. This has led to a system reliant on unsustainable financial mechanisms, such as credit and inflation, which mask underlying collapse. Morgan warns of a coming transition to a no-growth, degrowing economy, where financial systems will fail and social order may disintegrate. He emphasizes that renewable energy cannot replace fossil fuels without using existing energy infrastructure efficiently. Technological optimism is misplaced—extrapolation fails when laws of physics limit energy access. The shift toward degrowth will require societal adaptation, including simplification of production, reduced consumerism, and reevaluation of financial obligations. Unlike the U.S., China and Japan show signs of prudent financial restraint, with Japan serving as a cautionary tale of long-term degrowth. Global economies, including the UK, face similar challenges, though the UK’s public trust in institutions like the NHS offers some resilience. Ultimately, Morgan calls for a realistic understanding of energy constraints and a move away from growth-based systems toward sustainable, human-centered economies.

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Hello and welcome to the consular cast. Thanks for listening. My guest this week is Dr. Tim Morgan, a leading exponent of the view that the economy is an energy system and not a financial one, and he is the author of the book Life After Growth. He blogs at surplus energy economics.wordpress.com, and I've become a big fan. It's a pleasure to talk to you Tim Morgan. I discovered you about a year ago, and I've really been enjoying your blog surplus energy economics. I don't know if enjoying is exactly the right word, but I've learned a great deal from it, and you have a very concise and lucid way of presenting the information about the economy and energy and how all these things work together. So let's talk about it. We in the USA are pretty confused about what an economy actually is. Can you help listeners understand that it's primarily about the available energy and not about money per se? Well absolutely right. I think the best way to start on that is to start with three principles, and I don't think anybody would dispute these. The first is that anything that has any economic value or utility is a product of the use of energy. You can't produce anything that has any worth without at some stage in the process using energy. The second is that money has got no intrinsic worth. If you were kind of drifting the lifeboat with money, it's of no use to you whatsoever. So money has value only because you can exchange it for things that have economic value, which means energy value. That means that we can best define money as a claim. Now, you might want to make a comparison there with a hat check you get when you hand in your hat and code to the function. If the management print a lot of additional checks, it doesn't mean there are any more hats to go around when the time comes. And secondly, you've got to exchange it because the check itself isn't going to keep you dry. So you need to make that physical exchange and have something for your money. So money then is only a claim. And thirdly, we cannot access energy without using some energy in the process. If you drill an oil well, if you build a wind turbine or whatever, you always consume a part of the energy that you're getting. There's no free lunch with energy. And that's something that I call the energy cost of energy or eco. And so these are the three principles. Once you understand those, and I think none of them is capable of being disproved, then then you have a framework that says we have an economy of energy and a financial system of money, which is a claim on the output of the energy economy. And we can we can explore those dynamics and see where we are. What I'd like to explore our first is how we got so lost in the weeds. My own suspicion is that with the growth of industrial economies, we developed an ever more rococo system of banking and finance and it became ever more abstract from the on the ground reality until now it's almost disappearing up its own wazoo. Absolutely. These are sort of functional things too. If you go back to, let's say we start in 1760, invention of the first efficient steam engine heat engine gives us access to fossil fuels. Since then we've gone from point six billion to seven point eight billion people on the planet. The economy's grown even more rapidly. And the point when you get growth in the economy, you also get increasing complexity. So to an extent, the complexities of the financial system and many other things are involved, but they are a product of the complexity of the system. One would imagine that we're now bumping up against the diminishing returns of that complexity and the increasing investments we make in it as Joseph Tainter has pointed out in his books, the increasing investments we make in it produce only more blowback. Yes, that's right, because the more complex something becomes, the more costly it becomes to maintain it. And that in turn, as we know, because we know energy is everything we know that the energy requirement rises as the complexity rises. Now, here are the two that hasn't mattered that much, because over time, not only have we accessed ever more energy, but we've also seen the energy cost of energy fall through things like the economies of scale, some technological progress and geographic reach. So we moved out from Pennsylvania to explore for all around the world and we drove the cost down by doing that. We've now hit the constraints of economies of scale. We've hit the constraints of geographic reach. So we're now in fossil fuels into depletion, which starts to drive the cost up rather than doubt. Now, the energy cost of energy, when it hits the threshold of somewhere between three and a half and five percent of the energy that you've got, that takes away the scope for further growth in prosperity, that then exposes high maintenance systems. And that really is the narrative of how we go to where we are. The whole world has been going through kind of an energy quandary convulsion for the last 20 years. And you can see that very clearly in the statistics from about 1999 on. The shale oil miracle supposedly was expected to bail out the United States. And indeed, for 10 years, it seemed like a pretty good operation, except they spent 10 years demonstrating that the companies couldn't make any money producing it because the cost of drilling for it and fracking it and bringing all the trucks in and the sand and the fracking fluid, et cetera, et cetera, was so enormous that they couldn't make money. And now that they've demonstrated that they can't make money at it, they can't get new investment to continue the operations. This would seem to be a pretty severe constraint for the American economy. And yet there's no talk about it at all, really. Well, it's a function of two things. First is the energy cost of energy. And the second is technology. Now, technological progress with fracking has improved the economics of shale resources. But what it hasn't done is changed the physical parameters of the reservoir. So in other words, if you make technological progress, you can reduce the cost of shale access to less than where they were previously for the same resource, but you can't turn it into Saudi Arabia. Well, as I understand it, the return for shale oil is the equivalent of five barrels for every barrel equivalent of oil that you put into the operation. And that's a pretty bad return on energy investment. Yes, that's right. I don't think it's quite as bad as that, but it obviously depends which field you're looking at. The real problem with shale oil is that when you develop a conventional oil field, you have primary driving, in other words, you have the pressure that's in the field to start with. Then you go to secondary recovery injection and that's sort of thing. And only then do you go to tertiary or enhanced oil recovery. With shale, you're already at that late stage. Yeah, you're already at tertiary. That's right. You're already putting a lot of energy, if you will, into the system and return for the energy that you're getting out. And that's why you have such rapid decline rates. Well, a single-well production can drop 50 percent or more in the first year of production. So you constantly have to draw new wells to replace what you're losing. And of course, as a capital cost, but more to the point, there's an energy cost. There's the energy embedded in all the equipment and the activity that you're using. So you're on a treadmill with shale. Well, the net effect of all this is that America has not been able to pay for its own standard of living. And so in the process during this 20-year period, really the whole 21st century, we've run up $28 trillion in combined public-private debt. And what was this not essentially borrowing from the future to compensate for our problems with energy and to create, as you say, a simulacrum of growth? Yes, I mean, essentially, and the figures in other countries have been worse, but effectively America's been buying each dollar of growth with around $3.50 of additional new debt. And of course, debt isn't the only issue. There abroad a financial commitments, both formal and informal, the latter represented by pensioning, where there is a huge shortfall in provision. So to a certain extent, debt and other financial commitments are promises that we're making to ourselves for the future. And those can be explicit in contractual, which is what debt is, or they can be implicit, and not written down, which is what the general public's pension expectations might be, or they can be anywhere in between. But we are selling ourselves promises, if you will, that we don't deliver. And it's kind of interesting, Jim, if I may, to look at the narrative of this from an energy point of view. If we get to the mid-1990s, the economy's clearly accelerating now. You know, and I know that that's because the energy equation is changing against us. Ecos are rising and so on. But conventional economics doesn't say that. Conventional economics says the whole thing's about our money, and it can be fixed using money. So that's when we start talking about second stagnation and respond with what I call "credited" interest. In other words, let's pull liquidity into the system on the basis of credit. Now, that explodes in 2008 with the global financial crisis, but rather than as it were fast up to that situation, we then go for monetary adventurism so that we compound what you might call debt gimmickery with monetary gimmickery. A debt problem isn't too big so long as your money remains sound, but if your money isn't sound, then you are in very, very big trouble. This, I'm stressed, is not by any means solely in those states, this is a worldwide phenomenon. We are now at the point, however, where it's implausible that our debt will ever be paid back. The problem with that is the whole business of using debt as an instrument and a mechanism for a capital economy is that it's got to be a two-way street. You debt only works if there's a reasonable expectation that it will be paid back or serviced. Well, that's right, but if you have too much debt, you have a risk of default, by definition. Now, there are two kinds of default. The first is that you simply say, "Can't pay, don't pay, and walk away," and that's a default. It's hard default. The alternative is that you create enough money so that debt can normally be repaid, but in fact, in money that's lost most of its value. There's been a historic preference for soft default because it appears less painful. It's certainly more gradual. It's been called the hard drug of the capitalist system, the use of new money to pretend that you're paying your bills, if you will. I wonder, though, that given the complexity of the systems that we're running and all the subsystems, that the choice of a soft default won't be rather catastrophically disorderly. Well, it will be. The question then is for those who make the decisions, how much they know what their intentions are, whether they have the control that they believe they have. Now, when it comes to things like QE and SERP, let's remember that back in 2008, we were told these were temporary, these were emergency, that these were unconventional measures that would only be used for a short period of time to fix the problem. And what do we know? 13 years on, we still have them and bigger than ever. Stimulus has become the cure-all fix for everything. Well, as Peter Schiff pointed out, it was in 2007 or '08 that Ben Bernanke said that the disruptions in the mortgage field were transitory and contained. It is now 2021 that Jerome Powell says that inflation is going to be a transitory phenomenon. So we have reason to be distrustful about the official proclamations. We do. And just on inflation, let me say there that that's a somewhat selected measurement. We tend to talk in terms of your re-so consumer prices when you go buying food and whatever. Actually, inflation is a broad measure and it includes the cost of assets. If you were to factor in, as I have a project going on where I try to do exactly that, and I'm coming up with a figure for the United States this year somewhere around 6%. So that's a calculation that is outside pure consumer inflation. Now, some very good people do some good work on what consumer inflation probably is. They back out innovation, shall we say, like hedonic adjustment and geometric weighting and all that kind of stuff, and they can come up with a higher figure for consumer price inflation on the official number. But what I'm interested in is the broad basis. The way that the conventional economists operate is like what we use to call the old Polish blanket trick, where the guy wants to make his blanket longer, so he cuts a foot off the top and so is it under the bottom. Reminds me a little bit from what I've read about Richard Nixon and core inflation. They came up with the idea of inflation without energy and food included. Oh, great. Which some guy called inflation with the inflation taken out. And it enabled you to prove in 1974 that inflation in the United States was really very low indeed. And as long as you weren't buying energy or food or anything related to that, your inflation problem didn't exist. Well, another big feature of your practice I want to get into is the idea of the no-growth economy predicament. And it seems to me that this necessarily implies contraction, because I'm not sure that there's such a thing as a steady state no-growth economy. It seems to me that there's a great deal of order in the system as it's building up and getting bigger and bigger. But you start to encounter quite a bit of disorder as it goes down the downside of that impulse. How do we sort that out? I'm not sure that we can sort it out, but the solution is to, is to if you will understand it and plan accordingly. Now, there are various processes that occur in an in an economy that is shrinking. The first is we start to lose critical mass. This is from the point of view of the business. Some of the components you need to produce something all the way in which you you do something cease to be available. So you have to simplify more around that way you can. Secondly, utilization rates start falling, and that means you're trying to spread a constant fixed expense over a smaller number of customers. And if you put the prices up to account for that, then you drive further customers away. Third process here is that you have simplification, where it makes sense to simplify the products that you're offering and to simplify the way in which you produce it. And a product of that is then something I call delayering, where you take out some of the processes that exist between the farmer and the consumer complex. If you like, you take out some of those processes, you delay some of that. And of course, all of this is compounding. And at the same time, we have a financial system that is entirely predicated on growth. There's no way you can borrow money and pay back that money plus interest, unless your resources grow over the term of that low. So our financial system is entirely predicated on growth. Our economic system can adapt, but only if it knows what it's trying to adapt to. So then you have a widening conversions between the financial economy, if you will, and the real or product economy of energy. How do you imagine some of this stuff resolves itself? You're implying that we are going to be entering a period of pretty striking disorder as these operations work out. I think that's right. Although anthropologists say that in terms of observable behavior, we've been around for 50,000 years, we've had the industrial economy for less than 250 years. So can we, we've had to learn and adapt enormously in that, that rocket speed acceleration? Can we show similar adaptability now that that is over, starting with recognizing what's happening and adapting accordingly? Well, one of the questions you're raising is whether, you know, or how a society and economy carries on with the, the real on the ground economic transactions of daily life as the financial economy dissolves. From what we're saying here, it doesn't seem that there's much possibility that the network of obligations that exist currently and the assets and instruments that support them are going to be able to carry on. Well, that's right. I mean, if you had an analogy with a car, the financial system's got no breaks and very, very poor steering. It relies on impetus. It also relies on extrapolation. You know, that if something's been growing at this rate for X number of years, it must carry on growing at the same rate for X future number of years, which isn't the way the world works. But it's the way that the financial world is assumed to work. So that we built something which is growth predicate, it is growth dependent and it's not beyond the wit of humanity to come up with something better, but it isn't the present system. Well, we're already beginning to see quite a bit of, of disorder introduced into the, the social systems of America. And indeed in Europe, too. I'm wondering how long it takes before those social disorders overcome, you know, whatever metaphysical finance questions we have to answer. Well, yes. I mean, as the economy stops growing and goes into degrowth, what this means is people get poorer. Now, that means that economic issues start to matter to them all and that all other issues start to matter to them less. So the question is, can we, within that trend, can we find mechanisms that provide, if you like, the basics for everyone? And can we concentrate collectively on the economic priority and try to deemphasize other issues, however important they may be? - I think we're talking about the, the idea of creating workarounds for this set of problems that seem to have no solution. One of the popular folders for for those workarounds is the Alt Energy field, and there's a belief in my country that we're going to solve all these problems by running Walt Disney World, Walmart, the interstate highway system, and the U.S. military on wind solar and used French fried potato oil. Among other things, you know, I think that we're going to be disappointed by that. You can't fabricate windmills and solar panels without a sturdy supporting platform of an affordable fossil fuel economy. That's exactly right. What we're trying to do is put the legacy energy into if you like an alt energy situation without looking at the equation as to how that works. Because I understand the economy, I choose to understand the economy as an energy system, and because energy is at the heart of the environmental issue as well, I tend to think that, you know, this is a connection that we have to make, and if we take the energy cost of energy as an example, the problem coming to is that people say I think they're right, that we have an imperative environmentally to get away from fossil fuels. That's true. But I think we also have an imperative economically to get away from fossil fuels, because if as is happening, the energy cost of energy of oil, gas, and coal continues to rise, the economy is dead anyway, whether the planet copes or not. Yeah. So this is a shared challenge. We need to calibrate it in both terms. Now, the energy cost of energy of solar wind and other renewables has come down, but we can't extrapolate. We can't say because it's fallen by this much in this length of time, it'll fall by this much in this length of time going forward. You know, extrapolation is a very dangerous thing. We say when my car's gone from north to 60 and 10 seconds, I'll be through the sound barrier and under two and under three. My little boy's grown to the height of five feet at the age of nine and he'll be 18 feet by the time he gets to 100. It doesn't work that way. And so therefore, we're in danger of tech blindness. By tech blindness, I mean, the assumption that technology is not limited by the laws of physics because it is. And extrapolation blindness, we always think, well, if the price of something's gone up or the cost of something's come down by X amount over X years, it must continue to do so that doesn't follow at all. So then we come down to the resources that you use to make solar panels, wind turbines. That's been costed globally, you know, transition's been costed at 95 to 110 trillion dollars. Okay, a lot of money. But we can find the money. The issue is that those vast sums of money correspond to correspondingly vast amounts of everything from copper and steel to plastic, ceramics, minerals, and so on. And the very difficult process of fabrication using these things. Absolutely, but let's just assume for the moment there is enough copper and there is enough lithium and there's never anything else. It then becomes the energy that's required to access those materials and convert them into the form that we need them for renewable generation. Now, what that in turn means is that you're tying the eco potential, the cost potential of renewables to the cost base of the existing energy slate so that you can't completely detach the two. When the day comes when solar panels can provide the energy to extract copper, then that might be different, but I don't see that coming. At the present time, it's a question of how do we use the legacy energy from fossil fuels to promote a transition? Are we saying it has to be at the same level of prosperity that we're at today because frankly, I don't see that. I don't think the equation works like that. I think that renewables are a secondary use of resources provided to us by legacy fossil fuel energy. And that then raises the question, well, should I be using energy to drive a car to fly somewhere or should I be using it to build a wind turbine or whatever? So again, we come into choices. Now, well, if you're John Kerry, you use it to fly your plane to international conferences on climate change. Well, I did hear he said that half the savings America will make towards net zero or carbon technologies that we don't have yet. Yeah. It's interesting. 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What is your observation about the international efforts around climate change? If you look at the costings that we have from reliable sources and the amounts that are being spent, they're not sufficient, and as I've said, this is not just a matter of environmental concern, though I think we should all have that, but it's also a matter of economic concern because we're watching the energy cost of extracting fossil fuels rising and not putting enough of that legacy energy efficiently enough into renewables. The idea that technology can fix everything simply doesn't work, extrapolation doesn't fix everything, so it is, in a sense, boots on the ground, making efficient use of the fossil fuel value that we still have, and the environmental torrents that we still have to build something better. And when I say better, I mean, not necessarily better than what we have now, but better than what it would otherwise be if we didn't. Yes, that's a very good point and a very important one. If we say the heck with it, let's just carry on driving our trucks and planes and not bother with renewables, then we may or may not destroy the environment, but we certainly destroy the economy. What it implies, though, is finding a whole lot of different ways of conducting our daily business. For example, in the United States, I can easily imagine the very critical trucking system going out of business, and Americans having to rely far more on the inland waterway system that we have from moving goods. But I don't think that there's, I think there's very little thought that's going into that at the moment. And so when the time comes that the trucking system doesn't work anymore, we're going to be quite flat-footed. Well, waterways are marvelous because when you physically move anything, you have to first of all lift it and secondly move it, and the water does the lifting for you. Yes. So as long as you're not in a hurry, the laws of physics work in your favor with waterways in a way that they don't with various forms of road transport. So waterways would be a very good way to go, much as developing trends would be a very good way to go. Because then you have an electric power transport without the need for batteries, or not batteries in the vehicle itself. Yeah. Yeah. Don't let me make these efficiencies. And secondly, on waterways, of course, it's very slow. Yeah. I'm not. We had a wonderful tram system in the United States. Unfortunately, it was a very short-lived era. It only lasted from about 1890 until the 1930s. Yes. I'm not sure that we're going to be able to recapitulate that, especially because of the manner in which we developed the property after that, which is to say the suburban sprawl model of using the landscape. Well, suburbia is a product of comparatively cheap energy. Yeah. And suburbia doesn't make sense if the energy equation changes in the way that most frantically it has. Well, we haven't discovered that. that in the United States yet and I think it's going to come as a terrible shock, especially now in the moment of COVID-19 when so many people are leaving the big cities to move to the suburbs for various reasons, but there seems to be absolutely no awareness that that is a living arrangement with a very poor future. Well, my belief is that we need a new vision on this. I've always lived in the countryside since it turns out, but cities can be great places if the transport is efficient, if the environment is clean and if everything works very effectively. Well, that's been my experience just traveling to Europe over the last 30, 40 years, is that we leave this kind of a horror show environment of the United States and you go to the cities in small towns of Europe and there are quite wonderful places. Yes, indeed, but even taking a big city, if I'm working in New York or Boston, do I want to have to drive in? I don't think I do. If somebody offers me a tram that's clean, safe, bright and convivial, you meet people and it comes along every five minutes, do I really need a car? Do I need to hassle? Yeah, the trouble is we haven't managed to do that in the United States, for example. I live close to one of the better rail lines in America, which is to say the line from upstate New York down the Hudson River to New York City. Right. But it's like the Bulgarian National Railway, the stations are like peace wars, the trains can barely manage to leave and arrive on time, it's a very unsatisfactory system. We don't seem to have the political will to make it any better. Well, that's it, because I think you can have a vision. You can have a city that is safe, that is electrified by means, to a very large extent, that has low pollution, that has transport that's efficient, that takes away that horrible commute. Yeah. You know, cities can be made vibrant. The idea we can all go and live in the countryside, I'm afraid, isn't feasible. But neither should we give up on cities, I mean, the word coincides to a certain extent with the word civilization, but I don't think we should give up on cities. But we do need to redesign them, perhaps on a more human scale. Well, my own sense of where that's all going, you know, within the framework of the economic issues we're discussing is simply this, that the cities have achieved a scale that is no longer consistent with the capital and resource realities of the future. And they will necessarily have to contract. It's really a question of how disorderly that contraction is going to be, because it's going to cause a tremendous loss of value in real estate. And probably it will provoke battles between various groups about who gets to inhabit the parts of the cities that retain their value. For example, you know, New York City is now in the peculiar Manhattan is now in the peculiar situation where now that so many people are working from home and the occupancy of the skyscraper offices is so low that the skyscrapers of Midtown Manhattan have overnight become liabilities instead of assets. This is a condition we had never seen before and I don't think that we're even beginning to deal with it or apprehend it or recognize it. Is it possible, like question, to turn some of these buildings into residential? Well, you know, I've thought about that and it seems to me that you have to think of the apartment towers as merely accessories to the office towers. And if the office towers lose their viability, I think that you'll see that the residential skyscrapers will likewise lose their viability. That's just my theory. Well, that sounds pretty terrible if that happens. Well, I think it is happening and so the question is, you know, and but also let's realize that Manhattan is kind of uniquely overbuilt parcel of real estate. There are a few other places in the world that have so many skyscrapers crammed into the central part of the city. It seems to me that like many things in world history, it seemed like a good idea at the time and now it's not. Yes, that's right. I think we have to think in terms of shortening distances. If energy is a problem, then transporting people is something we need to minimize and transporting products is something we need to minimize. So that makes the case for cities and in a sense, if we can get the economics right, it even makes a case for high rise. Well, perhaps we'll see how that works out, but it is going to have to work out. There will be a workout around those issues. Let's turn to the question of capitalism because it's an interesting thing to me that so many people regarded as a belief system, you know, a crypto religion. And it seems to me it's just a way of managing surplus wealth or, as you might say, prosperity. And we've had a lot of surplus wealth since 1800, so it's not surprising that the operations of capital have gotten ever more elaborate. Well, we have capitalism as an economic theory, but that unfortunately is dead because capitalism in theory states that you earn a return on your capital, and that's gone. That's gone temporarily for the last 12 years. And that informs a whole load of other problems and things like pension provision. I've got some calculations on that kind of thing. But essentially the whole system of capitalism considered purely, you know, neutralist theory is that you earn a return on capital and that you're not capable of doing. Capitalism plays to the side of us that wants to aspire and wants to improve our lives. And that's a very good thing to aspire to, whereas, collectivism asks us to subsume into cooperation, which again, cooperative effort is a very good thing. It put a man on the moon, but cooperative effort can all too easily become subservience to the state, to the center. Yeah, our tyranny. So we indeed, so we have to be clear whether we're talking about capitalism as an economic system, or capitalism as an ideal in a quasi-political, philosophical sense. We don't have capitalism in economic terms now, because the ability to, for a young person starting out to save some of his or her money, earn a return on it, and in that way gradually accumulate wealth. He's not possible. And the reason it's not possible is that when you adopt, say, Zerp, you change the relationship between capital value and income. And income isn't just wage. Your income is dividends, income is profits, income is the interest you earn on your savings, but there's a disarble equilibrium, which between income and capital, which enables you to earn enough income to add to and accumulate your capital. And that socially, if you like, is a capitalist ideal. That is where a young person starts out, he or she works hard, saves, invest that money, but that money then grows thanks to the reinvestment of income in that capital. And when you push the relationship between income and asset value so far apart, you break that connection and it becomes impossible for the ordinary person to accumulate capital. - Yeah. Well, I have the central bankers just about destroyed the basic mechanisms of capital finance, price discovery, the true cost of money, the time value of money. - Yeah, all these concepts that one learns as well is the time value of money, the pricing of risk, price discovery. To say they destroyed it, well, they certainly suspended it. - Thank you, right. - I think you'd say they'd call time out on it and we don't know when the game's gonna resume. - Yeah. - And the longer that goes on, the harder it gets back. The further we wander off from those principles, the harder it gets back to them. And the question then becomes, how do we restore the balance, the equilibrium between the value or price of assets and the associated level of income? Again, you come down to the question of default or inflation. So in other words, either the all forms of income and I say dividends as well as wages and salaries and profits, all rise in line with inflation whilst capital asset values underperformed that inflation. That's one painful way of restoring a balance between the value of price of assets and the level of all forms of income. That's one way of letting that happen. Another way is simply to let the prices of assets fall. So the question you have there is, is do we actually mind that much? If the stock market drops up to 1%, and if property prices drop, does it matter that much? And an interesting question there is, is if you take the national housing stock, if say the United States, you multiply the number of homes by the average price, you come up with a value and that sounds fantastic. We're richer than we've ever been. But in fact, unless you're gonna presuppose Martian's coming along with checkbooks, it's meaningless (laughs) because the only person I can sell my house to is you and vice versa. So the aggregate value is a delusion. What we're doing is we're applying marginal transaction prices to the aggregate and producing a notional value. So if the prices of let us say houses were to drop very sharply, the houses still exist. This isn't nuclear war. You know, it's net zero in terms of the physical existence and the utility of those properties. And the same applies to stock markets. We can't tell them all. So we attach a notion of value what I can't understand in perhaps his distance, but I don't see why the Fed are so obsessed with preventing stock market falls. Because if we presume the companies are still worth whatever they were worth before in terms of their earnings and the value that they had, then allowing some people to buy into those to the lower cost. What you're simply doing is regressing the balance between earnings and asset values, which is way out of kilter. Well, my guess about that is that so much of the asset value of these equities and assets, they're entailed as collateral for other things for much sketchier financial instruments. Indeed so, but then you step back and say, okay, the function of these inflated asset values is as collateral bearing in mind we can never convert all of that collateral into money. So we're playing theoretical games here. We can't turn the entire housing stock of Manhattan, let's say into money. It can't be done. So therefore, we are playing accounting things here with the issues that really matters, which isn't the asset value, but the debts and other obligations secured against them. So this brings us back to another point, which is to say that well, we know we have a bubble, we have too much debt, we have too many outstanding liabilities of one form or another. If the aggregate value of the asset securing them isn't real, in the sense that it can never be monetized, what really uses that backing? So it takes us back to what kind of default you want. Do you want inflation to default? Or do you want hard default, can't pay, won't pay default? The answer of course is that we want neither. So for those in government, this is really a case of spending it out for as long as you possibly can before you have to make that unpleasant choice. Yeah, and sometimes it's beyond your control and it will go where it will go. And that's exactly what happened in 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed. And it exposed the fragility of all these collateralized debt obligation bets that were made. And the sketchiness of all these things is a form of insurance against other obligations. Exactly right. And people often forget we had a test run of this in Japan in the 80s. You invest in stocks that go up, you use the increased equity of security to borrow against that and you buy property. That goes up, you use that collateral to buy, by the way, works of auto more property. And eventually you have a collateralized pyramid. And you pull a straw out of the bottom of that and the thing falls down. And it's interesting statistic, which I believe is true, that on the basis of price per square foot, the grounds of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo were at one point worth more than the entire land area of California. And something which sounds like nonsense usually is. Yeah, just like something that sounds too good to believe usually is. Absolutely. Hey everybody, we're proud of our association with David McElvaney's ICA Wealth Management as a sponsor of this podcast. And I recommend you listen to the McElvaney weekly commentary. David's fine podcast out every Tuesday and available at iTunes podcasts. Gold has been on a roller coaster, but we got a clue about where it's moving later this year. Think money printing from sea to shining sea. Can you spot an inflationary trend? When dollars lose purchasing power, it's time to think about wealth preservation. It's time to think about gold. There is no better asset for building a stable foundation for your portfolio. And vaulted is the easiest way to invest in gold. Vaulted is an online mobile web app for investing in allocated and deliverable physical gold. Buy and secure gold with ease and convenience, giving you full control over securing your financial future. Vaulted delivers the best prices every time along with personal advising from the experts at McElvaney ICA. Join thousands of investors who have discovered these benefits for wealth preservation in an increasingly worrisome time. Visit consular.com/vaulted to learn more about the vaulted program at McElvaney ICA and earn this podcast a referral point when you sign up that's consular.com/vaulted V-A-U-L-T-E-D and now back to the show. You discussed in your latest blog at surplus energy economics. A thing called the liability vortex. Can you tell us what that means? Yes, since I'm looking in that at the US in particular, you've got soaring debt. That's one thing. You have debt that's grown at around $350 for every dollar of economic growth. The numbers over the 20 years pre-COVID were 50% growth in GDP, 100%, 104%, I think it was growth in debt. Dead is only half the picture because we have financial assets, which of the financial system, which the rest of us are liabilities, and they have grown even more rapidly. And then, of course, there's the gigantic gap in pension provision which was put at something close to 30 trillion of the end of 2015. So this is a situation in which you get something to a vortex because there comes that moment when somebody realizes, "Hey, we can't, we can't honor any of this." Not just we can't repay these debts, but we can't meet these broader obligations. We can't meet the expectations for pensions that the public have. And you realize that your assessment, your strength for carrying this burden is your measure of GDP. But, of course, GDP is inflated every time you spend borrowed money. Every time you put off cost to tomorrow, that helps to inflate GDP artificially. And the moment has to come when someone says, "Well, we can't keep taking on ever more and more of these liabilities without getting sucked down into this vortex." mathematical slight of hand disguising what's really going on. And I'm not saying it's intentionally malign mathematical slight of hand is just the way the system works. Well, speaking of slight of hand, there's this new cultish thing called modern monetary theory, which looks like the kind of lunacy that visears and necromancers and astralogasters would dream up to malify the mad king of a bygone empire on the verge of collapse. What's your view of the the new cult of modern monetary theory? Well, the first observation is that the same initial stand for magic money tree. I think the point I'd make to people is that you can understand money, but by doing so, please don't think you understand the economy. You can create any amount of money you like. You can watch it. You can study it and you can study it behaviorally. It's valid and interesting science to look at to study the behavior of money. But you're watching the behavior of a human artifact. You're not studying the behavior of the economy itself. We come back to the point that money is only a claim. You could be addressing a lifeboat with a million dollars in in bank notes and it'll do you know good whatsoever. So there's no reason why you shouldn't study money as long as you don't persuade yourself that you're studying the economy. Now, when you said that, you can have monetary theories, modern anti-deluvian or whatever, and they may be interesting in terms of how they explain to you the behavior of money. But please don't ever think they fix anything in the economy because the two things that are closely related are not the same thing at all. Well, we seem to have really entered a phase now in the USA where we're following the prescription of Richard Duncan, which is that the state can simply produce as much money as it wants. And we've gone exponential now. You know, the hockey stick graph of the amount of money that we're creating from borrowing is now so steep that it's another thing disappearing up its own wazoo. Well, it's like my analogy there at had checks. You know, a lot of people turn up the hand in their hats and coats and while they're at the function, the management prints a whole stack in a little checks. And then the people come out and they're still only the same number of hats and coats they were in the first place. So now you get to the point where it needs three checks rather than one to get you the same hat that you came with. Well, to put this another way, how do intelligent people take this seriously? I mean, is it just a game or a scam? I don't know that it's that entirely. I mean, in terms of if you like ordinary people, which I guess is all of us, most people have busy life to lead. They don't have time to study modern monetary theory or energy theory or anything else. They take what they're told. And when they're told by supposedly expert willing form people, if this is the way we're going to look at it. works and then it's difficult for them to break out of that very well. I have a vision of where this is leading. I was about to say I can see where it's leading but that's not true. I can't really see where it's leading but I have an idea. It's my own idea and it seems to me that the USA and other advanced nations are pretty soon going to be going medieval, as I like to say, and only after a period of epic disorder. What's your scenario for the gaming out of the current civilizational quandary? I always like to try to be an optimist but I will simply say it's becoming very hard to do that. Ah, because that optimism in this situation would require rational choices. We're not seeing that in politics. We're not seeing rational choices in how we handle the economy. We're not managing expectations rationally. We think the economy is simply a matter of money. We know we can create money out of thin air. Therefore we can grow the economy in perpetuity. Therefore we can take on forward commitments that can be met out of the products of growth. We're also blinded by the idea of technology. We don't realise that technology is limited by the laws of physics. So when you take the ability to print money, or create money should I say, and the ability to extrapolate technology into the future, we're living in a never-neverland where we don't understand what's happening. I think even the best intention people may very often not understand what's happening. We have to relate to the physical world we're in. We have to remember nobody ever bought lunch for the percentage that we need to get down to the real bedrock at this, which is energy and the environment, and how that is translated into prosperity, how it's shared between people. What our reasonable expectations are. By the way, I wouldn't see China necessarily coming through this bottleneck easily or gracefully, although we do assume a lot and extrapolate a lot about what's going on there. They came to the industrial orgy pretty late in the game. Their domestic oil reserves are pretty meager, and the supplies that they depend on have to go through to bottlenecks, the Straits of Hornemuse and the Straits of Malacca. So they must be pretty worried about how that's going to work out for them. They are, and of course the Chinese system of politics, if you will, is based on a grand bargain. The citizen surrenders certain rights that you or I might take the ground in the west, but in return the government guarantees his or her prosperity. And up to now, that's worked pretty well. China, I think, produces some very astute people, and it's interesting that they're reigning back on financial innovation. And even allowing state owned entities to go bust, at a time when we think cheap money is a fix for everything. So are you saying they're preparing better? Yes, they are. It doesn't mean that everything's going to be simple for China. My goodness, it has grown, it's dead enormously, although proportionately less than we have. Nevertheless, there's been a huge increase in aggregate Chinese debt over the past 13 years since the GFC. And China has problems. Yes, I mean, they have an energy problem undoubtedly. But in the case of saying we all have problems, and they tend to manage things, I think pretty astutely. Well, it's hard to imagine that they won't do exactly what Japan did in the 1930s, and find themselves forced to go adventuring for petroleum. And water. Well, there's water too, there you go. Although that may even be a more difficult quandary than the oil. Well, it's interesting, you think back to Japan, that the decision they had to make with the American oil embargo and Pearl Harbor and all that, the decision they had to make was to grab the eye resources of the Dutch East Indies. What is now Indonesia? And they made that faithful decision to grab those eye resources and then didn't even institute a convoy system to get the oil back to Japan. Yeah, it didn't work out too well. I'm speaking of Japan, how do you account for what has been going on in Japan financially for the last 30 years or so since they really got into trouble with their money management? Well, Japan has been, as we say over here, the canary in the coal mine, Japan has been the test bed, because this is a country with a very large population, very sophisticated financial system and very limited energy resources. So they in the 80s, hit issues that we're really only hitting now are referred earlier to collateralization that you you see the value of one class of asset increase, you borrow against that, that drives up another class of asset and so on. That came to an end in the late 80s, and they've only recently that the Japanese stock index has got back to where it was in the late 80s. So they've had an experience of what you might call degrowth or at least post growth experience going back 30 years, but fortunately for them, that's happened when the rest of the world has still been growing its economy until quite recently. You can look at Japan as a positive example of stars if you like. Japanese haven't got any richer since the late 80s, but they're not poor and they're taking along personally well. But to what extent is that something we can follow or is that luxury that Japan's enjoyed because other countries have been doing better? Yeah, I would imagine the latter. You know, it's similar to, no, it's not identical, but it's a little similar to the idea in America people always point to Cuba and how well they managed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the end of their subsidies. But what they don't account for is the fact that it all happened against the background of a greater world that was still pretty orderly as well as a great deal of money that was flowing in from the United States from Cubans in the United States to Cuba itself. So, you know, that allowed them to squeak through that. Well, they also started with low expectations. They won't, they won't a rich country getting poorer. Yeah, the way that perhaps Argentina was. I must say though, I imagine that Japan would go medieval pretty happily and willingly because they had such a lovely culture before the West sailed in to Tokyo Bay and made them psychotic. Yes, that's right. I mean, Japan barely acknowledged the existence of the outside world until was it Admiral Perry turned up? Yeah, it was a lovely artistic culture, you know, with wonderful, appropriately scaled technology for the time. For example, you know, the city of Tokyo, which I believe was called Edo at that time, had a wonderful system for distributing water and collecting wastes and was a very, very large city, but still managed to operate beautifully because of the technology that they, the appropriate technology they used. And it was also a society of tremendous artistry. Yes. It has an interesting analogy there, you know, Jim, with the Netherlands. Because that was an example of a very efficient renewables-based economy, if you like. The Dutch were brilliant with the use of wind and the channeling and use of water. And also went through an artistic flowering, you know, we think of the old masters, the great painters of that time. Yes. So, there's an interesting analogy I wouldn't want to push it too far between sustainable society in Japan, if you will, and sustainable society in the Netherlands. Well, speaking of Europe, just let's conclude with some thoughts about your birthplace, your homeland, the United Kingdom. I have a hard time understanding what kind of economy they actually have there besides the equivalent of Wall Street, which is called the City of London. What is the economy of the UK? And what's the nature of their predicament? Well, their predicament obviously has been shaped considerably by what's been happening with Brexit. And it's very interesting that in proportion, the assets, and if you like the scale of the financial system, has been shrinking in relation to the size of the economy for quite some time. And they are, to a certain extent, at least, going to be shut out of markets by the Brexit process. It's interesting also that the current slogan of the current Prime Minister is "Buildback Better", which, how am I optimistic? It doesn't say "Buildback Bigger", which I think might be interesting. They're trying to get more balanced. They're trying to create greater equality. I commend a lot of what they're trying to do, but they do have the same, if you like, attitude problems that the US is going to have to confront. And it's interesting also that there's a great emphasis in the United Kingdom now on what the state can do. The campaign against COVID is just one example of, although it's a conservative market government, it does seem to accept collectivist solutions to things. Of course Britain's always had the National Health Service, and people in Britain, I'd say, have more faith in that than any other entity you can have a name. Oh, although it doesn't really seem to perform very well. The National House says, "Oh, it does. It's very efficient in terms of, if you look if you measure its efficiency as I've done some years ago, it's actually pretty efficient." I mean, not that the system we have in the United States is a whole lot better. In fact, it's kind of a disgraceful racket. Well, I think that's right. The NHS is, I think, rightly revered by the British public. You know, you can criticize anything you like, and criticize the big, and criticize the monarchy, but don't ever criticize the NHS. If you're in England, and it comes from a vision, really in the late years of the war, to provide health care for everyone, for the point of use, and it's an institution that I think has served Britain pretty well. Were you relatively optimistic about the UK's trajectory? No. I'm not, there's not many countries where I'm optimistic about their economic trajectory. Where I'm slightly more optimistic about the UK compared to say the US, is the ability to adapt, to change expectations. It's going to be difficult, but I think they have a slightly better shot at making the cultural change to de-growth. I put it no stronger than that. Oh, that's interesting. Was Brexit a wise thing or a foolish thing? Well, I try to stay neutral on that. It was certainly a democratic thing. As a Democrat, I have to respect the decision that was made. I don't think it was enacted as effectively as perhaps it could have been. I think part of the blame for that has to go on Europe, not just on the British. Because Brussels tended to think it could just dictate what the British would accept. And of course, that's not how these things work. And we were also far too early into the process. I mean, so I wouldn't second guess whether the public were right to vote for it. I simply accepted they did. Yeah. Well, on that note, Dr. Tim Morgan, I think we're going to conclude. Thank you very much for coming on the podcast. You're very welcome. And I look forward to checking in with you again when conditions have changed, which I think they will probably soon or rather than later indeed. So so we will ride again and have a good what remains of the day 3000 miles from here. Thank you. (gentle music)

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. The economy is fundamentally an energy system, not a financial one, as all economic value stems from energy use.
  2. Money has no intrinsic value and is merely a claim on energy-based output, like a hat check with no real physical value.
  3. The energy cost of energy (eco) rises as systems grow more complex, and when eco reaches 3–5%, further growth becomes impossible.
  4. Shale oil development is economically unsustainable due to high energy returns, rapid decline rates, and massive energy inputs.
  5. The U.S. has accumulated $28 trillion in debt, using credit to sustain growth while ignoring rising energy costs and systemic fragility.
  6. Financial systems rely on growth and extrapolation, but both are flawed—technology cannot outpace physical laws, and debt is unsustainable.
  7. A transition to a no-growth economy will trigger disorder, requiring simplification, reduced utilization, and rethinking of financial obligations.
  8. Renewables cannot replace fossil fuels without first using legacy energy efficiently, and solutions must balance economic and environmental imperatives.

Summary:

Dr. Tim Morgan argues that the economy is fundamentally an energy system, not a financial one, where all value arises from energy use. Money is a claim on energy output, not an intrinsic asset.

The core of economic stability lies in the energy cost of energy (eco), which rises with complexity and eventually limits growth. As fossil fuel reserves deplete and extraction costs rise—especially in shale oil—energy-based economies face structural constraints. S.

has responded to these limits with massive debt accumulation, using monetary expansion to sustain a false growth narrative. This has led to a system reliant on unsustainable financial mechanisms, such as credit and inflation, which mask underlying collapse. Morgan warns of a coming transition to a no-growth, degrowing economy, where financial systems will fail and social order may disintegrate.

He emphasizes that renewable energy cannot replace fossil fuels without using existing energy infrastructure efficiently. Technological optimism is misplaced—extrapolation fails when laws of physics limit energy access. The shift toward degrowth will require societal adaptation, including simplification of production, reduced consumerism, and reevaluation of financial obligations.

, China and Japan show signs of prudent financial restraint, with Japan serving as a cautionary tale of long-term degrowth. Global economies, including the UK, face similar challenges, though the UK’s public trust in institutions like the NHS offers some resilience. Ultimately, Morgan calls for a realistic understanding of energy constraints and a move away from growth-based systems toward sustainable, human-centered economies.

FAQs

The economy is primarily based on available energy, not money. Everything of economic value requires energy to produce, and money itself is merely a claim on the output of energy-based economic activity.

Money has no intrinsic worth because it can only be useful when exchanged for something that has economic value—specifically, energy value. Without physical exchange, money is just a claim with no real utility.

The energy cost of energy (eco) is the energy used in extracting or producing energy. It’s important because it limits growth; when eco rises to 3.5–5% of total energy, it becomes impossible to sustain further economic prosperity.

The financial system has grown increasingly abstract and complex over time, disconnected from real-world energy constraints. This complexity now requires more energy to maintain, creating unsustainable debt and inflationary bubbles.

Technological progress cannot override physical laws. Extrapolating past trends into the future—like assuming solar costs will keep dropping indefinitely—is dangerously misleading and ignores energy and material constraints.

The liability vortex occurs when rising debt and financial obligations grow faster than economic output. As GDP is inflated by borrowing, the system eventually reaches a point where it can no longer meet its obligations, leading to systemic collapse.

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