Kalshi CEO Defended Hiring Don Jr. Just Days Before Everything Changed
59m 17s
The conversation explores two main topics: the cultural significance of Kewpie mayo as a rich, egg-yolk-based mayonnaise, and the role of prediction markets in modern forecasting. Kewpie is highlighted as a premium, chef-endorsed mayonnaise with a distinct flavor profile, symbolizing a broader interest in traditional food culture. On the topic of prediction markets, the discussion emphasizes their value over traditional polls by providing real-time, transparent, and data-driven forecasts through public participation. These markets incentivize rigorous research and reward informed traders, allowing users to hedge risks in politics, sports, and economics. The speaker, Tarik Mansoor of Kalshi, defends the platform’s neutrality, noting that its relationship with Donald Trump Jr. was based on influence, not political favor, and that the hiring decision predated the 2024 election. Kalshi also stresses the importance of transparency, regulation, and user protection, citing real-world examples like the Onion Act to illustrate how market manipulation can lead to poor policy. Despite legal challenges and state-level lawsuits, the platform argues that prediction markets enhance public understanding, promote price discovery, and serve as vital tools for risk management. The discussion concludes that prediction markets are evolving from niche interest into mainstream, transparent, and impactful tools for understanding complex events—offering greater public insight than traditional media or polls.
This is Matt Rogers from Lost Culture East, that's with Matt Rogers and Bowen Yang.
This is Bowen Yang from Lost Culture East, that's with Matt Rogers and Bowen Yang.
We've been talking about Kewpie mayo for a minute now, and wow, so many of you already love this stuff.
And if you're thinking, wait, what is Kewpie? Do you not have the internet?
It's the OG Japanese mayonnaise, the one with the red cap.
What makes it different?
Egg yolks.
Kewpie is made with egg yolks only, giving it this rich umami flavor that elevates everything.
Chefs use it. Restaurants use it. Where chefs work, of course. Food and flavor lovers use it.
You haven't tried it yet?
Well, find the red cap and see what everyone's talking about, why don't ya?
Kewpie.
The original Japanese mayonnaise.
Kewpie.
Hi, I'm Catherine Rampel, economics editor here at The Bulwark.
Donald Trump Jr. just got the boot from Kalshi, which is a controversial prediction market platform that had hired Don Jr. as a paid advisor.
Or at least he and Kalshi.
Kalshi have agreed to part ways.
Don Jr. had been working as a paid advisor for Kalshi for about the past year and a half.
In fact, he was announced as a new hire a few days before his father, Donald Trump, was sworn in for his second term as president.
Kalshi says the decision to part ways with Don Jr. was related to the fact that Don Jr.'s investment firm decided to make a $300 million investment in Kalshi's chief rival, Polymarket.
But Don Jr. had already been an advisor and investor in Polymarket for a while, going back to over a year ago.
So this is not an entirely new relationship.
What is new, what did change, is that we just had a major election in which there was a blue tsunami.
And Democrats are coming back into the majority in the House and the Senate and seem pretty keen on investigating any companies that have relationships with the Trump family, particularly those that might be looking for regulatory favors.
Just coincidentally, two weeks ago.
A week before the election, I happened to interview Tarik Mansoor, the CEO of Kalshi, at a public event at the Economic Club of New York.
We talked about a lot of things, including many of the lawsuits and even criminal charges that Kalshi and Mansoor personally are facing in states around the country.
I also asked him about whether the decision to hire Don Jr. as a paid advisor might be seen as favor trading.
Mansoor said at the time that.
He hired Don Jr. simply because Don has a massive following online and the decision was not, quote, a political decision.
Again, this was one week before the election.
It seems like at least the relationship between Don Jr. and Kalshi has evolved since then.
Take a look at our whole exchange.
All right. Thank you so much for being here.
If it's OK if I start by embarrassing you a little bit.
OK.
The reason you were late.
May I share?
Well, I usually have a good excuse for being late, but this time.
Yeah.
So the reason why Tarik was late is that there's a dress code here.
And Tarik, I gather, did not show up wearing.
I had to buy a shirt. I was buying a shirt.
I only mention this because it feels like an elaborate metaphor somewhat for the some of the regulatory questions facing your industry.
Tarik, you know, they could have snuck you in through a side door, but you went out roaming the streets of New York.
I had to follow the rules.
Exactly. Had to follow the rules.
So anyway, so thank you again for coming and for the for abiding by the dress code.
I wanted to start by talking about the midterms that are coming up.
You have said that these midterms are truly the first prediction market election.
What concretely does the public get from prediction markets that polls and forecasters do not provide?
I mean, a better forecast, really.
And it's it's also sort of answering a little bit of a separate question.
I mean, polls.
Polls are really asking people what they want to happen, like what they're who they're voting for.
Prediction markets are asking people what they think will happen, which are two different questions.
They're also kind of pricing something different.
A poll is essentially, you know, OK, if I poll this room, it will give me, OK, this is the percentage of people in this room that are voting for one candidate or the other.
And, you know, often see a poll that says, OK, you know, like in Texas, Tallarico is polling.
I don't I didn't look at recent polls.
I usually look at the prediction markets.
But let's say Tallarico is polling at 51 percent.
But the prediction markets are 65, 67 percent because it's a probability.
It's not the same thing.
You know, a poll that's a 67 percent would usually translate to like a 99 percent probability of the candidate winning.
And that's, I think, one of the things that the general public mistakes often.
And, you know, but maybe to really answer the question, I think the thing that's unique and I really think about this election as being the first prediction market election, even though 24 is when we went mainstream.
And it's the first time that we have a piece of information that is really flowing bottom up from people.
That's really what's exciting me about this.
It's like historically, OK, how do we know which candidates are worthy to look at or interesting or about to win?
I mean, it really is a few publications with a few people in those publications selling us, OK, here are the different candidates and here's how well they're doing.
And there's polls, which in my view, I mean, polls are mostly an elite top down messaging or information medium because, you know.
Polls are commissioned by a few people that decide they have all sorts of decisions they make when they run the poll, who they're going to ask, what's the sort of sampling bias in it.
There's all sorts of things that can like lead the poll to go one way or the other.
And, you know, the best proof you have of that is actually, you know, we're in the last street to the election.
And, you know, I'm not a wizard, but I'm going to make a prediction is, you know, the Republic, each of the Senate races are pretty contentious.
You're going to see two polls that are released for each race, one from the Democrat, one from the Republican.
And the polls are going to be saying opposite things.
Why?
Because polls are going to be saying opposite things.
You can make them say whatever you want.
That is just not true for markets.
You can't.
I, you know, people oftentimes come and tell me, why is Kashi predicting something?
We're not predicting anything.
This is millions of people going one way or the other and with real skin in the game.
And that, I think, is what's interesting.
In some ways, you're sort of reshifting the power of information to people, millions of people that we cannot, nobody can really control.
This is, you know, if you look at 2028 for Kashi right now, it's, you know, you have John Ossoff, you have Gavin, you have AOC.
And that's information that's coming from millions of people, not.
You know, an ad board or two opinion writers at Politico, right?
And that's what's so different about prediction markets.
You have said that prediction markets are different from gambling.
They're not gambling.
It's about price discovery, at least in my recent conversation with you.
And I'm sure that the viewers online and the participants in this room will agree there is great value in price discovery.
It helps markets function more efficiently.
But why is it important for?
Markets to price who wins the Cardinals-Cowboys football game or who gets eliminated on Dancing with the Stars this week?
Two actual bets, by the way, on Kashi.
I don't know, you'd be surprised by the number of people that care about Dancing with the Stars.
Yeah.
You know, I mean, who am I to say whether Dancing with the Stars matters or not?
I mean, really, it's like this is always interesting.
The interesting thing to me about this is like, certainly we have markets that are more societally useful to some people than others.
And there's markets that are more, some people would find them frivolous.
And, you know, and this is where the.
The rule of a federal regulator can come and put some lines and decide, OK, these are too frivolous.
These are like in the public interest and have enough economic consequence.
But, you know, I'm sure you can find some markets that are funny on Kashi because some set of people really care about them.
And one example I've always quoted, it's so interesting.
I've gotten so much inbound about our Taylor Swift markets.
And it's always been interesting to me because the general public, when you think about Taylor Swift, you think it's a gimmick.
You think it's like some sort of funny side show.
OK, Taylor Swift is doing one thing or the other.
I can tell you, I have a partner.
I have a partnership with MSG.
You know, I'm not going to say exactly how much we paid for it per year, but let's assume we paid for it a million dollars a year.
That's my deal value with MSG.
After this woman decided to get married there, I can resell that thing for three million dollars now.
It went up by three X.
That is the economic impact of Taylor Swift just deciding to do her wedding at MSG.
And this is true for the weather.
It's true for economics.
It's certainly true for sports.
I mean, the notion that sports is a sort of side show or a game is a bit outdated now.
Like it's big business.
Seventy billion dollars of private.
Equity have gone into sports.
Whether the World Cup was going to be played in certain cities.
I mean, that has invigorated the city in many different ways.
Go to Kansas and ask them, what did the World Cup do to the city?
I mean, there's a real inflection point that happened.
A lot of people that were hedging on Kalshi.
I mean, some people bet on Kalshi.
They trade.
And a lot of people do it the way they bet on the stock market or the way they bet on traditional grain futures as a way to make money.
But there are some people that are actually using it to offset risk, to essentially hedge themselves against an adverse consequence.
And, you know, sports, one of the typical examples is like, you know, we have.
We have.
We have a bunch of media rights buyers that know that, OK, if Team America loses early, that investment they made in the advertisement is going to get marked down by 50, 60, 70 percent.
Why?
Because Americans stopped watching the World Cup.
And so to me, what's interesting is, you know, the difference in markets like in gambling has never been about behavior.
Gambling is a behavior.
There are people that, you know, bet and gamble and trade, whatever you want to call it.
Any name on Kalshi, the same way they do it on Robinhood, the same way they do it on Coinbase, the way they do it on the stock market.
You know, the same way they do it on the NASDAQ.
That is true.
That doesn't make a market not a market.
You know, the structure is, is it a market that promotes open price discovery, that actually if somebody is smart and doing research in the world, they come to the market and get rewarded for it.
And the reason they're getting rewarded, because a lot of you are actually looking at the prediction market forecasts when it comes to politics and so on and so forth.
There's a public good that comes out of it, which is this prediction.
It's making us smarter of the world.
And then some people are hedging their risk.
And then you need for every hedger, you need a speculator.
And that's true for prediction markets, it's true for sports, weather, economic, it's true for grain futures.
for all futures.
the topic can change the market doesn't or is it gambling where the sole purpose of the model it's
a business model you're going to a house and if you're doing anything that's smart if you're
showing any indicative behavior of doing research and getting sophisticated and calibrating the odds
or being smart about what you're doing you get banned because that's not what the purpose of
this thing is it's not price discovery or promoting getting smarter about something
the purpose of it is for you to lose money to the house that's really what structure you're
betting against the house the house revenue is equal to the customer's losses and over time
you root out the winners and you figure out how to get the losers coming back and so on and so
forth and so oftentimes people you know they have this conception which the casinos have done a very
good job at like preceding this narrative that prediction markets these young men that are you
know gambling these life savings i mean if you look at like the percentage of the volume that
comes from these young men it's tiny on calci it's pretty much irrelevant really the 70 to 80
percent of our volume comes from these the people maybe the best way to imagine it a lot of you
probably here have watched a big short you know the two kids that like
uh were living in their mom's garage but like did all the research they were going crazy doing the
research on like the mortgages and like read every single one of them and all of that that's what
we're doing you're adding that level of rigor to politics to sports economics and 70 80 percent of
that is those people they're setting up teams and they're doing copious amount of research the same
way that uh morgan stanley allen's does research on apple stock and then trading it on the open
market and if they have good piece of information they make money and if they don't they get
punished and that's i think what's so exciting about this next generation of markets is anyone
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there are a few participants who have outsized participation in these markets outsized volume
actually found that there's a small number of accounts on polymarket and cal she often pros using
sort of a more data-driven algorithmic trading model who take home most of the winnings not just
participation but most of the winnings and they phrased it as there are a few sharks and a lot of
losers potentially losing their shirts what duty do marketplaces like yours have to ensure
participants are informed about the risks they take and ensure that they are not gambling away
their life savings and they're not gambling away their life savings and they're not gambling away
let me ask i want to answer the risk question it's been interesting i did see that walsh journal
article most of the data was from polymarket but cal she says that it's a bit different and i also
don't know how they sampled that data but you know it's always been interesting to me like
how many hedge funds outperform the snp every year like what percentage of hedge funds outperform the
snp it's pretty much an 80 20 thing 20 of hedge funds win and 80 lose and it's always been
interesting to me it's as if there's some sort of standard that an open competition a market
should be 50 50 it's like you know you're like 50 percent 50 percent of the people
win and 50 of people lose imagine like but then there wouldn't be skill then what are we even
doing like in there's been this sort of supposition that like it should be like a competition should
be uniform imagine like you know we run the nba finals and every year we pick one team and
uniformly at random and that's the one that wins i mean what's the point of a competition
a competition is a game of skill the same way in the stock market and prediction markets
you will reward people that will be better you know some athletes put more effort energy resources
into their research than others and they will be rewarded disproportionately than others and that's
what people put way more money effort resources to get better at this than other people and that's
what an open competition open market does the thing that's unique about prediction markets though is
that and you put out some trader um uh some of you may have seen this we put out some studies and
it's all public but who are the top traders who are the people that are performing the best in
fiction markets and it's amazing you see it 80 of them went to public school they're 2x more likely
to have worked in retail than i've worked in wall street or banking i mean think about that they're
banking you know the federal reserve put out a paper about uh you know the forecast from calci which
i think is main street it's people millions of people laymen average people against wall street
on economics on like inflation gdp interest a bunch of economic indicators and they found that
main street calci was actually more accurate than wall street and that's a paper that's public it
may be in the pack but it's called calci and the rise of macro markets and after that paper was
put out it's like how is cash so predictive on inflation like who are these traders are they
like wall street etc and you look at the top traders like our top trader on inflation is
never traded financial markets uh likes reading about the economy for 25 years and he's now a way
to monetize it i'd certainly think though that calci like robin hood like the nasdaq we do have
a very and i believe you know we are regulated as a federally regulated exchange we spend the
first four years getting regulated and my person and we are doing a lot of things that are beyond
the regulation and my personal beliefs and i've been a very big advocate of this i'm pro-regulation
i'm pro-free markets but also pro-regulation i don't think they're counter to each other i actually
think that if you do it right and if we solve the hard problems that are not usually sexy headlines
you can actually get to a better outcome or free markets grow even faster and better but you have
sensible guardrails around it i believe it's totally the platform's responsibility to make
sure that we're policing irresponsible use and irresponsible use is not people losing money
people losing in a competition or losing anything in life that's that's what you do you you got out
compete by somebody else and that's okay it's losing money that you cannot afford if doing
things that can harm you and harm your life and that's true for calci it's true for traditional
gaming like whatever sports sports books and draft kings it's true for robin hood it's true
and i think that the rules need to be updated to reflect the reality that financial markets now
have millions of people not just institutions are participating in them whether it's an options and
so on and so forth and but the key thing about prediction markets is when somebody is doing
things that are harmful to them and keep losing money and they're clearly vulnerable and have
addiction issues they don't they're not losing money that money to calci they're losing it to
somebody else in the open market so we don't have an incentive to keep promoting it in fact we use
that to to send predatory marketing to these customers to actually ban these customers or add
more friction to their accounts because again the sports books their business model is reliant on
these most vulnerable customers that keep losing money to the sports book that you know they send
them a drink or get them a sweet or whatever but on calci like i am reliant on these informed
traders that make the markets more efficient and more accurate over time and sure some people are
going to lose that's a competition but those people that are really doing it irresponsibly
in some ways we want to kind of put them out of the system i think of it as a long probability it's
and on both extremes there's all the smart informed trader and then on that very extreme
of those is the insider traders the people that are actually cheating on the one side those you
want to ban and then there's people that are going to be losing because you know they got
outcompeted by somebody else and then on the other end of that spectrum you have the people that are
like doing it irresponsibly and you also want to basically put those out of the system and that's
what the regulation needs to basically target you mentioned insider trading um i i believe that
just in the elections related markets you've already suspended six 2026 candidates for the
for improperly betting on their own races.
There have been some other very high profile cases
of insider trading, the teleprompter guy,
the Trump teleprompter guy, just as an example.
- George Santos.
- George Santos as well.
- That guy's a moron, it's unbelievable.
He loves committing fraud, it's like his thing.
- How do you go about detecting insider trading?
Because I imagine that in the George Santos case,
maybe it was relatively easy if he was doing it
under his own name, but maybe somebody has a cousin,
maybe the cousin of the teleprompter guy,
it seems very difficult, unlike in some of these
other competitions that you were talking about
with sports and things like that.
- For politics and yeah.
- Well, for politics or any of these other markets
where it really would be an unfair playing field.
- That's right.
- If there is somebody who has insider information
at the heart of what the bet is, or even worse,
you might have some moral hazard problems, right?
Where they can effectuate
the outcome that they are betting on,
they can set the wildfire or what have you.
So can you talk a little bit about how you try to prevent it
or how you detect it, insider trading, ex post?
- Yeah, I mean, a few things.
Let me address some moral hazard because I think
it's a bit easier and then I'll get to insider trading.
So we, there's a bunch of regs that ban essentially markets
that present moral hazards, like violence, war, terrorism,
assassinations, et cetera, like those have never been listed,
including wildfires, we've never listed wildfires.
Those have been listed offshore.
So on British markets that are unregulated that run offshore.
And that's one of the challenges that we've had.
And, you know, and I always say this,
and I say this pretty publicly at this point,
like I like competition.
I love competing with Robinhood and Coinbase.
Now Goldman is entering the space.
There's so many, competition is good.
An industry doesn't really become an industry
without competition.
I mean, the things that I've always struggled with
a little bit with some, one of our big competitors,
PolyMarket is I think we have principle,
like principles differences.
I think they went offshore, did unregulated.
And then the results show, they listed some of these missile strike markets,
etc., they've really infuriated people for good reason. They infuriate me too. They're bad markets
that shouldn't exist because they present moral hazards. So really the line there is like, you
know, there are regs that ban them, like, and, you know, we shouldn't allow any operators to do these
types of things. And if there are certain markets that are on the line, my view is we should be
conservative and not let them happen. Now, insider trading is a more interesting issue. And I always
go back to, you know, initially when the beginning of the year, when the first insider trading case,
which is the famous Maduro trade happened, you know, there was a bit of a debate in the industry.
Like we came out very strongly, say we've, you know, we spent the first four years building
systems to ban insider trading, and we're very against insider. And some of the industry players
who've now come around initially were saying, well, actually, no, we should let insider trading
happen because it makes market prices more efficient. Like if you let insiders trade on the
information that they have, it should, in theory, make the market price more efficient. And
it's a completely moronic take, basically, because like, you know, there's sure theoretically that
would happen, but what would happen if you let corruption go rampant in a supposedly free
and fair competition? People stop believing it's fair. And what happens if people stop believing
it's fair? They stop participating. The thing breaks. People stop using it. And that's why it's
been in the stock market, it's been in traditional markets, it's been in prediction markets.
There's a few layers. I mean, one is we verify all customers. So when you're on board to Kalshi,
we take your name, social security. Number two is we send it to a bunch of vendors that usually the
banks use. So after the Banking Secrecy Act was enacted, banks have a duty, the same way as a
regulated exchange like us, we have a duty to figure out how much money they're going to spend.
We have a duty to figure out who we're transacting for, who we're moving money for, so who the
customers are. And then you can cross-vite it against a bunch of lists. So FEC reports,
politically exposed people, their families, their close families. And there's all sorts of lists now
also with sports leagues. Now we just announced a partnership with the NBA. The core tenet of that
partnership is they share data with us about who may be an insider in the league so we can ban them
from trading. And then we ban all these people from trading on things that they proactively,
we proactively ban them on things that they might have an insider information or influence over.
That ban is actually a self-regulation. That's not currently law. We're pushing for this to be law.
I'm strongly advocating for this to become law. But what's law is also after the trade, like post
the fact, which we had discussed last time. After a trade happens, the thing that's interesting with
fraud is there's always something suspicious. Somebody all of a sudden is buying in larger size
something that's an asymmetric long shot or other things. And then that goes to an investigation team
that can impose fines all the way to criminal prosecution. And the way to really combat crime or bad actors is you catch
them. And when you catch them, you have to enforce heavy consequences. And that, you know, that's like
true for any financial crime or any crime really on the street. And so that the next person that
considers doing it is going to reconsider it because of how bad it would be for them to get
caught. Now, here's the thing I'll say about prediction markets. I'm sure a lot of you have
seen, especially the young people in the room, you know, the meme about the plane from World War II
around survivorship bias, where like, you know, the plane was shot in certain places and we make,
you know, we make the completely wrong conclusion about where we should shoot the plane or not shoot
the plane. Like, I think it's a bit what's happening in prediction markets. Like, and the thing is
prediction markets are incredibly transparent. All the trading activity is public. You see it.
Everybody sees it. You can go to cashflow.com right now, click on, you know, Texas Senate race or any
race or whatever you want to click on. And you see all the trading activity publicly available as a
log for anyone, which is not really true for traditional markets. You cannot easily, the reporters
and press and general public and our customers cannot see it so publicly. And so it's interesting
because there's more.
Basically, the TLDR is there's way more trading happening in the stock market. We're just catching
way less of it. Whereas in prediction markets, we're just actually catching much more of it
because it's so blatant. It's right there for everybody to see when somebody, you know, is
moving the price from 10% to 25%. Well, everybody, you know, starts freaking out about what happened.
And that's a good thing because then we can go and police it. And I think that's a bit of that
dynamic happening. But over time, society will, I mean, the candidates now know it's like, well,
if I'm going to do something on my campaign and I get caught, it's pretty much going to ruin my
campaign. So I'm not going to do it. Well, I was going to ask you about a study
actually that from Bloomberg that looked at how much it takes to move one of these prediction
markets in a midterms race, because these are generally relatively thinly traded races.
So Bellwether, an online tool built by a Stanford grad school of business, grad school of business,
rather, research lab monitors how much money it would take to meaningfully move political markets
on prediction market platforms. A single bet of less than $100,000 could move 99%
of the 15,000 U.S. midterm election markets.
That's right. $100,000 could move 99%.
That's not true. There's no way that's true.
That they tried.
I didn't even look at the research. I can tell you right now it's not true.
By at least five percentage points.
I mean, people can put out all sorts of shit. I mean, you know, like, I'm sorry for the, I mean,
it's, you know, I just, I mean, you know, it's like the polls from Wedgwood. Oh, I think, you
know, this candidate is like up 17% and like the two dudes were just fabricating fake data. I mean,
you know, tell them they should move the market. They should put money on it then.
We should ask them. Do they have confidence?
Do they have enough conviction to put money on it? I mean, I don't know. I don't know what to tell
you. I mean, it's not true. If somebody put a million and a half dollars on the LA mayor race,
you can all go publicly see it. I don't know if it's in the pack, but we can, you know,
if anyone, tarik.cashier.com asked me about that, I'll send you all the information. They put a
million and a half dollars on the LA mayor race and they moved the price from, I think it was
something like 25% to 40%. They were trying to artificially manipulate public perception on
what people perceive Spencer Pratt's odds of winning are. Guess how much, how long,
the price stayed at 40% for? Nine seconds. It went to 40 and then the smart people,
the traders that have incentive to make money on these things. This incentive is so clean,
transparent. They're like, well, something is off here. Certainly it's not 40%. They traded
it back all the way to 25%. So what happened to the $1.5 million? They just lost their money.
It's completely stupid. They should have actually commissioned a bunch of polls,
which by the way, they probably did to say that Spencer Pratt is crushing it in that election,
or bought a bunch of AI videos to, you know, promote a bunch of misinformation on TikTok
and Instagram. So, so which they also probably did like, you know, the, the, I mean, if you're
a campaign candidate right now and you're not doing that, you're, what are you doing? Like,
this is what everybody is doing. You do attack ads. I mean, you know, campaign one-on-one,
you set up a campaign, put a million dollars into like creating a bunch of fake, you know,
cool AI videos that makes your opponent look very, very bad. Say a bunch of inflammatory
things and you start ripping them. I mean, that's left and right. That's politics pretty much.
And so my point is like, sure. Could people move prediction markets? Certainly. That's
right. But we have to put them in context of everything else that we're dealing with. I mean,
how much, how much money did it take for these two dudes to fake the Wedgwood poll?
Zero. They're just coming up with numbers. They literally like wrote number on a spreadsheet and
they sent it to a bunch of mainstream media and they were being reported left and right.
And then people were like, why do people not trust the polls? I mean, why, why would they? I mean,
you know, I mean, we, we, maybe we are, maybe I should do that experiment, like fake a bunch of
polls and then also release it. But like, my point is like markets have, are not going to be perfect
now. If you look at them at, look at a bunch of studies that have shown how calibrated they are,
it's like, they do work. When we say something has 20% chance of happening, it does happen two
in 10 times. Some markets are going to be more public, more, have more volume than others. The
same way that, you know, Tesla stock has much more volume, is more efficient than a Russell 2000
biotech stock. And that's all publicly available on CalSheet. Maybe this is the most important
takeaway here is everything is public. The methodology is public. The incentive is public.
And once something is low volume, it's also public. And I tell customers, if someone's
saying something is like $5,000 of volume versus $5 million of volume, you should treat it
differently. One of them has, is more efficient market than the other one. None of that is true
for polls. None of that is true for how the black box algorithms on social media are feeding
information or not feeding us information. That is certainly not true. Like none of it is true
for all these other sources of information that somehow are held to a much lower standard,
right? Like if a poll is basically a sample of like a completely missampled versus not
missampled, do we even know? Is there some, any public audits about how the poll was done
and so on and so forth? There isn't. And I think that the fact that we can be asked that question,
I think is a good thing. I actually think this is why these markets are so important
is because all it's bringing more transparency to the entire process.
Have you thought about how you will adjudicate some of the election outcomes, given that there
is likely to be a lot of contesting of election outcomes? I mean, who wins in Alaska if the
Department of Justice decides to try to overturn the results of the election?
So this is a question that markets have always had an issue with. So I'll give an example and I'll
get to the election because elections are actually surprisingly interesting. Like you would think
it's just like a, you know, yes, no. And so back in the day when CME, the Chicago Board of Trade
listed butter futures, you know, they said, okay, we're going to list the futures on the price of
butter. They would get to settlement and then all the, you know, the butter farmers and the traders
and speculators, they would all like, it was civil war. They would all start fighting because they're
like, no, no, no, no. Like this type of milk should count as butter. And then, you know, this
cheese is actually kind of buttery. So like it should be in the buttery definition. And so how
they actually handle it, they like, they realize what these markets are. The reason we call them
event contracts is they're a legal contract. They were like, okay, we're going to set it.
Like what you're buying is a contract. There's a swap that pays based on these specific legal,
like legally defined characteristics. So if you look at any of our markets and you like,
you know, control F view rules, you'll see the full rules. It's a long PDF. It's like
three pages of legalese that explains exactly upfront to the marketplace. What exactly does
that mean for us to say this straight up Hormuz is going to open? Like, what does that actually mean?
And it's usually a very specific definition of like, okay, the seven day average of amount of
cargo is X, Y, and Z reported by these different agencies. Elections are interesting. So in the
24 election, what we've done, so for the elections, we're very careful. We've got,
we basically get election lawyers, like election integrity lawyers that essentially help us with
the definition of, okay, what is the, like the, the, the moment where, you know, the election is done,
and a way that essentially is non-partisan
and is defined upfront to the entire public.
can see and agree to up front.
So we're 24.
What we've realized is the only way to really determine,
like fully determine and settle an election
is January 20th.
So it's basically whoever gets sworn in
as the next president of the United States.
Because actually, I didn't know this,
but actually even after a Congress cert,
there could be a bunch of different things
that could happen, including a SCOTUS overruling
a Congress certification and so on and so forth.
And that's basically, I think, the standard we do.
I don't know how we're doing every single one
of our midterm markets,
but there's a team up front that defines these rules
and a team of external counsel that essentially vets them
to make sure that once the settlement is done,
that's basically who won the election.
And I mean, we don't want to be in a business
of calling an election or deciding what the outcome is.
We want to be in the business of like,
once the outcome is decided,
however it gets decided,
and that's a whole different issue
that society has to deal with,
we are there to settle it, basically.
The same way as the butter.
We don't have strong views about what butter is or isn't.
We'll just be there to settle it as long as we agree.
What the final definition of butter is.
I should go and look up
how many Kalshi markets relate to butter.
We don't have that yet.
No?
It's a touchy subject.
Touchy subject, okay, fair enough.
We also don't have onions.
You can explain why.
Because this goes back to the market manipulation question,
which is, this is the prime example
of how we really kind of get to unsound policy sometimes
when there's a time of crisis.
Which unfortunately, we often do policy
as a reaction to a crisis
instead of just being thoughtful.
And proactive about enacting policy
that makes sense and is down the middle.
But in 55, 1955, there's two guys
that manipulated the onion markets
by basically buying up pretty much
most of the onion supply
and doing what we call a short squeeze.
So they put a big short and then they tanked,
they sold all the onions at the same time
to tank the prices down
and make a lot of money on their short, on the futures.
A bunch of people went bankrupt.
It was really bad.
So Congress, at the time, was like,
well, obviously the issue is onions, not humans.
And so we will ban.
We will ban onions.
We will ban onion futures.
The Onion Act of 55.
And, you know, it's just such an interesting use case
of like, you know, yeah, obviously, I mean,
manipulation is only endemic to onions.
You cannot possibly manipulate tomato futures
or corn futures.
I mean, that's impossible.
But it's one of those interesting things.
And you see there's a real practical impact now
because onions are one of the most volatile commodities.
They're a very volatile vegetable
because there is no future market
to dampen that volatility,
to help farmers reduce their risk
and predict how much they're going to sell for.
So.
Supply ends up being kind of volatile.
And the market is, it's actually more volatile than oil,
which is one of the most volatile commodities out there.
And so, you know, after we deal with the prediction market issue,
my next thing will be to repeal the Onion Act,
which must be done.
Also, movie box office returns, right?
That those are, you also can't offer prediction markets in those.
You can't do futures on box office returns.
Can I talk about that one?
It's pretty fun.
Briefly, sure, sure.
Okay, I'll do it fast.
But it's just these interesting use cases in the law,
which don't make, but at the time,
there was an exchange we wanted to do box office futures.
And the reason why those,
those futures were great is because right now,
you know, like movie production is basically a few big,
it's a monopolistic, you know,
it's a few big studio companies that like have all the resources,
all the investment, and they can basically produce movies.
What's hard for basically a bunch of the smaller studios
is to get lines of credit to basically get going.
And so the reason to build a futures market for it is basically
if you can predict ahead of time that a market was going to be kind of successful,
it can help you basically get more predictability in the future.
So you can get higher credit worthiness and like raise loans,
raise money, and basically let the smaller players,
basically get, you know, get more, more, more competitive and more dynamic.
It was actually gonna, they started to go around and last minute and not Frank,
a small line got introduced out of nowhere,
which was like banned box office futures.
Guess who was introduced by the lobbying coalition for the three big box office
companies. And really the two reasons was like,
they didn't want to prop up more competition because if there's open price
discoveries, there's more transparency on who's going to do well,
which moves are going to do well or not.
It might be an equalizer of where capital goes.
And the second hidden reason,
which after a while it came around,
they didn't want to have a good forecast of whether a movie gonna do well or not
ahead of time,
because usually they get three or four weeks of back box office sales before
people realize that a movie was pretty bad.
And so if you have more transparency in that system,
it would kind of hurt their bottom line.
And so sometimes a lot of people don't also like these markets.
And we think we've seen this a little bit with the casinos now,
like they don't like the idea that there's an open market that is pricing these
sports events so transparently because it kind of hurts their ability to screw
their customers.
Um, and so there's a little bit of that going on.
So maybe that one is.
So let, let, let's talk about some of that litigation.
Um, you have faced lawsuits and I think about 20 states trying to restrict or
ban, but we're the ones that suing in most of them.
You're suing in most of them, um, because they're trying to regulate you.
No, it's not exactly right because they're trying to like to us.
So we see them first.
Okay.
Okay.
Fair enough.
Um, as I understand it so far, appeals courts have issued, it's not a
regulatory.
Well, they've issued conflicting rulings.
Do you think that there is any legitimate state interest in regulating
products that look and feel like sports?
Not, not exactly the frame the right way.
So, so I don't have my phone now.
It's just turned off by battery, but you know,
recently I've been really obsessed with this court opinion.
There's a court opinion that goes, you know, we believe I don't have the exact
language, the thing I read to you last time.
So, so we believe that, uh, dealing in these types of markets is void by the
common law.
Because it is contrary to public policy.
It is not only contrary to public policy.
It is a crime against the state of Christ crime against, um, uh, the
country, a crime crime against humanity.
And they go on and on about how the species of gambling is the
preeminent sin.
And it's emphatically the worst thing that's happening to society.
That's an opinion about, uh, from 1888 about grain futures.
It's like amazing.
Like it's the States were suing the Chicago board of trade because some
farmers are betting on the price of grain.
They're gambling the price of grain.
Some of them were losing their house, which was bad.
And.
States were like, well, this is gambling.
It's the same thing as people, you know, betting on the bucket shops,
which was the original version of the casinos and the sports books at the time.
And, you know, that whole thing played out, but a bunch of States,
there were like 20, 30 States that's through the Chicago board of trade.
And it went up to the Supreme court.
And, and then, you know, we, we handled it with the commodities exchange act,
which came in 74, which is like, okay, yes, there is gambling, speculating,
trading, whatever you want to call it in all financial markets.
If the line is, if anyone is gonna use a certain market to gamble, then, you know,
we, the NASDAQ should be state by state regulated.
Like, and, and there's an argument to be made for that because there are people
that lose their shirts, gambling on options markets.
It's true.
And so how do we draw a line?
The line is, goes back to, is it a market or are you betting against the house?
Because the house incentives are to basically ban out the winners and screw the losers.
The market's incentive is to promote price discovery and open market that can produce
the public goods of the price forecast, which says gives farmers predictability about the future.
The same way the prediction markets give us predictability about a bunch of different things.
And risk management.
There are some speculators on one side and hedgers on the other side.
And the reason why a market needs to be regulated, there's a reason why it needs to be
regulated at the federal level, is because of liquidity.
Like when you want to buy something, you mentioned the piece of some state, state races have
low volume or low liquidity.
Why?
Because I'm not taking the other side.
Every time, if you're on one side of the market, you have to be on the other side of that market.
And so at the time it's a little bit like they were thinking about, well, well, we have two
options.
Either let New York Stock Exchange be a nationwide market with nationwide rules, where the rules
of who is an insider in California are the same as New York.
So that when I matched the two of you abiding by the same rules in the competition, and
then we enable liquidity so you can trade against someone in Texas, someone in Texas
can trade against someone in California, against Hawaii.
Like that global liquidity, that diversity of trades is critical for an open market.
Or the alternative is imagine we bifurcated the New York Stock Exchange to 50 state New
York stock exchanges, like 50 national stock exchanges, where you can only buy Apple stock
in Oregon from someone who's in Oregon.
What would happen?
You can't buy the Apple stock.
It wouldn't work.
It would bifurcate liquidity, make markets inefficient.
It's a very anti-free market.
It's a very anti-free market's way to approach things.
It would just not work.
And so the message is always like, it's not about cash not wanting to be regulated.
We spent the first four years proactively getting regulated when our main competitor
became the Uber of the space, Polymarket.
Two years ago, you didn't even know who we were.
I've always been very pro-regulation.
I want regulation.
And if there's a delta with the states, I always tell them how the marketing is being
done, et cetera.
Let's have that conversation.
We're open to it.
If you want to tax it, certainly you can tax it.
It's more about whether we want this market to live as a market onshore, or we want to
drive it offshore to give yet another monopoly to the casinos.
That's really important.
That's really the fundamental question that's going on here.
And I like to choose the free open market competition, which is what America has chosen
historically.
So these lawsuits are over the sports betting in particular?
Some of them.
No, a lot of them are actually about the whole thing.
OK.
Well, the reason I-
New York is about the whole thing.
Utah is, I think, a whole swath of events.
I don't mean-
Some people think-
The point is, again, where's the line?
Where's the limiting principle that you're drawing?
The topics can change, but the structure is exactly the same, right?
Elections, economics, interest rates, the whole thing is the same.
So no, I think there's a bunch of these lawsuits that are a much broader set of things, basically.
Well, the reason I ask about sports is that it does seem like that is at least one common
denominator among the different lawsuits.
And as I understand it, sports bets made up something like 95% of your revenue a year
ago, and now it's closer to 60%, 65%, somewhere around there.
So what happens?
What happens if you give a monopoly to a sports book model?
I mean, just worst case scenario, you're going to lose a lot of money.
You're going to lose a lot of money.
for the customers like the winners that are getting banned from sportsbooks are
They're basically using prediction markets right now, should have a place to go, and they cannot do it on a sportsbook.
It's just, like, terrible.
But, like, you know, we have, I mean, our fastest growing, actually, businesses are not sports.
It's, you know, the commonly thing that what people believe to be fastest growing is actually not also crypto.
It's actually commodities.
And, like, we're just entering single stocks.
Like, we're a very diversified company now, and we have 30 million customers, which is really large.
Like, we're basically one of the largest fintech, if not, I mean, top two fintech sort of brokerages in America today.
So we're very excited about the direction of travel.
We're entering into compute futures.
We have a few announcements coming.
We just announced our S&P partnership this morning or last morning.
Everything is hazy these days.
But, like, which we're very excited about because we're going to be developing a bunch of indices.
Like, imagine the S&P for politics, the S&P for sports, the S&P for economics, for all these different areas of the economy that are essentially becoming increasing larger industries.
But to summarize all of that, like, you know, the law is on our side.
The law is very clear.
And the pro-social utilities of prediction markets are very clear.
And, you know, we're going to be developing a bunch of indices.
And we feel pretty good about our court standing.
Speaking also about the regulatory risk and how states are approaching all of this,
Kalshi announced on January 13th of 2025, shortly before Trump's inauguration, that Trump's son, Don Jr., was going to be joining as a strategic advisor.
Reports at the time indicated that he was being given something like $300,000 worth of equity in the company.
And the press release said that he was going to be joining as a strategic advisor.
Reports at the time cited his, quote, extensive business experience and influence.
Don Jr. brings a fresh perspective to Kalshi as we continue to push prediction markets into the mainstream, unquote.
Since then, Don Jr. has been reported to have told Republican state attorneys general to back off investigations in prediction markets at a closed-door event in March.
Do you understand why, at the very least, the perception of this relationship with the president?
The president's son and his relationship with his own father, with other states, suggests favor trading on the part of Kalshi.
Yeah, I mean, we totally understand the optics issue.
I mean, there's no question about it.
And we keep getting asked that question over and over.
The press loves that question, you know.
And I always think, like, why are we not talking about the pro-prediction markets?
What is interesting about prediction markets over. I've answered this question a million times.
You can find a million clips of me online with a bunch of hate comments about it.
Like, I'll tell you the same thing right now.
But it's interesting.
I didn't even know about this Republican. Then why are we talking about this Republican?
Why are we being sued by Republican attorney generals?
Like, if that worked, then, like, what's happening?
I mean, so look, we've never done anything on the regulatory front.
And we've never done anything on the policy front.
It was made up front, very clear at the beginning.
And it's still very clear.
We've never done anything.
And, you know, whatever happens, happens.
It's going to surface that basically nothing in that regard has ever been done.
The interesting thing about it is actually it was announced in January, but we had actually done it before the election.
It was not a political decision.
It was never a political decision.
Because at the time, there was still a 50%, 55% chance that Harris would have won that election.
So we were a company that was. 20 people.
And then people. You know, now we're very big.
So people look at us as some sort of big industrial, you know, like, establishment company, big company.
Be scared of it.
But, like, you know, I'm a random guy that grew up in Lebanon, single mom, volatility, crazy life.
I go to MIT, love math, love markets.
I went through four, five, six years slug.
Anyone who's built a company or started a company at some point, those three, four years of early building,
they're the most excruciating, painful experience anyone can go through.
And I'm telling you, building a high. Like, what should hopefully become a high-growth tech company is one of the hardest things you can ever do.
And I really believe in prediction markets.
I believe in this so much that I staked my entire career and took all the risks, even though I'm a risk-averse guy.
Like, Luana is a risk-loving one.
I'm a paranoid person.
Like, I think about risk all day.
And we got to a place in 24 where literally it's been six years of building things and no one cared about prediction markets.
It was like a niche corner of the internet, which is a bunch of weirdos.
Like, maybe if I probe this room, there'll be, like, two dudes in this room that had heard of prediction markets in 23.
Like, and no one else.
And those two dudes, sorry, you're probably internet weirdos.
Like, and, you know, like, I mean, it's, I mean, that is the people that like prediction markets at the time.
And so you get a place, how do you get the word out?
And you had Don, who was a public figure, that loved them.
He did.
And it was amazing.
And, like, he had 10 million followers on Twitter.
And the deal was, like, he helped us promote the message and he helped us get it out there.
And we did this with Republicans and we did this with Democrats.
If you look at our Twitter affiliates, people love to cover.
We have hundreds of Republican affiliates and hundreds of Democratic affiliates.
And yet that announcement happened and people flew with it.
And, like, that was a narrative that was. It was basically set.
And it was never a political decision.
It still isn't.
And we also have a lot of advisors on the Democratic front.
People just don't like to talk about them.
I'm guessing next year they will talk about them because, like, you know,
Cal, she hired a Democratic advisor because Congress flipped, et cetera,
even though we had them for two years.
And, oh, my God, you know, evil corporation, big, bad, everybody freak out.
I mean, I don't think it's unusual for companies to hedge their risk
by developing relationships with Republicans and Democrats.
It's still a political relationship.
Certainly, but it's interesting to me.
It's like. That one specific. Frankly, we do hire lobbyists.
We have infinite number of lobbyists at this point, right?
That is just not one of them.
This is not one of people that. And you will. I mean, when all the things surface, you will see that it was not one of them.
But what's interesting to me is, like, I see all these reports about, like,
Cal, she gave to whatever.
I wouldn't even know about it.
$7,000 to candidate in X, Y, and Z.
And there's a big article about it.
And it's a little interesting to me because it's like,
how much have the casinos given in the last 20 years?
Like, what game am I supposed to be playing?
I didn't set the rules of the game.
Like, if it were up to me, like, you know, I would just say, like,
I don't know, all this political giving should not be allowed.
I don't know.
This is not my game.
I think, you know, what you. I walked into the thing.
The politicians were freaking out early this year about things that we didn't even do.
Like, it was Cal Shane Polymarketing.
And the Polymarketing would do every single one of these things.
Where they shat the bed, it was them.
And I basically, you know, came to clean up the shit.
And, like, I mean, it's true.
I'm so sorry.
I know we're the New York Economic Club.
And I didn't come with a T-shirt.
But, like, you know.
But my point is, like, the casinos have been playing this game forever.
And I realized, oh, God.
Like, you know, this is a thing that we have to get better at.
You have to build a public affairs function and a comms function.
Explain who you are.
And be able to walk in the door and explain who you are.
And once I walk into a door, like I am right now, and explain who I am,
people understand that, actually, there is a lot of benefits to this market.
This person is actually pro-sensible regulations.
And that's basically what lobbying is about, you know.
But I don't see any articles about the casino giving, which I'll tell you right now.
It's way bigger than anything Cal Shane has ever done.
You know, those guys are very good at the political.
The lobbying game.
And they'll always be very good at it.
We're just, you know, getting a little bit better.
I think we have time for a few questions.
And we have some mics floating around as well.
Back there.
Hey, Tarek.
So, I'm curious, like, what's your take on perpetual futures?
I think that's, like, another business line that you guys are expanding.
It's another one we're getting sued over.
But it tells you what it is.
I mean, this is interesting, right?
Like, so the CME sued over perpetual futures, right?
And some, I don't know, they want to label them as future or swaps.
It's some small technical thing that doesn't really matter.
But, like, and it's interesting because, so what are perpetual futures?
Perpetual futures are basically futures.
They're the same thing as the future.
But unlike futures, they don't expire.
You know, they don't have a set calendar when you have to naturally close your position.
Now, futures expire because historically,
like, let's say, you know, you wanted to, like, set up pork belly futures or cattle futures.
There's a natural point where you're going to deliver the physical good.
There was a natural place where, you know, it made sense to deliver the thing.
And so that's how the market structure evolved.
And it evolved to things that don't have a natural expiry, like crypto or, I would say, oil or stocks, single stocks or others.
And the concept of perpetual is actually, we didn't invent it.
It was from the 90s.
Schiller used to talk a lot about perpetuals, about the idea that you should have futures markets that don't expire on a variety of different things.
And I think it's just more elegant because, you know, right now, if you want to take a position that's six months long on oil or crypto, let's say, Bitcoin,
you have to use, like, let's say, CME or other futures where you have to open it and close it every month.
So you open and then you do close and then open again, which you call a rollover.
And then you pay fees at every rollover.
So it's a very inefficient mechanism.
With a PERP, same amount of leverage, same amount of risk, same regulation, same methodology.
Everything is the same.
You can just open it and then close it in six months and you just pay fees at open.
And then close instead of paying fees six times.
Why does CME and some of the, you know, big monopolistic exchanges like it, dislike it, is because, well, guess what?
Rollover fees is like 20, 25 percent of their revenue.
And now that there's an alternative where you don't have to pay rollover fees, what happens to that revenue?
It's going to get squeezed.
That's usually the constant talk, you know, push and pull.
It's like the innovator and the people that are pushing the boundary are going to have to push.
And then the incumbents are going to figure out ways to protect their turf.
And I feel pretty good about PERPs, though.
That's my, maybe, if you ask me how I felt about them, I felt pretty good about them.
There's a microphone over here.
Hi, thank you so much for joining us today.
I just had a question about what do you think makes a good target prediction market?
And what makes, like, a market just linger around the five-figure level to compare to the ones that are multi-million dollar ones?
Like, what have you seen drive that?
See, this is the fun stuff.
Let's get into it.
I mean, like, the, here's, okay.
Prediction markets, what they do is they aggregate information that doesn't sit in a committee, right?
Like, when Hayek was talking about information markets back in the 40s,
he was, the idea was really, like, okay, you know, we have a table.
You're the board.
And you make some big decision that's going to impact millions of people.
Like, you need information that is actually coming from the millions of people that you're impacting.
How do we do it?
Market price is a very good aggregator of information.
They do a very good job at essentially incentivizing people to have a good piece of information to come out in the open.
And so prediction markets, like any financial markets, do a very good job when there's a lot of disaggregated, dispersed information
that's sitting with the corners, with some person in Hawaii, some person in China.
some person in California, some person in Texas,
some person in New York,
and they aggregate all that information.
So the places where prediction markets, I think, over time struggle a little bit more are places where that's not quite true.
And so, you know, the first version of prediction market, some of you may know this, is the Pope elections back in the 1400s in Rome.
But that's interestingly, in my view, one of the bad versions of prediction markets because there's not really information outside of the, I don't know, 14, 15 cardinals that walk into the room and make the decision.
And so that's been, you know, always a kind of an interesting concept for it.
The other one is interesting because I think, like, I think what's great about CalShoot right now is because we've onboarded so many customers from elections, from sports, from crypto,
we can build much more liquidity and all the other questions are more and more interesting over time.
So one of the things I want to release soon is markets on job displacement from AI.
Imagine the types of questions we can start answering.
So instead of listening to the rhetoric that's partisan and biased and, you know, agenda-driven from both sides, okay, AI is not going to do anything to jobs.
AI is going to kill all jobs.
How about we do a market with real skin in the game where millions of Americans are telling us what they actually think?
And we can then use that to inform better and better policy.
And I feel like CalShoot is finally at the point where we have enough customers, enough liquidity to basically get those questions answered.
So the things that would historically have basically no volume or very little volume.
My question is, most recently you raised the Sirius F funding.
Is there anything, the IPO is coming up in the near future or you're waiting for all the court cases to be, you win, then you go for the IPO?
As much as I'd like to answer.
That's a good question.
You know, my comms team would kill me if I commented on the IPO.
So that's my answer.
Right here.
I would answer if it was just up to me.
You know, a year ago, if you asked me, I would have answered it.
But, you know, this is why, you know, people talk about Don Jr. all day.
Is there a prediction market bet on when you IPO?
Now I have a comms team that tells me no and, you know, people might freak out about this one.
So, thank you.
I wanted to come back to this topic of, you know, like how even or uneven the winners are.
And the competition on Kalshi and Catherine, you brought up the Wall Street Journal article.
And I think that talked about Polymarket, but it said on Polymarket, at least they were able to evaluate or analyze that 67% of the profits were earned by 1/10 of 1% of the accounts.
And I'm curious if that's, is that like another one of these things that like makes Polymarket different from Kalshi or do you see something similar?
And then just a related aspect of the question.
You know, do.
Kind of larger market makers, people put up a lot of markets, trade a lot of volume.
Do they, do they get different terms from, from Kalshi?
Yeah.
So, so that's a great question.
So the numbers are not as, it's not, I don't know.
I don't know how that study was run, honestly.
Like the numbers are not correct.
Like it's not that tilted, but it's tilted.
I mean, you know, it's still like, again, I mean, if you really do an analysis on like the distribution of profits in the options market, like what percentage of profits is just Citadel alone?
Like when Citadel is trading against Robinhood options traders, like what percent of profit is Citadel?
It's massive.
It's basically pretty much everything they paid to Robinhood every year for the PFOF.
Right.
But the principle that you upheld, which is interesting, this is, I think what, like the market maker piece, the principles I've upheld at Kalshi in terms of the market structure is what the traditional commodities have.
And I think over time, stock markets have less and less of, which is a completely free and fair and open market.
Everyone has the same rights and same obligations.
And there's some liquidity programs that we run, which, but they're publicly available for anyone.
So anyone can access them and get the certain rights.
But they have to abide by certain obligations so that, for example, OK, you are going to get, let's say, a small rebate on your fees that you're paying.
So you don't have to pay the full fee, but you're going to have to be available two sided at all points in time, even when it's uncomfortable for you and you may lose money doing it.
And that's how these market making programs.
So that's to boost up liquidity in certain places.
The most interesting thing about Kalshi, so the institutional market makers that people think about as like Wall Street, like the big names that you would know, are actually a much smaller percentage of profits.
And liquidity and volume than people think.
The biggest people, the people that are really winning in prediction markets are basically the average people.
And I go back to the to the mental model of the two dudes from the that were in their mom's garage in the big short.
Those it's like the new Wall Street.
That's what excites me so much, because these people, when you ask them, do you trade in financial markets?
Like, no, because I don't have an edge, but they have an edge in politics.
They have an edge on sports. They have an edge in weather.
They have, you know, there was a recent piece of paper that said that weather markets are 10 percent more accurate than the national average.
Of weather stations.
And it's because, you know, you talk to these people, it's like this one guy, he's public about it, so I can talk about it, Scott Supak.
He's one of the examples.
He has now a team of 10, 15 people.
He got into prediction markets historically because he would get onto Twitter fights with climate deniers, climate change deniers, and get so pissed that he'd be like, put some money on it.
And he found prediction markets, like, OK, you come to prediction markets, we're going to put some money on it.
You're not just going to sit on.
And if he was right, you know, he would punish them by making them lose money.
And he's so into it.
And this guy, like, scrapes satellite data, has all sorts of meteorologist, meteorology models.
I mean, he's very, you know.
But that's not, like, the traditional institutions, people that, like, anyone can actually put the effort and get good at it.
That's the whole point.
Now, not everybody does, like, everything in life, right?
But that's the key point, is that there's no structural advantage or anything like that for the financial, like, financial guys.
And that's why they're not the top performers.
They just aren't.
That's a great question.
Over here.
Or maybe there's one.
Hi, thanks.
So you guys are doing, like, north of $3 billion.
There's a volume on certain days recently.
I mean, obviously, you mentioned already a lot of that's being driven by sports, a lot by combos.
Crystal ball, you know, five years from now, what is the single largest, like, type of contract that Kalshi's trading?
And if it's perps, what kind of perps?
I don't know for sure, but my feeling is compute futures right now.
I think it's going to be very big.
And we're announcing something big on that soon.
Because, you know, the way to think about it is, like, derivatives markets get big, whether it's true for, like, grain, oil, sports, politics, when the underlying gets pretty big.
Like, when the underlying, there's enough moving in the underlying, then so you get a derivative market that ends up basically, you know, laying on top of the underlying.
And generally speaking, it varies.
So the FX derivatives are 2x the FX market.
That's at the very least.
But usually there's some market structure.
There are some market structure reasons that make the derivatives smaller.
On average, it's like 5 to 10x basically bigger than the spot.
So if it's true that we're going to spend, like, a trillion dollars on computing in the next year or two, I mean, you're talking about a 5 to trillion dollar market for derivatives.
So I think we want to win that.
I'm pretty excited about that.
And so, you know, I don't know if it's going to end up being, if they materialize.
But if they materialize, I feel pretty good about our ability to win there.
And I'm very, very, and it'll end up being, I think, the biggest.
I think we have time for one more question.
Is the reason you didn't have a shirt today because you lost it in the prediction markets?
I wish I could trade in the prediction markets.
No.
That wasn't my question.
Could you talk a little bit about your fee structure of the sportsbooks versus Kalshi?
So say, you know, you want to make a traditional sportsbook at 1, -1.10, 4.5%.
How would that same bet price out on Kalshi?
So it depends on like, I mean, so we, we take a fee.
So it's different.
So the sportsbook.
So the sportsbook is a little bit different.
And if you're winning, you get kicked out.
And if you keep losing, they keep betting against you.
And the way that they optimize their revenues over time is find the losers and the people that are most highest propensity to lose and keep bringing them back with promos.
They figure out that you will lose $1,000 a week if they give you, the minimum they have to give you is $175.67 per week.
They have a bunch of algorithms that are very smart to bring you back.
So that's why you have so much promo and bonusing and all that stuff.
For OptiMe, I think that's the stuff that really needs to be banned
because that's, I think, the worst part of how to promote addiction
because you find someone that has a propensity for addiction
and you give them more and more candy.
And that's how you make money long-term.
And then there's a spread, yes, but the key thing you need to understand,
people think of it as a spread,
but the winners are getting rooted out of the system.
That's the key thing.
You figure out how to move the car counters out and get the best customers,
and that's the customers that you try to extract as much as possible from.
We don't have, like, we don't have them.
They are trading against each other, and, you know, let's say they transact.
You buy 100 shares from him at $0.50, so $50.
I take 0.7% on average, so I will take basically $0.35 on top of the $50.
And that's a trade, no matter who wins or loses, and that's my fee.
That's basically all the money I will make.
We don't monetize the data.
We don't monetize anything else.
The data is all public for anyone to access.
I don't know how to think in American odds.
I don't even know why American odds exist.
I think they exist to confuse people.
I really do.
I mean, I was a math guy, and every time I had to think about them, I'd get confused again.
I don't know.
I can think in percentages, but, like, which I think how people should think.
But I truly think that American odds were literally invented to confuse the hell out of people.
Because they make it very clear what the spread is, which is, like, insane, you know.
But, yeah.
I don't know.
But we're cheaper.
I mean, yeah.
Please join me in thanking both Tarek and Tevin for being here.
Thanks a lot.
That was good.
Thank you.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Kewpie mayo is a traditional Japanese mayonnaise made solely with egg yolks, offering a rich, umami flavor widely used by chefs and food enthusiasts.
Prediction markets provide more accurate, transparent forecasts than traditional polls by aggregating real-time, bottom-up market data with skin in the game.
Markets like Kalshi enable price discovery through open participation, rewarding informed users and exposing manipulation attempts due to public transparency.
A key distinction between prediction markets and gambling is that they promote research, risk hedging, and public knowledge, not just gambling or loss.
Kalshi has faced scrutiny over its relationship with Donald Trump Jr., but asserts the hiring was based on his influence and not political favor trading.
The platform emphasizes regulation as a tool to protect users from harmful behavior, including addiction and insider trading, while supporting market efficiency.
Historical cases like the Onion Act show how crises lead to ill-considered policies, but modern markets offer better transparency and risk management.
Prediction markets are expanding into areas like politics, economics, and sports, with growing institutional adoption and public trust over time.
Summary:
The conversation explores two main topics: the cultural significance of Kewpie mayo as a rich, egg-yolk-based mayonnaise, and the role of prediction markets in modern forecasting. Kewpie is highlighted as a premium, chef-endorsed mayonnaise with a distinct flavor profile, symbolizing a broader interest in traditional food culture. On the topic of prediction markets, the discussion emphasizes their value over traditional polls by providing real-time, transparent, and data-driven forecasts through public participation.
These markets incentivize rigorous research and reward informed traders, allowing users to hedge risks in politics, sports, and economics. The speaker, Tarik Mansoor of Kalshi, defends the platform’s neutrality, noting that its relationship with Donald Trump Jr. was based on influence, not political favor, and that the hiring decision predated the 2024 election.
Kalshi also stresses the importance of transparency, regulation, and user protection, citing real-world examples like the Onion Act to illustrate how market manipulation can lead to poor policy. Despite legal challenges and state-level lawsuits, the platform argues that prediction markets enhance public understanding, promote price discovery, and serve as vital tools for risk management. The discussion concludes that prediction markets are evolving from niche interest into mainstream, transparent, and impactful tools for understanding complex events—offering greater public insight than traditional media or polls.
FAQs
Kewpie mayo is an OG Japanese mayonnaise made with egg yolks only, giving it a rich umami flavor that elevates dishes. This distinguishes it from other mayonnaises that may use a combination of egg whites and yolks or different ingredients.
Chefs and food lovers use Kewpie mayo for its rich, complex flavor and ability to enhance dishes. Its unique taste and texture make it a popular choice in both professional kitchens and home cooking.
Kalshi and Donald Trump Jr. parted ways after Trump Jr.'s investment firm made a $300 million investment in Kalshi's rival, Polymarket. This raised concerns about favor trading, especially given the political context following the election.
Prediction markets ask participants what they believe will happen, rather than what they want to happen. They provide probabilistic forecasts that reflect real-time market sentiment and are less prone to sampling bias than traditional polls.
Prediction markets are not gambling; they are about price discovery and risk management. They reward participants who conduct thorough research, promoting transparency and better decision-making across sectors like politics and economics.
Participants use prediction markets to hedge against risks, such as political or economic outcomes. The markets provide public, transparent data that allows millions of people to contribute insights, making information more accessible and accurate than traditional sources.
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