“It’s 9,058 Miles To Antalya, We’ve Got A Fraught Negotiation Agenda, Half A COP Presidency, Multilateralism Is On The Ropes, And We’re Wearing Sunglasses.” “Hit it.”

We are in good shape. So we're just going to run through the standard intro. So you'll have to stay quiet because you won't get introed till the end and you two can work out what to do about that. I mean, well, like you could make snarky remarks like that. Yeah, I could just introduce myself at a time of my choosing. You could heckle. This is Let Me Sum Up, your regular deep dive into recent reports on climate and energy. I'm Luke Menzel, recorded today on Gadigal Land in Sydney, and I'm joined today by two co-hosts and one very special guest, Global Vice President for Marketing and Instortion. Let me sum up podcast. Frankie Muscovitch. Hello, Frankie. Good afternoon, folks. I have to say, I'm feeling particularly smug in this moment because I think KPIs on marketing and extortion are about to be met in full. What could you? Dare I say, perhaps succeeded. Possibly be talking about Frankie. I don't know. There could be more extortion though. This is a general access episode. There could always be more extortion, too. It's part of our commitment to public service. Well, if we can keep ourselves to time, maybe we can convince our special guest to stick around for some boco, but then I'm just laughing at myself as I even put us that idea, and there's a familiar laugh in the background. We are also joined by a man who has spent the afternoon trying to work out what we should call the COP Presidency Troika. Now that the threesome is a foursome, Tenet Reid, G'day Tenet. Obviously, it's got to be the quacker. That could be, besides anything else, part of Australia's legacy to the world. And there is a man that is very well placed to take that suggestion on board and provide some rapid-fire feedback. A bloke that has recently added the COP31 President for Negotiations to his Ministerial Responsibilities. It is Australia's Minister for Climate and Energy, Chris Bowen. Hello, Minister. G'day. If you've sent me a report to read, I have not read it. Just getting that out there early in this podcast. What could be more worth reading than the COP? That's right. I did joke to Luke as we were leaving the office on the way through. I feel like I'm the most underprepared that I've been for a podcast, and Luke's like, "I've read the paper, Frankie. We just lived it two weeks ago." We all lived it. There is a small matter of the two-page, which I think could do with some explanation and explication, but we'll get to that. On this week's show, we reflect on the wash-up from COP30 and work through what it all means for the important role of Australia. We'll be playing in COP31, but we were reflecting on where to start the conversation, Minister, without going through the blow-by-bow of the last three years, three and a half years of effort that has gone into this COP31 outcome. We're interested to maybe start the chat with where it all started, because as we know, this was an election commitment, actually, prior to the Albanese government coming to power. Where did those conversations start, and why did you elevate this as the bid for hosting a COP as something that you were keen to pursue as part of the climate and energy agenda of the incoming government? Well, we've been through those intros ourselves internally, a few times recently. Examined your life choices. Look, it was a 2022 election commitment to bid to host a COP. Actually, technically, we said COP in 2024. At that point, to be honest, we were in opposition, we had really sort of thought through the five yearly rhythms of the UN groups, but that changed pretty rapidly. But it was part of our powering the nation policy. We took to the 2022 election. It wasn't a prominent part. It wasn't up there in lights it was mentioned. It was a separate submission to the shadow cabinet back in the day, which Penny Wong and I took. The truth of the matter is, you remember this was about the time in the empty speech, the empty room, Glasgow, and we thought, well, we really want to restore Australia's international leadership. It was a COP bit away then to bid to host a COP and really turn from, you know, prior to president, really. It was Penny Wong's idea to add the Pacific element. So I think it was my idea to say, let's bid to host a COP and she said, well, let's do it with the Pacific. And it went from there. Yeah, the rest is history. The rest is history. I'm glad that you initially bidded for hosting a COP in 2024, because I remember putting together a COP bid parody song that I performed at the Great Debate at the CMI summit. That was filmed, wasn't it? And it was. Is that the niches thing you've ever done, Luke? I don't know. I don't think so. Pretty niche stuff, pretty niche stuff. It's diff competition where we are. But the 2024 rhymed in a way that 2025 would be with the key line. So yes, but yes, but I think by the end of that year, you'd sort of decided that actually 2025. And then, and then I remember, it was, I think it was Shamil Sheik, Turkey, and that's how we're bidding in their plenary session speech. Like three minutes after, after you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. We've all got some shared history there because I remember, so Shamil Sheik was the first COP that I'd ever been to. And I think yours, Luke as well. And I remember, you know, like tenant being like the, the COP knower of the three of us, like, we've got to go to like all the things. And I think we were probably then like being a bit creepy and figuring out where you were going to be at certain points. Yeah, my F.P. detail did have you on the list. Yeah. And so like, we're like, oh, we have to go see the national statement because we obviously knew like you'd be sort of calling on that. And then because the, the minister from Turkey was either the immediate, like next, very close. But anyway, we all had our headphones on in the room and we hadn't like just upped and left. So we weren't like that stalkery. We weren't like following you straight out or anything. But then we were still listening and then did he just say what we think he said by like a warmly announcing their interest in hosting the very same COP. And it was like at that, at that moment, it was game on just sort of extending that kind of recent, more recent kind of shared history, like all three of us were on the ground in in Belling over in Brazil. And, you know, like lots going on on the ground in the negotiations outside of it, we didn't the fires in the fires, the very, without an emergency alarm system in the complex. Yeah, I was meeting with a German minister and a member of my AFP detail banged on the door and said, ministers, we're out, we're off. What? Seriously? And he said, there's a fire. And we thought it was probably a pretty minor fire at the time. And then we're sort of, I was talking to Ed Miller Band and the German minister outside. And one of our delegation came up and said, we think this fire is pretty serious, actually. So we suggest all ministers, we've arranged a bus and off you go. So yeah, that's scenes. Floods. Yep. Fires. We were waiting for the plague. That didn't eventuate. Was that the moment when you realised actually having someone else take care of the logistics might not be such a bad thing? And so like the fire took place at about 3pm. And presidency texts came out at 3am following that. Like when ministers all got, well, some ministers got in their buses and like went off. Like, did you all go off to your separate compounds and air bnb's? Yeah, we did. And then I remember, this might be details that our listeners don't really care about. But I remember, I texted Miller Band and Wopka, the European commissioner. I don't know, 5, 6 o'clock said, we'd been told that the venue would reopen at 8. And I said, well, I'm going back if you're going back, but if you're not going back, you know, I'm not going back for no reason. And, and there was two and a half, whether the delegations would go back in at 8 o'clock to any end, we didn't go back in. We did it all remotely. But yeah, yeah, so it was all a bit dysfunctional. I think we should circle back to that. There was a fairly heady sort of 48, 56 hours in the lead up to the final plenary. But for the purpose of this chat, we should like the beat of it all, like and how that landed particularly, you know, where we had the reception at the Australia Pavilion on Tuesday night. And there was very clear that your enthusiasm for kind of landing the thing was strong. And you know, you were certainly making it clear there was no guarantees at that point in the cycle. But you were, you were really, I think the phrase you used was in it to win it. And obviously there's a lot that happened in the subsequent, even 24 hours, right? Do you want to like share what you can? Yeah, I mean, let's deal with that first. I mean, there was a rumor going around for what it's for, what for one, a bit of word that Australia was just going to withdraw and give to Turkey. And I wasn't going to let that rumor stand because that wasn't going to happen. We were in a negotiation. And part of that negotiation is Turkey are saying to us, well, we're in it to the end, you know, we'll veto if necessary. And by definition, if the negotiation is going to work, me saying to Turkey, we'll we're in it to the end too. So it's important to send that message. You know, we're serious. If it ends up with vetoing each other, that's okay. I mean, that's a key to a good negotiation and say we can walk away from this. If we have to, we'd rather not. But, you know, if we can't reach agreement, we'll go all the way. And, you know, I said to him, I believe I have the support of the we or group, which we did, but they could still veto us. And he said, well, you know, we won't shy away from a veto. And I said, well, we won't, we likewise aren't about to step back. So that's an important part of the, of that conversation, including the public elements of it. So, and I believe, I believe we did win, you know, we both won in a sense. But, you know, no one was withdrawing. But basically, you know, again, for various reasons, I weren't going to do every gory detail in the negotiations, partly because it'll take too long and bore our listeners and partly because, you know, they were closed doors. But on the first, on the Monday, so I get in on the Sunday and on the Monday was the first meeting. We're nice to the Turkish Minister. Look, we're here for three days, at least, you know, are we going to give this go or not? You know, we can just go back to our delegations and so we're going to veto each other and we'll end up in bond. I think it's a poor outcome for the world. Or we can sit down and have a good old go. And he said, well, I'm, I'm up for it if you are, you know, my words, not his, but, and let's see if we can reach agreement or not. And then three days later we left the room. Well, we didn't, we didn't see much of you out. No, it was very different cop for me this time because normally I'm out and about and doing events and going to plenaries and going to minute high level ministerial meetings and expressing Australia's position. I took the view this time while I was obviously, my team are still checking in with me very regularly about the COP 30 negotiations. I took the view that the national interest was most served by making sure we had a good outcome for COP 31 because this is where Australia could have the biggest influence compared to, again, we were very much involved in COP 30, but it wasn't quite, it was a very different cop this time for me because I was in that room. So the, again, then the Brazilians appointed two mediators to help us, which was very valuable. Ambassador Lirio, who's a former Brazilian ambassador to Australia, and Yelchin, who is the Deputy Foreign Minister of Asia by Jeanne, who we work closely with at COP 29. So we knew him and liked him. So they played a very valuable role. It was actually quite formal in some, what they said in the middle, Turkish minister on either side, our teams behind us. So it was quite, and we had rules about how many people in the room, you know, it was me plus two, him plus two. And if somebody accidentally came in, someone else had to leave, all that sort of stuff. We kept it quite formal in that sense. And the Brazilian and Asia by Jeanne representatives both played a valuable role saying, you know, what are your key objectives here and your red lines and how can we see if we can find a way through this. And the result was the two page agreement. Where did the idea of splitting out the role of president negotiations emerge from? From that meeting, from those meetings. So, you know, to be very honest, we had at various points thought about an outcome like this and had at various points, you know, discussed these sorts of things with Turkey and in different modalities, you know, because there's really four elements to copyright, the cop hosting, the pre cop hosting, the action agenda and the negotiations. So, you know, once you've realised there's four elements, you think about which elements are the most important to you and try and work out which are the most important to your colleague and see if there's a way forward. But, you know, our case was that Australia has restored climate leadership. We're very active in the climate, in the cop negotiations with all the respect, you know, probably more active than Turkey. So, our big focus is trying to get a successful outcome to the negotiations. We've built up some skills. I've built up some experience now. We think we can play a role here. And that was the sort of outcome that emerged through that process. Do you think Turkey went into that room sort of very clearly wanting to host the physical club? Yeah, I do. I do. And part of it, again, part of the negotiation is working out with your counterpart is serious. You know, are they really going to veto it? So, it's a big call. A big call to walk into a plenary and say, well, they might be the choice, but we've earned a veto. I read the review that they were deadly serious. So, therefore, that leads you to the outcome that, well, a negotiated outcome would be better for us because we could get something, you know, get a pre cop for the Pacific and get the negotiations, as opposed to nothing if it goes to bond, right? You're not hosting pre cop, you're not leaving negotiations, you're doing nothing if it's in bond and a better outcome for the world because with multi-electrolism under attack and people questioning the cop process, if the narrative was they couldn't even agree on the next host and the next presidency, then the cop would come and the cop process would come at a real pressure. I thought we had an obligation to try and avoid that if possible. When we had that briefing after your press conference, I think it was the Wednesday night, you talked a lot about that. You also talked about the responsibility you felt to the Pacific to give them an outcome, right? Yeah, and I very regularly consulted with the Pacific there. So, I'd finished a session with Turkey and then go and have a session with the ministers who were present. And, you know, the Pacific's been around a long time. They've been, you know, they've been on the losing end of many negotiations, so they know when they see one. And they said to me, if you can get the negotiations, that's a win. That's a big win because that's what we care about the result. Obviously, we'd love to have it in Australia. And, you know, the pre-cop is important and we'll try and we'll make it a bit bigger than a normal pre-cop is our plan, you know, we'll make it a bigger event. And we spoke to them about that, but they were really rock solid in support for a negotiated outcome, which was very important. And I said to them, if you tell me you'd rather lose with dignity and be vetoed, then we can do that. And they said, we don't want that. In terms of how things have played out at other cops and negotiations with Turkey and with Australia, it was not so very long ago in Katowice in COP 24 that Turkey did threaten to veto the whole outcome of the entire COP over a particular issue that they considered important to their national interest. And they were talked down from that. It pushed the whole COP 12 of the 24 hours of overtime that it went into to get to that and high-level interventions to head of government level from around the world, including from some powers who were who are not currently putting their shoulders to the wheel in a forward direction. Whereas the last time that I'm aware of when Australia was was up for being seen as a as a sort of a hard case to the extent of threatening the whole outcome of a COP was probably like 1998, which probably not an era in Australia's climate diplomacy people are keen to go back to. No. Well, I mean, to be fair, usually someone threatens to veto for a COP outcome, not the COP hosting, but I mean, and did this time as well. I mean, we might get to it, but literally I finished the three days of negotiations with the Turkish minister and walked into a COP 30 negotiation at four o'clock and left at seven o'clock the next morning. And that only happens if someone's threatening a veto because if everyone agrees, well, I don't like this, but I can live with it. Well, that's what we're not going to pull on all night at that point. So that's part of the COP process. I think just rounding up the COP 31 presidency, I do think maybe we have hit upon something special that might become more of a model going forward. If you think the world needs countries to come together, Australia and Turkey are with our rich but complicated history over more than a century to quite different countries with a strong disagreement about who would be the better host and president, but sort that out and can come together. That's a pretty powerful message to say, well, if we've been flexible and we've put the world first, maybe you can, too, to other countries. And also, and I did discuss this with my Turkish counterpart and said, well, we could be quite a powerful combination here. Forget this, right? You know, there's plenty of countries that will care about what Australia thinks, but there's also countries that will care about what you think. So if I go to you and say, the negotiations are going, well, but this one country or these two countries are holding out, it might be a country that cares more about what you think than what I think. There's plenty of countries that will care what I think, but there's also countries that will care what you think. So I might say to you, well, I've got this all lined up, but, you know, country X is fighting Devito. It could be the call from you is what puts them out of the line as opposed to a call from me and vice versa in different state in different circumstances. So it could be quite a powerful combination. And as I said, I don't mind turning to this part, as I did say to the Turkish minister towards the end of the negotiations. You forget this, right? My success is your success. And vice versa. You know, if I deliver a successful negotiations, that means your cop is remembered well. Paris is remembered well. Copenhagen is remembered badly because of the negotiations. So, you know, once we, if we sort this out, then we're in it together. And it's not, we're no longer rivals. We're now, I want you to succeed and you need me to succeed. Which is one of the most fascinating dynamics coming out of this, because this was obviously an incredibly hard fought process. And, you know, frustrating at times, you know, and then to transition from that dynamic of fierce competitors to deep collaboration to achieve a shared outcome. Like, I imagine that you must, you must have, despite, you know, all of the blood, sweat and tears that went into the beard and the fractious nature of it at times, you must have confidence that you have a partner you can work with. That's the most important thing. Absolutely. Because I mean, the agreement we struck was important and it was important to get that reflected in the cop decision, which it is. It's, you know, footnoted in cop decision, which means it has force of a cop decision. So our agreement actually, you know, is in effect a decision of the cop. That was important. But more important was building trust. And in three days, locked in room with someone, you do get to know them. And he walked away confident that he could trust me with negotiations. And I walked away confident that I could trust him to let me do the job necessary. That's the most important thing. And we've been in contact since, you know, we've been texting each other since. And that's important. And we'll keep chatting during the year. We, you know, keep in touch. He's got things he's responsible for. I've got things I'm responsible for. We'll keep each other advised about how we're going with those things. One of the things that like questions that immediately arose to me after having witnessed like a pretty extraordinary final plenary in billing, right? Unfortunate one, yep. Very unfortunate and, and, and sort of deeply symbolic in some ways that it was the Latin American peers of Brazil that sort of stood up and, you know, and objected and like caused what felt like a bit of a fraying of the process towards the end there. But I sort of immediately cast it forward and thought that's, you know, next year, that's Minister Bowen, President of COP Negotiations and Minister Karoum, COP President. How are you thinking about how the two of you would navigate a situation like that? Well, I mean, I think communications is the key always. That occurred to me, too. Obviously. And I think it occurred, I think that's why I was imagining him thinking, oh, this is quite good, that Chris is going to be... So, yeah, that was, that was, I mean, Andre would be the first to say that was unfortunate and difficult. And, you know, I said to my team, my negotiation and one of the things that gives me confidence is Australia's negotiating team, you know, our officials who you guys know well are so deeply respected around the world. You know, Sally Box and David Higgins and the team, so deeply respected around the world. But, you know, they said to me, we saw this one coming, you know, because it was all about adaptation and the whittling down of the indicators to 50 from 100 was always going to be deeply problematic. So I have some confidence that when we're in the chair, you know, we will be able to identify those issues early and work them through without it getting to the floor of the plenary. One of the things that's happened, it seems like increasingly, frequently in cop closing plenaries over the past decade or so is like it's a consensus driven process. But there's been a little bit of wiggle room for the president defines what consensus is exactly. And sometimes that has like, I think, I think the least wiggle room was seen with the most consequence probably at Copenhagen, where two or three Bolivarian countries sort of stuck the final knife in to the Copenhagen accord, whereas when Espinosa was president she said consensus is not unanimity. Yes, yes. And there was like last year at Baku, what appeared, although it was kind of clarified by India this year not to have been an objection with intent to stop the outcome, but it appeared that the finance decision was sort of gabbled through while pretending not to see that there was an objection. This year the president appeared to be just trying to sort of barrel through and was brought up short in excruciating specificity. Has the wiggle room evaporated? Is consensus going to be an even harder thing to navigate? It's too early to tell, but I think you should always be very careful about gabbling anything through because it just builds such bad will. So we'll see how it pans out, but my intention is to avoid that, is to avoid that by early and strong engagement and understanding key countries and groups, red lines and finding ways through it. That's my best answer. One of the criticisms that has been leveled at the Brazilians in sort of tackling the negotiations the way they did, and it wasn't an unusual cop in that sense, in that they took a lot of things behind closed doors. Like there weren't very many like open negotiating sessions where all parties were engaging with each other on those core political issues. On the big four, which turned into the Mochirao, which turned into the cover text kind of decision, and much of that kind of was taken behind closed doors, shuttle diplomacy and things like that. And I just wonder, you're clearly a study of cops and the way that different presidencies have gone about it, but like are there are there kind of key notes you're taking from now having kind of been pretty actively involved in a few of these? Well, I mean, again, I'm not going to sort of run through how I envisage the year panning out in full detail because there's a lot of consultations to go. No, we demand a simulation exercise. We like the detail. You know, it would be my intention to be as transparent as possible. No, it's always, my definitions are closed door negotiation, right? Believe me, you do not want to be there at two o'clock in the morning inside the room. But, you know, you can be as transparent as you, as you can be about the objectives and the sorts of issues. It's a party driven process, as most cop presidents would say, but one that can be guided and the more transparent you can guide it to better under your hand on the table there is a two page, which sets out the famous two page document, the famous two pager, to key or Australia partnership modalities. Indeed. There's quite a bit in there, but it's not a true cop document unless it has the word modality, so it's modalities with a footnote. Love it. A footnote in the title is quite an achievement. Yeah, it's about an hour spent on that. So I've sort of been, I never had the need to do this before, but sort of like in terms of those different elements that you were describing that is part of the presidency, like the two kind of very active ones, obviously there's a hosting of the pre cop and the cop and then they're important. But in terms of like the tools that you have to deploy, you have the negotiations and you have the action agenda. And the ideal version of this is that presidency is aware of all the buttons that they have on the console and is able to kind of use those two pathways in complimentary ways. And sometimes there are things that start in the actual agenda and land in the negotiations, but certainly you want kind of an integrated strategy. We effectively got two people at the console. So I'm interested in your thoughts about how you're going to navigate like a cohesive strategy across the negotiations and the action agenda. Because as we know, as the Paris rulebook has become more and more settled, there are important matters to prosecute through the negotiations. But equally, the action agenda is becoming increasingly important as a vehicle for ambition and momentum in terms of the actual, the outcomes that, in terms of mitigation and adaptation that we're also passionate about. Look, I mean, I think the most important thing there is not so much agreement, but the cooperative relationship built up, which is real, as we've discussed, and the most important thing. So we have the negotiations, they have the action agenda, but they will consult us about the action agenda because I said to him, we did have things in mind for Adelaide. So, you know, it's yours, but there are suggestions we would have. He said, great, I need the help. So we will collaborate on how they interact. I mean, I need to know what's on his mind in the action agenda so I can think about how that plays into the negotiations and vice versa. I'm confident that that'll be okay. And again, that'll be based around not so much what's written here on a piece of paper, as important as that is, but the spirit of, you know, his success being my success and vice versa. You know, if the action agenda is successful, that helps me. If the negotiations are successful, that helps him. So it's in both our interests to be helping each other. And so you're confident that perhaps not the full agenda that we would have been taking forward in the scenario that we were, you know, as a traditional presidency and we were running this thing out of Adelaide. But there are key things that you'll be able to prosecute through the action agenda. Well, yeah. And again, that was not a controversial part of the negotiations. That, you know, they would have responsibility for the action agenda, but we would have, you know, ideas to suggest to them on that. I am confident that that will all come together pretty well. Likewise, the cop and the pre cop. I mean, I said to him, it's important you come to the pre cop. He said, I will, et cetera. So I think that's all that will all be okay. In terms of the pre cop, obviously being held in the Pacific, given how important this is and you know, pre cops traditionally, you know, fly a bit under the radar, but perhaps that's not the vision in the same way. I mean, it's not, it is a pre cop. It's not the cop. So it's not the main deal, but we do want to make sure it's impactful. We want to make sure it's a, it's a Pacific resilience fund event as well. So we'll be active in making sure that ministers and indeed maybe more senior than ministers come to that event because we want it to be a serious event. We'll invite the PIFT nominate who hosts it. But it will be a serious event. Yeah. And I mean, because I think it was, it was apparent to all of us how kind of much in close contact you were with the Pacific ministers that were there on the ground and watching you host a press conference with them after the deal was landed. Like you could tell your own lockstep. Have you got an early sense of, you know, what, what are the most pressing issues from their perspective, not just from a negotiations point of view, but I mean, having been talking to, you know, the good folks in DQ that are working on like the policy thematics and action agenda that, you know, an Australian presidency would have pursued. Do you have a strong sense of what the Pacific people want to have? And not just from this process, but from, you know, having held three teller knowers with them about cop 31 for those who are following on at home, who might be where teller knower is a Pacific word for a consultation. We've held three teller knowers with my Pacific counterparts, but also just working with them on the previous cops on cop 27, eight and nine about, you know, checking in with them, what's important for them in those negotiations, you pick it up on the way. So, you know, I'd point to access to finance. There's lots of adaptation finance out there now, but small island developing states have trouble accessing it. So what can you do about that? What can you do about countries that don't necessarily have massive capacity to fill in thousands of pages of forms applying for finance? And of course, you know, the importance of oceans in the climate debate. I mean, this was a good cop in terms of elevating the Amazon and deforestation. And that was very important. I learned things in that process. But, you know, here's our opportunity to do likewise for the role of oceans, for the role of island nation states, for island nation states continuing sovereignty, all those sorts of things, opportunities to elevate the Pacific agenda. So something that seems like it's going to become a bigger thing some cops soon and maybe it is next cop is really, really, really grappling with the sum of what all the mitigation commitments add up to. And the fact that I think there was there was some acknowledgement of this in the outcome this year, but it's simultaneously really significant and it is bending the curve on expected climate change. But it's also quite distant. It's also not enough. Both things can be true. Yeah. And so like, and there's been several attempts to do that, right? I mean, global stocktake was really an attempt to do that. The roadmap was an attempt to do that this time in a sense. So no doubt that will continue to be a factor. Yes, but it's like for a cop with a very strong Pacific role in it and focus in it, that is both like incredibly important. But also if language about overshoot has started to be recognised in some of these processes, but still sort of, you know, no more detailed than saying it should be as short and as low and overshoot as possible. But the nature of that makes an enormous difference to the physical reality, the social and economic pressures on like everybody, but most obviously on Pacific Island states. So like whenever we do get down to that nitty gritty to a greater extent, that's like, that's horrible nitty gritty. Like any of the choices available are really, really difficult. Is that a cop 31 conversation? Well, I mean, I think it'll be a factor tenant, but you know, how big a factor time will tell. But yes, I mean, we will have a cop at a time when the world hasn't yet done enough. That's a statement of fact. So we will have to try and take the ball forward a bit. Yeah. Just in terms of the outcome where it landed, there's a sort of quite a lot of energy and enthusiasm that had developed among advocates, stakeholders, people that were sort of starting to lean in on the idea of a cop being hosted in Adelaide and kind of the opportunities that would provide both to build momentum here at home, but also make a contribution to the global conversation. Some of those ideas, you know, can be carried forward in this, you know, this novel and innovative world that we find ourselves in of Australia playing a significant role. But the cop being hosted in Antalya, others, you know, make less sense if the physical cop isn't hosted here. What are your reflections or messages to the folk that will be listening that, you know, I don't think it's too strong a word to say that some of our friends in this space are going through a bit of a grieving process around all of this. You know, yeah, it would have been great. It would have been fantastic having Adelaide. And that was always the preferred, you know, best outcome, but it wasn't to be. But keep the ideas coming. I mean, you know, what does the document say? It says building on the efforts of the COP30 Brazilian presidency, Turkey and Australia working together and with Pacific Island countries to strengthen and elevate the action agenda. So, you know, that's they're pretty good words to have in there about the action agenda. And so if there are ideas, me and my team, very happy to hear them. I think it's really, it was significant to lots of us that saw Australia sign on to the Bellam Declaration to transition away from fossil fuels. Like that's looks like the strongest sort of statement that Australia's made yet in the sort of multilateral forum and noting how like contested that was in the final plenary. Like, I guess I'm interested in your early kind of thinking about, you know, how that how that conversations likely to evolve next year, right? You've got this kind of environment in the negotiations where the US is absent, the EU presented a little more fragmented than they have in the past because of the nature of, you know, just elections that have happened in member states. Meaning they certainly from talking to Europeans on the ground felt a bit disappointed the way they showed up in some respects. So like you're inheriting the presidency at a time where some of the strongest advocates for ambition and progress there, like a not as present and shoulder to the wheel forward. So given the fossil fuel declaration came through the action agenda, do you see Turkey picking that up and running with it? Do you feel like Australia should be an active proponent given we've signed up to it? Yeah, see, I mean, the way I say it, I actually said is a much more natural progression from Dubai, where the world first signed up to transition away from fossil fuels. That was our suggestion. So we said, I said to the cop president at the time, you know, okay, I understand you can't get phased down or phased out. I understand that's impossible. How about transition away from that was like at 11 o'clock one night. And he said, oh, maybe, maybe we could do that. And that was with the Pacific Land was from the PIF, right? So it went from the PIF to Australia, to the cop president, and then became the cop decision. So I mean, Saudi Arabia signed on and everyone signed on. So I was nothing surprises me really in Australian politics. But when I came back and that was an issue in the House of Representatives, it was like, well, hang on, Saudi Arabia signed on to this liberal party, you know, those softies in Saudi Arabia. You know, so I see the Dubai consensus as the big, the big turning point there. And really, the Bellarm Declaration is really just saying, well, now we've all agreed to this. Let's have a roadmap about how we're going to do it. And, you know, 80 countries didn't sign on the Bellarm Declaration, but 80 countries did call for a roadmap away from fossil fuels. More than 80, I think I've got to more than 90 eventually. So I see it as more just a natural, not even a progression, but a but a locking in of what we decided in Dubai to make sure it becomes a reality. I mean, that immediately raises kind of what many of us observed as a regard action against the consensus in Dubai. And that's surely something. And that's an ongoing issue. But the fact of the matter is it was the Dubai consensus. Every country, every party to the cop signed on to it. So it shouldn't be that controversial. I mean, if you're not transitioning away from fossil fuels, what, what is it for? What is this process for? Maybe the Saudis have been reading Hansard and got got second thoughts after and, you know, let's be clear about it. And again, from the other side, you get the criticism, right? On the other side, you get the criticism about, oh, well, you're doing this or that. So you're not transiting. Well, transition means gradual, you know, by almost definition, it means renewables increase and fossil fuels decrease over time. Doesn't mean, you know, every single thing is renewables. And it's a transition away from is carefully chosen language to reflect this is hard work. It's not going to happen overnight. Every step needs to be a step forward. But that doesn't mean that we can get rid of fossil fuels tomorrow or that there isn't a place for, you know, making sure gas, you know, it's firming up renewables, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So, but, you know, the transition away from is what it's all about. It will be fascinating to see, like, I mean, it is clearly going to be another push to get that into negotiated text. And next year's cop, there was a push this year. That kind of, you know, blew up a bit spectacular. So look, all I'd say about that is, you know, as negotiations president, it's our job to talk to all sorts of people, not just people, you know, you don't develop a successful negotiation by just talking to people you agree with all the time. That's going to lead to a pretty obvious outcome. You know, there are countries around the world which I'll be sort of talking to and they'll lead up about, you know, what are you trying to achieve? Here's what we're trying to achieve. How could you, you know, maybe we could work on this very similar process to what we just did, we took care. A long way to, apart from each other, to start with. The language that was agreed in Dubai under a presidency that was like, wasn't is an important member of the Arab group of negotiating parties and a significant fossil fuel producer. And maybe that helped with finding that consensus. Like Australia is a very significant exporter of coal and of gas. And we understand the painful side of the transition there as well as the positive side and the new opportunities. So, like, do we have, despite not being embedded in a negotiating grouping in the same way as Dubai, but do we have some added heft or credibility in talking about this? I think so. Now, some people come at the other angles, "Oh, look, Australia's a fossil fuel country, they're hypocrites." I don't see it that way. I see it as, yeah, we are a fossil fuel producer and exporter. And so, we bring a particular perspective to this. I.e., you know, we see the need to develop the new industries and the new energy. And we're doing that domestically. And here's how we think we can help the rest of the world do it. So, I do think we bring that perspective and that extra, I see it as credibility, to say we're not lecturing other countries, we're in the middle of this transition ourselves. And we know how hard it is. And I find that's a pretty common feature of international negotiations. You know, it's very different domestically. I mean, you know, our domestic achievements are so well regarded internationally. When I'm talking to ministers, they say, "Oh, you know, they look at what we're doing, our figures," and say, "That's pretty impressive. People get how hard this is when you're a minister of another country. You know it. It's hard work. Likewise, you know, I look at what India is doing. I meet with the Indian minister. I say, "What you're doing is impressive." You know, at the same time as you're electrifying and introducing electricity to villages, your megawatts, your 10 million houses, you know, it's all very impressive stuff and hard work. So, I do think that's reflected. If we shift gears and look at, like, where we landed in Brazil, and we've lightly touched on kind of the very fractious nature of that closing plenary, but there were also some very positive things that came out of it and potential vehicles that you can use to prosecute some of the priorities that you've spoken to, the BLIM mission, 1.5, the global implementation accelerator, what are your reflections, both, you know, some of the things, the legacies out of that closing plenary that, you know, you may need to circle back to and address in a proactive way to get a good outcome, and also some of the positive things coming out of that final decision text that you can carry forward? So, and I guess the accelerator falls to us, because under the agreement with Turkey, we have the mandates. So, Australia takes forward the mandates arising from the negotiated outcomes under the agreement. So, that means, at two o'clock in the morning, I realised that that was us, you know, when they said we'll do this accelerator thing, oh, I'm pretty sure that'll be us. Okay, at one point I thought, what is an accelerator, and then I realised, well, that's largely up to us. So, that's a good opportunity for us. So, do you want to just quickly unpack what that is? Well, it's basically, again, that was really what, that's really what the all night negotiation was about, it was about that sentence. The accelerator is really recognising to Tenence Point before, we're not on track for 1.5, so what does the world need to do? And what, within the realms of nationally determined contributions and sovereignty, what do countries need to do? So, that's work that's been commissioned for us to manage over the next 12 months. The BLM roadmap is different, that was the COP President announced he was doing that in the plenary. So, it wasn't a COP outcome, so therefore, Brazil holds the pin on that, so we don't hold the pin. No doubt we'll be consulted, but that is COP 30 President to take forward. Obviously, we'll try and make those documents as complementary as we can. There were other options that, you know, that were sort of presented before this, the implementation accelerator was the thing that was landed on, like there were options around, I think it was like an annual review process to examine, you know, I guess the gap in NDCs and BTRs to 1.5 and put another reliance on parties to then come to, you know, come to COPs or to the UNFCCC with plans on how they're going to bridge that gap. And that was controversial because it was sort of, some parties chose to frame that as a change to the policy cycle of Paris, which feels like a bit of an overstatement. But like, yeah, I guess like, do you have any early thoughts or views on what kinds of activities you'd be looking at? I think it'd be early, I mean, I've got some thoughts, but you know, I have to do some consultations with other countries, et cetera, because I wanted to be a serious process and serious document. But the names in the tins got to be, it's got to accelerate action and encourage countries to do things sensibly. Noting one of the most sensitive things these countries say, hang on, the N stands for nationally determined. So, and that's important to recognise as well. And see multiple sides of this, because like, clearly, the sum total of everybody's commitments and action, not enough, as important as it is not enough. And so iterating more frequently towards adequacy has an inherent attraction to it. But like, if we think about the process that Australia went through over the past like two years of work leading up to the decisions around the 2035 targets, that was a lot of work. And I don't know, would you be enthusiastic to do that every year? No, I mean, I see both sides of the yearly thing. Yeah, I mean, the yearly thing, I can see why that's controversial, right, because they are meant to be five yearly. And, you know, what does a yearly review mean? And how would it be implemented? Again, I was in the room for some quite heated debates around that. And that's one where I could actually see both sides of the argument. I kind of feel like wanting to ask a question about like, zoom forward, it's like, the day after closing plenary of COP 31. And hopefully you've had some sleep in the last 24 hours. I think that is a win-state that is unattainable. It would be the first. I haven't slept toward the last three costs, not as president. I'm not sure how you think I could get the last president. I think aspirational goals. You reckon it's going to be so smooth that we're all embedded at eight o'clock on the second floor. I was finished on the Wednesday. Yeah. Just like Brazil was going to. Well, Angibai was going to. Yeah. That's right. Anyway, we love that for you, minister. But like, what does satisfaction look like to you? Look, just again, it's too early for me to be definitive because, you know, there's a lot of other countries that I need to talk to, but a good, solid step forward. You know, people say, well, you know, they didn't solve all the world's problems and it wasn't perfect. But, you know, this was clearly progress. I'm always about progress and that, you know, this was things that have been difficult in the two hard basket. They had a, you know, they made progress on. And it sounds like there's two reasons that you're hopeful for that outcome. There's the substantive progress of kind of getting something done, but there's also demonstrating that multilateralism has a beating heart. One is important and two works. Yeah, Pym. All right. Well, I guess it's going to be an interesting 12 months, minister. Yes, indeed. And yes, contrary to rumours, perpetuated by some, domestic policy remains the focus. There's a bit of that. There's plenty more to do. We're ready to read some papers. I have an iPad and a team's meeting on the iPad. So, you know, if you can't ride two horses, you should have been the circus. Indeed. Well, we need to tell our listeners that we are once again for our end of year episode going to be watching a movie, right? Yes. There's going to be a poll. Tenet gets his way. It's Soylent Green. Yeah. Soylent Green, it's time has come. There's a reguard, reguard action against the UAE consensus. There's an even stronger reguard action against Soylent Green. I can report tenets based on my sense. The president of movie negotiations. Well, my record is not one of success. But there will be a poll that emerges. But we wanted to, we wanted to give you the opportunity, minister, to a security. I don't know if there's a, there's a movie that's top of mind that you think that this podcast needs to, needs to address with some alacrity. Well, I'm afraid the movie I would suggest hasn't been made yet. Cop 31. I think basically every Ann McEwen book has been turned into a movie. Sure. And his latest book is climate fiction, which I quite enjoyed, what we can know. It's hot off the presses. I read it recently. It is about climate change. So inevitably to be turned into a movie, just not probably in time for your 2025 movie club. But I would recommend the book. It's not just about climate change. There's a whole lot of other things going on, but it's clearly, you work out pretty early. It's set in the future. And there's climate change has, has played out in a negative way. Cop has failed at this point. Well, that sounds great. I say to Hollywood, hasten slowly in adapting this one. Don't pump it out for 2025, which, which like with generative AI, somebody could give it a go. But no, they must not because this is the year of soil and green. I thought you were going to say of climate progress that cop 31 and we don't want that as a backdrop to successful negotiations. A negative example to go, you don't want that. So make things work at cop 31. Like that's great. Get it out for like June of 2026. Perfect. Well, that is our show for today. This podcast was edited by energy professional and podcast tragic Mark Spencer from here media studio. Frankie, you like promoting things? I'm promoting this, this podcast. I'm promoting the fact that we decided not to put it behind the paywall public service as much as it pains me to say that. I don't know if there's anything to go behind the paywall because I don't know if you need to leave. But if you want to do five minutes of bonus content, we would be. Or do you want to promote something? Tell us what you really think about your Turkish government. Final points of our 2035 target. How many, how many batteries have you installed this week? Oh, no, no, don't encourage him. 146,000 as we, not, not this week since one July as we go to air, but, but as we record by the time it goes to air, I guess I have in the 50,000. I can't believe he goes from that point forward. All right, that is indeed where we're going to call it. But for Frankie Muscovich, Tenant Reed and Chris Bowen, I'm Luke Menzel. Thanks for listening and we'll talk to you again soon.