Israel and Palestine in the 20th Century Part 2

Welcome to the McCormick on History Podcast. Hey everybody, today's part two of our series on the 20th Century History in Palestine and today's Israel. If you listen to the first episode, you know that this podcast is designed to give a rather brief and as objective as possible view of the major events and trends in this part of the world in the 20th Century. In this episode, we'll cover the period from post-independence to the Camp David Accords. So here we go. For the newly independent Israel, independence was not easy. The war for independence, which included two UN-brokered cease-fires, meant that conflict didn't end until 1949. Really low-level fighting continued long after that year. There never was a period of real lasting peace. The 1949 borders remained Israel's borders until the conclusion of the 1967 war, a conflict that heavily affects contemporary politics in the region. So, we understand that Israel's independence from the start was fragile. Arab states refused to recognize the state of Israel. Its border nations were all revisionist powers hoping to in some way challenge and defeat Israel. The war's results were simply put, you know, just simply not accepted. Israel was an isolated country with enemies all around it. To outside observers, it was hard to see how Israel could survive. It was a tiny state with millions upon millions of arrows and Muslims in opposition. It couldn't trade with its bordering states. It was short on capital. The land and its cities and towns had been severely damaged by war. It's kept coming in, where their backgrounds varied and not all the Jews were treated the same. It had a military that needed cash badly to defend the country. The problems were enormous and almost endless. In 1950, the Israeli parliament, the Kinesi, approved the law of return that allowed Jews to immigrate to Israel with almost no stipulations. Immigration though, it was a double-edged sword. It was important for Israel to gain more population, but many of the immigrants came to the country without any possessions to speak of. They needed immediate assistance, but the state was short of cash. In addition, after the first push of European Jews, Jews from around the Arab world, North Africa and other parts of Middle East flock to the new country. These differing cultural and religious traditions within Judaism would cause rather significant problems, but that's a podcast for another day. To survive, Israel needed foreign aid, and the United States was pursued immediately. The US was the first state to recognize Israel, and the Truman administration began sending aid, economic and military. Loans were made available. Since independence, the United States has contributed over $150 billion in aid, an enormous amount of money. American support was enhanced by a 1952 reparations agreement with West Germany. This was highly controversial to say the least. Money was critical to Israel's existence because its economy was failing, and the West German government was trying to close the door on the Nazi era. And wanted to be seen as a responsible member of the international community. You must remember, the West Germany as a state had only been established in 1949, and now when these negotiations are taking place this 1952. Many Jews opposed reparations, or even these negotiations. It was only seven years since the war ended, and it felt like Germany was trying to buy off the Jews. How could a monetary settlement in any way serve to soften the unbearable pain of the Holocaust? Even with opposition from Germans and Israelis, some Germans argued that they couldn't afford to make these payments. Nonetheless, the agreement was ratified. The agreement was enormously important for establishing a new and significant relationship between at that time West Germany and Israel, and it's a relationship that continues all the way through today. In the late 40s and early 50s, the changing political environment in Egypt was destined to affect Israel in a profound way. Gamal Nasser was a veteran of the Arab-Israeli War, distinguishing himself from the battlefield, trying to fight against Israel's independence. Nasser became President of Egypt and promptly instituted a series of domestic reforms and initiated an independent foreign policy that annoyed the West, but especially France and the United Kingdom. Nasser supported the non-aligned movement and even endorsed Algerian independence, a position that made France extremely angry considering the independence movement in Algeria, which was causing so much turmoil in French politics and in French society. In addition, Nasser was friendly with the Soviet Union and Eastern-Bloc states. When the United States and Great Britain backed out of an agreement to financially support the construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile River, Nasser struck back. His nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was really the icing on the cake. He believed that revenue from the canal would finance the Aswan Dam project. He also received funding from the Soviet Union to build the dam. Israel was prevented from using the canal and Britain and France feared that they might be next. Prime Minister Anthony Eden viewed Nasser as an uncontrollable tyrant and ignored Nasser's popularity throughout the Arab world. What resulted was a secret agreement between the United Kingdom, France and Israel to take back the canal and to remove Nasser from the presidency in Egypt. The agreement was shameful and I mean that it was a shameful agreement that really severely damaged Anthony Eden's reputation. He required Israel to attack Egypt, followed by French and British troops who would be inserted under the guise of peacekeepers. The worst of it for Israel was that it was on the offensive. They were supposed to be on the offensive by the agreement. There was hesitancy amongst Israeli leadership to participate, but they eventually came around. In 1956, the Eraser Israeli Army smashed the Egyptian forces in the Sinai. And Britain and French troops arrived in the Canal Zone two days later. This was exactly how it was planned. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was not happy and neither was anyone else for that matter. The whole thing backfired. British and French troops were forced by international pressure to leave, but Israel didn't suffer as much criticism. UN peacekeepers came to the Sinai, just keep the peace between Israel and Egypt, something that was not opposed by the Israeli government. Israel did not regain shipping rights to the Suez, although it did regain rights to use the straits of Tyran, where the Gulf of Akhaba meets the Red Sea. This cool thing is down on the Egyptian border, although the crisis effectively made NASA a hero throughout the era of world and really simply untouchable. In the 50s and 60s, Egypt became a stronger and a better established state, but it was not accepted by those around them. In the 50s and 60s, Israel became a stronger and a better established state, but it was not accepted by those around them. Although there were occasional back channel communications about peace and settlements and wealth. refugees and things like this, but not they're never coming to anything. In 1967, tensions between Egypt and Israel reached a boiling point when NASA announced that Israel would be banned from the straits of Tyran access that they had defended in the 1956 Suez crisis. Although this was one of the triggers, simmering animosity and a number of other issues, which almost seemed never ending, played a huge role in the impending war. Numerous flashpoints heightened the tension and really almost had a sense that war was coming in an inevitable manner. Even today, though, there's considerable debate about what actually led to the 67 war because there's so many points of contention. Some point to consistent Israeli retaliation for terrorist attacks, such as occurred in the Jordanian town of Samua in 1966 in the West Bank, which was controlled by Jordan. Some argue that NASA was fearful that Israel would acquire an atomic bomb and thus change the dynamics drastic quickly. There was no question that the Syrian border was rife with conflict. Palestinians used some border areas, staging grounds to attack into Israel. Low level fighting with Syrians that include fighter jet engagements only enhanced the possibility of war. Syrian plans to divert the Jordan River, deprived Israel of much needed water and it fueled animosity. The new Syrian government took a very hard line on Israel and certainly stirred the Palestinian pie. International Egypt was the recipient of weapons from the USSR, outfitting their army and their Air Force, the Soviet equipment. It was abundantly clear that the Arab world saw the Soviet Union as generally their ally and viewed the United States as only interested in supporting their enemy Israel. There's not one exact cause. The point here is that there was plenty, there were so many points of tension and animosity that it didn't take much of a spark to generate a major conflict. As mentioned earlier, the Israeli retaliation when they attacked Samoa was significant in that it greatly angered King Hussein of Jordan who had been covertly at least the only state in the region talking to Israel about a settlement. Hussein had tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees living within his borders. Actions like the one that Samoa were not well received in Jordan and especially, and Hussein always had to be mindful of these Palestinian concerns because of the refugees living within his country. On April 6, 1967, Israeli and Syrian forces engaged in an artillery and aircraft duel that was a foretaste of the future conflict. It was a clear Israeli victory and some military and political figures believe that it indicated that Israel should strike more forcefully against the Syrians, especially with Palestinian guerrilla campaigns continuing along that border. Egypt's confidence grew when they concluded a defense agreement with Syria in 1966, putting Israel in great jeopardy of potentially fighting a two front war. Tensions increased even more when the Soviet Union notified Cairo on May 13, 1967 that Israel was days away from launching a full invasion of Syria. The information was faulty and it spoke to a very large army being assembled by the Israelis there, but it was faulty. There's much debate today about Soviet intentions with this notification and well as the accuracy of information associated with it. Some think that Soviet Union was hoping to stop Israel from gaining a nuclear weapon by generating this impending war in the Middle East. Regardless of the theories surrounding all of this, on May 14, 1967, NASA reoccupied the Sinai with his troops and demanded that the UN get out. On May 22, 1967, he significantly increased attention by banning Israel from the Straits of Tehran, access that they had defended in the 56th Suez Canal crisis and had been recognized by many states. With these moves, NASA's star became searingly bright. He was seen as the new Arab hero throughout the Middle East. It looked like he had the ability to organize a coalition of Arab states against Israel. A few days later, King Hussein of Jordan without really much enthusiasm signed a defensive treaty with Egypt. Hussein favored the West and didn't really like NASA, but he feared the Palestinian refugees and pro-NASA elements in his government that might topple him if he didn't warm up to Egypt. Understanding that they would be at a severe disadvantage of Arab states were allowed to launch a first attack. Israel chose to move preemptively. President Johnson warned Israel to not fire the first shot. But the closing of the Straits, which really financially damaged Israel a great deal and the actions of Egypt and the other Arab states had set Israel down a path of preemptive warfare. Israeli defense force had been preparing for something like this. They were well trained, well equipped, and had a exceedingly good air force. Starting on June 5th, 1967, Israel smashed their enemies and drastically increased the territory controlled by Israel. The war was no contest. Israeli forces performed just as expected. They destroyed Egyptian and Syrian air forces mostly on the ground using American and French aircraft. Their troops fought with great enthusiasm in their tanks. Many of British manufacture worked very well. In five days, it was over. The Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem and the West Bank were now under Israeli control. Israel expanded its territory significantly with the conquest of East Jerusalem, all the major Jewish holy sites were under Jewish control for the first time since the ancient state of Israel. Territory, the acquisition of these lands meant security, but again, it was a double-edged sword. Large numbers of Palestinians and arrows found themselves living in Israel while others fled, creating more and more Palestinian refugees. The United States had opposed unilateral Israeli action, but Israel had kept Washington fully informed all along that their intentions were to use military force. Washington didn't try to persuade Israel against the preemptive attack when the die was cast. This was very different in relation to what had happened in 1956 when the US was kept in the dark. Of course, American influence in the region also was under strain in 1967 because America was deeply involved in the Vietnam war. The United Nations stepped into the situation, passing resolution 242. This is a very, very famous resolution that demanded Israel withdraw from the occupied territories as a foundation for establishing a lasting peace agreement. With Israel having gained important territories for the defense of their country, they really weren't interested in abandoning any of the territories. If felt as if the country had now obtained a level of security, and that was certainly the feeling within the borders of the Israeli state, let's take a moment to dig a little deeper and to evaluate what happened. There have been transagents over and transagents over Israel's existence. contributed to causing the war. Furthermore, NASA made some really bad calculations. The saber-raddling and diplomatic activity encouraged by his generals and influenced by flawed Soviet intelligence ended up being disastrous. Moscow alleged that Israel, remember, was preparing an attack on Syria and had positioned large force on its border and that simply wasn't true. Israel's conquest of the Golan Heights was permanent damage to Syria and played and still plays a large role in Syrian politics even today. Afghites' al-Assad was minister of defense at the time of the war and the loss of the Golan certainly helped shape his views toward Israel after he became president in 1970. Israel took the territory on the last day of the war, some believing that it was unnecessary and perhaps even a dangerous move. Nevertheless, the Golan Heights became Israeli. Israel's victory full and complete on the battlefield did not bring about a period of peace and tranquility. The assumption of new lands, as we've mentioned before, always brings new problems. Israel's victories brought minorities into the country who were not very happy to be a part of Israel. Furthermore, violence continued sporadically, especially with bombings, but with victory came in Israel a bit of hubris. Many leaders like Goldemeyer felt no compelling reason to negotiate for a lasting peace, considering Israel's remarkable battlefield dominance. In particular, Israeli Air Force had commanded the skies, making it all but impossible for Arab states to score a victory. Some Israelis believed though that they were entering a glory period, but this was not the case. The 67 war fueled the Palestinian issue. Before 1967, no one really talked about the Palestinians and a Palestinian state except NASA, really, who used it as a political football. The war changed this. The Palestinian Liberation Organization was founded out of the Arab League in 1964, but it began to gain significant attention after the 67 war due to a steady stream of attacks on the Israeli Defense Force and on civilians. This could only be done with the support of Jordan, which allowed PLO forces to use it as a staging ground. That all changed in 1970 though, when the PLO was expelled from Jordan because King Hussein feared the growing power and influence of a large number of Palestinian refugees. Undeterred, the PLO moved Lebanon. The Palestinian Liberation Organization had problems though, urging unity. Yossar Arafat, the leader of the PLO's most significant faction Fatah, at least since 1969, was at least a little bit prone to negotiation. But other factions were more zealous, seeking no compromise or no negotiation. Black sector, for example, the organization that conducted the Munich Olympic kidnapping, ultimately killing 11 Israeli athletes was energetically opposed to anything but the end of Israel. Now, the PLO charter was very clear that Israel did not have any right to exist and the territory was rightfully Palestinian. What that meant in reality could have been a little different. Could there be a single state that included Jews and Arabs living in a secular society? Was it two state solution possible? Was violence the answer? Many Arabs admired the PLO because it was viewed as an organization of action. Arafat's profile increased with each passing year, although it was not able to exercise control over all elements that fell under the umbrella of the PLO. In 1970, Ann Warzadat became President of Egypt. Sadat was not widely known at the time and he was very different from his predecessor. His assumption to the presidency radically changed the trajectory of Middle East history. The Arab world and the UN had demanded the return of the occupied territories that Israel had captured in the 67 war. Remember this is UN resolution 242. Israel refused to negotiate the return. Syria and Norway believed that a war, any potential war at least, would eliminate Israel. But they thought that success on the battlefield would force Israel to negotiate a settlement that might include the return of the Golandas area and the Sinai to Egypt. The Palestinian people themselves were not really part of the thinking. These two states were not going to go to war for the reestablishment of a Palestinian state. They were going to go to war for their own interests. Sadat was uncomfortable with Nazar's foreign policy that he believed gave Egypt few diplomatic options. Better relations with the UN and the US and Europe could lead to an adjustment of borders, they believed. Sadat expelled the USSR from Egypt in the summer of 1972, although his military was equipped chiefly by Soviet and Eastern bloc weapons. The US was thrilled with the development, but the Soviet Union was not out of the picture. Continued tension and violence between Israel and Palestinians and Arab states, fueled in part by the Munich Olympic kidnapping, played positively into Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. Sadat had attempted to negotiate with Israel about the Sinai, but these initiatives had not gone far. It was a sense of hubris, like I mentioned earlier in Israel, after the 67 war that worked against an agreement. Sadat saw a limited war with limited territorial ambitions as perhaps his best option. When planning the 73 war, Egypt's goals were to move no more than about 15 miles across the Sinai Peninsula. The goal, they didn't want to take the whole place. Egypt and Syria colluded to wage a two front war against Israel. Surprisingly, military preparations were not taken seriously by the Israelis, the Americans or anyone else. This was a failure that would lead the goal to my air's political defeat. The attack was a surprise, occurring during Yom Kippur. On October 6, 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces launched a lightning quick attack on Israel, especially Egyptian forces. The Israelis were caught flat-footed, fully unprepared, and during the first days of the war, it looked like defeat. Syrian and Egyptian troops made great progress. During the war's second week, the Israelis righted the ship, and all those suffering high casualties defeated the Egyptians and the Syrians. The war quickly brought the Soviet Union and the United States into the conflict, mostly as proxy powers. It was sort of developing as a pseudo-proxy war. The Soviets wanted to restore their influence in the Middle East, the United States favored Israel, in part to balance the Soviets' position in the Arab War. Neither side though wanted the war to expand. American support, especially intelligence and arms greatly assisted the Israeli victory. Israel won again, but the war had a different effect than earlier conflicts. It, in Israel, it felt very much like a defeat. High loss of life and Egyptian and Syrian early successes made Israel look vulnerable, but their military had performed well albeit there were moments when it looked like defeat was on the horizon. Again, the Israeli Air Force equipped with American and French fighters was very good, and the troops on the ground were expertly trained. The war had international importance, and some were nervous that there was this potential for the war to entangle the U.S. and the Soviet Union directly. Henry Kiss. and Richard Nixon wanted in Israeli victory, but they did not want to see the Arab states humiliated. They hoped the convinced Arab states that the Soviet Union was a dead end, but they feared the chaos that would occur if Egypt and Syria were humiliated. Therefore, negotiating a ceasefire once Israel had the upper hand was essential. This was the age of detainment, we must remember. The Soviet Union liked the cooling of tensions, and so did Nixon. No one wanted to go down the road of a direct conference confrontation. There was too much work had been done on day time to ease tensions, through things like the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty negotiations, better known as this size, salt. Furthermore, the war had enormous significance outside of the Middle East, by precipitating the OPEC oil crisis. Arab states angry over the United States' support for Israel, including American arms, which helped win the war, exercise power by cutting production, placing real political and economic pressure on the United States and European countries. The OPEC crisis heard economies in many states around the globe, but demonstrated that Arab nations could exercise real political power through the manipulation of oil production. Inflation became a significant problem around the globe. After the war experienced, Sadat became even more of a pragmatist. The conflict was costly in man and damaging to the economy. Recovery was expensive, even in defeat though, Sadat's reputation increased. He was a hero to many Arabs for directly taking on the Israelis. But he wanted the Sinai back and realized that the constant tension didn't serve his country well, with Western leaning reforms in Asia. It made sense to try and reach a settlement with Israel. Israel really needed one as well. They desperately required some sense of normalcy in their neighborhood. There was a lot easier to craft a settlement with one country rather than with all the enemies around them. Like their enemies, the war left thousands dead and significant destruction, and the military needed time to rebuild its strength as well. The war caused Goldemeyer to resign due to the failures of predicting what becomes known as the Yom Kippur War, the 1973 War. Manakum Began, a French politician, and he really had been a French politician for many, many years, took her place. It was Began's government that would encourage Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. But it was also Began who would agree to what was considered the impossible. President Carter made peace in the Middle East a centerpiece of his presidency. With N.W. Slodot wanting a level of normalcy, the timing for Carter was good. Slodot had a winning smile and an outgoing personality. He also understood that a dramatic gesture might just score him some important points. In line with his personality, Slodot made a bold move and spoke to the Knesset in 1977. It amazed the world and it offered the opportunity for normalizing relations. In September 1978, Jimmy Carter invited Slodot and Manakum Began to camp David to discuss and finalize a policy for future peace between Egypt and Israel and maybe other states. This negotiation resulted in the camp David Accords. The negotiations were unique in so many ways. They negotiated for 13 days with most of the talks held directly between Carter, Slodot, and Began, not from teams of foreign policy specialists. There were shouts and accusations tossed about and sometimes spoke stormed out of rooms, eventually though they reached a compromise. They agreed to craft a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. One that would be negotiated in good faith. They were announced using violence to settle disputes and Israel agreed that a Palestinian government would be crafted in Gaza and the West Bank, making the territories self-governing entities. At the same time, all states were to pay particular attention to Israel's security as well as their own. They wanted the Egyptian and Israeli agreement to influence the establishment of other hopefully-like agreements. Critically, they pledged to establish diplomatic relations with one enough. Camp David wasn't a peace agreement, but it was the foundation for a peace agreement. That's how in Shrenche the problems were. The Camp David Accords were a landmark in Middle Eastern history, winning Slodot and Began Nobel Peace Prizes. It may have been Jimmy Carter's greatest achievement and honestly he really did deserve to hold the peace prize as well. The Accords work in March 1979, Israel announced that it would withdraw from the Sinai and in exchange Egypt would recognize Israel with diplomatic relations fully established between the two countries. Slodot in addition opened the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. This was a moment that no one thought would ever come. A normalization of relations between the Egypt and Israel. There was room now to discuss or even establish perhaps a two-state solution, but unfortunately other states had no interest in following Slodot's lead. They dug in their heels in opposition seeing Slodot as a sellout. In fact, Egypt was kicked out of the Arab League as punishment. Slodot sacrificed his life. He was assassinated in 1981. Nonetheless, all of this showed that a peace settlement could be negotiated. The two-state solution was not a pipe dream. Democratic Palestinian state development might be possible. Normalization of relations was possible. Unfortunately, all that optimism would not reach fruition. That's our story for next time. I hope you've enjoyed this brief look at the complicated and so very tragic history of Israel and its neighbors in the 20th century. See you next time.