Is Ukraine winning the war?

(clicking) - Welcome to my Léa Lauren. My name is Anastasia Lopatina. I am Pa Adam Alma Egin. - I am Fabia Popman. - I'm Nina Hollander. - And this is a new weekly podcast about European security. Because Fabian, as you always say, there clearly isn't enough podcast on that particular topic out there in the world. So before we get into it, we should probably do a little bit of an introduction of what this even is, why we wanted to do this podcast and who we are. So we've all been friends for several years now. And we've had many conversations about the war in Ukraine, Russia's melanectivity in Europe, the European industrial complex, on-grade strikes, you name it. And we've decided that it would be great to plug the microphones and make these conversations public. And so with this podcast, my Léa Lauren, we're trying to do just that. We're gonna be gathering every week and discussing things that are my Léa Lauren, deeply alarming. I think everyone is gonna have a different scale every week. But just thinks that we're focusing on in the European and global security. We're gonna be focusing on Europe though, because all of us are based in Europe and care most deeply about Europe. And yeah, every time we're gonna be discussing a few things that we're alarmed about before diving deeper into several topics. And to start off this podcast, we decided to do three first episodes dedicated to different topics to sort of set up the conversation for many months and years. And we wanna start with the war in Ukraine. That's gonna be the very first sort of launch episode. The second episode, which you'll hear in a week, will be about Europe. And the third episode will be about the global security situation. So we'll talk more about the US, the world, the world, the world. - So yeah, with that out of the way, do you guys wanna do a little quick introduction of who each of us even are? Where are we based and what we're working on? Karanana, do you wanna go first? - Yes. - Yeah, so hi everyone. I am Karan Anna Egan. I am a senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. I recently became the program for Ukraine and full spectrum threats. So I'm particularly excited about the topic today. Ukraine's been something I've covered for a long time in addition to being part of the typical European group of researchers who have solely focused on Russia for so many years. So tempting now to also divert much more attention to Ukraine matters. - Yeah. So I'll-- - Europe is in Oslo, right? - I'm based in Oslo, yes. And I also recently stole Fabian to my institute and to my program. I guess that's a good segue. - Okay, go ahead. - That's a great segue. Yes, that's a great segue. - Yes, I also very recently had the pleasure of starting at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in the very same program as Karanana. My research has been focusing on continuous to focus on missile technology, nuclear strategy and all things European security and defense. And you're also the author of "An Amazing Newsletter" missile matters, which-- - Yes, exactly. - You must have subscribed to. - Weekly analysis on missile stuff. If you're interested, probably gonna put the links in the box. - Yes, yes. Mina, where are you? What are you doing? - I'm knowing this based at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies, which is located at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. And my main focus is on Northern European security, specifically, but also wider European security, transatlantic things. I've been following the war in Ukraine, obviously, also very closely, but more from the perspective how it impacts what the European sort of reaction and response to it is, how do we start integrating Ukraine more closely into Europe and so on. I also do research on Arctic security and hybrid warfare among other things. I just didn't really say what I've been focusing on, like, you know, in my research. So excited to say that I'm part of the program. But I also just wanted to chime in and say, like I've worked on Arctic high north security matters for many years, and that I wrote my PhD on Russian information confrontation and Russian use, like, non-military means, but also-- and we'll look at how, you know, Russia combines military and non-military tools. It's also known for some as hybrid threats, so that's also part of, like, my focus area. - Okay, excellent. I guess that leaves me. Well, I am based in Kiev. I'm currently at the time of this recording in Washington, which makes my setup here a little complicated, but I live in Kiev with my daughter and my husband. I used to work at the Kuwait dependent. So unlike everyone else gathered here, I'm a journalist. I've only ever been a journalist. And at the Kuwait dependent, I've focused on life and occupied territories, Ukrainians in the Middle East, Crimean Tatars, issues in Crimea. And then around a year and a half ago, I moved on to Laughair, which is an outlet here in Washington that writes about national security and law. We have a legal focus. So we write about a lot of sort of legal foreign policy national security interceptions, except I don't have any legal background, so I'm a little bit of a unicorn at Laughair. I just do Ukraine and Russia stuff, everything related to the region. And Ukraine fell out there. So yeah, okay, excellent. With this out of the way, let's jump straight into what are we alarmed about this week? - Well, I can start with my little alarming topic. And I'm only mildly alarmed because this is a topic that surpasses my expertise and understanding. So there's a lot of alarming reports about the fuel supply and price situation because of the US, Israel, around war. There's all kinds of very sort of apocalyptic predictions that none of us is going to go in summer holidays because there's not gonna be any jet fuel. I plan to just like be at home for my time. - I think for the future episodes, we should get someone who really understands the economy and the energy markets. - That is. - With his own forces. - A good idea. - Yeah. - We can calibrate our alarm more. - Yes, more appropriate. Okay. Five-end. What are you alarmed about? - This week, I am mildly alarmed about NPT review conference which has started yesterday. NPT, that's the non-proliferation treaty. It's the treaty instrument where all most states in the world have agreed that proliferating nuclear weapons is not something that we want to do. And hence we refrain from it. Every couple of years, the member states, which are virtually all the UN member states, they gather to hopefully agree on some things over the last couple of review conferences. The last three to be precise, there was no agreement to be found. And I think it's extremely unlikely that this year, there's gonna be any type of agreement with everything that happened in Iran, everything that continues to be going on in Europe and elsewhere. And you know, it's a bit alarming because it's in many ways. It's the last remaining nuclear treaty instrument that prevents us from pure energy. So we don't wanna see it falter. But at the same time, our hopes have been so low for so many years now that, you know, mildly alarming, but we can handle it probably. All we have to. - Hey, Karanana. - Yeah. I recently read this really interesting report by the Institute for the Study of War that looked at the Kremlin's expanding media conglomerate. - This is a report by Natalia Buhayova, right? - Yes. - That's true. - To do a shout out, she's excellent. All of her work is amazing. I believe they're a part done as well. - I agree. And, you know, speaking of people to invite in the future. - Yes. - Yeah. - I mean. - So tell us more about the report. - I mean, we already know. And also, like I've read about this in my PhD, how Russia uses information, you know, in a strategic sense. So it's part of Russian strategy, you know, and increasingly important part of their toolkit as they're losing influence in, you know, all these other domains, like politically, economically. And especially in the European context, which I've focused most on. But what I really enjoyed about this article is that they sort of look at how Russia is really trying to assert itself globally. And especially in countries like China, Iran, Brazil, the BRICS countries using like the networks, the BRICNET networks to really like educate journalists, influencers, create, you know, new media networks to spread like the Russian narrative. And especially, of course, try to tarnish like Ukraine's reputation worldwide, Europe's reputation, et cetera. So I just thought it was a really decent, you know, a decent work on this aspect that I think we don't focus enough on in a European context, like how Russia is really trying to leverage the, you know, the world outside Europe to gain support for its own project. So shout out to the report. - Yeah. - And it's mildly alarming as well. Yeah. - Yeah. - That's a wise plan. - I mean, And at the risk of going too deep into this for the section of the episode, just a sentence for me that it's really hard for liberal democracies in Europe to grapple with Russia's information attacks and Russia's media spreading, you know, and spreading this information and doing all of these essentially information attacks because it's, you know, if you're a democracy and you value freedom of speech, it's very hard for all of us in the studio to persuade politicians and liberal democracies to do anything about it, because it's seen as, you know, not very democratic. But I can add a level should to this with some of these. But we should. Yeah, let's do that. Let's save this exact conversation for the next episode, which will be dedicated to Europe. Lastly, my mindly alarmed. And actually, I'm not even, I wouldn't say I'm mindly alarmed. I'm probably deeply alarmed about the fact that so a few weeks ago there was a mass shooting in Kiev, which surprisingly made very little headway in international news. But there was a mass shooting, I think seven, at least seven people were killed just in a supermarket in Kiev. I got my open fire. And it reignited a debate in Ukraine about gun rights with many people pushing for greater amount of weapons to be given to civilians for more civilians to be able to get weapons easily for the sake of, you know, defense, self defense. And with many making arguments that, you know, will have an unsafe world and civilians have to have a chance to protect themselves. This is not going to be some sort of a political neutral podcast. Like we're all going to be sharing our, like, opinions and views here. So I'm just going to be straight with the listeners. I think it's a bad idea. I'm not not grow guns in any way. I think the less guns there are the better. So I'm very alarmed that, you know, there are a lot of veterans and generally very respected people in Ukraine who are pushing for, you know, easier sort of gun regulations. So we'll see, we'll see where that debate leads. There's no, there hasn't been any bail passed on this. It's still too early, but the debate is ongoing and I'm worried that it will lead to a less safe Ukraine in the future. Speaking of, speaking of alarming things happening in Ukraine, we should jump now into our main topic for the episode, which is just sort of setting the stage for the podcast for the future and talking about the frontline situation in Ukraine about the security situation, but the negotiations, although there is basically nothing to talk about in that round, but that should be stated as of as its own fact. I thought we could split this and sort of doing out titers, entitled view or thoughts on the war in Ukraine and the situation. I just remember like last year, it was so, you know, gloom and doom and I was in, you know, discussions on, you know, Ukraine is really like, you know, they're losing terrain. It's looking bad. The financial situation is dire. Russia was really like, you can tell that they were like feeling so cocky with Trump and train the White House and you started hearing, you know, the Russian narratives, you know, from the White House podium and then, you know, you entered the winter, which was really hard for Ukraine, but it's not like things are like flipped around, but the situation is definitely looking much better for Ukraine. Russia again has not been able to take advantage of, you know, all the strengths that it has on paper. It's losing so much people that are not able to recruit enough people to sustain like the size and also the pressure on the frontline. And Fabian will probably chime in on, you know, all the long range drone campaigns inside Russia. And I mean, they've been doing this for a long time, but really now you can see how it's picking up speed and taking out all these logistic hubs and Europe finally was able to provide the financial package. So I guess like the bigger picture now to just set us off is that it thinks are looking better for Ukraine in the sense and there's, you know, you don't hear the voices that, you know, Ukraine should just, you know, give the territory up and, you know, meet Russia, the negotiate here where I'm sitting in DC. I'd argue some voices are, are something like that, but that's just a British year. Yeah. Yeah. Of course, there are many, there are, of course, different viewpoints on this and the European and US official viewpoints on Ukraine has also diverted a lot in the past year after Trump entered re-entered the white house. And this complex is like important to sort of take a moment to appreciate the fact how much more self-sufficient Ukraine is at this point. Ukraine, I mean, Ukraine is not in Tyler's self-sufficient, but it has managed to build a lot of sort of supply chains that are not so dependent on external donors. Ukraine's own industry has taken a lot of steps forward. And also how. Ukraine just looked the sub very quickly because the statistic wasn't in my head, but more than half of all of the weapons that we use right now are homemade. It's a sick producer Ukraine. You're fine. I remember reading like about a year ago that it was at 30%, and this is like adding like a significant chunk to that. So that's a significant sort of change for Ukraine's ability to conduct this fighting according to its own wishes and not being so restrained by the availability of equipment from partners and then whatever limitations it comes with. And then also sort of what I find is one of the most important developments looking at this from Europe is how Ukraine has become this kind of partner and not only a recipient of aid. So there's been a significant change in that relationship as well, which will have like a lot of ramifications going forward. And also the fact that after the Trump administration basically ended nearly all aid to Ukraine and as J.D. Van Asa said, he's very proud of having sort of pushed for that. Ukraine and Europe have been able to figure this out like not maybe in the most optimal way, but in a way, anyways, that sort of puts Ukraine into better place now. So I would say that my glasses definitely have pooled in. But listeners will learn as they come back to the podcast that that's generally the vibe with Mina. Her glasses always have full, which is why one of the reasons why I love her. Yeah. And then we come to me and my glasses typically hold exactly. People have followed my work. It might know that I play my nuclear strategy background, which forces me to always approach things from a worst case perspective. But even I have to admit, and happily so that I also got the feeling, and this is also something I've been thinking about in preparation for this podcast episode now, is it just the feeling or the things actually get better? And I do believe right a bit, it's a change in the overall mood that I feel in Europe in no way in Germany when I go to visit there and elsewhere. But it's also key statistics that have flipped, right? So as Karin Anar already mentioned, so on the Russian side, the casualty rate now appears to exceed the replenishment rate for Russian manpower. We continue to get statistics from the Russian economy, which clearly indicate that that the economy is struggling, right? It has been struggling for a long time. Again, there's like nothing that indicates an immediate collapse, but some of those mark week, more like indicators that many people know a lot more about than I do, but the way I understand it and I see it, it's not looking super rosy, right? And then you have last month for the very first time, and this is really difficult to confirm, but it might very well be the case that Ukraine launched a greater number of long range strike weapons or long range drones specifically into Russia, and then Russia launched at Ukraine. Again, right, this is really difficult to confirm whether that's exactly the case, but what is very clear from the outside and even without proper statistics is that the strike rate at which Ukraine has been able to launch into Russia has been increasing quite drastically. And this is also putting, creating enormous difficulties for Russia, for the state, for its economy, and changes the dynamics of the war in my view because I think it constitutes one of the key independent sources of leverage for Ukraine, right? As long as Ukraine retains the ability and there's absolutely nothing to suggest that this may change over the medium to long term, to launch into Russia, that is something that Russia will have to take into account that as long as it is an aggressor and attacks Ukraine, as long as that its economy might suffer under Ukrainian long range strike attacks. So that is really, really important, so overall, I also see this situation more positively, these days much more positively than over the harsh winter, but I think now we're all very curious, Nastya, what your experience, what your feelings are at the current state of the war. I wanted to add to Fabian's point on how it's pushing and damaging Russia's economy, but I think a really important thing to communicate here as well is that Ukraine by increasing the drone attacks are also bringing the war to Russia. And I think we shouldn't underappreciate how important that is and how to so far, like, you know, the Russian population at large hasn't really felt the consequences of this war and they've been, you know, they've been able to just say, well, I don't see it, then I don't really necessarily have to care about it, right? So that's a really important element and you see a lot of videos now of Russians being like, oh, there's, you know, I can't really ignore that my windows are covered with oil, right? So that's also a really, I think an important part of this. Especially that Ukraine is bringing closer to the relevant cities in Russia, which are of course Moscow and St. Petersburg, because obviously Ukraine spent some time in Kursk, right? But that didn't do that much, so for the Russian perception, maybe like somehow, like it was like remote enough, but all this stuff happening in the Gulf of Finland, that's very close to home to many, many Russians and these sort of spectacular videos of the oil terminals in flames are as Karin and SS hard to ignore. So that's definitely a really important development. But sorry, now I want to you, Nassia. I find this question of sort of how to assess the bird's eye view, the general dynamics very complicated, like just a few days ago, I was asked by an American friend in New York, whether they thought that Ukraine was winning or not, whether Russia was winning or whether Ukraine was winning. And I didn't know how to respond to that because I'm not sure there is an easy factual response or just a, I'm not sure there is even an answer that can be given to this, because I think it's really a matter of optics in many ways, because you know, you could say on the one side, the very fact that, you know, Puyov is an occupied, the very fact that all of us and all our listeners can go to Ukraine and mostly do their business as normal, the very fact that that's real is a miracle. And that's a huge testament to what Ukraine has been able to achieve with its partners. On the other hand, though, we are able to achieve this at an enormous cost, at an unimaginable cost, at a cost of basically every family in Ukraine having somebody who was died or injured in the war or is mobilized and has very high chances of getting killed or injured. This question of like, is the war going in Ukraine's favor or on in Russia's favor? There are so many, there are so many factors here that I could, I could never figure out which is which. And I mean, I agree that right now things feel like they're looking up and I think largely that's because we had just an extremely horrific winter. I wasn't clear with my family for, or the for the full winter, and it was definitely the worst winter we've ever had. And I'm pretty sure it was the coldest on record and it was part of it was just purely the weather. It was the coldest in modern Ukrainian history. There's nothing anyway. Any of us could have done about that. And then of course, you combine that with the fact that Russia, as it has done every year since the beginning of its full school invasion, has tried to destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure specifically with the obvious goal of plunging people in darkness and cold. And they, I don't think they succeeded because there wasn't, you know, there wasn't really a mass, countrywide blackout. But, but it was a really miserable time, you know, like my family, me, my toddler and my husband, we've had to stay at a hotel for a few nights because our apartment didn't have water because the pipes just quite literally froze. They're very old Soviet pipes and an old Soviet building. They just didn't handle the weather. And then we also, like barely had any heating. It was extremely cold. And we had to spend, you know, thousands of dollars getting, you know, power stations and generators and various heaters just to heat like at least a bedroom where we all slept. Yeah. And we were extremely lucky that we had the resources to do all of that. And it was still a very horrible experience. So, but every time I sort of complained about it, I thought of, you know, the single moms living on the loudbank of Kiev who don't have the material resources to help themselves. And who just have had as thousands of people in the loudbank, like no, actually no heating, zero heating for months that winter because of Russia's attacks. And so I think in my perspective, like I remember when when March 1st, you know, arrived and when it was in Ukraine, that's the first day of spring. Everyone just like breathed the sigh of relief that like, oh my god, like we generally felt like the winter is never going to end and it's finally over. And the sun is out and the temperature is milder. And like things are just, yeah, things are just better. And then of course, layered onto all of that is these interesting reports from the authorities and from the Ukrainian authorities that, for example, in February, the Ukrainian government said that for the first time since 2023, Ukraine liberated more lands that it had lost that month. Which I think, you know, you layer on to that on into spring coming and then Ukraine's long range strikes that are very dramatic, produce all of this content with Russian oil and flames, etc. It gives a it gives a great sort of positive picture and it's great for morale. But yeah, I mean, it is all very complicated though. Like if you go a few steps further and you try to analyze what any of these things really mean long term, the situation with February and the land and the liberation of land. I've read analysis that, you know, suggests that ultimately this is about narratives and both sides Ukrainian Russia, as is always true in all wars, trying to present their accomplishments, trying to sell their success as much as they can possibly do it. And so if you really look at what's happening in the Ukrainian front line, the front line is so extremely porous and so extremely uneven and it's so hard to track who actually controls what because there is a 20 kilometer wide kill zone and then there is like a gray zone that it's really unclear who controls what it's it's kind of easy to make these grand statements that will abrade it acts a amount of kilometers of territory. When in reality, it's unclear whether all of that territory was even under Russian control to begin with. And then whether you now control it, you know, like, but because the Ukrainian front line is such that, you know, you would have five Russian dudes trying to infiltrate a certain area, they get through a line, they set up shop like dig a hole and hide in there and you can claim however much you want around that little hole in the ground as Russian controlled, but is it really? And so you run into this question of like, how do you determine who controls what and then how do you make these assessments of will abrade it? Eximate of territory or will lost. Eximate of territory. All that is to say that as a Ukrainian, I think everyone, I think everyone is pretty exposed as at least if you're a journalist, maybe this is a media thing, but as a journalist, my job is to keep my, my government accountable. So I will always look critically at my own government first before I, you know, support them or before I look critically at any other government. And so when I hear all of these news about positive developments, I always take a minute to like really think if that's what actually is happening or are they trying to present it in a way that's more rosy than it really is. But, but I think like that's part of like the, you know, there are a lot of recent widespreads great to have you on this podcast and to discuss these matters with you, but I think also like you being able to present this perspective on Ukraine and the Ukrainian government that I don't think we hear that often in, you know, in the Norwegian media or the European media in general, because the picture, the outward pictures of our image and, you know, what we hear from Ukraine is very often tied to Zelensky and his team, right? So I think it's very important to dive into the nuances, the infighting and, you know, to gain more understanding of how Ukrainian politics and society works. I do have like one point on like the frontline issue, I think because obviously like both sides have an interest in, you know, claiming victories, you see these stories about Russians like running up to a point like planting a flag, there's a photo op and then you run back, right? And the flag is destroyed. You hear a lot of those stories, but again, like the bigger picture when it comes to the frontline is that it has turned into this really more like not static because you have like movements all the time, but the movements are very incremental, very small. And for the longest time, we've talked about how, you know, yeah, Russia is able to like slowly but surely like push itself like deeper inside Ukraine. But what is changing now is that you don't hear those stories as much anymore and you're now talking about like how they're unable to like continue that slow and steady push into Ukraine, at least for now. And I think that that is a change and it also matters because if you were to come to, you know, this eventual eventually to this like negotiation table, like the strength of what you can show for on the battlefield is also something you can, you know, use in these negotiations. So in that sense, I guess I agree it does matter. It definitely matters because I'll be on maybe. I just, you know, just want to say that there was a direct relationship and a very strong relationship between what is being negotiated and what's happening on the front line because I think what's happening on the front line is ultimately the greatest factor of how the war is going to end and on what terms. So I think I would push back a tiny bit against that. I think it mattered more in the past when we tried to impress Donald Trump in an effort to keep him on the side of Ukraine. Then the front line was extremely important because then it really directly translated into potential leverage both vis-à-vis the Americans but also the Russians. I think the Europeans right now and you know for me personally as long as the front line is in the state that it is right now, I'm not too concerned about it and I also frankly you know it's also because I focus on other things but I don't see the need to follow the tiny changes that happen and I would say and this is a bit my impression talking to the Europeans. I think overall the frenzy over small changes in the front line on the European continent really has disappeared. Overall there's this understanding now that the war, the broader dynamics of the war and the strategic outcomes are most likely decided elsewhere. And hence we are a bit more in the dependent of what's going on on the front line on a daily basis and I'm for example not at all concerned right by European support at this stage. Dropping just because let's say Ukraine has a couple of bad weeks or even bad months on the front line right it's great the way it is right now and but I think it's not as conditional anymore as it was in the past and certainly compared comparing Europe to the US. But the Europeans are not at the negotiating table though. So I'm glass. Sorry. Is anybody there is no negotiating table? You're right. There is no negotiating table. But in terms of like ultimately the hypothetical peace deal that Ukraine and Russia will hypothetically at some point sign it matters who is going to be party to that conversation and in the past we saw that the Europeans were trying to be but really warrant or at least not to the same extent that Ukrainians I guess and the Europeans would want but yes Mina give us more optimism on that. I actually don't think this so yes last year Europeans were not at the table of these so-called peace talks that the US initiated. I wouldn't even call it negotiations. These were talks led by very incompetent people. This has been the European discourse on the talks that yes Europe should definitely be party to any meaningful negotiations but these talks were not meaningful negotiations and I honestly just sort of feel sorry for everybody involved that it seemed to have been mostly just a massive waste of time. I don't think that but I can I can argue with you on that after Fabian Chimzin because I think he was trying absolutely. Sure. No, no actually I just agree with Mina I think you know the Europeans if we get to a stage where we start to seriously negotiate because yes we haven't had a serious negotiation yet because the Russians did not step away a single inch from their maximalist objectives. Hence it is not a serious negotiation period. The Europeans will have to be involved because the Europeans will be part of whatever security guarantee arrangement will follow. Hence once we get serious negotiations I agree with Mina the Europeans will be on the table one way or another. Yeah finally enough it was every time the Russians that rejected the proposals from the US not the Ukraine. But I also have to say like I agree with everything and that's been said here especially that you know Russia is unable to you know meet its goals in Ukraine these with you know using its military power so that's why it's again like I said in the introduction you know it's the information demand becomes more important right trying to convince Trump that you know we're best buddies and that you should listen to us instead. But I actually I think you know yeah Europe weren't a part of like the so-called negotiations but they played a pivotal role in like making sure that things didn't like completely collapse when it comes to US-U.K.R relations. So I think you know you saw all these like leaders going to DC trying to mend things especially after that catastrophic meeting in the White House you know where Trump said Zalazka doesn't have any cards etc like so and every round like European leaders have been really like hands on and played like a really important part. It was a massive damage control effort. Yeah and it went I mean it went well in the sense that no catastrophe occurred and we were able to avert any sort of worse outcomes and in that sense yes I agree that it was the European effort was super important to sort of back Ukraine make sure that Ukraine doesn't feel the need to agree to anything that is clearly unacceptable and so on. So that was super important but I don't know I'm really curious to hear in Asia whether you think that like what was the use of of this exercise and and where did it get us because you seem to have a more positive view. I think I was at a view and ever since the talks have really begun I don't even remember when that was roughly a year ago. I've. I was April 25 was the first time. Thank you. Thank you. Yes. We have the negotiations. So I once thought that it won't work. I yeah. I am so I am don't believe that the current talks can lead to actually an negotiated settlement in the nearest future just because you know the Russian demands are directly incompatible with Ukrainian demands right now and the things that they're asking us to do sorry I'm just going to be naturally speaking for the Ukrainian nation here and the things that they're asking us to do were like I just don't see how we could agree to them at all in the nearest future but at the same time I don't think the talks were useless because I think every peace negotiation and the development of like the peace framework they always take time and everybody knew that in Ukraine it will also take time because both sides have to really nail down what exactly it is that they want what exactly it is that they are able to accept work in sessions they're able to accept and all of these things are very complicated policy and security matters that have to be you know workshopped over you know hundreds of hours by the respective negotiators and if they're not of been willing to talk directly then in some sort of you know third party mediation forum and all of that takes a lot of time and so I think when you look at I think that somebody I think that it just takes a lot of time and a lot of work and nobody in the Biden administration was doing that work because they they were sort of taken the path that I think may not you are kind of advocating for that like this isn't a serious negotiation the Russians aren't actually seriously negotiating and until then there is no reason to waste the time I think I look at it slightly differently I think that there is use in workshopping all of these dozens of issues like if like if we read some of the documents that have been floated around like the actual peace deals there's a lot of complicated stuff what like the amount of troops that Ukraine is going to have the demarcation line how is that going to be monitored what weapons Ukraine may or may not use etc like there is a lot of humanitarian issues a lot of security issues all of these are complicated and it takes a lot of time to figure out what both sides are comfortable with and so I think at the very minimum what the talks have achieved is that both sides have talked a lot about these things and figured out in their respective countries what it is that they're at least partially comfortable with there was an ability in Ukraine to sort of debate some of these issues publicly right because once you know we got media leaks that you know this is what is being discussed at the negotiations there was a set like there was a certain public debate about it in Ukraine which I think is also useful and it's gonna you know help ultimately selling whatever deal comes out of it at some point to the public and so I think there's just a lot of like sort of lower level work that has to be done that I think was done and I'm not saying that the Russians can't change their positions tomorrow they can I'm not saying that what was negotiated in the negotiated in these last uh in this last year is ultimately going to be the the peace deal but at least we got some basics down I think that's I think that's great also the Russians the Russians work best I think in the state of sort of ambiguity kind of like the strategic ambiguity concept I think the Russians love that the Russians love not having to say exactly what is it they want they love operating in the state of vagueness where like we may want the Parisia we may not want the Parisia we may be pushing for this we may be pushing for that and I think there is value in making them put things on paper and say what exactly is it that you want there is value in enforcing some clarity onto them and I think we also got some of that in the past year I hear you on like how you know started some discussions and some issues that will be necessary to discuss in a hypothetical future settlement um and but yeah you really you were able to address Russia in the sense that again and again you know they kept saying like yeah we want peace but then obviously you know they hear a they think they concessions that we're demanding from you. - Yeah. - Yeah. Exactly. So the court reed, reed, uh, reed causes you said that you feel like you got some kind of basic parameters out of this. So what would those be for you based on, um, I think it's just good that we got to talk. It's not again, it's not that I'm saying that now I know what exactly the Russians want because they could change their mind tomorrow. But I think it's good that the Ukrainian civil society, the Ukrainian media got to sort of discuss some of these issues. Like for example, the question of the cap on the Ukrainian troops, like, well, the Russians were demanding initially like more than a year ago, the Russians were demanding that, you know, a cap on Ukrainian troops. And that sounded horrible and everyone in Ukraine was like, Oh, what the hell? Like we're not going to let the Russians push anything related to troop numbers because that's an abuse of sovereignty that as a matter of principle that's very bad. We shouldn't let them dictate that. But then you start having a debate about it. And you see that if the document, and I don't exactly remember what the number was in the, in the last documents that were floated, but let's say if the number is 700,000, that's what the Russians are demanding as a cap. That actually, if you start talking about it and you start analyzing it and the expert community gets involved, you realize that that's actually a lot more than Ukraine could even afford to maintain and peace time. Like we don't even need 700,000 standing troops, one could argue. And so now you get from this debate of like, there is no way we're ever going to agree to a cap of troops to, okay, this particular concession is actually something that could be manageable. And so this is just, to me, this is one example of like how having a debate about these issues is very, is very healthy and very helpful. Part of that debate has to be whether that includes also what exactly are you writing in the agreement? Is it the Ukrainian armed forces? Because that's great. Because if that ends up being in the final document, because we have a bunch of troops that are not legally a part of the armed forces of Ukraine, they're a part of national guard or some other formation. So anyway, but the Ukrainian public and I probably wouldn't know any of this because I wouldn't even be thinking about any of this because there wouldn't be a conversation. So that's why I think just discussing it is helpful. I completely agree and I think it's an interesting, again, talking about things that we don't really necessarily hear about in the Norwegian media or European media is like, that those discussions actually are helpful for the Ukrainian society, too. It's a very interesting perspective. And a bit related to how this war ends. And I sort of, I don't want to let go of something that Fabian said about the frontline being the decisive factor in how, who gets what at the negotiation table? Fabian, you said that there are other arenas where the war will be decided. I'm curious if you could elaborate a bit on that because I'd love to discuss. Yeah, yeah, of course. And I think this goes maybe into what we can discuss next. We see this war going and what are challenges and opportunities for Ukraine. So in my view, if I look at the war as it is right now, I think the frontline matters in as much as it affects the capacity, the overall national capacity available to both sides. And it will be decided in favor of the state that maintains a certain level of capacity for longer than the other. And so that's the capacity, right? This includes everything. This includes manpower. This includes industrial capacity. It of course also includes to some extent the will of the people. Although I would say that's pretty, pretty stat fast on both sides. So I think more likely or the more decisive dynamic at the strategic level is looking at those industrial resources available to deploy and maintain troops and equipment on both sides. And so those are, this is the key dynamic that I am trying to follow, right? Who is basically holding out for longer? Because the key question is for me, right? Can you create hold on longer than Russia is able to maintain a minimum level of aggression where puts the Ukrainian state under severe pressure? And so far, right? Ukraine has been able to hold on. As we discussed earlier in previous conflict episodes of this war, the pressure was greater than it feels and potentially is right now. But we also don't know how this is going to look like in a couple of months or even years if this war is going to go on for even longer. So this is what I'm looking at, right? And I think the decisive factor in this war is located. But what do you guys think? How decisive was the EU loan to Ukraine? The EU has been trying to give 90 billion euros to Ukraine, but Hungary was blocking that vote because of this pipeline that moves Russian oil to Hungary and a few other nations. And Ukraine said that that pipeline was shut off because of a Russian attack and because the debris, you know, or a Russian drone damaged the pipeline amidst one of Russia's big attacks. And so the pipeline was shut and Hungary was accusing Ukraine of delaying the opening sort of manipulated the energy situation there. But long story short, the pipeline has been opened I think a few days ago. Hungary lifted its veto and the 90 billion euro loan was finally fully finalized as far as I'm aware. There shouldn't be any more legal problems from Brussels. So yeah, Ukraine is, this is going to be a two-year loan. So the first 45 billion euros were expecting this year. And then there's going to be another tranche next year. So that's the situation. It is huge. It's a lot of money. But yes, Fabian, do you think that that is playing a role? Yeah, that's really important because I think, you know, broadly speaking, everything right now, both for Ukraine and Russia is opportunity cost, right? Because both sides really struggle with increasing the overall amount of resources they have available to wage this war. So basically, both sides consistently have to allocate scarce resources. And if now suddenly Ukraine is able to get this injection of 90 billion, right? It's not going to solve all issues, but it's going to alleviate some of those critical resource constraints it has been suffering under, right? So this is a huge, huge advantage, of course. And broadly speaking, you know, this is the theory of victory that I have always advocated for. The one thing that Ukraine has on its side is that if Europe is steadfast behind it, in theory, it will always, always be able to mobilize more resources than Russia, due to the financial and industrial capacity that's behind the European states that supporting Ukraine, right? And so if that pipeline is working, then this is making a lot of things easier for Ukraine and many things harder for the Russians. And I would like to add to that because this is an equation also not only of the national resources of Ukraine and Russia individually, as Fabian was just pointing out, but the coalitions that are backing each one of the war parties. So of Russia, it's maybe looking a little trickier now with the situation in Iran. I mean, obviously China is a big, big factor on the Russian side, which has been absolutely decisive even. I think that there's no doubt that Europeans are really committed to and have even gotten sort of used to supporting Ukraine, especially in the north of Europe. So of course, we have to always remember that caveat that the support is unfortunately very unevenly distributed in the European context and the small northern European countries are punching way above their their weight. And there's many others who should do and could do much more. However, on the whole, the EU and its institutions and the European countries are very sort of committed to this. So there's no sort of reason to fear that the support for Ukraine and these evolving partnerships that I mentioned earlier that this development will somehow abruptly end. So in that sense, that pipeline that you mentioned Fabian is looking pretty good on the European side, but unfortunately Russia also has backers with significant resources and most full China. And this is sort of like wrapping up because to just bring in like the Russia side into this equation is, you know, Russia has its backers and yes, it is struggling financially. You hear all these discussions on how, you know, Putin is meeting also like push back on how he's like trying to close down the internet and really like tight new grip on like the information environment inside Russia. However, I don't know if we're I'm not like an expert on like economy and stuff like that, but my colleagues who look into it, you know, they're saying that we don't, it's not necessarily going to be like a Russian collapse. And we have to always factor in that low growth in Russia, doesn't mean that it's going to stop its war in Ukraine. Putin and the Kremlin seemed very intent and set on like continuing and also like just funneling all this like social benefit and, you know, welfare, money into the war machine. And unfortunately, I don't see that way. We're at a point where Russia is getting the message across that this is going to be too painful for you to And actually going to be a danger also for like your regime. I don't see that we're there yet. And I'm also Concerned like we've had this discussions, you know For since 2014 that there's not this coherent, you know strategy when it comes to like what do we want for Ukraine Besides rhetorically saying we want Ukraine to win and survive as a country, but again Maybe this is like picking up now. We have the coalitions of the willing you see all these partnerships We're gonna discuss this more in the next next podcast, but Again, yeah, I mean it's looking brighter now, but then The momentum needs to be kept up and I think that's at the end of the day. That's a European responsibility Yes, and then something to add to what I was saying about that the Europeans have gotten sort of used to supporting Ukraine So so this has become like totally sort of a mainstream policy But but what we haven't like it's a step that we still haven't really taken and this also ties back to the negotiations question Like what difference would it make if if Europe was at the table if we wanted some some more results Then these talks produced until now we would have to not only support Ukraine As we do now or preferably more, but also be willing to do Go against Russia much harder than we have so far and that is I think the step that there's still a lot of hesitation About in Europe and that's certain for the next episode. Yeah, should be kept in mind So I think this is a good note to wrap on but I do want to add You know sort of a final Ukrainian perspective on this and that's that For me as a Ukrainian the most important factor of how the war progresses in the next year is one of the most important factors Whether Ukraine learns to fight better and smarter and whether Ukraine learns how to use its resources better because the way we're constantly doing it is Just not leading to a good outcome the Ukrainian military and Ukraine's top generals are under a lot of scandals and controversies related to the retreatment of soldiers related to you know their usage of you know very rush-alike tactics of these completely useless assault waves that lead a lot of men that leave a lot of men dead or injured and So I think it's a huge problem one of those things that you don't hear a lot in the Western press one could argue whether that's good or bad That's a different conversation But I think I'm looking for the Ukrainian government and for Zelensky specifically to realize that the current top military leadership has to change And the people who he needs to appoint have to be focused on one thing only and that is making sure that we are saving Every resource and every soldier we have because that is I think our biggest constraint you guys the Europeans have a lot of money You're giving us a lot of money. You can give us a lot more money I'm looking at you Kara Karen Anna-Angan Pretty sure if you scratch an Norwegian coins will start falling out of your body But it is also a separate question of whether we use the resources that are given to us well enough And I think we're not using them well enough right now and I really want that to change On that note, thank you guys all for listening and please bear with us as we learn to navigate this new medium that we're trying Please rate our podcast wherever you're listening to it leave comments whether you like that because I don't know It really does help promote the show. It's very important to us And if you like the show also would be very grateful if you considered supporting us on by me a coffee It's a platform that we're going to link in the description of the episode This work takes resources and effort to if you like to please consider supporting us And we'll leave all the links of things that we mentioned in the description of the episode And of course special thanks to our audio engineer the magician behind Making this possible and thinny bardoway and thinny do want to say hi Hello everyone. I'm also here in Kiev So we're as as you see it will soon be I suppose I also host the podcast to crane without hype which will have an episode coming out right before this one So a lot of work to do this week. So thank you all for listening. We'll be back next week. Bye Bye bye