Is U.S. Control of Limited Territory in Greenland A Strategic Necessity?

(applause) This is open to debate. I'm John Donovan, President Trump, once Greenland. He wants the U.S. to own it. He has offered to buy it. He has hinted at taking it by use of force, and then he has walked that back after Davos. But there are strategic parts he is not letting go. The pressure campaign continues. American control of some territory in Greenland, he says, is psychologically important. All of this is set off a storm of astonishment and worry, certainly among America's NATO allies, because the nation that owns Greenland, Denmark is a member of NATO, the alliance that the U.S. has led for 76 years. Denmark does not intend to sacrifice its sovereignty. But some experienced strategic thinkers say what the president wants is not beyond reason, that there is a thoughtful case to be made for U.S. control of at least some parts of Greenland. Two of them are about to join this debate. They will face two equally qualified people also taking on the stage to prove them wrong, where at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, our partner in this episode to witness the arguments around this question, is U.S. control of limited territory in Greenland a strategic necessity? Let's meet our debaters. First on the side, answering yes to this question. I want to welcome Alexander B. Gray. Alexander served at the White House for four years, most recently as Chief of Staff of the National Security Council and Deputy Assistant to President Trump. He's now a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. Hi, Alexander, welcome to the program. You are a fourth generation Oklahoma, and I understand how you're liking these East Coast winters. Nothing compared to tornadoes. Fair enough. Well, anyway, I'd like to welcome you with a round of applause to our stage. [APPLAUSE] And now it's your partner, is Michael Pillsbury. Michael is a longtime U.S. defense and foreign policy strategist. He held senior Pentagon roles under President George H. W. Bush and has been a key figure in shaping U.S. policy towards both China and Afghanistan. Now the senior fellow for China's strategy at the Heritage Foundation, an author of a book called The Hundred-Year Marathon about China's long-term strategic ambitions. Welcome, Michael. Welcome to the program. What point are we out in the hundred-year marathon? 25 years to go. All right. [APPLAUSE] Taking the opposite side of this argument, I want to welcome Dr. Corey Shaki. Corey's career and government includes the U.S. State Department, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council. You are now the senior fellow in the director of foreign defense policy studies at AEI, and you recently came out with your new book, The State and the Soldier. Corey, you are an open to debate veteran. We think this is a record that this is your eighth time debating with us more than anyone else. Does that give you an edge in this program? I sure hope so. We'll see. Thank you. Corey's teammate is Max Boot. Max is an historian and author and economist for the Washington Post, a former CNN global affairs analyst, and also served as foreign policy adviser to the presidential campaigns of John McCain, Marco Rubio, Mitt Romney. He is currently a Gene J. Karpatric senior fellow for national security studies here at the Council on Foreign Relations. Max has written a number of books, including his biography of Ronald Reagan, titled Reagan, His Life, and Legend. Max, any guesses on what President Reagan would think of this moment in foreign policy? There you go again, John. I think he would probably be pretty surprised to find a president of his own party who opposes immigration and supports tariffs. All right, sounds like we're beginning to get this to the start of your argument. So welcome to the program, Max. [APPLAUSE] All right, we're going to go to our first round. And our first round is comprised of each of the debaters taking this floor to make their opening statements, telling us why they're arguing, answering, yes, or no, to our key question. That question again is US control of limited territory and Greenland a strategic necessity. Alexander, you are up first. The floor is yours. You have four minutes to answer for us. Pleasure to be here. Who would have thought a kid from Oklahoma be here at the Council on Foreign Relations in Manhattan, it's an honor. So I think before I explain why I support this proposition, we need to go 9,000 miles from Greenland to a place called the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific. The Solomon Islands is a sparsely populated archipelago in a key sea lanes near Australia. It has been a critical choke point in the Indo-Pacific, since before the Second World War, American Marines died on Guadalcanal at huge numbers to keep it safe. And why is it relevant to Greenland? It's relevant to Greenland because, like the situation in Greenland, it is a hub for malign, pure competitor influence, namely China. When China first came in to-- in 2019, first came into the Solomon Islands, because it was relatively benign. They came in under the proposition that they were going to provide economic opportunity to the people of the Solomon Islands and maybe some infrastructure support. They came in and they very quickly started expanding into political control, into potential military opportunities. Dual use ports, airfields, very quickly the Solomon Islands sitting at a strategic choke point in the South Pacific became a quasi-Chinese colony to the extent that the Solomon Islands government under the influence of the People's Republic of China has allowed uniformed officers of the People's Arm Police to actually go into the Solomon's and enforce Solomon Islands law against Solomon Island citizens. That is an extraordinary use of malign foreign influence. And my contention is it will happen in Greenland if the United States does not act proactively to prevent it from happening. And this isn't new. This isn't unique to Donald Trump. American presidents since Andrew Johnson in 1867 have viewed the security of the United States as intricately tied up with the security of Greenland. It's why we tried to buy it under Woodrow Wilson in the First World War. It's why Franklin Roosevelt sent Marines to occupy Greenland in the Second World War. It's why Dwight Eisenhower and Harry Truman both viewed the security of Greenland as integral to America's security posture against the Soviet Union, particularly the Soviet undersea threat in the Cold War. The moment Greenland achieves independence, which their own national security strategy says they intend to do but the 2030s set aside this current kerfuffle. When they get independence, like the Solomon Islands, they will be 57,000 people whose aspirations for sovereignty will quickly run into the malign influence of Russia and China. And you will see just a couple thousand miles from the East Coast of the United States sitting astride critical sea lanes that have been American priorities for decades. You will potentially see Chinese submarines and aircraft and Russian submarines and aircraft menacing key and core US strategic interests. This does not have to be personalized. This doesn't have to be about any American president. It wasn't about Andrew Johnson. It's not about Woodrow Wilson. It's not about Donald Trump. This is about a core, continuous American security interest. And we have to prepare for that day and the near future when an independent Greenland will pose a threat to the United States regardless of the good intentions of our friends, our Greenlandic friends. We have to have a plan today for what a post-independence Greenland's security architecture looks like so that they are prepared to uphold their sovereignty while the security of the United States is protected. Thank you. Thank you, Alex. Our next debater taking a position that American control of limited territory in Greenland is not a strategic necessity. I want to welcome to the stage Max Boot. Max the floor is yours. [APPLAUSE] Well, thank you very much. I have to confess if somebody had told me a couple of years ago that we were going to be debating whether the United States should annex all or part of Greenland, I would have thought you were crazy. But then I would have also thought you were crazy. If you suggested we were going to tear down the east wing of the White House or close the Kennedy Center, there's a lot of things going on right now that are pretty strange. But I think we need to be clear about why we're even talking about Greenland and has nothing to do with strategic necessity or the national security interests of the United States. It has everything to do with the fact that the president of the United States is a former real estate developer. And he likes to acquire land. He wants to acquire territory. He's made it very clear that he sees Greenland as kind of a trophy property, the biggest acquisition since Alaska in 1867. And when the New York Times pointed out to him, we don't need it for security or economic reasons because it's part of Denmark, which is part of NATO, and therefore completely open to American cooperation and American investment and American security. President Trump's reply was, it's psychologically important to me. Well, just because it's psychologically important to this current president doesn't mean it's important to the security of the United States. And it's not. We heard a great deal from Alexander about the Solomon Islands. We're not talking about the Solomon Islands here. And the Solomon Islands, among many other differences, are not part of NATO. Greenland is part of NATO because it is part of Denmark, which is something that we recognize in a treaty in 1916. We also have a 1951 treaty updated in 2004, which allows the United States to have a military presence in Denmark. And if you listen to Senator Mark Warner, the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who is privy to all the intelligence that the United States has, he has said repeatedly, there is no Chinese threat in Greenland. There is no Russian threat. The only outside threat in Greenland comes from the United States of America. Now, if there is some down the line, if there is some Chinese threats, some Russian threat, we can certainly address it. in fact we already pledged to address it because again it's part of NATO it has not gone independent maybe it will go independent in 10 years 100 years 200 years we can cross that bridge when we get there but right now it is part of Denmark which is part of NATO and again we are pledged to protect it and Denmark has made very clear they are happy to have more US troops if we're worried about Denmark if we're worried about the threats to Greenland from China Russia and any other power why is it that right now we only have about 200 troops there in the past we had as many as 10,000 troops in 17 bases now one base about 200 troops there is nothing preventing us from sending more troops to protect Greenland if we thought it was an actual national security priority but clearly it's a psychological priority for the president it's not an actual national security priority but in the course of pursuing president Trump's psychological priorities he has caused a crisis with NATO we only have to think back a couple of weeks to remember that NATO was on the brink of an existential crisis when president Trump threatened military action and economic action to take a territorial way from our treaty ally and contravention of the UN Charter which forbids territorial aggression now when the markets went haywire when the european threatened to strike back with tariffs of their own president Trump walked back his threats at Davos thankfully and now he's on voy to Greenland just wrote in the New York Times that all they're asking for is open access they're not actually even asking for what the other side is arguing for in this debate which is American acquisition of Greenland so I'm all in favor of open access to Greenland but guess what we already have open access to Greenland we don't need to cause a crisis with the most successful alliance in world history in order to get open access to Greenland and that would be a pretty poor tradeoff in any case to take control of about 58,000 people and some polar bears on some frozen tundra at the cost of sacrificing our alliance with europe by the way we do about a trillion and a half dollars of trade with europe every year so there is no national security imperative to an ex-anipart of Greenland in fact the imperative is not to do so and not to risk a crisis with NATO thank you Max we have heard our first two opening statements so far we're going to continue with two more after we take a break i'm john don van this is open to debate welcome back to our debate around Greenland i'm john don van this is open to debate we're here at the council on foreign relations new york city headquarters with Alexander B. Gray Michael Pillsbury Corey shocky and max boot we've heard our first two opening statements now it's here from Michael Pillsbury who is arguing that us control of limited territory in Greenland is a strategic necessity Michael the floor is yours okay could i just ask please does anybody here tonight from Denmark please raise your hand four Denmark lost to 20 no 43 soldiers in Afghanistan Denmark's been one of our closest allies forever i happen to love Denmark myself so there's no intention from me i think for anybody else to offend or insult Denmark by talking about the importance of Greenland and i think some veins already are coming to understand that that there's a strategic network the Greenland's part of began in the early 50s the three biggest early warning radars one in Alaska one in England the third and the first one the first one in the V shape to detect enemy missiles was in Greenland Greenland has several other increasingly strategic roles Alexander Gray already mentioned the submarines he has a scenario in his testimony to the Senate about a year ago suppose Greenland follows its own law the i think it's called the self government act of 2009 it's an option if there's a vote a referendum and the majority prefers independence then it obligates Denmark to begin negotiations over how to do the split how to divorce so the machinery is there there are several other legal approaches a compact or free association Alexander has talked about and written about insular areas is another concept so it's not annex at all anymore it's president trump saying that after his long meeting with the Danes and also with the NATO Secretary General he and his team now see how they can get the strategic benefit that he wanted without annexation and without necessarily even any territorial control these are phrases the Chinese have picked up and by the way the context for all this is China our long term competition with China bipartisan Joe Biden talked a lot and did a lot about it the Chinese have are going to have many opportunities in the next 20 years or more to kind of get the drop on us and this is one of the opportunities they're already talking about it worldwide the Chinese are saying this proves the Americans are still colonial bullies and they will do this to you it's addressed in Africa Latin America South Asia this is an example of the evil America by the way they don't say Donald Trump they don't say this is a real estate magnate from New York you know who has ego problems no they say all Americans the American government is out to do this to you people so we've got to be alert to strategic challenges when they happen and Alexander and president trump himself have pointed out this is an this has an importance that has to do with the rise of China we simply can't have a country going independent if they do that and the odds are they want to in green land and then have the Chinese and Russians step forward and say you're our friends now so with the Danish government in support of this new approach with the NATO Secretary General in favor and with a very specific list of things that the US government and its allies need to do on green lands not just what's called it used to be called fool space force base that's the old member I told you in the early 50s the very first line of early warning was green land it still is so for golden dome and frankly for something you may have never heard of called chrome dome back in the 60s American bombers flew around green land with h bombs on board to protect it to protect the early warning system and one of those bombers crashed four h bombs went into the ice that strained us Danish relations but we got over it the radiation was in control but green land you should not be thinking of in terms of polar bears thank you very much and our fourth speaker will be taking the opposite side the same side that Max bootook I want to welcome to the stage the floor is yours Cory shocky so many of the points I was going to make might actually made that our ally Denmark actually had a higher per capita casualty rate fighting in Afghanistan than the United States did that's significant and what our adversaries are arguing is that what the people of green land and the people of Denmark and the people of our allied countries think about this behavior by the United States shouldn't matter that that shouldn't affect this that there's no opportunity cost to behaving the way we are behaving and I would submit to you that that's simply not true right one of the last sales of sovereign territory in the international system was Denmark selling the west indies what we now think of as the us virgin islands to the United States in 1917 and as part of that treaty negotiation we paid Denmark 25 million dollars and we promised to acknowledge Danish sovereignty over greenland so we are already in violation of a commitment we made to the government of Denmark almost a hundred years ago second thing to remember about where this issue stands is that in 1951 the United States and Denmark by that time already NATO allies signed a what we think of in the defense department as a status of forces agreement in which the government of Denmark offered the United States and committed in treaty that the US would have exclusive jurisdiction over the basis we established in Greenland we had during the Cold War 17 US bases in Greenland we now have only one by our own choice and the government of Denmark and the government of Greenland have repeatedly emphasized that the United they are partners with the United States on preventing China from using Greenland for purposes that corrode the security of the United States of Denmark and of the other NATO allies so what the president has done with creating this this tornado over Greenland is to impose an enormous opportunity cost of creating the sense that the United States is no longer a reliable ally when the president of the United States says we have to have control over Greenland. That means, 'cause that's the only way we can be sure we would defend it. That undermines not just our pledge in 1917 and 1949 and 1951 to the government of Denmark, but it undercuts the commitment that we have made to our NATO allies as well. And so we need to acknowledge that first of all, any needs we would have to increase American security by access to our operations in and around Greenland, we already have. And that the bad faith actor in this actually isn't even China. It's us who are causing our friends in Greenland in Denmark, in the NATO allies countries to question whether the United States is a bigger threat to Greenland than China is to American interests in Europe and beyond. That cuts to the fact that no dominant power in history has ever had as much voluntary assistance as the United States gets from friendly countries and we're destroying it with these threats to Greenland. - Thank you, Cory Shockey. That concludes our opening round. And now we move on to round two where the debaters and I will have more conversation on the topics that were raised, but just to summarize what I think I heard in the opening statement, the team that's arguing that the US should have some control for at least limited portions of Greenland because it is a strategic necessity. It's Michael Pillsbury and Alexander Gray. They're saying fundamentally it's all about China, that China is a threat, a malign foreign influence, that China has established a record in situations where status of sovereignty might be considered ambiguous of coming in and doing things that are harmful to US security. They anticipate that may happen again as Greenland faces potentially a vote for independence and the rules would have to be rewritten. And fundamentally they argue that it's a necessity because otherwise the United States would be incredibly vulnerable to an attack from China. The team on the other side is saying it's not at all about China. This is not about China. This is about a president's appetite for real estate. And they also make the case that the status quo works that the United States already has access that's needed through its arrangements through NATO and through Denmark and that Denmark has been an exceedingly friendly and cooperative partner in NATO in regard to Greenland as well. And the secondarily, the impact of the president's pressure campaign on NATO has been terribly de-laterious to that relationship and in ways that I think you're suggesting may take a very, very long time to repair. I want to take something, Corey, that you said in your opening statement to Alex Gray, taking everything together, Corey was arguing not just that in this case, she says, China is not the bad faith actor we are, the United States are. What's your response to that? Yeah, so I don't think that the United States is a bad faith actor when what we're simply trying to accomplish here is worrying about what happens to the 1951 treaty when an independent Greenland refuses to acknowledge the 1951 treaty. The 1951 treaty was forced upon them by their colonial masters in Copenhagen. Why would they choose to honor the 1951 agreement post-independence? So you're fundamentally arguing that the status quo that you feel is working is not long for this world, very potentially, and therefore you can't count on it. So Max or Corey, if you can respond to that. Yeah, I'd love to. Even if Greenland negotiates independence from Denmark, there's going to be a negotiation about the status of bases. There's going to be a negotiation about what will and won't carry over. And as part of those negotiations, if we're considered a threat to Greenland, they're sure not going to want American bases and American operations there. Michael. Corey, this doesn't get it yet. China is surpassing us in many areas. There are probably 20 more examples beyond Greenland that we will face over the next five years or so, where the best thing we can do is shut off, shut a door. The China doesn't have to go through. We unlock doors as an old metaphor goes. The burglar will come and try the different doors. If one is open, the burglar will go in. So we're trying to shut the door in Greenland to make sure that we have the strategic things we need. The metaphor. I'm confused because my understanding-- and maybe I'm off-- but my understanding is that Greenland is in the northern hemisphere a long way away from China and no relation to the Solomon Islands. So it seems like a rather far-fetched scenario suggests that China is about to take over Greenland if we don't occupy it first. It actually kind of reminds me as a historian of the justifications used by European imperialists to take gobble up territory all over the world in the 19th century saying, if we don't do it, some other country will do it. So that became a very convenient excuse. But imperialism is no longer acceptable. Oh, it's-- 2018, when I was in the White House, there was an attempt of the Chinese to buy an airfield in Greenland. And with the help of Denmark, turn that down. What's exactly-- Exactly, we can't turn that down. When Denmark is not sovereign over foreign policy there, I have no confidence that that same outcome is going to occur. There's what you're ignoring us. There's a billion reasons why Greenland is not necessarily going to go into the defendant, which is that Denmark actually provides about a billion dollar short of subsidies to Greenland every single year, which they're not going to get if they're independent. But the larger point-- larger problem I see with the argument is you're creating these kind of castles in the air, imagining crises many years down the road, which may or may not occur. And then where you head off the speculative crisis, which may or may not occur, you want to start a crisis right here and right now, which could lead to the dissolution of NATO, right here and right now. I offer a positive vision here. Greenland gets independence. And the United States starts today negotiating what's called a compact of free association with independent Greenland, where we provide some of the much needed social services that you alluded to. We provide them with incredible opportunities, like our friends in the Pacific have enjoyed. And we preserve the right to deny an adversary the ability to use Greenland for malign purposes. So the only way that the United States will get to the economy of scale economically, politically, or militarily, to manage the security and economic challenges that China is posing for us and for other countries is if we act in concert with like-minded countries. So in order to get a future benefit in Greenland, we are actually destroying our ability to work with others and manage the China problem more broadly. - I'm curious, Michael, do you think that the president's pressure campaign has been anything but antagonistic to Denmark at this point? - I think it's been effective. - But do you think it's been antagonistic? - No, here's a goal, I think. And this is where Max Boudre is right about his real estate background. If you read the case studies in Art of the Deal, you first shake up to the other side. Then you try to learn what their bottom line is, then the negotiations go on. That's exactly what he's done about Greenland. And I think Max has missed the memo. We are not talking about annexing Greenland anymore. Nobody except Max. - Let me ask you this question. Had the president not walked back the threat of force at Davos, we would be talking about annexation. I think that's what he was implying. You so force, if necessary. - No, because there's compacted free association. Alex is mentioning several other means besides annexation. - So if the president said he would not rule out the use of force. And my question is when we talk about strategic necessity, what does necessity justify? How far if annexation were something that he were voicing? I don't realize at this point, it's become hypothetical. But it just wasn't a real article. - It's withdrawn. Nobody says annex anymore except you and Max Boot. - I want to ask you, what does strategic necessity justify in terms of American action? - It justifies us giving them the best offer we can give them. So membership in USMCA, if they want Danish health care, but their security and sovereignty is critical to us, let's put them on try care. Let's put them into the US veteran system. Let's find creative ways. - You're going to provide Obamacare for people in Greenland, but not in the United States, is that what you're saying? - I'm not arguing against Obamacare, Max. I'm arguing that Greenland's security issue for the United States and it justifies extraordinary exertion to keep it safe. - What is Denmark supposed to do right now in this? - I think we need to have a tri-partite discussion between the Danes, the Greenlanders and us about what their future looks like. This is not about Danish domestic politics, this is about the same reason that FDR thought that it was essential to occupy Greenland in World War II, the same security imperative is applied today. - You're opposed to the question. - Imagine what the US government's reaction would be if a treaty ally of ours, let's say France, said we need to have tri-partite negotiations between the government of the United States, the state of California and the government of France, 'cause California's gonna become independent someday, and France just can't allow that to happen in a hostile way. We would be outraged at that undercutting of the sovereignty of the United States government, and that's what you are suggesting we do to Denmark. - I'm suggesting that if the Greenlanders say they want independence, so I'm just reading their national security strategy, they say they want independence by the 2030s, I think that we should have, in our own self-interest, a productive conversation of-- not what can we do to bully anybody, but what can we offer? -You just discouraged bullying, but do you think that Denmark and Greenland have just been through a period of bullying by the president along the lines of the art of the deal? I think the president's negotiating. -I think that's not how it's perceived by the people of Greenland and the people of Denmark and the people of allied countries. -And by the way, with all of us bullying and threats, he hasn't achieved anything except alienating our European allies. There is no new agreement on Denmark and Greenland and the days I've made clear that they will not agree to any infringement of their sovereignty over Greenland. And so basically, President Trump had to retreat. So this is not some eight-dimension-chest art of the deal. -America's superpower is playing team sports. It's getting voluntary cooperation from countries to do what's in our mutual interest. And that's what this kind of behavior, this kind of threat to a treaty ally makes more difficult. It's entirely imaginable that we will see a future in which the United States goes to fight a war and nobody comes to help us. -All right, we're going to wrap up our discussion portion of the debate right here. Next, our debaters are going to take questions from our Council on Foreign Relations audience. That'll be right after the break. I'm John Donben. This is Open to Debate. Welcome back to Open to Debate. I'm John Donben. I'm here with our debaters, former National Security Council Chief of Staff, Alexander B. Gray, the Heritage Foundation's Michael Pillsbury, American Enterprise Institute's Corey Shaki, and Washington Post-Columnist Max Boot. Okay, I'd like to go to see you for some questions, please. Right here in the third row. -Rana Farouha from the FT. This is a question mainly for Alex and Michael. I thought you made a really good case, which I largely agree with about hemispheric security. But my question is this, is blowing up NATO right now, if that were to be the case as a result of what's happened, worth it, and is there an assumption that we are in a triple or world in which Europe can no longer be trusted to take a transatlantic centric tack towards its future? Do you think that the way in which China has pulled parts of southern Europe in particular into trade alliances into the one-belt, one-road situation has created that world? And then to Kerry's point, what does that mean when we need the fins to build icebreakers? And European countries to create demand. -I think that your example about southern Europe is a great example of why the United States has to be careful about what's happening in our hemisphere. The Chinese have a playbook for how they will use economics to proceed the flag, and they will use every instrument of national power to undermine our ability to have the hemispheric defense that was normal from FDR until recent years when we turned our attention to things that were far outside of our core interests. Now, the United States will always be a critical part of NATO, NATO is the greatest alliance in the history of the world. We need to, as hard as it is, for everybody in this room and outside to separate this from the personality in the White House today, this is not about Donald J. Trump. This is about something that has animated American strategic thought for 150-plus years. Let's think about how our interests will be threatened in the years ahead by the exact pattern of Chinese behavior you just laid out, not what's happening with American politics today. -Alex Part of the question also was, "If NATO is blown up because of this aggravation, is that worth the cost?" -NATO is not in the alliance. We're not all in this because we're best friends. We're in it because it serves each other's core interests. And the interest of Europe is to prevent a hegemon like the Russians from taking over continental Europe. The United States, as the balancing power, is able to come in and prevent that from happening. Let's not worry about who said what to whom. Let's focus on the power dynamic, and that's why NATO is relevant, and that's why we're relevant to NATO. -Mex. -If you listen to what Alexander says you would imagine that every U.S. president going back 150 years has been obsessed with an ex-greenland, and that this has been one of the fundamental tenants of American foreign policy has been to an ex-greenland, whereas in fact, I'm pretty sure that in the last 70 years, the only president who's actually thought to an ex-greenland is Donald J. Trump. In fact, no, Harry Truman. -Harry Truman, for sure. -That's what I'm saying since Harry's right memo. -I've been in Matthews. -I said 70 years, Michael, since Harry Truman. The only president is Donald J. Trump. -Okay, sorry. -And what has actually been an animating principle of American foreign policy for the past 80 plus years is collective security. And any American attempt to infringe on Danish sovereignty over greenland undermines the concept of collective security undermines the NATO alliance. And so it actually does grave damage as Cory has been arguing so eloquently to America's core security interests. -All right, I'm going to take another question. -Hi, my name is Philip Ellison. For the past 60 years, since the 1960s, we've seen the move toward decolonization. Greenland is not anything but a colony of Denmark. When are we going to start talking directly to greenlanders and forget? I mean, not forget, but of course not to sideline the den. -I'd thereof you like to take that out of the side? -I think the answer should be never. -The answer should be never, you say. -Well, again, this is a little bit like, you know, to use Cory's analogy. It's like if the Chinese or Russians decide that Puerto Rico should really be independent and start talking up to Puerto Rico about how they can become independent from the United States. We would see that as an infringement on our sovereignty. We would see that as a threat to US national security. And when you say talking to the greenlanders, there have been credible reports in the Danish media of US envoys trying to fulment an independent movement in Greenland and trying to wage covert action in Greenland to try to lead to a succession movement. We would not tolerate that in our territory. I don't know why the Danish should have to put up with it in their territory. -Oh, they said? So I think that we already are talking to the Greenlanders. We have a consulate there. We set up under President Trump and I think Chris and under the Biden administration. Look, we, a couple weeks ago, we had a joint meeting between the foreign ministers of Greenland, Denmark, and the United States. And it was a productive meeting. -Middle of the question. All the way in the back. -Hi, my name's Haul. I love polar bears and like, quiet property. But I want to ask about, is annexing or acquiring Greenland? In some ways, a strategic distraction, China is in the Pacific. And this is taking a time to actually focus on China, possibly Solomon Islands. And with our Navy, our Navy is stretched then. Do you want to send more destroyers to focus on Greenland? Would they be focusing on the Pacific? -Clarified, then. -Are you saying, is this a foolish policy because we can't actually manage it? Is that the question? -I think of it as operational over stretch and distraction, operational instructions. -It's not an intended distraction. It's not a ploy to distract. It is a negative distraction for the US strategy. -Correct. -Okay, let's take this up first. Remember the nitty gritty for a second? The referendum on Greenland, authorized and described into tail and their own self-government act, involves perhaps 30,000 voters of the total of 57,000 people. It's a strict, it calls for a strict majority outcome. So that's 15,000 people who may or may not know much about what it would be like if they had China as their main partner compared to America as their main partner. So a Chinese, I'm supposed to keep in touch with the Chinese, I visit there all the time, very funny joke was made recently in terms of a distraction. This Chinese diplomat said, "You know, the CIA is overturned, people all governments all over the world. It's only about 15,000 voters you would need in Greenland. Why doesn't the CIA just turn them into voting for you? I'll hug to myself. You know, that's a pretty good idea." -Yeah, I think that kind of sums up the problem with this proposal because it suggests that we act like China or Russia. And that is a reason why, by the way, although this is billed as a plan to fight China and Russia. And I'm actually kind of surprised you're not talking about Russia at all because actually Greenland is a lot closer to Russia than it is to China. But the reality is, as you've been alluding to, both China and Russia are delighted by this because it makes their case that they should be allowed to undertake territorial aggression against their neighbors because that's what the United States is doing. Are you legitimating aggression by the enemies of democracy? -On the third row from the front, yes. -Hi, I'm Rachel. I have a bit of a clarifying question. The bait is US control of a limited territory, but we seem to have moved on to annexing all of Greenland instead of limited control. So my question is, sort of, wouldn't you concede that already having bases or expanding the number of military bases, as you said that we already are allowed to do? Would be us having limited control of Greenland? -Well, I think we're talking about changing the status quo in some way beyond where we are now, which is what you're opposing. But let's take the question on. Do we already, you're already making the case that we already have the question? -Yeah, what are you opposing exactly? -We are opposing the notion that the United States should violate the sovereignty of Denmark, should threaten a NATO ally with acquisition of its sovereign territory. And in fact, that ally has already, by treaty, ceded to the United States everything we need in order to secure ourselves in them. -And it's worth pointing out very quickly. We have bases in dozens of countries around the world where we don't own the territory. So it's very easy to have a US base without actually owning the territory. -The Ego Garcia. -Well, we now lost. -Which we've lost. -Yeah. Look, the challenge here is, and there's a question about the national security strategy. This is uniquely important to the United States. because of its hemispheric element. This is not an American military base somewhere else in the world. This is a strategic priority in a way other things are not. And so the question about limited sovereignty that covers bases, look, we already have the 1951 agreement. The 1951 agreement has been underutilized by presidents of both parties for 35 years. We should use the, I say, called Denmark's bluff, put more US troops in under the 51 agreement to the Hilt that doesn't solve the fundamental problem and neither does limited sovereign territory over bases that we are moving on the path toward an independent Greenland that will not be in a security position to defend its sovereignty and that will hurt our security. All right, that is a conclusion to the question and answer portion of the debate. Thank you, everybody, who asked a question. [applause] And now we move on to our closing round. And in our closing round, each of the debaters has one more opportunity to make their case for or against the question that we're asking. And first up, once again, Alexander, your two minutes starts now. You are arguing that the US should control limited territory in Greenland as a strategic necessity. So it's always fun to debate to my favorite authors. I will say that where I disagree, particularly with what Max said, was that the United States doesn't have time. This is something that moves much faster than democracies traditionally are able to respond to. We have a horrible history as democracies of getting in front of insipient security threats. Our great friends in Australia thought they had to go back to my favorite analogy in the Solomon Islands. They thought they had it under control. I had numerous conversations with Aussie officials who said, "Don't worry about it, mate. I got it covered. They didn't have it covered." And that's because we do not have a great ability as democracies to get ahead of these security threats that autocracies move way faster. And so we've got to act quickly now to get ahead of it. That's why I'm advocating not doing anything to break up NATO, not advocating that we do things that would damage our relationship with our close European allies. I'm advocating we have a respectful conversation with Greenland with the Kingdom of Denmark in the room about what the future security arrangement of an independent Greenland looks like. And this means a compacted free association most likely where the United States provides for the security of Greenland and most importantly, we have to have the right to deny any malign power under treaty, the use of airspace, sea, or airspace in Greenland. We must be able to deny that. And that is what a compact allows us to do. We can put our best foot forward. We can give USMCA associate membership or allow an annex in USMCA that covers Greenland. We can offer the Greenlanders tremendous integration with the United States from an economic standpoint, from a social services standpoint, like we do in the compact states. There are things we can do today and we don't have as much time as my colleague thinks we do. Thank you. Thank you, Alex. Max Boot is up next. He's arguing no to the question. Should the US control limited territory in Greenland as a strategic necessity? Max, your closing statement, please. Well, Alexander says that we need a treaty to deny any malign power access to the territory or air or sea of Greenland. And I fully agree. And guess what? We already have such a treaty. It's called the NATO treaty. It actually exists right now because Greenland is part of Denmark. It is part of the US security umbrella. And that is what we should be supporting instead of talking with Greenland about how they can become independent, which would be seen as an infringement of Danish sovereignty because Greenland has made clear that Denmark, that Denmark has made clear that Greenland is not for sale. Now, if at some point we reach a point where the people of Greenland vote to succeed from Denmark, we can talk about what happens at that point, but that's an entirely speculative scenario right now. And right now, if we're talking to the people of Greenland about how they can leave Danish sovereignty, that's an assault on our NATO allies. It will be perceived that way. It has been perceived that way. It will be seen as the United States violating the territorial integrity of Denmark. And what this is really all about, folks, is the so-called "done-road doctrine," which is that President Trump is trying to revive his version of the monroad doctrine, but what he's really trying to revive is 19th century imperialism, where every great power can do it at once and can prey on its neighbors. And so therefore, he believes that the United States can dictate what happens in the Western hemisphere. We can remove the leader of Venezuela. We can seize its oil. We can take control of Greenland. But you know what? That's an invitation to Russia to do the same thing in Ukraine. It's an invitation to China to do the same thing in Taiwan. This is a mortal blow. This is a mortal threat to the principles that have underpin the global security order since 1945 and that have led to the greatest expansion of freedom, security, and democracy in world history. This is a danger to the United States. It's a danger to the world. It's a danger to our allies. I ask you to say no to annexation or control of Greenland. I ask you to say yes, it's a collective security and NATO. (applause) - Michael Pillsbury, your closing statement, please. - Okay, well, two or three new points. Number one, Chinese ICBMs, Chinese nuclear weapons, they're tripling the number of nuclear weapons. They have now gone to 320 ICBM silos. The American response is to upload more H-bombs to our Minutemen, a nuclear arms race is in the process of beginning. It's just context or what's going on in Greenland. We're in a long-term competitive struggle, if you will, with China. This is a case study and how it's handled. I mentioned before, I was joking, I was convening a Chinese joke. What about 15,000 voters in Iceland? I'm sorry, Greenland. (laughter) I was thinking ahead. (laughter) Don't we have the right, I hear Max's words, but don't we have the right as a country to offer to the voters in Greenland? This is the Danish subsidy. It will be doubled under the Americans. By the way, the NATO Secretary General himself is involved in this process. Trump was talking about, he praised the NATO Secretary General for his work on this new offer to withdraw annexation and move to something quite different. So NATO is involved, the Secretary General himself, if he's reported this correctly, by the way. How can we deny ourselves telling what would happen to the people, the voters of Greenland, when they're the ones, Max, they pass something called the Self-Government Act 2009. Quite detailed, if the referendum goes for independence, the Danish government is obligated to start the negotiations. So we don't have a NATO blowing up. We have the means of a solution to the problem that we've got to take Greenland more seriously than before. And we have the money and the means and the military and the intelligence to do it. Denmark does not. No offense to Denmark. Thank you, Michael. Sorry, your time is up. Thank you. And, Cory Chalky, you have the floor. And the last word. So I will concede our adversaries' suggestion that if only we could see our long-term strategic benefit in an independent Greenland, that the United States had public support that the United States Congress would extend the money that you suggest and ratify that treaty. And it would all happen in a context that does no damage to NATO and has public support in the U.S. and in other countries. That could conceivably be advantageous for American interests. But that's not actually where we are. And where we are is that the president of the United States is behavior, threatening violence against a treaty ally of the United States that has fought alongside us and taken casualties in higher proportion of their population than we have. That threatening that ally has changed the dynamic. Max gave you the numbers on how it's changed the dynamic in NATO, Europe, and in Greenland specifically. We can't undo that. We can't -- they won't unsee that. And our -- the alternative team is suggesting that those things don't matter. But when I was a little kid and I would get in trouble, I would close my eyes because I thought my parents couldn't see me if I couldn't see them. But allies can see the consequences of what President Trump's threats have done. And those will be enduring and they are making us less secure and have the potential to make us less prosperous as well. Playing team sports is how the United States succeeds. And we have not done it well. We have done damage to that with the assertions we've made on Greenland. Thank you. So I want to thank the Council. Once again for providing this opportunity. We love working with you. I want to thank our four debaters. I want to thank everybody who asked a question. We'd like to conclude just to show that this is all done in good faith with Pat Grootfog. A hand shake. A hand shake. Among all the debaters. So please, thank you very much. It's an nonprofit working to combat extreme polarization through what you just heard, civil debate, our work is made possible by listeners like you and by by the Rosencrantz Foundation and by supporters of Open to Debate. Robert Rosencrantz is our chairman. Our CEO is Liam Athau, Elizabeth Kitsenberg is our Chief Advancement Officer. Andrew Lipson is head of production. Michelle Debra Cini is head of marketing. This episode was produced by Alexis Pangrazi and Katie Perry. And the Open to Debate team also includes Gabriella Mayor, Gabriella Yana-Chelli, Linda Lee, and Julia Serkin. Our theme music is by Alex Clement and I'm John Don Van. We'll see you next time on Open to Debate. [MUSIC] Panically.