Iran’s Long War: A Conversation With Ali Vaez and Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar

I'm Dan Kurtz-Falen and this is the Foreign Affairs interview. This expectation that we are one coercive push away from regime collapse or economic collapse I think is really magical thinking and it is not going to in any way put us in a better place. I'm not saying that this could go on forever now with sanctions and the blockade. No, I think at some point there might be a breaking point. I just don't know if we are there yet. I think we tend to underestimate the capacity of Iran as a state and also the society to absorb pain. Nearly eight months since it began, the war in Iran has settled into a grim stalemate. Two essays in the new issue of foreign affairs consider just how long this stalemate could continue and what decision-makers in Tehran think they can achieve in the coming months. In the new forever wars, Ali Baez of the International Crisis Group argues that Iran prefers deadlocked to any plausible compromise with Washington. And while Iran escalates, Muhammad Ayatollahi Tabar of Texas A&M argues that Tehran will pursue a more ambitious goal, forcing the United States out of the Middle East altogether. Senior Editor Daniel Block spoke with Tehran Baez on Monday, October 12th to discuss U.S. and Iranian strategies, the future of Iran's axis of resistance, and the durability of regime that Western policymakers have often underestimated. Ali, Muhammad, welcome to the foreign affairs interview. Great to be here. Great to be with you. Ali, I'm going to start with you. You recently wrote an excellent piece for our latest issue called the New Forever War, why America and Iran fight on without victory. And your central argument is that although most of the world may hope that the war between Iran and the United States will end soon, the kind of low-grade conflict the two sides have been having for months is sustainable and likely to endure. Could you tell us how your argument helps explain what's happening right now? First of all, Daniel, thank you and your team for helping shepherd the piece through the publication process. It's an honor to be featured in the November December issue. To get through your question, the bottom line argument upfront is that both for Iran and the U.S. the continuation of this conflict, despite all of its costs, seems less costly than the alternative, which is to find a settlement we could require to make very people concessions to the other side. And this is precisely what we are seeing right now. During the high-level week in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, there were a lot of efforts to try to bring Iran and the U.S. back to the negotiating table. And there was, in fact, the meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Arafqi and his counterparts, Jadav Kushner and Steve Whitkov, to try to engineer some sort of a return to a memorandum of understanding. The Iranians had a proposal which would condense the timeline for the June MOU instead of taking 30 days to open the streets of foremost. The Iranians proposed to do it in seven days in return for the U.S. to take some steps in the first few days of that agreement, basically providing around with some economic reprieve and lifting the U.S. blockade and ending the war. But this was the MOU repackaged. And the MOU was seen in Washington as highly favorable to the Iranians and therefore President Trump does not want to return to it. Again, purely for political reasons. The U.S. wants now that Iran puts nuclear consensions on the table as well. And that is something the Iranians don't want to do because they believe if they agree to the U.S. moving the gold posts, it would basically signal to Washington that pressure is working. The economic pressure that the U.S. is now applying to Iran through the naval blockade, almost an air blockade, and the tightening and very serious enforcement of sanctions. And that is a message that Iranians are very reluctant to send to Washington. So, despite all the efforts, there was no progress in New York. And now we hear the drumbeats of the possibility of another round of confrontation, either as an October surprise that the Iranians would engineer in the run-up to the midterms or after the midterms when President Trump has very little to do and might see an opportunity once again trying to weaken the Iranian regime. And this again shows the cyclical nature of this conflict that we might go from one form of ad hoc truce and understandings to another cycle of confrontation, tit-fatat conflict. And again, it returned to the same pattern without really resolving the conflict, which is why we decided to call this piece a new form of forever war because it's not a war in which the U.S. has boots on the ground or is continuously, there's continuous fighting. But it is a war that we cannot find a solution to, which means that it would continue in one form or another. I just want to quickly define the MOU that refers to the June memorandum of understanding that the two sides reached in which, in theory, Iran would allow some commerce to pass through the straight-of-form moves, and the United States would stop bombing Iran, and they would agree to move towards some kind of nuclear negotiations. But it quickly fell apart when it was clear the two sides didn't see eye-to-eye on its provisions. Yeah, look, MOU, it took two months to negotiate that it fell apart in slightly more than two weeks, but it really addressed the essential, which was to end the war and open the straight, and deferred all the substantial issues, most importantly, the fate of Iran's nuclear program. But the very fact that even a minimal understanding did not survive, it indicates that it's very hard to put a floor under tensions between Iran and the United States and find the sustainable piece in a way that we can step aside and away from conflict. Mohamed, you also wrote a wonderful piece for our latest issue. It's called "Wire on Escalates," to Iran's strategy to drive America out of the Middle East. And one of your main claims is that the status quo might not actually be as sustainable as it seems, and that Iran is likely to up the ante. What do you think your argument says about present events on the ground? Thank you, Daniel. It's wonderful to be here with you and with Ali. I think my argument may not assertly contradict Ali's, it might be actually to make complement each other, in the sense that precisely because the U.S. has no credibility, as far as Iran is concerned, because, as Ali said, the U.S. keeps changing the goalposts, that's how Iran perceives the situation. The Iran inside seems to believe that no deal can survive. And I think it's partly because there is a perception gap between the two sides when it comes to their capabilities and to their basically resolve. The U.S. sees Iran as extremely weak. You keep getting from U.S. policymakers and also from the expert community in Washington that Iran is weak, Iran is at its weakest, it has ever been. And this is basically a constant thing for years. I think it's based on partially correct assessments. Yes, Iran economically is weak because of the sanctions, because of the blockade. Militarily, it has suffered tremendously from the United States and Israel as a result of these recent wars. But it is a country with enormous capabilities, with a lot of tools and resources. And for decades, the U.S. has been expecting Iran to collapse. I mean, not just in a few years, not just in a few months. I mean, right now you hear from Secretary Beslan and others that regime may collapse in a few weeks. So because there is this perception in Washington that the regime can collapse at any moment, they don't really have a lot of incentives to come to a lasting agreement. And the Iran inside believes that unless it can correct this perception or this misperception on the part of the U.S., no deal can survive. And that's one issue. The second issue is that, and that's another conventional wisdom, I think in Washington, and that is, the two sides believe that time is on their side. I think at some point, maybe that was the perception, but I think at least the Iranian side right now believes that things could change on the ground. Yes, it has survived. Yes, it's been fighting back and it's been successful relatively. But the fear is that right now the blockade could become another blockade that the U.S. has imposed on Iran could become another permanent condition similar to the sanctions. And unless Iran tries to break this situation in the next few years, especially while Trump is still in the White House, things may not get better because at some point the U.S. may take care of its ammunition shortages or stabilize the energy market or find ways to go. around the street of hormones and then guess what the next president might be less divisive as President Trump is and some of the basically the next administration could establish some form of consensus and impose a more effective coalition against Iran and impose more costs on Iran. So they believe that time is short and they should escalate and they have a lot of tools and options as I mentioned in the piece in terms of using their allies in the region, potentially going after data centers in the region, potentially cutting off the internet cable. It's interesting a couple of weeks ago I read in some of the conservative papers inside Iran that Iran should target the internet cables and guess what Secretary General of Iran's Supreme National Security Council most understand as I said a few days ago exactly that. So it seems that they think they can escalate and in fact they should escalate if not it will be the United States that will go after them. And I think this assumption that the two sides have concluded that they cannot defeat each other. It may be correct that they may not be able to do it but I don't know if the actors themselves have come to that conclusion. It seems both Iran and the United States we may believe that they cannot defeat each other as experts but I think both Iran and the US it seems that they think that they can inflate massive pain on the other side and force the other side to give up. Mohammed one of the things you say in your piece per the article's title is that Tehran could try to literally force the United States to withdraw from the region. And in the time since you wrote that the United States has pulled various military assets from bases near the Persian Gulf. In fact earlier this month Washington withdrew all the B1 Air Force bombers. It had stationed at a base all the way in the United Kingdom after intelligence officials uncovered a potential Iranian plot to attack that site. What do you think this says about the potential success of Iran's efforts to evict Washington? So in the 12th day war the US and Israel attacked Iran and in the first days they went after the military leadership they decapitated the military leadership assassinated several top generals of the IRGC. In the second round on February 28th they went not just after the IRGC and regular army commanders but also after the political and religious leaders as well including the supreme leader himself. So the conclusion that the leadership in Iran has made is that this is not just a typical war but the US is out there with Israel to kill all the leadership to destroy the Islamic Republic potentially turning Iran into a failed state and destroy Iran basically as a nation state. They have seen what happened in Gaza what happened in Lebanon in other I guess theaters as well. So I guess the conclusion they have made is at this point everything is a fair game and they should to tell you and in this context a lot of ideas that used to be fringe ideas coming from some radical factions and elements inside Iran a few years ago they're now becoming mainstream. One of them has been for Iran to go after the US bases not just in the region but in Europe and other places as well and they see this now as a success that as Iran attacked US bases the US pulled out and now because Iran attacked some radar systems throughout the region the penetration rate of its missiles probably gone up and soon Iran will go after basically those bases in Europe. So increasing the cost on every country that is collaborating directly or indirectly with the US. So they see this as a successful doctrine if you will but of course it's dangerous because at some point things could backfire and that could force these countries to mend some of the gap and tensions they have in the United States and basically get more directly involved in the conflict in the Persian Gulf. So I think that is the challenge that Iran has that's why they have to be very careful not to push too hard. Ali you've been somewhat skeptical that Tehran can fully evict the United States from the region I guess about the extent of the damage that it can ultimately deal to some of America's bases both in the Middle East and further afield. Do you think that it has a better chance now at kind of pushing Washington back and out or do you still have some skepticism about how effective this strategy is going to be? No I remain skeptical because of several reasons. One is that pushing the US out of damage bases in the region during the war is one thing sustaining that policy in the long run is another. If at some point there is a degree of understanding between Iran and its neighbors or between Iran and the United States it would make it so much harder to cross that threshold of constantly bombing US bases in neighboring countries. So that's one consideration here. Second is that the United States does not need to have the fifth cleat part in Bahrain or to have its biggest military base in Qatar in order to be able to project power in the region. As we saw even the US B1 bombers do not need to be based in Europe. The US can't bomb Iran all the way from Missouri as it happened in the 12th day war. And I just want to pause to remind listeners that the 12th day war refers to the US and Israeli bombing campaign in June of 2025 in which those two states dealt significant damage to Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Yeah that's right. And then the reality is that at the end of the day the US is very likely to remain the main military actor and hegemon in the region after this war despite the loss of its credibility that Mohammad rightly pointed out to in the eyes of its allies in the region and more globally. And countries in the region might try to hedge and might try to develop new alliances whether it's the mecca pact that the Saudis have now signed with Turkey and Pakistan or bringing in other actors like Ukraine which has been helping with some of the Gulf countries anti-drone capabilities to shoot down Iranian drones or China or Russia. It doesn't matter the defensive infrastructure in the Gulf states is primarily American and is very likely in the short term to remain American. So although the concept of kicking the US out of the region is something that the former supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei indicated that after President Trump killed General Salimani in 2020 as the main and the most meaningful revenge against the United States it is more of an ideological concept I would say than than a real one because again at the end of the day the US would remain a pretty influential actor in the region and Iran would not be able to completely eliminate US influence and presence. You see the clearest example of this in Iraq now the US is withdrawn from Iraq after it's reintroduced forces troops on the ground to combat and help the Iraqi forces combat ISIS in 2014-15. But again it retains significant military presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. So that is the reality of US military presence and even if it withdraws it would be able to project power regardless of how much punishment Iran is able to inflict. Ali one of the things you were just talking about was other regional powers and Iran's effort to get them to hedge more to partner less with the United States and perhaps also partner with Iran and I was thinking about that in light of the news that the Houthis launched a really brazen attack against Riyadh's international airport in Saudi Arabia. The Houthis of course are close partners with Iran. Do you think that these kinds of attacks are likely to continue and do you think that they're likely to succeed at getting a power like Saudi Arabia to partner more with Iran and less with the United States even if it's not pushing Washington away altogether? So in order to respond to that question let me take a step back and describe Iran's national security doctrine prior to this conflict or let's say prior to the 12th day war last year. The concept was primarily that Iran would rely on partners and proxies to push conflict away from Iran's borders. It is what the Iranians used to call for defense policy. The idea is that you buy strategic debt by creating influence in countries like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen so that your adversaries don't they're attacking you not because of the fact that they're afraid of your conventional power but because they're afraid of what your allies might be able to do to punish them and that deterrence in the eyes of the Iranians worked for a very long time. Now the second layer of security was Iran's conventional ministry capabilities its drones and its missiles. It was also paging on potential nuclear capabilities as the ultimate deterrent was also hedging on the possibility of shutting down the straight of hormones. I think what this war has done and has changed the order of those options for the Iranians. Obviously, the network of partners and proxies did not deter an attack on Iranian soil. And what we now see is that Iranian drones and missiles have proven to be its most effective tool for deterrence. And it's very interesting when you look at the internal debates. The same kind of aura and theme that the former commander of Iran's goods force, the IRGC's expeditionary force that had created this network in the region, of awesome so they money had. Now, belongs to Magik Musabi, who was the commander of the IRGC's Air Force, who deployed all of these drones and missiles. So I would say that for Iran, it's not that the network of regional allies do not matter anymore, but it matters in a different way. And it also is probably going to be rebuilt in a way that is quite similar to the beginning of this network. Smaller cells, rather than big hierarchies that are wonderful to Israeli or the US targeting and intelligence penetration. The priority also has changed. And the weight of these groups has changed in Iranian thinking. Before the 12th of the war, I would say, as beloved was still the most important, the crown jewel of Iran's network of influence in the region. The Houthis were further away because the Houthis were never really truly a Iranian proxy. I would say that sequence has changed now. The Houthis are the crown jewel in this network given how much Hasbola has been weakened. Again, it doesn't mean that Hasbola doesn't matter, but the Houthis have proven pretty effective in projecting power in the Red Sea and also targeting Saudi energy infrastructure. But that, the fact basically creates, I would say, mirror image of what Muhammad was saying about Iran's ability to push the US out of the region, which is that if you push too far, you risk creating a coalition against yourself, because I think conceptually, the Iranian approach has shifted from strategic depth to strategic entanglement, meaning that Iran has proven to its neighbors that it's insecurity is their insecurity. If Iran is under attack, if it cannot export oil, so is everybody else in the region. So security is indivisible. But the problem with that concept is that it has an inherent contradiction, which is that if you push too far, you risk basically generating a coalition against yourself because your neighbors don't want to continuously live in insecurity. But if you also demonstrate that you're willing to accommodate them, especially by disarming some of these groups or supporting their integration in domestic security forces in certain cases, then you might be able to also bring your neighbors to the conclusion that your security is their security. And that is a debate that I think would be ongoing within the Iranian security system, and would highly depend on the trajectory of this conflict. Muhammad, when you look at the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, do you see this as a potential example per what Ali was saying of Iran and its partners going too far and alienating their neighbors, or do you see it as a successful example, perhaps of them, showing their neighbors that Iran's security is their security and that they therefore need to be more accommodating of Iran's interests? I think Ali is absolutely right that it is possible that it gets to that point. But they think from the perspective of the leadership, it is certainly, again, a successful story. They think that the Houthis have shown a lot of restraint towards the Saudis, up until recently, exactly how Iran showed a lot of restraint towards the U.S. and in both cases to restrain whatever that means was taken as a sign of weakness, and just as Iran began escalating and showing its resolve and capabilities to the U.S. and Israel, the Houthis did the same by also trying to do to the Saudis what the Saudis have been doing to them in terms of imposing a blockade. So now the Houthis have imposed their own blockade on the Saudis, and now, just as the Saudis attacked the airports in Yemen, the areas controlled by the Houthis, now they are attacking the Saudi airports. And in a way, this also complements Iran's broader regional strategy that exactly what Ali was saying, that if there is no security for us, there is no security for anyone else. If we cannot sell oil, no one else can sell oil. If there is a blockade on us, there will be a enabled blockade on you. If there is an air blockade on us, as you know, the U.S. recently imposed new sanctions on Iran's airliners and other countries cannot allow Iran to use their airports or air spaces, except I mean, they have some exceptions. So now Iran is showing that it can do it to others, not just directly, but also through the Houthis as well, that they are now controlling two choke points, if you will, the straight-off hormones, and also the bubble-man-tap. And guess what? There could be other choke points. There could be attacks against the Suez Canal. Some Iranian officials have talked about Jebel Tar as another potential target, so that if we turn the conflict into a regional conflict last time, next time we will turn it into a global conflict. And both directly, through their own reach, the Iranian side, now they say they will attack ships in not just in the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Iran, but also in the Indian Ocean. Or they will do it with the help of their own allies. Or it doesn't have to be their allies. It could be their sympathizers in other parts of the world. So I think from their perspective, this is working very well, and they are escalating and escalating very, very slowly. And again, I want to be very careful here, and that in the sense that if they are attacked, then the escalation will be on a completely different level. But because they're careful not to provoke the enemies, and also the public opinion both internally and also globally, not to provoke the public opinion too much, so they are going very, very slowly from their perspective. But there is a lot of room for miscalculation by all parties. I mean, that is the problem, that every conflict, I mean, every, I often say every inch of the region is a ticking bomb. And what is, what we are seeing now since February 20th, is different parts are just going off. And the way Iran sees this war and conflict and tension in general, not just in this case, is that wars release more energy, create more possibilities, more potentials. And they could pose a challenge. But if Iran and its allies know how to leverage the new conditions and the new potential, they can come on top of it. And so far, despite all the challenges, they think they have done relatively well. We'll return to my conversation with Ali Vyas and Muhammad Tbarr after a short break. We've been talking so far per what you just said about news and developments that seem to bode well for the Islamic Republic and its partners. I want to switch to news that might bode a little more poorly. And let's start with one of the choke points you were just talking about, which is the straight-of-war moves. Obviously, Iran was successful at largely shuttering the waterway after the conflict broke out. And this was widely seen at perhaps Iran's biggest accomplishment. But recent data suggests that the United States has succeeded at getting quite a bit of oil and gas through the waterway, circumventing the Iranian military. Ali, let's start with you. Do you think this means Iran's hand might be weakening? Well, not necessarily then, because in a way, yes, there is some oil leaking out of the region, but oil is only leaking out of the region and not anything else. What is really putting a lot of pressure on the markets right now are derivatives and refined products. Mostly you see the impact in terms of the price of diesel in the United States and the Iranians pay very close attention to the price of diesel, to the markets, to yields on treasury bonds and so on. And also, it is true that Iran might be more limited in its ability to see or to target some of the shuttles that are getting oil out of the region, maybe as a result of US attacks on the southern shoreline of Iran in the two weeks after the MOU collapsed. in July and August. But it also might be because Iran has an interest in allowing some of these shuttles to go through because either some of the Gulf states are providing it with some financial incentives or that itself is able to mix in some of its oil with Iraqi oil or some other oil that is leaving the region. But I think at the end of the day the continuation of this strategy is also not necessarily possible for the United States and its regional allies. It's a very costly undertaking. Both the Eskirt that the United States provide for vessels that are that are getting through the straight insurance prices. Now we have seen stories about ship captains being paid under $1,000 a month a salary to take the risk of basically staring the ships through these very choppy waters and so on. So this is not something that is sustainable in a long period of time. But yes, maybe in the short term it has eroded some of Iran's leverage. But you also see now in the past few days the de-Iranians have stepped up attacks. We have now seen some super tankers even being affected. And the Iranians have changed a strategy of only targeting the ships that were crossing through the straits to instead targeting ships throughout the Gulf and even the sea of Iran. And there are two additional policies here that I'm alluded to. One is to go after pipelines or ports that were essential in trying to circumvent the straits. We saw of course the East West hotline in Saudi Arabia being targeted Saudi oil refineries being targeted both by the way by the Houthis in Yemen but also by the Shia militias in Iraq. And I've also seen the Houthis pulling pressure on Saudi shipping through the Red Sea. But we might at some point also see the Houthis extending this pressure to other countries and to other shipping lanes in and out of the Red Sea. So there are still options available for Iran and this is a sort of a game of cat and mouse and at some point Iran might feel more confident that it has the upper hand and at some other points the U.S. might feel that it has the upper hand. But again at the end of the day and the same dynamic is in on the kinetic side of things. Neither side is really going to be able to move the needle fundamentally I think. Mohammed in your article you argued that Iran was worried that the strait of her moves was something of a wasting asset. I'm curious to get your take. Do you think that Iran is losing its leverage over the waterway? And if it is do you think it might start to avail itself of some of the options that Ali just laid out? I think there has been a lot of frustration inside Iran in the past couple of weeks that Iran could not close the strait 100%. That for a variety of reasons some ships started getting through whether it was the fact that Iran had lost some of its capabilities in that area because of the U.S. bombing or it was also by design as Ali said maybe it was in Iran's interest to let some ships go through maybe there was some backdoor dealing with the Iraqis or for other reasons. Also there has been a lot of frustration against the Omanis and the Omanis have had traditionally good relations with Iran but in the past couple of weeks we're seeing some Iranian analysts and figures have been complaining that the Omanis have basically collaborated with the U.S. in opening that corridor near the shore in the strait of her moves. So there's a lot of frustration and there's also this concern that over time as I said there could be some alternative routes or other possibilities that would reduce the importance of the strait of her moves but I think as Ali said fundamentally this is going to be an important short point for Iran and Iranians understand that this is something they don't want to let go of this at any cost and they think even if in the short term some ships go through they have other possibilities other capabilities they can they can go after the alternative routes they can go after the ships even if the ships go through again you're hearing this from Iranian analysts that even if we cannot stop a ship going through this sort of almost right away we will find that later maybe in the Indian Ocean or next time when they're coming back. So again we're in the early process both sides are trying to figure out how to deal with this issue by trial and error but I think Iran inside is determined not to let this go I think the straight of her moves is not just about deterrence in terms of forcing the US to think twice next time if it wants to attack Iran but also they see this as their own sanctions against much of the world and that is if they can control the strait next time any country that wants to use the strait gets his ships through the the strait of hormones if they are implementing the US sanctions Iran will not let them go through basically so they have to reduce some of the sanctions on Iran so this is basically Iran's tool to counter US sanctions it has enormous importance and they as I said in the US media we hear that or Iran discovered the strait of hormones no they knew that they had this capability for years for decades in fact it goes back before the revolution even the Shah of Iran talked about leveraging the street of hormones but I think for a variety of reasons they were careful not to use it because they were afraid to backfire but once they faced an existential threat on February 28th they went all in and I don't think they're gonna let go of this whether they're gonna succeed it's a different story but I think they're determined to hold on to it you were talking about the connection between the closure of the strait of hormones and US sanctions on Iran and I want to talk a little bit more about the US sanctions on Iran and the blockade that the United States has launched along Iran southern coastline it's clearly having quite a negative effect on the Iranian economy both public and private employees within Iran have taken to social media to say they are quitting their jobs because their salaries can't support them Iran's national security advisor recently warned that the Islamic Republic is facing one of the most difficult periods in its history Ali you've written that you think Iran will be able to ultimately withstand the economic pressure of the United States is placing on the country I wanted to check and see do you still think that and if so why or why not inductive the same logic that Obama was explaining on the strait of hormones applies here which is that when you're fighting an existential battle there is no economic breaking point this regime would not hesitate to transmit a enormous amount of economic pain to the population based on the argument that it is fighting for the survival of the state unfortunately I think President Trump's narrative especially his civilizational threats against Iran have underlined and validated given credence to this argument of the Iranian state that it is fighting not just for the survival of the regime but for the survival of the nation state and in doing so the leadership's argument is that there is no limit to the amount of economic pain that they are willing to tolerate to draw from another context in which the Pakistanis decided to pursue nuclear weapons at any cost they were saying that they were willing to eat grass if it becomes necessary but to gain the ultimate disserence this is the same proposition here yes the going is getting very tough if you look at the currency if you look at the inflation unemployment GDP contraction all of that the country is in truly dire straits economically but this regime has tolerated a lot of pain in the past during the Iran and Iraq war for instance and I don't think would hesitate to tolerate even more economic pain if it means that it can achieve that strategic equation that we were talking about before which is to deter the United States not just from attacking it again but to come to realization that regime change in Iran is simply impossible Mohammed one of the things you wrote about is that although Iran is an autocracy and although it can absorb quite a bit of economic pain its leaders are attuned to domestic public opinion they are worried about losing too much support from the public do you think there is a chance that America's actions right now could push the public past the breaking point to a point where the regime would start to be concerned that it will lose too much support and that bad things could happen to the government I think to the extent that the population views the US as the aggressor in this conflict and I think much of the rhetoric that is coming out of Washington points in that direction as as Ali said I think it might be difficult to see a united opposition emerging against the Islamic Republic But I think if the population views the Islamic Republic as the uncompromising party, or as the aggressive party, if Iran, for example, initiates the next round without any justification, then I think there is a possibility of domestic punishment, if you will, there is a lot of frustration on the part of the population already, even within some elites that maybe the regime should have shown some flexibility in some of the negotiations, for example, or not to, or maybe, if even if the US violated the MOU, maybe it should have tolerated some level of violations, instead of just going after the tankers in the strait and basically contributing to destroying the MOU. So it is possible, that's why I think they're very careful not to push the limits, but of course they may miscalculate. Also, let me just add something to the issue of the sanctions, and that is, you're absolutely right, you look at the figures, the inflation rate is around 100%, and people are very angry, very frustrated, but one thing to keep in mind is that the economic figures that we see don't always capture the real story on the ground, there is a whole informal economy in Iran, there are all these charity organizations, there are all these foundations, there are also some grassroots organizations that kind of help with different strata of the society. Now, that is not to say that the situation is not bad, the situation is really, really bad, but there are some other means and possibilities that exist on the ground that help partially alleviate the situation that we don't always know, we don't always see, we see here in the US that if the inflation rate goes up by half a point or something, how much it affects the market, and we think while looking at what's happening in Iran with 100% inflation rate, so that is not a good analogy, and there is a whole picture that we don't see, we don't know, I'm not an economist, so I don't want to make any judgment, but it's just something to keep in mind, there's an informal economy that we don't see, and that could affect the situation on the ground. And finally, maybe I can just share with you this personal story Ali mentioned about the Iran-Iraq war. I remember as a young teenager during the 80s in Iran, I was listening to an opposition radio, and the analyst, I think, was based in Paris or somewhere, and the analyst was saying, in one week Iran has to choose between bread or gun, and I thought, okay, let's see, you know, what happens in a week? And nothing happened. One week, two weeks, months, years, the war went on. Now, I'm not saying that this could go on forever, now with the sanctions and the blockade. No, I think at some point there might be a breaking point, I just don't know if we are there yet. I think we tend to underestimate the capacity of Iran as a state, and also the society to absorb pain. If I may add, then since we're sharing memories of the Iran-Iraq war, that I remember that we had to go and stand in lines for hours to get milk or eggs or some basic staples. Right now, speaking to friends and family, you know, Iran, yes, prices are astronomical, but there are no serious shortages. There is no run on the banks, and this is for a country that has suffered about 15 years of economic stagnation and very high inflation, phenomenon economists often describe as stagnation, and is one of the most sanctioned countries in the world, and we talked about the naval blockade and an air blockade. So, this expectation that we are one course of push away from regime collapse or economic collapse, I think is really magical thinking, and it is not going to, in any way, put us in a better place, and even if it were true, right, we have tried this policy in Iraq, the very severe sanctions between the First Gulf War and the Second Gulf War, really destroyed the fabric of the Iraqi society. Already we've had about 9, 10 million Iranians pushed under the poverty line, and as a result of this war and the continuation of economic pressure, millions more will probably fall below the poverty line. Is that the kind of society that the United States believes would create a more peaceful and prosperous Middle East, regardless of whose ruling Iran? Again, we tried this in Iraq, and even after forceful regime change, putting the pieces of the puzzle back together was an enormously painful exercise, and hasn't really spared the kind of fruits that the US has in line 25 years later. So, again, I think we have to be realistic about what coercive policies with our economic or military can achieve, and this is why, at some point, it will be good to use the leverage at the negotiating table in pursuit of realistic aims, but so far, I see no sign that there is any realization that that kind of elusive victory is not around the corner, and it's so much better to sit at the table and compromise. So, we've been talking about the domestic state of affairs within Iran, and I want to think a little bit more about it. Muhammad, you wrote an excellent piece for us in March 2025 called Ken Iran Save Itself, and one of the things you argued then was that Iran might engage in some very limited liberalizing reforms, namely loosening its dress code, and allowing for more public debate, in order to short popular support as the country came under increased US pressure. Do you see any evidence of that happening today, or do you think Iran might loosen any of its domestic restrictions in the months ahead? Absolutely. So, I wrote that piece in the aftermath of the collapse of the Syrian government Bashar al-Assad. That experience, I think, had serious consequences inside Iran because his army completely disintegrated, and there was absolutely no public support, nothing, and he was just gone in a few days. And that was very shocking to the Iranian leadership, and they were very afraid. And given the societal resentments and some of the legitimacy issues that they had, so it was a wake-up call, and that generated a debate inside Iran. And one of the things that affected was the veiling issue, the dress code. As you know, in the aftermath of the Masa Amini movement several years ago, and women's growth. I just want to quickly remind readers that was when Amini was likely killed in Iranian police custody after not properly wearing her veil, and it led to these mass protests that convulsed the country. Exactly. So, after that, the Iranian government withdrew the morality police from the streets and relaxed the dress code. It did not enforce the dress code for a while, but the parliament was working on a new dress code, and then when I wrote this piece, essentially the National Security Council suspended the enforcement of that bill. And I think with that a new in a way, if you will, quote-unquote, a liberalizing era started to some extent. But the regime is very careful. It's liberalized, it de-liberalized, it then re-liberalized, so it's a vicious cycle. So, they may not go after women who are not veiling. At the same time, they go after the leaders of women's organizations and those who encourage protests. It's similar to Saudi Arabia in a way that they eventually allow women to drive, but then they went after those who were promoting the idea. Of course, I don't want to compare the two situations. The very different, but the idea is that you go after the political leadership, leaders of those movements, but then you introduce some level of liberalization. So, there were some videos coming out of Iran a few days ago that, for example, I'm based in Houston in Texas, so that there was a new Texas, Texan restaurant, Texas style restaurant in Iran. And you go in, you see the videos show that it could be anywhere except Iran. So, I think the regime seems to be allowing, you know, a little bit political social space, if you will, to open, but it's very careful not to let this become more political to challenge a leadership. Now, we tend to look at these events in Iran and say, okay, that shows the State Society gap. That means the regime will be gone. It's a matter of time. I think it does show some level of State Society gap, for sure, but we should be careful not to read too much into this, because again, we're talking about the State that has a lot of capabilities and they are using these measures to basically survive. So, just if I understand you right, part of why it's using these measures right now, is it recognizes that given the increased economic pressure it's facing, this is a way to loosen some of the pressure on society and make sure that Iranians are more likely to be on board with the government, relative to the what they would be otherwise. - Right, and also, I would add to this, the fact that the regime is kind of in a transition mode if you will, kind of from Islamism to nationalism, if you will, or kind of combine the two. So in order to expand their base and bring the more secular strata of the society, they do need to open the political space and allow some social freedom as well. - Ali, I'm also gonna take you back to a previous article you wrote. This one in 2023, and it was called the long twilight of the Islamic Republic. And you wrote this right after the woman life freedom protests that we were just talking about. And you argued in effect that the regime was at a dead end. You compared it to the Soviet Union in the 1980s, which is to say ideologically bankrupt, and incapable of addressing its massive structural troubles. Shortly before this war began, Iran was again rocked by mass protests. My question is, do you still think the Islamic Republic is headed for collapse? Or do you worry the US and Israeli attacks have given it a new lease on life? - Well, I fear the latter. I do believe that this war basically did provide the Islamic Republic with a new lease on life, because it revived its ideological narratives in ways that they could have not really imagined a few years ago. Again, you know, when the Iranian leaders, but how many used to say that Western animosity is not just against the Islamic Republic, but it is against the nation state, there was really not a lot of evidence to back that up. But now there is in the words of US President, and the memes that President Trump publishes on true social. The Iranian people have seen it with their own eyes. And that's basically shifted the opinion of many Iranians who did not buy into the discourse of the Islamic Republic. It re-energized the regime's core constituents throughout this conflict then. There were basically millions of Iranians that the regime was mobilizing of some were coming out organically to the public squares in all the cities every single night throughout this conflict to express support for the regime. This kind of energized base was even what regime officials were worried about losing prior to this conflict. And also another thing that happened was the discreditation of Iranian opposition abroad. And this general idea that help could come from abroad, whether it's through US or Israeli support or, again, opposition figures abroad. And that too is very helpful to the Iranian regime. I have to say that I had a prediction in that piece that things were never going to be the same after the women life freedom movement. And the social revolution almost that you were talking about with Muhammad is one manifestation of that. And I do believe that this war has also changed the nature of this regime. Iran is no longer really, in my view, a theocracy. It is not yet a military dictatorship, but it has become a security state in ways that it wasn't prior to this conflict. So yes, the regime has survived. Yes, it has, as life has been prolonged, but it's also a transformed regime is not the same as it was before. To close, I want to ask each of you what would need to happen over the next couple of years for the argument you made in your recent print pieces to be proven wrong. I'll start with you, Muhammad. If we look back, say, two, three years from now and there has been no escalation, perhaps there's even a peace deal, what do you think will have happened? I think this requires a credible deal on the part of the United States to be put on the table and which would effectively divide the Iranian leadership and deepen the gap between the state and the society and force to regime if it's a credible deal and force to regime to accept it. And this is exactly what happened with the JCPOA, which was a deal put forward by President Obama based on the assumption or the agreement that Iran could have some minimum level of enrichment. And that created some pressure within the regime and a lot of bottom-up pressure. And at that time, President Rouhani leveraged the societal pressure and helped him put together a broad coalition, which in turn outmaneuvered the Supreme Leader and the IRGC who were against the agreement. If we see anything like this again, I think in that case, I think we may come to an agreement that would prevent an escalation and that could lead to a relatively stable situation, but I don't see any sign of that for now. - And then Ali, let's say the current stalemate doesn't persist either because we have escalation or optimistically because we reach a durable peace agreement. What will have happened? - Well, first of all, there's lots that could happen. A lot of black swans that could emerge that we are not expecting right now. There could be an escalation that basically goes wrong. Imagine if the Iranians who did fire a successful warning shot towards US warships a few weeks ago and the Indian Ocean managed to actually successfully target one. If there is a US warship that sinks and God forbid tens or hundreds of US sailors are killed, in that scenario, I'm afraid someone like President Trump would see no red line in how far he would go to retaliate, including putting boots on the ground or even using a tactical nuclear weapon. I wouldn't rule out any possibility of how escalation could spiral out of control. We would end up with a scorched earth situation that would be disastrous for the region and the world, but it could take us off of this path of the possibility of a low level conflict that would be prolonged for a period of time. There is also the possibility that something changes politically in Washington or Tehran in the coming months that would bring about a serious change. Of course, we have not seen the Supreme Leader since the beginning of the war. Maybe there will be some fractures within the Iranian regime that none of us can imagine right now. There could also be the possibility, although I'm very skeptical of it, as Mohammed also alluded to, of some kind of a deal that would actually be more sustainable than we imagine. That would require the kind of discipline and focus expertise in the negotiations that this administration has not really demonstrated, not just in negotiations, but Iran, but also in other discussions, even with allied states like Canada, for instance. So I remain skeptical of some sort of a way out that would be durable, but the risk of uncontrollable escalation or some kind of shocking political change, I do believe does exist. So just one final point in terms of what can happen right now, given all the problems and everything that Ali and I discussed. I think at this point, the only way I see out of this situation is some form of, if you will, a less for less deal. And even that has to be in the sense of not what each side has to do, but what each side should not do. Because of the credibility problem, because of the commitment problem, the only way is at this point to reduce tensions is, for example, for the US, not to fully enforce the blockade, and they are on the Iranian side, not to try to fully close the straight-off hormones. Basically, you reduce the tension step-by-step, and then at some point in you can build on this and move forward. Otherwise, in this context, I see no way out except escalation. I think even in stalemate, as I discussed, may not be sustainable. - Mohammad Ali, thank you so much for joining us. - Thank you. - Great pleasure. (upbeat music) - Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at fornafares.com. This episode of the Fornafares interview was produced by Adrian Feinberg and Connish Thoror with audio engineering by Todd Yeager and original music by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Amina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. And if you'd like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in. (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music)