Inside Sweden's Cold War Stay-Behind Operation

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It was a preparation for an invasion that might never come, and never did. Across Cold War Europe, stay-behind networks were established on the premise that Soviet forces might successfully invade and occupy sovereign territory. These clandestine organizations consisted of carefully vetted soldiers, intelligence officers, and everyday citizens, tasked with remaining behind enemy lines to gather intelligence, conduct sabotage, and support resistance movements if their country were overrun. In neutral Sweden, the Prime Minister secretly authorized one such covert network in 1949 to mount guerrilla warfare against a potential Red Army occupation. Today, I speak with Johan Wenström, author of The Stay-Behinds, Sweden's Cold War Guardians, about this long-classified operation. Johan, welcome to SpyCast. Thank you very much. Johan, before we get into the Swedish case, what is a stay-behind organization? Well, stay-behind is really. It's an adjective. It describes, you know, an organization, a military or civilian, that operates behind enemy lines in occupied territory. In this particular case, we're talking about a civilian stay-behind structure in Sweden during the Cold War. It's very interesting because you write about how difficult it has been for historians to document the activities of stay-behind organizations, or the stay-behind organizations. Why is that? Well, yes, you're right. My book is the first qualified book to appear in English on this subject. It has largely been left to journalists and conspiracy theorists. In the case of Sweden, our government and, you know, the qualified research community have not really been interested in pursuing this line of research. Because, you know, there was a fear of. What might turn up? You know, there was uncertainty regarding, you know, whether or not this was a legal organization or not. You know, uncertainty regarding what they really did during the Cold War. So, it was seen as something that was better sort of left alone. And for a long time, you know, it was considered almost like UFO research or something. And I am the first qualified researcher in my own country to really. To document this history in detail. Well, you note that there was concern at the time about the legal basis for standing up such an organization. But there's also a very clear political risk, too. The entire concept demands that a political leader says, we are going to lose this war. And therefore, I need to set up an organization to deal with the aftermath. How difficult is that or was that to do? Well, I think. I think that was the main lesson of World War II for Western European societies. That you have to establish, already in peacetime, resistance networks. Because the, you know, the heroic resistance networks in Denmark, Norway, France and Czechoslovakia, you know, they really had to spend a few years improvising their enterprise. And so, when Sweden and, by extension, the whole of Western Europe, switched enemy in 1945, from National Socialist Germany to the Soviet Union. Most countries, Sweden included, reasoned that we need to set up these networks already in peacetime. So that everything is established for the next invasion, really. Because this was something that was really countered on, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s. Could we talk about, for a second, what sort of infrastructure needs to be built? I mean, obviously, you have things such as safe houses, covert communications network. But what was on the mind of those trying to set these things up with facing a potential Soviet invasion? Yeah. The most important factor is really the people in a resistance organization. Finding trustworthy individuals with the right character traits, that takes some time. And that is really a precondition for everything else that a resistance organization does. So you're asking people to set aside part of their lives to spend years preparing for a hypothetical invasion that may never happen. How do you maintain that sort of devotion and adherence to the secrecy required to make that planning successful? Yeah. It's really interesting. A lot of people that I write about in the book, they spent, as you say, years, sometimes even decades, preparing for an event that never materialized. And they did sacrifice a lot. Not only career advancement in some cases, it put strains on their families. But perhaps most importantly, they carried the psychological burden of knowing that it was partly up to them whether or not a Soviet occupation would be successful in their part of Sweden. And why did they do this? Year after year. They never received any material compensation for their assignment. It was really out of a sense of love of country, national sentiment, which is, I think, not only touching, but also a very important lesson for our moment, that a will to defend your country is really fueled by national sentiment and not these sort of abstract notions. About, you know, democracy or our parliamentary system or whatever. It's really about, you know, national love. Well, let's look at Sweden in 1949. Sweden is formally not unaligned, not part of the NATO alliance, of course, unlike today. But the Soviet Union's right across the Baltic. You have a coup in Prague that's just taken place. Finland's been pressured into a security arrangement with Moscow. What convinces Prime Minister Erlander that Sweden needs to, at least, start planning for an underground resistance movement? Well, it was partly the experiences of World War Two. Prime Minister Erlander, he had been involved with Sweden's secret support to the Norwegian and Danish resistance movements during the war. So he had experience in this, but he also, you know, was very motivated by the events that you just mentioned. He had experience in the stolen elections in Poland in 1947, the Prague coup the following year, and of course, Stalin's offer to Finland, merely hours after the Prague coup, to join the Soviet Union in a friendship and security pact. And, you know, Erlander and many other people in Sweden's military and political establishment at the time reasoned that Sweden may very well be a good place to be. between the Soviet Union and NATO. - Well, let's talk about day one. What would that have looked like with a Soviet invasion? What might the stay-behind organizations have to do in those first 24 to 48 hours? I provide what I think is a plausible invasion scenario in the book to establish the fact that the stay-behind organization was not merely the product of someone's paranoia. It was a response to a real and present threat against Sweden. Before day one, we have to think about the days leading up to day one of an invasion. Most likely, an invasion would have been preceded by a wave of liquidations and sabotage efforts directed against Swedish infrastructure, fighter pilots, our electrical system, etc. So the Cold War version of a green man invasion. Exactly, exactly. The purpose of which is to hinder Sweden in this case. From, you know, raising its guard in time, you know. And so when the actual invasion starts, the key fighter pilots have already been assassinated. The invaded country is struggling, you know, to keep together because of, you know, electrical failure, etc., etc. So it's about really softening up a country before the actual invasion. And it would have started probably on day one with bombing campaigns. Against Swedish military runways and also the landing of paratroopers close to centrally placed Swedish airports and harbors in order to, you know, facilitate the landing of further troops via sea and air. So let's assume for a minute for purposes of our scenario here, military victory. But there's the political situation as well. How were these organizations? To determine whether or not the government had survived and who still had legitimate authority. So the plan was to have the Swedish government and the royal family, along with the leadership of the Swedish stay behind organization, escape to a headquarters in either England or America and conduct the struggle for Sweden's survival from there. It was for a long time, you know, an informal norm. But it became part of our constitution that Swedish government is not allowed to make decisions on occupied territory to maintain, you know, its political integrity. So the plan was to have the government escape. And then after the occupation had been, you know, successful and completed, the stay behinds would spring into action. And they were supposed to listen for, you know, radio transmissions, giving them, you know, the signal. To start their work, basically. Who was the Swedish stay behind organization looking for? What types of civilians, what types of personalities in order to increase the likelihood that resistance would be successful? They often had jobs like gamekeepers or farmers or low level white collar workers, you know, sort of insurance salesmen. And the organization was looking for people who won. As I said. As I said earlier, had the right sort of personality, you know, who were trustworthy, who wanted to do, you know, a service to their country. But who also had a profession that would allow them to, you know, without raising any suspicion, travel around in their local environments. I mean, this sort of operation puts a real premium on leadership. I'd love to discuss some of the personalities involved. First, Tieta Palm. I don't know whether we call him our lead spy, but it's certainly a connection here between the stay behind organizations and the part of government charged with sort of the overt defense of the realm. Yes. So Tieta Palm was the head of Swedish intelligence for almost 20 years between 1946 and 64. And he was also one of the operational directors of the stay behind movement. For. For almost 15, 15 years, he was asked to do this to be a part of the, the tactical staff of the resistance movement, because in 1949, there were, there were only so many people you could ask, you know, to be a part of this, who had that particular competence, but he was not involved in this in, in, in his capacity as head of Swedish intelligence. And he was always very mindful of maintaining a war between Sweden's secret intelligence service and the resistance organization. And that continued in later stages as well. The intelligence service was never, you know, directly involved in the resistance organization and, you know, other top military people who sat on the board, the chief of the army, Karl August Ehrensvärd, for example, they were there in a more advisory role. This was purely a civilian organization. But Tide Palme is, is, is a really interesting character, you know, and, and if there's one hero in this book, to me, that's Tide Palme. He was a religious historian before he became head of Sweden's secret intelligence service. You've compared him to Le Carre's George Smiley. Oh, yes, yes. He, he looked exactly like, you know, Sir Alec Guinness in the Smiley films of the, you know, 70s and 80s. And, you know, Tide Palme, you really see a resemblance in, in terms of their personalities as well. They were actually so, so similar that one can suspect that David Cornwall, John Le Carre, you know, might have met Tide Palme in, in Germany, for instance, during his MI6 service there during the Cold War. Who knows? But he's a really interesting figure who really belongs in a Le Carre novel, you know, rather than the sort of prosaic reality of Swedish intelligence bureaucracy. Well, Johan, that's the next book, right? It might be, actually, because I'm now doing a commented edition of his diaries, which he kept during his time as the director of the secret intelligence service. It's really a unique document showing what. What the Cold War looked like on a, you know, daily basis from the point of view of Swedish intelligence. And I, I build on that diary in the Stay Behinds book, of course. It's one of the most important sources. But I'm now also doing a commented version because a lot of it is written in, in code. And I was actually the first person to, to, to, you know, break those codes. I was able to read it properly, you know. So I'm now doing a, a version of the diary that everyone can read. It's a really important document, you know, not only for researchers, but also for the general, you know, audience in order to understand Swedish security and foreign policy during the Cold War. And, and actually also to, to understand the actions of, of certain foreign security and intelligence services during the Cold War, including the CIA. I want to expand on the CIA, but in a bit different way. There have always been some suggestions that the Swedish Stay Behind and some of the other national Stay Behind organizations were really created by the Americans. But you suggest that, no, that's really far from the truth. You have to understand there were potential relationships, but it didn't guide what was happening. That's true. Yes, yes. I mean, the CIA and, and MI6 were both involved with the various European Stay Behind networks. But again. In a more advisory role, I was actually fortunate enough to meet someone who was the MI6 liaison for the Swedish Stay Behind organization at one point. And, and he confirmed this and said that, you know, he mainly contributed to radio batteries and cartons of tax-free cigarettes. But in Sweden, certainly this was an independent organization. There was an attempt by CIA and MI6 in the early 90s. To sort of co-opt this organization into a wider NATO structure. But that was firmly rejected by the Swedes because they wanted to keep it as a national defense organization. Of course, you know, utilizing advice and other forms of assistance from the Western powers. But it was never a question of ownership. Britain, for instance, you know, gifted the first shortwave radios in the mid-50s to the Swedish resistance organization. For instance, CIA was kept in the loop. Obviously, obviously Sweden counted on, you know, support from the Western powers in the, in the event of invasion, you know. Do you think they accurately assess the level of support they would have needed from the outside if, if the balloon had gone up? No, I think in the Swedish case, they were very, you know, standoffish towards the Western powers. Tirpal particularly preferred. He preferred dealing with the Brits over the Americans because he felt that CIA was trying to direct too much and try to take over. Nonetheless, I do think that maybe they were too standoffish, you know. I think it was wise to keep a kind of strategic distance to the Western powers. But maybe they went too far, you know, considering the level of support that Sweden would have needed in case of an invasion and occupation. You know, not only conventional military support, but for instance, also, you know, hosting a Swedish government in exile and the stay behind leadership. So there certainly is a material and logistical element to all this. But I want to talk a little bit more about the human element. And I was hoping you could tell us a little bit about Alvar Lindenkrona. Yes. And, you know, at one point he even uses his daughter. I'm not clear whether it was wittingly or unwittingly as part of his cover. Yes. On her part, obviously. So this was the first national commander of the stay behind organization. And he maintained that assignment for three days. Three decades, actually. He was the leader of what I call the first generation of the stay behind movement with a wink to, you know, the Bader-Meinhof gang and other sort of similar structures that shared this, you know, cell-like structure with the stay behind organization. And he was an insurance executive and an aristocrat. He was a very unlikely resistance leader. In 1950s Sweden, you know, completely dominated by the Social Democrats. But, of course, it was the perfect cover, you know. And he did use his oldest daughter, Elisabeth, as a kind of cover when conducting meetings regarding the resistance organization, you know, in public or abroad, you know. So he often kept Elisabeth close in order to give the impression, you know. That it was just a father-daughter trip or something, rather than something having to do with Sweden's contingency planning in the event of occupation. And she's not the only child who was used in this way. It was actually not uncommon that stay behind operatives used one of their children in this way, which might be, you know, motivated from a tactical standpoint. But a lot of these children have, you know, in adult age, come to realize that they were actually used by their parents, you know. And have had to sort of reinterpret their entire relationship with that parent. Have they had the reaction one might infer from the patriotism you described that led civilians to want to be part of this organization, to work to be part of this organization? Have they had those same feelings? Yes, but very mixed emotions, I would say. Partly, at least the adult stay behind children that I've encountered, have very mixed emotions. You know, partly pride, of course, but also a kind of sorrow. Because they have had to realize, obviously, that the special attention that they were given in childhood was, you know, not necessarily motivated by love, but rather, you know, strategic consideration. And that is, of course, a hard pill to swallow, you know, for anyone. I do, you know, interview Elisabeth Lindenkrone at length in this book. She even has her own chapter in the afterword. And she actually accepts that her father put country above family and above her specifically. It's so remarkable. It's so touching that she can feel that way, you know. And that she, by extension, also puts, you know, country above herself. You've spoken eloquently about families that have put their country before themselves. But Sweden as a whole, you described as really punching above its weight in the international arena. Does that mean this was successful? Where did this really have an impact on security beyond that of Sweden? Well, yes, I do think it's emblematic of a wider attitude in Sweden throughout the Cold War. Really, we were a non-aligned country, not just formally non-aligned. We were non-aligned. We were never neutral, as you often say here. You know, the doctrine was military non-alignment in peacetime, you know, with the ambition of being neutral in wartime. But obviously, we would never have been neutral. We were firmly, you know, philosophically in the. Western camp. But we did project, you know, an image of Sweden being this vaguely pacifist left-wing country that couldn't really decide between the West and the East. But that was a cover for a massive military build-up. At the end of the Cold War, we could still mobilize one million men overnight in our conscription army. Today, we have two brigades. And we had a very. Very professional intelligence service. Actually, Teder Palm's intelligence service was the foremost partner service to CIA and MI6 during the early Cold War. Partly because of his, I think, you know, sort of strong integrity. The Brits, MI6 said that he was the most difficult person they've ever encountered. And Teder Palm was also good friends with Alan Dulles. You know, when I went. Through his personal correspondence, I found, you know, a Christmas card from Alan Dulles. And I think that was, you know, really a sign of the respect that Teder Palm enjoyed in the Western intelligence community. Because he was a nationalist. And he didn't want to subjugate himself and the interests of his country, you know, to the interests of foreign powers. And that was actually the leading principle of Sweden's foreign and security policy. During the post-war era, you know, we did what was necessary to keep Sweden safe. And if that meant, you know, collaborating clandestinely with NATO powers, you know, so be it. But because of our geographical location, you know, we needed to maintain the illusion that we were this sort of third-way country. When we come back, we look at the conspiracy theories surrounding the Swedish Stay Behind Network. Now, with the end of the Cold War, for Sweden and for the world, we're all fortunate that these operations didn't have to take place. But there's often a darker afterlife to these organizations once they're stood down and they become public. And in the case of Sweden, there were some conspiracy theories. There were some theories that developed around this organization, perhaps, that it kept on going after the end of the Cold War. Well, it did go on after the fall of the Berlin Wall, of course. And it went on well into the 1990s. So apparently some people in our government didn't really believe the sort of end-of-history hype. But it was always under democratic control. And it was always this kind of compartmentalized organization. Nonetheless, you know, as you said, conspiracy theories abound, particularly concerning a link between the Stay Behind organization and the assassination of our then Prime Minister, Olof Palme. But in my view, that is sort of part of the disinformation campaign that has been directed towards the Swedish Stay Behind organization from the left and from Russia, even. It's interesting to note that both Iran and Russia uses Western Stay Behind. And I think that's a very important thing. and strategic lessons to be drawn from this history history. And that is actually a point of the book. I call it, you know, as historian Neil Ferguson says, applied history. And I think it demonstrates, you know, the sort of timeless usefulness of having stay behind forces. The invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that the sort of Cold War invasion scenario, in fact, never vanished. And in our highly technological society, it's really useful to have a low tech, primitive kind of resistance network set up already in peacetime. I think the strategic lessons to be drawn, not only for Sweden, but for all Western NATO members, is that it might be wise to have a kind of strategic distance to not only the major powers in NATO, but to. to allies generally, you know, in Sweden, and I think many other NATO countries, there is a kind of exaggerated belief in the solidarity within NATO. But you have to understand that you need to maintain the logic of the nation state within a military alliance and to have the competence and the resources to defend yourself, you know, the mutual defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty and not with. sounding. Johan Wenstrom, thank you very much. The book, The Stay Behinds, Sweden's Cold War Guardians. Thank you. It's been a pleasure. Thanks for listening to this episode of Spycast. If you liked the episode, please give us a follow on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts and leave us a rating or review. It really helps. And if you have any feedback or want to hear about a particular topic, you can reach us by email at spycast at spymuseum.org. I'm your guest host, Dr. Mark Jacobson, and this show is brought to you by N2K Networks, Goat Rodeo, and the International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C.