Inside Iran: The Country Trump Cannot Control? (Question Time)

[Music] Welcome to the rest of this politics question time with me, Roy Stewart. And me, I was the Campbell. And today we've done something rather unusual, which actually, as the deserves credit for, which is that he said rather than the two of us answering endless questions on a run, we might actually get a genuinely deeper on experts. So we've got my friend, Green Sajadpur, who is himself, obviously, originally a Iranian descent, but has been the leading analyst at the International Crisis Group, and then again, more recently, the Carnegie Endowment. He is somebody who understands Iran very well, but actually, perhaps, even more, he understands the US debate on Iran very, very, very well. He is going to be with us as we answer your questions. And my goodness, we have had hundreds of your questions. We are absolutely delighted to have you with us, Karim. Roy and I have quoted your work in Foreign Policy magazine many, many times in recent days or weeks. Let's just kick off with where we are in terms of the theme of nationalism and Iranian public opinion, more generally. Leo, why are the Iranian people so split at the opinion of this war? Mateer, why do we see so little or no sign of uprising? Is this Iranian regime control of the rally around the flank effect? And it is say, I'm asking similar questions. So let's start with that. It's great to be with both of you. And those are very important questions, which, to be honest, are not easy to answer because we don't have good polling inside Iran, like under any authoritarian regime and now an authoritarian regime in a state of war. A lot of what we get is anecdotal, but what I would share is that first of all, the questions from your listeners are absolutely right that Iran is one of the most nationalistic populations on earth. It's a population which feels proud of its very ancient history. And nationalism can take you in multiple different directions because you could say that, you know, Iran should be a great nation. In my view, it should be a G20 nation. It has the human resources, the natural resources, the history to be one of the world's 20 wealthiest nations, but under the Islamic Republic, it's a pariah. And therefore, for Iran to fulfill its potential, you need to get rid of the Islamic Republic. The nationalism could take you also in opposite direction to say, no matter what you think of the regime, we're a sovereign nation and we oppose external intervention. I would argue, Rory, that Iran is a deeply polarized society. These days, but in my view, it's not polarized 50/50. It's polarized probably around 80/20, 85/15. And that I would say around 80/85% of the population is opposed to the regime. The regime has a hard core of 15 to 20% support. And what we know from dictatorships is that what matters most is not the breadth of your support, but the depth of your support. Meaning, you don't need a majority. You just need a devoted minority that is armed and organized and willing to kill on your behalf. And so I suspect that that devoted minority has been reawakened in Iran the last few weeks. I am skeptical that those who were opposed to the regime several months ago now are supporting it. But this goes to the second question, why haven't we seen any popular uprisings? And the reason why is that people are under bombardment at the moment. And they're just thinking about staying safe. And they're not thinking about political mobilization. And the big question is what happens once the dust settles, whether that's one month from now, several months from now, are people then going to think about political mobilization or is it a situation which they believe that the regime is just too ruthless to be challenged in the near term and they may look for opportunities in the future. Julia Kelner asks, what do we need to understand about the new Ayatollah? And Vincenzo Mareska, at what point does decapitation of Iran's leaders start causing genuine systemic collapse? And I think what's interesting there was my sense, correct, if I'm wrong, is that the new Ayatollah, in a sense, is a product of Donald Trump and some of the things that he's been saying about, it's got to be somebody that I approve of and the Israeli saying they'll take out anybody that they don't approve of. So is this a guy that you were surprised became the new Ayatollah? And what do we not know about it? I mean, if I can add one question to those from our listeners, should we be surprised that we haven't yet actually seen them physically speaking to his people? This episode is brought to you by Fuse Energy. Energy policy rarely stays in Westminster for long, usually arrives for the bill and from the 1st of April 75% of renewables obligation costs will come off electricity bills and move into general taxation. So if bills are meant to fall from April, why would anyone bother switching? Because policy sets the floor. The saving itself is automatic. What suppliers offer beyond that isn't and that's where real competition operates. Fuse goes beyond the mandated saving. Customers who switch save around an additional £200 on average. In the Fuse Energy app, you can see exactly what you're using and what it costs with 24/7 support if you need it. Listeners to the show will also receive a free trip plus subscription when they switch. Get more than just lower rates. Switch today at Fuse Energy.com/politics using the code politics and save around £200 on your bills. Visit Fuse Energy.com for full details and terms and conditions. All very good questions. So Mojsh Sabah Kharmani is someone who was widely known to the Iranian public given that he was the son of the guy who ruled the country for 37 years. I had told Ali Kharmani, but he was not heard nor was he seen. There's only really one grainy video of him which exists. So he always was someone who operated in the shadows and he had long been in the conversation for succession. But I don't think it was a foregone conclusion that he would succeed his father until the father was assassinated. And I think that really helped his chances pretty significantly because not only did he lose his father, he lost his mother, he lost his wife and the regime wanted to essentially continue with the status quo and was reluctant to bring in someone new who would perhaps revisit the principles of 1979. And so he obviously is inherited in almost impossible situation. And that first he's injured. We don't know how badly he's injured. I've heard from people in Iran that the injuries he suffered are not life threatening, but nonetheless he's been injured. He's obviously in probably great emotional distress given he's lost much of his family. He's having to live underground and hiding because Israelis are actively trying to assassinate him. And he is someone who he's inexperienced. He's never really given a speech before a large audience and suddenly not only are 90 million Iranian eyes on him but the world's eyes are on him. So I think he's inherited a very very difficult situation. I would not predict that he is going to be like a Muhammad bin Salman figure. Someone who is going to be with us for many years to come out. I'm a little skeptical that he has that within him. Now the other question is could a political decapitation lead to the regime's implosion? And you know anything is possible certainly in the first three weeks of this war it seems much more from the outside that the regime has actually coheared and they've closed ranks around a common threat. You know as they say there's no factions and foxholes. You know it's a regime which despite its internal differences recognized that its life is on the line and they need to project a unified front. But once the war concludes as I said this will be a regime which inherits economic wreckage already before this war was virtually economically bankrupt. Its population largely despises it and it's one of the most sanctioned nations in the world. And now its neighbors largely despise it because it's been going after its neighbors in the Persian Gulf the last few weeks. So it's not for me a foregone conclusion that six months from now, year from now they'll be able to continue onwards with the status quo. But I think basically they have a few options. Number one is retrenchment. We saw that with Saddam Hussein after the 91 Gulf War there's a possibility of implosion as we saw in the case of Milosevic after military humiliation. And then what we saw in Vietnam was after years of putting dogma before interest over time the regime adapted. But that was a multiple year process and you know that is also possible in Iran. Karim one of the other scenarios you talked about in an article that we shared quite widely was a parallel that you saw possibly with the collapse of the Soviet Union a period of instability and then the reemergence. In essence of Putin who represented you know the KGB at the heart of the old Soviet Union reemerging after a few years as the new structures of a new We will sort our term regime. That's right, Dory. That was one of the, in essay I wrote last fall in Foreign Affairs looking at five plausible scenarios for post-charmony Iran. And that was obviously before Charmony was assassinated. But I've long thought that perhaps the best parallel with the Islamic Republic of Iran is the Soviet Union and that, you know, two deeply dogmatic regimes, but not suicidal regimes. They want to stay in power, but they've consistently put revolutionary ideology before the national interests of its population. In Russia, similar to Iran is a resource-rich economy. And so I could easily see a scenario whereby the Islamic Republic simply is incapable of putting interest before ideology. And when they eventually try to do that, like Gorbachev did, it doesn't actually prolong their shelf life, but it hastens their collapse. And what we saw in the Soviet Union was, you know, period of power vacuum and a great wealth disparity between these emergent oligarchs and everyone else. And you could see that scenario also in Iran, you know, unfortunately authoritarian collapses and power vacuums are not filled by moderate intellectuals usually. You know, just as there was very few people who were interested in being ruled by a mid-ranking KGB agent when they were protesting the Soviet Union, well, Vladimir Putin was someone who understood how to mobilize power. And likewise, in the Iranian context, it could well be someone who emerges who is an alarm of the security forces or the revolutionary guards who understands how to mobilize power. Even though, as I said, if there was a free and fair vote, I don't think that's what people would vote for in Iran. What happened in the Russian context to really simplify is that Putin throws out communism, replaces it with grievance, driven Russian nationalism. And that also can be a potent tool in the Iranian context, a nationalism. That nationalism, as I said, can take you in multiple different directions because you could try to harness a grievance driven anti-American nationalism as Putin has. But in my view, Iran historically, in contrast to Russia, has actually been a partner to the West. Whereas, you know, Russia, China, they always see themselves as great powers and competition with America. Historically, Iran has sought to have the United States and Europe as a partner against its more predatory neighbors to the North like Russia. And so, in my view, it's not a foregone conclusion that the next stage, whatever comes after the Islamic Republic, will inherently be anti-American because, in my view, it's in the Iranian national interests to have a much better relationship with the United States. I got an email this morning from somebody called Jillian Curtis. She said, you and your Rory said on the podcast that Donald Trump was surprised that Iran attacked America's Gulf allies. I wasn't and I'm a 17-year-old student. Were you surprised that Iran reacted in the way that they did? Not at all because they had telegraphed that that's what they were going to do. They telegraphed that on several occasions. I told Khamenei said that they're going to regionalize this war if they're attacked. So they made good on that promise. And I think the logic of their attacks are severalfold. Their hope was that they were going to attack these Gulf countries whose leaderships are very close to the United States, to President Trump in particular, whether that's the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and that those countries would go to President Trump immediately and say, please stop this war. I don't think that that has actually played out as they anticipated, but another logic for their attack on their Gulf neighbors was obviously to spike the price of oil. And they have succeeded in spiking the price of oil. They've succeeded in largely closing down the strait of hormones, which everyone now knows is a key energy thoroughfare for the global economy. And here, Alistair, their strategy has been to really negatively impact American public opinion. And they've been successful at this over the last decades. And I say it's one advantage that dictatorships have over democracies when fighting wars against one another. Whereas, dictatorships have contempt for their popular opinion democracies and American presidents are much more sensitive to that. So we already see that perhaps three out of four Americans seem to be opposed to this war. And this is very much part of Iran's strategy to continue to spiked the price of oil. You know, a lot of explosions happening when people are watching their television sets. And the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan is still in recent memory for most Americans. And so they want Americans to be asking their members of Congress and the White House, how are we getting ourselves into another quagmire in the Middle East? And I think Iran is hoping that that is going to be the winning strategy for them. Green, one of the mysteries, I think, for me is that they've gone quite so far with the Gulf States. I see a logic around oil, you know, attack oil facilities, but they've done much more than that. They've been shutting down Dubai International Airport. They've been attacking the financial centers. They seem to be going much, much further in their attacks on the Gulf countries than they need to. In fact, all they really needed to do was control the Straits of Hormuz to drive up the oil price. Is that because at some level, the regime actually really dislikes the Gulf States that there is some form of, I don't know, suspicion of Arab allies of the US and that there's something more ideological going on there that it's not just practical? That's 100% true, Rory. This is not just kind of a military tactic or strategy. It is also a reflection of a deep ideological antipathy toward these countries in particular, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia because they have polar opposite visions for the Middle East and Iran. I think UAE has now been on the receiving end of over 2000 Iranian missiles and drones. They're a little bit less so, but if you look at those Gulf countries, they all have forward looking visions. Saudi Arabia is called Vision 2030. UAE is a version of that Vision 2031. And I say Iran's vision is Vision 1979 and very different goals for the Middle East. Iran benefits from regional instability. Those countries need stability. Iran's model is anchored in social repression. Those models are anchored in social progress. Those countries, their security packs are with the United States and Israel. Iran's official slogans are death to America and death to Israel. So very, very different visions for the region. And in particular, the example of the UAE United Arab Emirates, I'm sure many of your listeners of visited places like Dubai and Abu Dhabi and Iran is quite striking. And I really attribute this to the leadership of two different men. And the UAE, there was a leader, the founder of the modern day United Arab Emirates was a guy called Sheikh Zayed. And the father of the 1979 revolution in Iran was Ayatollah Khomeini. And I say that these two men, Sheikh Zayed and Ayatollah Khomeini, the 1978, essentially went to the same elevator. And Sheikh Zayed pushed up and Khomeini pushed down. And the gap between these two countries is truly enormous. And that Iran is five times the size of the UAE. It has perhaps ten times the population. In the seventies, its GDP was severalfold that of the UAE. Now UAE, much smaller country has eclipsed Iran in terms of GDP. Significantly eclipsed them in terms of GDP per capita. The UAE has become a hub for international transport and finance and technology. And Iran is this global pariah. And so one of the lessons I learned Rory, having lived in the Middle East several years, was living in Beirut two decades ago. And my big takeaway for my year in Beirut is that it takes decades to build and it takes weeks to destroy. And those countries understand that. They've put trillions of dollars into their business model. They want to build soaring cities, societies, economies. And they know, unfortunately, that Iran has the capacity with $20,000 drones to come in and destroy or significantly disrupt everything that they built. And for that reason, those countries are really in a bind. But I'll conclude here and saying that one of the Iranian goals has been to kick America out of the Persian Gulf. And I think these attacks on the Gulf countries have actually just only further solidified and cemented the need for that partnership that they have with America. And they demand that America retain a significant presence in the Gulf to deter future Iranian attacks. Okay. Let's just stick with military strategy. Alison Kennedy, is there any military logic to what the Americans and Israelis have done in bombing Kharag Island? Can you explain what Kharag Island is and what your reaction is to the attacks upon it over the weekend? So Kharag Island is where Iran primarily exports its oil. And so it's a very key node of the Iranian economy, oil exports, energy exports, so the lifeblood of its economy. It was essentially a move by President Trump to try to threaten the regime into opening up the straight of hormones. And what I should emphasize here, Alistair, is that the state of Hormuz is this very narrow thoroughfare in the Persian Gulf. And the way that Iran is preventing safe passage in the past, they would do that with mines in the sea that could potentially explode any passing ships. But this time around, they've been doing it effectively with drones, essentially swarming and attacking ships. And you look at the economic asymmetry of this warfare, in that these tankers, these large oil tankers are sometimes $100 million tankers carrying hundreds of millions of dollars worth of cargo of oil. And they are being effectively threatened and disrupted and attacked by $20,000 Iranian drones. So Iran, essentially right now, is holding the global economy hostage with far less resources, obviously, than the United States. And I think as we've talked about most of this oil, and it's not only oil, but it's also natural gas and fertilizer, is not bound for Europe or the United States. It's primarily bound for Asia. And so the question for President Trump, the challenges, can he bring in those countries like China and India, South Korea, to try to get those countries to help keep the straight open? Let's take a quick break, Kreme. And then we can come back for many, many more questions. But thank you very much. And I think the first one we'll come back with is some sense of when you think this war might end. But thank you so much for your time. Sure. [MUSIC PLAYING] Hi, it's Rory here to celebrate the release of my book, Middleland, and Paperback. I'm doing two live shows on stage in London in September. And I'd love you to join me for the conversation. Middleland is my portrait of rural Britain and politics. It draws in a decade of living in Cumbria, being the member of Parliament, writing about its resilience, its beauty, and what this corner of England can teach us about community purpose. And if you'll allow me to sound a bit grand, democratic renewal. Every ticket to the show includes a copy of the book. And it should be a great opportunity. I'll be in discussion with people. We'll have questions. I'm happy to engage with almost anything. We can talk about global politics as well. I'm playing the Dominion Theatre in London's West End on Sunday, the 13th of September, and the Richmond Theatre Enrichment on Tuesday, the 15th of September. If you'd like to buy tickets, you can head to fein.co.uk/rory-steward. That's fein.co.uk/rory-steward. [MUSIC PLAYING] Finally, on day eight of the World Cup, England Play Tonight, we've assembled a top team to work out how we win it. Harry McGuire and Michael Richards at the back, George Estanwey, Jinking in Midfield, and its Shira and Lenika at top. Come and join us on the REST's football, on Netflix, available right now. [MUSIC PLAYING] Welcome back to the REST's politics question time with me, Roy Stewart. And me, Anastakambal, and we are with Karim Sajupur, who is an Iranian expert as you'll have-- I hope, experienced so far. So, Roy, where do you want to take us now? Well, I was going to come to what happens now and how the war will unfold. So, Aras, what's Karim's best estimate of how long this war will last? Ishaan Gayur, analytically speaking, not what he hopes. What do you foresee happening over the next six to 12 months, Lindsay Bennett? How does Karim see this ending? Can I just before you come in on that, just sort of-- I look at this and I think Israel and the US are now actually in a bad situation. I mean, effectively, the regime has not been toppled. And Iran is demonstrating that it can completely destroy the economies, the Gulf, and hold the Straits of Hormuz hostage. And they will fear that if they stop the war now, Iran essentially the regime emerges in a stronger position, because people will think, well, if you strike them again, they're going to be able to destabilize them at least and hold the Straits of Hormuz hostage. And that will be an incentive for Netanyahu and Trump to keep pushing on to try to either topple the regime or somehow guarantee the Straits can be opened. But maybe those things are not achievable. So then I didn't see how this thing comes to an end, over you. So let me first look kind of six months out and then come back to the immediate term. And I don't think, Rory, that unfortunately, there's going to be a resolution to this conflict, because President Trump's goal was essentially to try to change the character of the Iranian regime. It wasn't only about degrading them militarily, which obviously the United States and Israel have done, but to kind of end this 47-year menace of the Islamic Republic of Iran chanting death to America and death to Israel. And that doesn't look like it's a near-term possibility. And so what Iran wants to cease hostilities, among other things, they want to reassureances that the United States and Israel are not going to attack again. But those assurances cannot be granted Iran. So long as Iran is, as I said, not so much its hostility toward America, but toward Israel, because Israel is within missile range of Iran. And it feels an existential threat from Iran's nuclear ambitions. And so I think there's going to be no deterring Israel from potentially taking military action in the future. So long as Iran's identity is premised on death to Israel and death to America. And so I don't see this conflict being resolved in the next year. Now, we could definitely see a cease of hostilities. I think President Trump's challenge is that, in my view, this was not a war of necessity. It was a war of choice for President Trump. There wasn't an imminent nuclear threat. There wasn't an imminent missile threat. There was an imminent threat to President Trump's credibility. Because on nine occasions, last January, he warned the Iranian government that if they killed their protesters, America was going to intervene and support those protesters. And obviously, we know that Iran shredded President Trump's red line. And they killed up to 30,000 protesters according to some estimates. So the reason why Trump intervened was threat to his credibility, not an imminent threat to US national security. And what began as a war of choice, in my opinion, is essentially evolved into a war of necessity. And that I don't think that it's possible for President Trump to simply now end the war and say, OK, we're good. We won when you have a pariah regime essentially holding the global economy hostage. And so it is a predicament. You're absolutely right. It's a predicament for the United States and Israel. From my vantage point, virtually every country here has been a loser with the exception of Russia, which, as its oil coffers have been significantly enriched over the last weeks. And one could argue that Israel's end game is perhaps a little different than that of the United States. Whereas the United States goal was not to turn Iran into a failing state. Genuinely, I think the Trump administration's goal was something along the lines of Venezuela or if not better. But I think Israel wanted to significantly degrade the Iranian threat, which has happened. And they are prepared to do, as they say, to mold the lawn every several months to prevent Iran from regrouping militarily. There's a question here, Karim from Sarah. Why are the US and the West more broadly so bad at understanding the cultures of other countries, including Iran? What do we miss as a result? And can I just add to that? What do you think we don't understand about Iran? Well, there hasn't been any relationship between America and Iran since 1979. So 47 years in which there's no US embassy in Tehran, no Iranian embassy in Washington. And there's not that much expertise on Iran and the senior ranks of the US government. Off the top of my head, frankly, Alistair, I don't know of a single person who at the White House, Pentagon, state department or elsewhere who has real expertise on Iran or has visited the country. So that obviously is a challenge. What we're also talking about here is not just knowing Iranian culture or speaking the Persian language, but it's understanding the ideological and strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is very different than understanding Persian culture. I would say that someone asked me this question last fall, what have been the biggest mistakes that US and Western policymakers have made on Iran? And I would say there's two related mistakes. Number one, I think people overestimated the ability of this Iranian regime to reform. And when I say people that's been primarily a critique of the left and academia, those who said that the Islamic Republic is capable of changing its identity. Well, in 47 years, it hasn't shown itself capable of changing its identity. But I'd say the other mistake is those primarily on the right side of the spectrum. who have overestimated perhaps the fragility of the Iranian regime. And if only we increase the pressure or if only we decapitate their leader or attack the military, militarily the entire system will collapse. And that is also so far been proven incorrect. And so that's why I've kind of over the years leaned on this idea of the containment model which worked vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. And listen, this is a. I know it's very unsatisfying because in modern times we want to see a quick resolution, a quick fix which is either going to change the Iranian regime, which would, in my view, be in the interests of the United States to have an Iranian government which represents the national interests of the country or even a democratic Iranian, that would be wonderful for the United States for Britain. Or if we can't change them quickly, we want to do something which says, "Okay, let's just do a deal with them. We're the problem. Let's just be nicer to them." But you can't normalize relations with the regime which needs you as an adversary for its own internal legitimacy. And so that's why over the years I've kind of fallen back on this idea of the containment model which. Just on that Korean, was. Would you say that the JCPOA was a form of containment? Was that as close as we've got as the West to being in a kind of broadly a right as an okay position? So I supported the JCPOA which was a very polarizing issue in American domestic politics. My critique of the way the JCPOA was managed was that in my view, Iran is not only a nuclear challenge. At that time when the JCPOA was signed in 2015, I believe there needs to be three pillars of an Iranian strategy. One is certainly nuclear. You need to contain the nuclear ambitions. A second is the regional context. And regional context, I mean, their support for regional proxies like Lebanese, Hasbullah and Hamas, and also their use of drones and missiles. And the third pillar of an Iran strategy, in my view, needs to be thinking about how do we advance the cause of change inside Iran? And this was somewhat similar template to our strategy towards the Soviet Union. President Reagan believed that standing for freedom and democracy was an important component of challenging the Soviet Union. I think that was proven right. So my only critique of JCPOA was that I didn't believe that the entire strategy could only rest on one of those three pillars. Question from Alex from Oxford, to what extent does weakening the regime potentially make the former Iranian proxies more dangerous? You know, the counter to that is that most of these proxies are significantly reliant on Iranian resources. And so in the event that there is political change in Iran and a new Iranian government decides that supporting these regional proxies, opposing Israel, are not in the Iranian national interests. And that happens to be my view. You know, it may be that initially you start to see lashing out from some of these groups in particular, the Houthis of Yemen. But over time when the mothership has been changed, that source of revenue will largely dry up. And I don't really see any other country in the world feeling that financial vacuum that Iran fills for them. The question here that relates to something that Donald Trump has been saying and then slightly walking back from it and then walking forward again. And we don't quite know what he thinks. But I think that's what prompts his question from Zirian Assis in Manchester. What is the likelihood that Kurds will be involved in a ground offensive in Iran and are we likely to see an independent Kurdish state anytime soon? Just talk us through the whole unassumative issue, but the Kurd issue. And in particular, this idea that was floating around for a few days as to whether the Kurds might be involved in some kind of ground campaign. Yes. So just for context, even though the words Persian and Iranian are often used interchangeably, about 50% of Iran's population are ethnic Persians. And you have also other minority groups like, for example, but a quarter of the population are Turkic, Ozzeti. You have Iranian Arabs, Baluchis and Iranian Kurds. And Iranian Kurds constitute about 10% of the country's population there in the periphery along the borders with Iraq and Turkey. And in my view, Iranian Kurds are a wonderful part of Iran's population who have been disproportionately repressed, brutally repressed by this regime. So both politically and economically, they've been significantly repressed and disenfranchised and they have very, very legitimate grievances against the government. Now, Kurds have large populations in four countries in that region and Iran and Iraq and Turkey and in Syria. But I would argue culturally, historically, linguistically, Kurds are closer to Iranians than they are to Turks or to Arabs. And for that reason, I think if Iran had a decent central government, many Iranian Kurds are very happy to be part of Iran. The more brutal and repressive Iranian government is, the more you will see separatist tendencies among Iranian Kurds. And so, as you said, Alistair, there was a moment of only a few days in which this idea was floated of America potentially coming in and arming or financing Kurdish groups. And the challenge there is that, in my view, the most potent opposition to the Iranian regime is nationalism. The most potent opposition to Islamist radicalism is Iranian nationalism and what I call pluralistic Iranian nationalism. So, it's not a showvinist Persian nationalism, but a pluralistic nationalism which encompasses Persians, Azzedis, Kurds, Baluch, Arab, etc. And the danger is that many Iranians are sensitive about the country's territorial integrity. They really fear the Yugoslavia outcome of the country fracturing along ethnic lines. And so, when an outside power comes in and is, you know, allegedly or in reality, arming or financing different ethnic groups, you're going to lose a lot of nationalists who want to see the regime go. And so, that is, in my view, a dangerous strategy of playing with fire, but I do want to emphasize that Iranian Kurds are a wonderful and critical and integral part of the fabric of Iran and, you know, deserve a much better role than they have now. - Cream, my last question, I'm going to be wicked and ask my own question. So, Cream, you said something that you thought that the war was, was a war of choice that's now become a war of necessity. And the story seems to be that there wasn't any pressing reason for the U.S. to intervene two weeks ago. But now they've intervened. It's very, very difficult for them to leave this regime in place, given the chaos it can cause for the whole world. But at the same time, you've also explained many reasons why 20% or 15% of the population, if they have deep enough support and are determined enough, can hang on for a very, very long time. And good reasons to question whether simply striking this regime from the air is actually going to get rid of them. So, you seem to be suggesting it's a war of necessity, but it may be a war that the U.S. and Israel can't win, in which case they need to accept that autumn applies can. They don't have an obligation to do what they can't do. And they need to stop trying to do the impossible. - So, the nuance I would add there, Rory, is when I say it, we've gone from a choice to a war of necessity. That doesn't mean to imply that I believe that President Trump's metric for ending the war is changing the regime. That would be obviously a wonderful outcome, if it leads in a more positive direction. But I didn't believe before the war, or even now, that as the last 25 years of experience in the Middle East has shown us that the United States has the power to dictate political outcomes in the Middle East. And so, what I mean as a war of necessity is that I don't think he can, the President, can end this war with Iran still essentially holding the global economy hostage by deciding which ships can go in and out of the strait of Hormuz. I think that challenge needs to be addressed. I think that many of America's Persian Gulf partners also agree that that's not the war can't be ended like that. But ultimately, I think about an observation that Kissinger made, I believe, when a conventional army is fighting against guerrilla fighters, conventional military-like United States, if you don't win, you lose, and for the guerrilla fighters, if you don't lose, you win. And so, I do think that when all is said and done, this war militarily was obviously won by the United States and Israel. But the narrative war could well be that Iran is the winner because it survived having withstood this incredible shore fire by the world's greatest superpower and the Middle East greatest military power Israel. Question even Bethan Mallory, what is the real view of Russia and China of Iran? So that is an important question because those two countries are commonly lumped together, Russia and China, and I actually believe they have different interests vis-à-vis Iran. The China Iran relationship in my view is pretty straightforward. Iran is an energy producer, China needs energy, and so their relationship up until now has been fairly transactional, 90% of Iran's oil exports are bound for China. And I actually think that a lot of Iran's conduct is not necessarily in Chinese interests. For example, the Chinese benefit from having stability in the Middle East in order to ensure the free-flow of oil. And there's been no country in the Middle East, which has been more detrimental to stability and the free-flow of oil than Iran. I also believe that if Iran really fulfilled its enormous potential as a nation, if Iran should be a natural gas superpower, it has the second largest proven reserves after Russia, but it's not even top 10 when it comes to exports because of its isolation. In 1978, Iran was producing 6 million barrels per day of oil, post-revolution that the average number has probably been half. So if Iran really fulfilled its enormous potential as an energy superpower and as a global market, my view that's good for China. I don't think any of that is good for Russia. I think Russia benefits from Iran being a nuisance to stability in the Middle East because it increases the risk premium of energy. Russia benefits from Iran being a thorn in the side of the United States. Russia benefits from Iran, which is isolated and not able to exploit its natural gas resources and compete with Russia and European gas markets. Russia benefits from Iran, which isn't competitive with them in their historic sphere of influence, which is central Asia. So even though we commonly lump China and Russia together on Iran, actually think the two countries have very different end games. Final question from me, Gareem, thank you so much for your time and your insight. I think our listeners and viewers will really, really appreciate your contribution, but I think if we had one area where we had the most questions, it's kind of in this area of what are the alternatives? What are the alternatives to what Trump and Israel have done? Sarah, what would you say is a solution to the problems of Iran besides foreign intervention? Sabina, do you think military intervention is the only way to achieve regime change in Iran? So I guess people are just saying, America, Europe, all saying Iran is a problem. So I guess that is the kind of question I think is most asked is how else do you try to get them to be less of a problem? Well, I think one of the most important tools in our toolkit, as I say, this is the West, both America and UK and Europe is our values, Western values of democracy, liberty, human rights. These were very important tools which helped us prevail in the Cold War. And what I've seen over the years, certainly in DC, and since the Trump second term is that those great American institutions, whether it's places like National Endowment for Democracy and Voice of America and institutions within the US government, whether that's within the State Department, USAID, that played important roles during the Cold War, have essentially been in the words of Ann Applebaum unilaterally disarmed or they've atrophied. And it's my view that the US-Iran Cold War is not going to really end until you have a government in Iran which either is representative of its population or at a minimum reflects the national interests of Iran rather than the revolutionary ideology of 1979. And as what we've just seen over the last three weeks is that military power, hard power alone cannot resolve that for you. And I think we really need to think much more seriously about a strategy which helps to, you know, power and stand with the aspirations of people inside Iran who want to be South Korea, not North Korea, and a strategy which helps to kind of accentuate Iran's internal fissures. And I understand this is not a totally satisfying answer because this is not an eight-minute abs, right? This is not something that you can achieve in two weeks. It can potentially take years. But I do believe very much that there's no country in the world with a greater gap between its government and its people than Iran. And it's one of the few places, certainly in the Middle East in which you could argue Western values and Western interests intersect. Very good. Well, and of course not helped by the fact that Donald Trump occasionally appears to be more interested in the dictatorial approach to life than the democratic. But Karim, honestly, it's been fantastic to talk to you. I hope we'll maybe do it again one day, but thank you so much for your time. Karim, thank you very much. There was a great privilege. Thank you both. It was great to be with you. Great privilege. Thank you. Thank you, Terori Laibhati. Bye-bye. Well, that was great. Really interesting. I'm really pleased. It's extraordinary how even for Karim, all the contradictions and impossibilities and tensions there. I mean, there is a real sense now in which Trump and Israel have created a world in which there are no good options. I mean, he keeps reinforcing the fact that I think he would agree very strongly with us that this was a catastrophically stupid thing to do. But I guess he's leaning into the idea that now you've done it, leaving this regime able to claim a victory, feels not just sticks in the crawl, but is actually a real problem because how on earth is the economy of Dubai going to get off the ground again? How is Karim going to start exporting gas again? If a regime is left there, which at any moment potentially triggered by another strike from Israel, and as he says, Israel's not going to stop striking them, is going to strike Middle Eastern countries, shut the straits, etc. And yet it slightly felt the same to him that that maybe the situation for quite a long time to come because he didn't sound very optimistic that the regime was about disappear or become pro-Western anytime soon. No, on the contrary, I think you've got the sense from the things that they feel they've understood this extraordinary bombardment and they've understood it without uprising on the streets, without any real pushback internally. They may have worsened relations with the people whom they got reasonably well in the past, but they weren't worried about that. I also thought it was interesting the way he talked about the. This is only when we said when this thing first blew up that if you are a dictatorship, a real dictatorship, you can hold out for longer. And for them, he was saying there that this is not something that's going to get resolved in weeks, it's going to take years. And I think that question from the listener who said, "What do we keep getting role?" I think one of the things we get role is that we assume too often that countries and cultures that are very, very different to ours are going to react in the way that we would. The other one I would add is that we understand that these regimes are horrible and are hated by very, very large numbers of their people. And we talk to Iranians or Libyans or Iraqis or Afghans often outside the country, but sometimes inside the country, who just say, "This regime is absolutely horrible and none of us like it and we want to be rid of it." And that can tempt you into an intervention thinking that the intervention is somehow going to topple the regime and create a much better situation. And of course, when the son of the previous ruler of Iran, the Shah, is saying, "This regime is going to collapse like a pack of cards," or when optimistic Israelis are saying this regime is going to collapse like a pack of cards, we just have to remember, maybe remember Hamas in Gaza, right? It's true. Hamas was a horrible brutal terrorist group. It was profoundly unpopular with so many Palestinians, but that didn't mean that the Israeli campaign in Gaza has somehow got rid of Hamas. Hamas is still basically the day-fact of that. Or maybe the most dramatic one in my life is Afghanistan, where the Taliban government was unbelievably unpopular. Brutal, bureaucratic, hated by the majority of the Afghan people in 2001. We intervene. We spend 20 years on the ground. We spend $2,000 billion, and now the Taliban have taken over again. And I don't think they're popular now. I think they're probably much like the Iranian regime, 15, 20% support 80% against. But that doesn't mean that our massive investments of money can achieve what understandably Iranians want. My final point is this, that if you're Trump and you're the Americans, you are absolutely obsessed with the idea of being able to say we want. Okay? At the end of whatever happens, we want. Partly because they haven't been clear about what their objectives have been, they've been in one minute regime change, one minute take out the nuclear weapons, one minute killing, how many, and they've changed. There's not been a sort of consistent sense of what the strategy is to meet a specific objective. That becomes harder for them. Whereas for the Iranians, victory for them in this context is that the war stops without them being utterly destroyed because that is the rhetoric and the language that was used by Trump and Hexoth and Co. when this whole thing got launched. They are in an absolute mess of their own making, both politically, strategically, militarily. And I think the fact that they don't have allies rushing to help them in the way that they think they should just Trump clicks his fingers and everybody goes running because the rest of the world is looking on the table. Well, excuse me, what is it that you were trying to do? I think if Trump regime had any sense, and actually listened to somebody like Karim, who's basically saying, look, you've underestimated what these guys are up to and what they're capable of. And because there's a lack of clarity about what you're trying to achieve, they're just going to sit you out. The problem, of course, on that one is that the best case scenario for ending the war would have been Trump saying something like, this was all about the nuclear program and I've damaged the nuclear program more and they've got fewer missiles. But it's now so obvious to the rest of the world that he's exposed their ability to attack the economies of golf and drive up oil prices and close the streets of Formus. If he just says, well, mission accomplished, I've taken up the MSL programs, I've destroyed any nuclear weapons. We've won. Everybody will be saying, whoa, whoa, you've now created a state which is effectively able to blackmail the whole of the golf and the global economy. You can't walk away. Well, listen, thank you to you for getting, for having the idea of getting Karim on. Thank you to all our listeners and viewers. You sent in hundreds of questions and above all, thank you to Karim for being such an engaging and interesting guest. See you soon. Thank you very much. Bye.