In Moscow's Shadows 235: From a GRU to a Kill

From a grew to a kill, yes if you're excuse the rather lame play on James Bond title, what I want to do today is look at the attempt to assassinate the deputy head of Russian military intelligence. Hello I'm Mark Gallyotti and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast of varying length frequency and format yet always reassuringly low production values is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you and also by the crisis exercise software company Conductor. So on Friday morning left-hander General Vladimir Alexeiev, the first deputy head of Russian military intelligence which is technically ever since 2010 called the G.U. Golgasha, the main directorate of the general staff, though frankly pretty much everyone still uses its old name G.R.U. Grool, the main intelligence directorate. Anyway, pedantry aside. So Alexeiev was coming out of an apartment in a rather undistinguished block on Volokolampskoye Shorsse in northwestern Moscow. When in the the vestivule he was approached by a government who shot him twice. The member Alexeiev is an ex-special forces bed snaz officer who grappled with him. The government got one more shot off that hit him in the chest but then rather than finishing the job fled at that stage. An ambulance was called. Apparently it worked. He was worked on for 15 minutes in the ambulance before they headed off but managed to get into the hospital in time. He was in intensive care. He was in a coma but apparently he is now out of the coma and out of the danger zone. So we'll have to see what happens. Now according to the FSB which is always much, much better in the response rather than the prevention. The ringleader was one of the U.S. Korba, a Russian citizen though according to some reports actually resident in Tyadanofil in Ukraine. He was actually detained in Dubai. Remember Dubai is one of those places you can fly to directly from Moscow still with the assistance of the local police and has been extradited back to Russia already. And his accomplices were again according to the FSB. Two Russian citizens, Victor Varsin and Zinayda Sereblytskaya. Now Varsin has already been arrested. The suggestion is actually he was the gunman and Sereblytskaya who actually had an apartment in the same block or at least was renting one and may therefore have been the person who was like keeping an eye on Alexeiev. Anyway according to the FSB he has managed to escape to Ukraine. So what I'm going to start with is just a little sense of who Alexeiev is. The Demyyur Stepanovich Alexeiev because of his middle name is very widely known within the service of Stepanich. He was born in 1961 in the village of Galadky which is in the Vinitsia region of the Ukrainian, what was then Soviet Socialist Republic which is one of the reasons why this particular bad blood given his role currently in the covert and not-so-covert campaigns against Ukraine. Anyway when he left school he joined the military, he went to the Eriazan, airborne school which is the main paratrooper training academy and also something of a conveyor belt for recruits into the Spiritsnaz special forces which he indeed very quickly joined. He rose, so basically he is a battlefield officer who then went into military intelligence rather than someone who was I don't know a military translator or similar. Anyway he became chief of the intelligence directorate of the Moscow and then Far Eastern military districts before actually getting a job at the main headquarters of the GRU, the so-called Aquarium. So, go on sand in some ways the GRU is very crudely one could divide it between three different camps. There is so called Agantura, the agency which is the overall name for the intelligence gathering side. So yes in part this is what these days cyber but even before radio technical and other forms of surveillance satellites and in particular human intelligence officers you know the classically placed as defense attaches and embassies and the like. So that's one. Then there's the analytic and management side of the agency and then there are the so-called Sapogi, which means boots or jack boots or great boots or whatever. Anyway that's the slightly dismissive term for the ones who are in and come in from the spetsnaz. So that's it he's more on the, shall I say blue collar or sort of hard man side of the GRU but clearly highly capable and he became the head of the 14th directorate which is the overall responsible for special forces. I have a feeling that he might have been a protégé of Nikolika Stiechka, Colonel General Kastiechka who was another expetsnaz who in fact had served in Afghanistan who headed the 14th and then became first deputy director and chief of staff of the GRU retiring in 2009. So basically when he left the 14th directorate he handed it to Alexeiev and likewise Alexeiev followed the same trajectory and two years later in 2011 he became first deputy director and chief of staff. He played a key role in the plans, planning of the seizure of Crimea in 2014 then also in the undeclared covert operations in the Donbass this sort of weird mix of insurrection proxy war and just general sort of opportunistic campaign by ultra nationalists in Russia. Anyway so he was involved in that and that also involved the standing up of the mercenary army known as Vardner. So at this point he was already kind of in some way the curator of Vardner though his relationship with Pragosian was going to be a rather complex one you've got any Pragosian the entrepreneur who ran Vardner. He would then get his gold star of the hero of Russia for the operations that he managed in Syria where again particularly spetsnaz will play a crucial role but so too also was the wider panoply of military intelligence gathering. He would be sanctioned by the the Americans the Brits and I think the Europeans firstly for the GRU's role in election manipulation in 2016 and then also for the screepowl assassination attempt the use of novicechok in the British town of Saulsbury. Now I don't think that he was for example involved personally in the Sunlabor operation side of things for example the social media manipulation all that in 2016 American elections but the point is all of the so-called active measures. In other words not about intelligence gathering but about trying to bring about specific effects in other countries that all fell under Alexei of Sremik which is why he was sanctioned. There's talk that he had a key role in planning the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. I'm not entirely convinced that that's true. I mean he may have played a role but I'm sorry hard to find any kind of professional who played a role though on the other hand given that he is essentially a spook and a special forces officer rather than a conventional military specialist who had gone through all the various military training academies and programs and such like that might help explain this bizarre focus on the idea that with a handful of special operations and special operators you can somehow see the country so it is entirely possible and if so he actually also shares some of the blame for the catastrophic failure of that initial invasion. But it is certainly noteworthy that after the invasion the primary role for operations inside Ukraine was actually shifted from the FSB which is still active there but as simply now it is secondary and the GUGU was given primacy which actually suggests that there was a perception frankly that they were there to clear up some of the mess so whatever Alexei's role I think it is clear that the FSB played a much much more important one in framing that initial invasion. Now when the invasion happened it was Alexei of himself who personally denied Wagner any role in it why well by that time he had already on the orders from Defence Minister Shogu stood up an alternative arrival, a reduit so it was the reduit that actually played a considerable role in that initial operation and as a result it was reduit that was decimated in it so that's why he had to turn to Wagner and this is something that Anna Arutunyan and I discuss in our book downfall They must have been a point of considerable satisfaction for Prigogin. Then after Alexei had frankly humiliated him with Redut and when Prigogin had complained about this, you know, really put him in his place, that now Alexei was actually having to come crawling back to him. But still, that's what happened. Vagna came in, took up a lot of the slack in that crucial first year, and a half of the war when the Russian military was definitely scrabbling around for warm bodies to throw into the meat grinder. But nonetheless, it's certainly clear that there was a certain matter of bad blood that was developed by then. In spring of 2022, Alexei would also play a key role as one of the negotiators who managed to get the defenders of the Asof-style works in Marielpol to surrender. This huge Soviet-ear-owned industrial plant, which had become this little redout, and the defenders had been hanging on with extraordinary fortitude. Anyway, Alexei have got them to surrender, and very much seems to be that he did so promising very enlightened proper treatment of the prisoners of war that by all accounts was then a promise that was betrayed. Again, more room for bad blood, including particularly from the right wing Asof. As I say, Brigade, it has expanded steadily in size. Benelay, who had supplied so many of the defenders of Asof-style, and therefore felt particularly keenly the betrayal that followed. Since then, he or rather his little empire within the G.U. has been responsible for this escalating campaign of covert operations, subversion, sabotage, and even the occasional assassination in Europe. In June of 2023, during Brigadier's mutiny, Alexei, who happened to be in Rostov-Ondon when Brigadier seized it, and alongside Deputy Defense Minister Yunus Becki of Kurov, was seen on camera. I wouldn't say negotiating with Brigadier, and frankly it's chatting with him. Now Alexei would later denounce Brigadier and the mutiny at the whole, but at the time he seems frankly very relaxed. Yavkurov, who is definitely a soldier of much more the old school, is actually quite clearly bristling at what he sees as Brigadier's disloyalty. But when Brigadier says that they're just there, that after Shogu and Gerasimov, it's Alexei, if who laughingly says, "Oh take them." Nonetheless, he doesn't seem to have suffered. I mean, he then later made the ritual TV appeal to the Wagnerites, getting them to surrender. And after Prigogin's quote-unquote "mysterious death" – not there is much mystery there – it's Alexei of, who essentially took over the liquidation of Wagner. With the elements that were still inside Russia being rolled into the defence ministry, and most of Wagner's operations in Africa coming under this new body called the Africa Corps, which is very closely controlled by the G.I.U., G.U., and thus Alexei of. Now, in January 2024, there were actually rumors during the rounds in Russian social media channels that Alexei had been dismissed. But it turned out not to be the case. And in fact, in April of that year, it was reported that he had been collecting compromising information on Russian Deputy Defence Minister Timur Ivanov, who has since been sacked court-martial sentenced to 15 years in prison on corruption charges. So, to be honest, this seems to have been more of a kind of spat between subalterns. Clearly, Ivanov was trying to get rid of Alexei of, but the point is that the defence ministry, its relationship with the G.U. is a complex one because technically the G.U. is part of the General Staff apparatus. So, really, it's the Chief of the General Staff who, in practice, especially in time of war or equivalent to war, actually has the power of hiring and firing in this context. It's a little bit more complex, it's certainly not sort of a carbon-dried, but Timur Ivanov clearly wasn't able to get rid of Alexei of, and Alexei of presumably contributed to Ivanov's downfall. So, look, this is a guy who, as I say, he comes from the Special Forces side, he is by all accounts, very capable, able, gets on well with his subordinates, again that kind of bluff, man of action, type approach. He is capable of running a large and varied department that is carrying out a whole variety of different operations. He can play the political game to a degree. Let's be honest, he's not a particularly public-facing individual, but nonetheless, you know, when he has to, he can get rough and dirty in the internal politics of the Russian military, which, after all, is not just simply a war fighting or national defence structure. It is also so heavily driven by factionalism and for so many an instrument for enrichment. And for the record, Alexei of his family seemed to live quite well, though there's little asterisk there, which I will come to in a moment. Anyway, so who is to blame? Well, there's always the possibility that while we tend to assume that there's some kind of grand political narrative or whatever, that this is entirely personal. There is the claim on the Ogpou Vichikha telegram site, which often has a lot of, well, this is the trouble. It has a lot of kind of what purports to be inside a gossip. A certain amount of which is indeed accurate inside a gossip, which makes it all the more irritating, because it's always hard to tell that from the stuff that is just simply froth and water cooler conversations and such like. Anyway, they have claimed that in fact he was there with his mistress and their child. And that explains why a man who has a 61-year-old wife, he himself is 64 or 5 from memory. Who has a large, nicer state and home outside of Moscow, but why he was in this, frankly, not especially salubrious apartment block in the outer suburbs. Now, the alternative answer has been in fact that this was a safe house or a temporary accommodation. But anyway, so it might be that there's some kind of personal dimension here. Though to be perfectly honest, I thought that that would then lead to a shootout in an apartment block. I'm not convinced necessarily. Then there is the suggestion that it was precisely because of his perceived betrayal of Wagner. And the interesting thing is that although, yes, there is a lot of bad blood between him and many of the figures within Wagner still. I can't see this as being something that plays out a couple of years later. I was talking to someone in Moscow who does have connections into that world. Who said, look, if it had happened in the heat of the moment, sure. But these are not the kind of people who nurture long-term plots. And I think it's fair to say that the Wagner rights in the main are not long-term sophisticated planners. So I don't know. I actually have a sense that that notion is being spread really to cause mischief because it tends to come often from quarters which tend to be a little bit closer to the pro-Ukrainian side of things. Then of course, there's the perennial suggestion that it was the Kremlin that did it, as the Ho Ho hose, that off bush about of a window. I get so tired with this whole window's meme. But the Kremlin isn't going to do this. Why? Because well, for starters, in barricing, deeply embarrassing to the security apparatus to have another general killed. And frankly, if the Kremlin wants to get rid of someone, yes, occasionally it will use violence, just ask you for any pro-Gorgin. And here's amazing collapsing plane. But actually, look, it can just have people arrested. It can be shocked, shocked to discover that they were taking bribes. You know, it's so easy. In a system which almost encourages everyone to be corrupt. What that means is that everybody has a skeleton in their cupboard and the Kremlin can always decide who's cupboard to have a look through. So, again, I don't really buy that. So, the obvious answer is that it was the Ukrainians, though the Ukrainians clearly have not just not admitted it, but they have issued a denial through their foreign minister. But here's the whole question, the whole dilemma. Would they risk torpedoing the current talks that are going on? And perhaps even more importantly, earning Donald Trump's wrath for breaking his peace process. I mean, this is clearly what the Russians are pushing. Foreign Minister Lavrov has claimed it that it was a provocation and it was all about breaking up the peace talks. And I concur that it doesn't really seem to make sense. Especially since, remember, there are two Ukrainian intelligence agencies that really have been at the fore of carrying out assassinations and sabotage missions inside Russia. One is the SBU, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the other is HOR, which is the Ukrainian counterpart to the G.U. Military Intelligence. Now, until very recently, who was the head of HOR, it was Kyrilog Budanov, who has now become both Zelensky's chief of staff, but also is currently the chief negotiator. So why would Hoorah carry out an attack that would actually be a good idea? embarrass their own former boss, whom they seem to hold in a degree of respect that approaches reverence at times. Now, I don't think this is going to make the Russians walk away from the peace talks. I think they're just simply going to use this to try and earn brownie points. You see, look at those unreliable Ukrainians, they're trying to disrupt the talks, but we are rising above it and are still willing to have this dialogue, you know, that the kind of propaganda line. But on the other hand, I mean, although we've already had unnamed sources in, I think it was the Washington Post saying, "Oh, it's pretty crazy for the Ukrainians to do it." I think we have to acknowledge the limits of that argument. I mean, after all, hey, I thought it was pretty crazy for Putin to invade Ukraine in 2022. So, you know, it is possible for countries to do things that don't seem to be directly in their interests. And indeed, it may be that in fact, Ukraine is carrying out a kind of counterpart to the Russian talk and fight policy. Because, after all, they have not, apart from the very brief energy ceasefire, really, as a stop to Trump. They have not let up in their offensive operations, even while negotiating with Ukrainians. I mean, their idea is no. You negotiate best when you keep the other side under pressure. Well, this could be the Ukrainians saying, fine, you want to play it that way, we will play it that way too. Well, carry on negotiating, but who knows who we're going to kill of your officers in the meantime. So, that is possible. However, for that to be effective, that would need to be communicated to the Russians. They need to know that there is a message there. And I haven't seen any indications that there has been. It is also possible that this was an operation that really had gone beyond the point of no return. Remember, so many of these operations are not carried out by what we could call card carrying Ukrainian intelligence officers, but local proxies. Sometimes who are paid, sometimes who are driven by an ideological commitment to punish the Putin regime, often who are subordinate, who are blackmailed, or just simply are dupes, who don't know what they're doing. I mean, that's a lot easier when you have things like the bombing of the Crimea bridge, in which actually the poor bugger who was driving the truck bomb, he just thought he was just taking a standard load across into Crimea, rather than that it was about to explode with considerable force killing him instantly. Now, in that context, you know, you do trade off a certain degree of detailed control for arms, length, deniability, and you're simply not putting your own experience in dedicated officers at risk. So, you know, it might just simply be that they, you know, although in hindsight, they decided actually we wish it hadn't happened, they just couldn't do anything about it. I don't think it's very likely, but I just throw that out as a possibility. What I found particularly interesting though is, as people try to make sense of it, within a certain fraction of the Russian nationalist commentary at, there are people who are suggesting that in fact this attack was driven by anti-peace extremists within Kiev. So, in other words, this was not a kind of officially sanctioned government operation, but if I can quote one social media post, "Singsolensky on the verge of agreeing a peace deal, the SBU, the Ukrainian Security Service is doing what it can to prevent this." Now, on the face of it, this is conspiratorial nonsense, and especially quite bizarre because it's conspiratorial nonsense, coming from Russian ultrinationalists, which actually exonerates the Lensky. And, yes, I think that it's highly unlikely, but I'm not entirely, totally 100% willing to discount it, because there is some kind of form. Back in 2022, before the invasion, there was a Ukrainian banker, Denys Kireev, who had a lot of Russian contacts and friends, and who also it turned out was an asset for Huhr, and Budanov credited Kireev with providing absolutely crucial advance intelligence, a particularly about the fact that the Russians were going to try and seize Antonov Airport, at Hostelmell, and use that as a bridgehead into Kiev. Anyway, so it was crucial to prevent Kiev from actually falling in those first few hours and days of the invasion. Now, Kireev was then part of the team that were involved in peace negotiations in Belarus in Gormel on the 28th of February, so in others, only a few days after the invasion. He was due, also, to be in the next round of talks, but his body was found in Kiev. He'd been killed, through execution, and his body left in the street. Now, according to Budanov, and I think this has generally been accepted, it was the SBU that was behind his killing. Indeed, in 2023, Zalensky's then advisor Mikhail Opazalyak said that his death was a tragic mistake, possibly due to, quote, unquote, poor coordination between the Hur and the SBU. Now, that's entirely possible. Maybe SBU thought that Kireev was actually a traitor and an asset for the Russians, rather than for Hur, but it still doesn't explain, though, why instead of arresting him and putting him on trial, why he was shot in the back of the head in the street, and his body was just left there, and that the SBU kept so quiet about it, there's clearly something going on here. Now, according to a subsequent investigation by the Wall Street Journal, the man who's actually responsible to this was the SBU's counterintelligence chief, Alexander Peklad, who has the charming nickname of the strangler. I don't know why, and frankly, I'm probably happy remaining in ignorance. Anyway, Peklad's rivalry with Budanov is very, very well known, and the suspicion then is that actually this was more part of personal turf war games and such, rather than thing else. And of course, since then, Peklad has masterminded a series of assassinations inside Russia. Peklad was also very much a man in the circle of Andrei Yermak, who was Zelensky's former chief of staff, the man whose job Budanov now has. And as of last month, Peklad is the first deputy head of the SBU. Now, let's put aside Peklad personally. I have no idea if he was a tall responsible or not, or anything like that, but I really would hate to think that anyone inside the Ukrainian state would be so willing, either to do Budanov a bad turn, or to undermine a peace process, that they may well think is not in Ukraine's interests, but nonetheless, to think that people would still willfully carry out an operation intended to disrupt it is a rather alarming one. And let's be absolutely clear, this is depressing that I do feel I need to insert these caveats. I'm not saying a tall that this is the case, just that I wish for my own peace of mind I could be 100% certain it wasn't, not I don't know, 95%. Let's remember after all, that Tink of the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, which for so long have been blamed widely on the Russians, including by the former head of Germany's Federal Intelligence Service, but that is now looking increasingly likely to have been a Ukrainian operation. And the only question is actually whether this was approved by Zelensky or not. So look, there is some suggestion that there's a possibility for maverick operations carried out within the Ukrainian security apparatus. I don't know, as I say, the most likely outcome is just simply that this is a man who the Ukrainians absolutely consider to be a legitimate military target. They built up an operation, they saw an opportunity and they carried it out because they thought, well, actually the chance of getting Alexeev is worth the potential risk to a peace process that at the moment it's likely outcome is still very, very unclear. But anyway, whatever the reasons, this clearly is a significant moment. So let's take a break and then let me talk about quite what it might mean. Just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the Inmosco shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conductone, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counterterrorism, civil affairs and the like. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com/inmoscoshadows. And remember that patrons get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, as well as knowing that they're supporting this purely source at all things Russian. And you can also follow me on Twitter @markgalliotty or on Facebook @markgalliottyonrussia. Now back to the episode. Okay, so how does the Alexeev shooting matter? Well, first of all, it's clearly another serious black eye for the FSB, the Federal Security Service. Particularly the DVKR, the military counterintelligence service, which, although frankly, its main role seems to be just simply watching the military to keep an eye on them that they don't deviate from the party line. In theory, at least, they are also meant to be carrying out the kind of counterintelligence operations which would protect military targets. Now, is that really going to mean anything? Who knows? The FSB has proven to be entirely Teflon coated in the past. It can blunder time and time and time again, and their little fanboy Putin still doesn't seem to do anything about it. So, you know, I don't think it's going to win anyway sort of affect the FSB. It might finally mean that they provide a bit more security for generals, which is a fairly obvious thing to have addressed by now, but we'll have to wait and see. And in particular, it's also worth noting that while the focus is inevitably on the FSB, who will of course use the arrests as their sort of chance to try and distract from the intelligence blunder that allowed the attacker to happen in the first place? It's also worth noting, where is the FSO? The Federal Protection Service. Now, it's primarily Putin's secret service, his bodyguard, but it's also meant to protect senior government figures. Now, I can understand how you can't protect every single Lieutenant General. Russia has a lot of generals, but the deputy head of military intelligence in what is in effect a time of war. When a whole series of other officers have been targeted and many of them killed, I would have thought that someone would have thought that Alexei should fit into the category of people who should have FSO officers. Now, it's worth noting that he could well have just simply messed up. It could well be that he had a protection team, but especially if he was off visiting a mistress, maybe he told them to take the evening and morning off. He certainly did have a driver who presumably is a driver bodyguard, who was waiting for him downstairs, but again, that's not much help when you're on the 24th floor. So, you know, it is possible that it will transpire that he had a bit more security than this would suggest, but until we hear that one has to presume not. Will it have an effect on the negotiations, especially given that it's actually Alexei of the immediate superior? GU Chief Admiral Igor Kostiuk, who is currently leading them. Now, I don't think so. Again, I suspect that they, I mean, who knows, Kostiuk may well be furious, he may be relieved, who can tell, but I don't think that the Russians are going to regard this as an excuse to break away, as I said. I think they will just simply try to leverage the attack for what political capital they can, particularly with the Americans. But, yeah, Budanova is not exactly a shrinking violet. I don't think they're going to be in a position to brow-beat him by any means. Part of the central thesis behind this campaign of assassinations is presumably the key of hopes that they will rattle the Russian elite, and particularly the military elite, sufficiently that they begin to put pressure on the Kremlin to actually end the war, because they don't know if they're going to be in the crosshairs next. So far, I have to say I'm not seeing any signs of that. Again, maybe, partly just a problem, because as I say, there are too many Russian generals anyway. So you can still think that the odds are pretty good, or else you just simply accept that it's a risk of a time of war, or just simply you know full well that you can't afford to look like any kind of lily livid coward, and therefore you have to affect no concern at all for your own security. For whatever reason, though, at the moment I see no signs that this is leading to any kind of faltering within the elite. If anything, there is a chance that it brings pressure to bear on put into escalate. Now, I know it always seems difficult for people to think of anyone being able to conceive of the Russian campaign as being half-hearted, as missiles and drones continue to slam into Ukrainian cities and power stations and such like, but nonetheless, it is always worth stressing that although it's a small minority within the ultra-nationalist community, there are those who are exasperated, who actually do feel that the reason why this war is not going better is that Putin continues to try and temporise, that he continues to try and fight a war on the cheap and on the easy, so that most Russians are not really feeling that there is no wartime situation, that there's no mass mobilisation of reservists, there's not a use of conscripts, that there is not for example the imposition of a martial law regime, which they argue would actually make these kind of attacks less likely. And certainly, the Alexei of attack has already prompted a resurgence in these kinds of claims and demands. And it's actually also, I think, brought Tsargrad, the media outlet with which I continue to have an unhealthy fascination, but while it's always being on the extreme end of politics, nonetheless, I think it's been particularly intemperate following the assassination attempt. Let me just read a couple of passages. Shots fired from the 24th floor of a Moscow high rise have exposed a fatal problem, while our best men are being systematically murdered in their homes, we prefer the sleek, special military operation to the honest word "war". The assassination attempt on Lieutenant General Vadimiyra Alexeiev, the brains behind our military intelligence, that's a bit rough on Kostyauk, struck a raw nerve, "Give continues its reign of terror, while Moscow continues to fight like gentlemen." But in war, and especially in high politics, there are no gentlemen left, and the price of these refined manners is the bullet riddled bodies of the military elite and a humiliating position at the negotiations in Abu Dhabi. Do we intend to fight or just to pretend? Now, huge amounts of hyperbole amidst the spittle, flecked madness of this kind of apparent passage, but nonetheless, Tsargrad is speaking for a certain constituency. It quotes the military observer Viktor Baraynets. Ukraine's terrorist network is actively tracking down generals, who are extremely poorly protected. This saddens me. We've done nothing to protect them. They could have lived in the headquarters during the war. The fact is, Moscow is saturated with terrorists. We need to protect our generals. Not only have 13 generals died on the battlefield, we've lost another five in the rear. None of our generals have security. They drive around Moscow in civilian cars as an indication of the level of security. And Alexeiev is a second in command, the first deputy head of the main intelligence directorate. Now, it is perfectly true that both sides are fighting a shadow war and up to now not only are senior Russian figures in much less secure circumstances than one might imagine, but also to be perfectly honest, Ukraine has not suffered anything like the same kind of toll as Russia had. I mean, Russia, in the last 14 months, we've had Lieutenant General Igor Kirilov, who's the head of Elkebezet, which is the chemical, biological and nuclear defence troops. Anyway, he was blown up in December of 2024. Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskaliik, deputy chief of the main operations directorate, main operations directorate is the real brains of the general staff, by the way. So the deputy chief, that's quite a significant figure. Anyway, he was killed in April of 2025. And then we had Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvatov, more of the story is, don't be a Lieutenant General, by the way. Anyway, Fanil Sarvatov, chief of the operational training directorate of the general staff, who was killed just recently in December. Now, think of it the other way round, off hand, and it may be that I'm missing someone, but the only assassination, the only serious assassination that the Ukrainians have suffered that I can think of is Colonel Ivan Voronech of the SBU, who was assassinated in Kiev in July. Now, Voronech was a significant figure within the Spetsnaurs, quite possibly also in operations inside Russia. And what happened is the FSB hired two hitmen from Azerbaijan through an organized crime network. Again, this is one of the force multipliers that the Russians use. Their connections to not just Russian, but wider organized crime. Anyway, they used him to, they used these assassins to kill Voronech, but that's it, that's about it. They have been sabotage and similar attacks, particularly on infrastructure, but even that, nothing on the scale or sophistication, as the bombing of the Crimea bridge in 2022, or Operation Spiderweb in June 2025, when we had all these container loads of remote controlled drones implanted around Russian air bases and attacking their strategic bombers. So, there definitely is a real asymmetry here. Now, both sides are ruthless and cynical. As I said, they use dupes, they groom those with ideological commitments, they use black mail. I mean, there was a series of cases, for example, of fire bombings of Russian military draft officers, Voyankomati, carried out by pensioners, because what would happen is hackers would essentially steal their funds, and then they'd be told, if you want to get them back, then you've got to go and fire bomb a Voyankomati. All is fair in love in war, I think is the general assumption here. So, is it just that the Ukrainians, frankly, are better at it? It may be the case, certainly they are highly motivated. They probably have more freedom of maneuver, even though they stem from the same Soviet era structures of the GRU and the KGB, nonetheless, clearly the Ukrainians, just as they've shown much more initiative and dynamism and flexibility and imagination. In so many other aspects of the war, so too in the covert war. It could also be that there's a series of just different priorities. I mean the Russians, as they have focused largely on infrastructure, whereas the Ukrainians have looked also heavily at people. Yes, we've got the generals, but also there was the killing of Daria Dugina probably intended for her father, the idealog Alexander Dugin, that was back in 2022. Then there was the outspoken propagandist Vladylen Tatarski, killed in St Petersburg in April 2023 when again what was probably a dupe brought a bomb to a public event of his. And it could well be that the Ukrainians are just simply more willing to take risks. Because it's after all worth noting just the toll of losses. If you read the Russian press, frankly you'll soon notice that scarcely a day goes by without the reports of someone being arrested or someone being killed by the security forces, preventing them from carrying out one of these quote unquote terrorist operations. I mean I just looked at just last few days. Tuesday, FSB officers detained a 29-year-old, they say foreigner, I'm not quite sure what, let's now see anyway, in Moscow, who on orders from the Ukrainian intelligence services was preparing to detonate an explosion at an energy facility in the Moscow region and he was caught with an improvised bomb containing five kilos of explosive. When's he seem to have been clear? Then on Thursday you had two cases. A 21-year-old known as Maxim G found guilty of preparing and assisting in the sabotage in St Petersburg, he was sentenced in court for nine years and Andrej Smirnov, a Russian hacker who collaborated with the Ukrainians sentenced to 16 years in prison for treason. Then on Friday, FSB officers detained a 48-year-old from Kabarov's cry on suspicion of spying for hur and on that same day, well Alexei was shot. So we have to realize that the Russians are not entirely incompetent, they're actually quite good, unfortunately, at this kind of mass security status. But so long as the Ukrainians do happy to keep pushing, they are going to have successes. This is it, in some ways you don't care how many failures you have, as long as you have the successes. But as all of this matter in terms of the big picture, you know, left-handler general Kerilov of the chemical defence corps is buried and Major General Alexei Oretyshev takes over. Who by the by is near as I can tell, comes from a distinguished family of military aristocrats dating back to the 17th century. But who is to say that Oretyshev is going to be any less competent than Kerilov, he may be even better. Certainly as I say, there's no sign that generals are refusing assignments or promotions to left-handler general standard or fearfully petitioning the Kremlin for peace or anything. But unless it does matter I think. First of all, okay, so maybe the target that you're going for is going to be replaced, that's the importance of a chain of command, but perhaps the target is particularly competent. I mean, who knows, I don't know, you know, who would have been in position to take over from Alexei if he died and who presumably will be taking over in temporary status anyway, while Alexei recovers. But it may well be that this individual is going to be less competent, less confident or just simply is going to take time to be brought up to strength. So you create certain amounts of disruption within the military structures. As the toll of attacks increase, it certainly does convey this sense of a state that either doesn't care about protecting its people or just simply can't do so. And that's important because once you create this kind of attitude, then everyone is going to be basically paranoid on the lookout for constant attacks. They're going to be filled the need, they have to look under their car every time for bonds. And generally again, this creates a mood, which is important. In some ways, it's almost a little bit of a parallel with that period of drone panic we had in the West, where every drone that was spotted anywhere near an airport, or indeed what wasn't a drone, but was assumed to be a drone. That was suddenly seen as evidence of some kind of nefarious Russian campaign, whereas almost all of these turned out to be nothing to do with the Russians, even if they were drones in the first place. But the point is that mood of paranoia meant people were looking, if you look hard enough, you will find something that looks like a drone, and then you will lock down your airport and you will have all kinds of disruption. And also, it conveys that sense that the Russians can reach out and cause all kinds of trouble to us in our day-to-day lives within punity. Well, likewise, if people start to actually think that the Ukrainians can do this. It also means that any time that you have a general who's involved in a car crash, who dies or dies of a heart attack, someone will assume it was because his brakes were cut, or he was poisoned with some subtle toxin. And it all does put pressure on Putin by activating those ultrinationalists, so that he faces this pressure to escalate. Now, there's no signs that he wants to do so at the moment. But nonetheless, you know, it could be that yes, it forces him to be a little bit more amenable to the idea of peace, or it could push him to feeling that he has to escalate, even if it is politically and socially very, very disruptive. And in the process, actually could well undermine his own regime. Because the trouble is the longer he leaves it, and this is a classic Putin pathology, is that when he's faced with a tough decision, he puts it off as long as possible, often then his hand is forced, and actually things are even more problematic because he has delayed so long. Because at the moment Putin being Putin, he is dodging the issue. He has, well, through his spokesman, Peskov, he has continued to refuse to weigh in on whether or not they ought to be more security for the generals. He just, oh, well, that's for the military, that's what the security service is to talk about. Putin is, as ever, absent without leave when it comes to difficult and embarrassing situations. And again, that does undermine actually the whole credibility of Putin as the supreme commander-in-chief, the great father of the nation. Wars are, after all, fought not just on the battlefield, but much more decisively in the heads and hearts of respective regimes and populations. Now, in this context, predicting and quantifying the precise effects of any operation is never easy. Well, actually, let's be honest, it's impossible. And I suspect that everyone in each country has a tendency to overestimate their own capabilities, what they can do to the enemy, and underestimate their enemy's resilience. And in the process, the danger is, of course, that something that was meant to demoralise might actually stiffen sinews. Whether we're talking about the blitz in World War II, that didn't push the British population into surrender, the CIA's revolving array of attempts to kill Fidel Castro, or indeed actually thinking about it, the assassination of Ahrinehard Hyderick, who was the senior SS officer in Czechoslovakia during World War II. And here's assassination by Czechs, who were trained and brought in by the SOE, the Special Operations Executive. It was a successful operation, but it provoked reprisals that were extraordinarily brutal even by Nazi standards, which is saying something. So it's often regarded as a technical success, but an operational disaster. And in fact, generally, and I know I'm wondering off a little bit of a tangent here, but don't worry, the podcast will be over soon. Generally, the SOE, which after all had been established in World War II by Churchill with the mandate to set to Europe ablaze, was certainly at the time considered a success. General Eisenhower, it was, who credited its campaign with shortening the war in Europe by anything up to six months. But since then, there has been an interesting and lively debate about whether it actually was really that effective, even though yes, it carried out a whole variety of attacks, but did it take resources away from other better uses? Honestly, I've not yet been convinced that they were as counterproductive as some people have claimed, despite though the terrible toll on the agents, which again, in some ways, is a parallel with the Ukrainian campaign. But the point is here is just simply that there is room for serious debate. And my concern is that as with so many covert operations, the enthusiasm for the process and satisfaction at tactical achievement, and particularly in this kind of a context, just that sheer sense of satisfaction when you kill the general of what is a brutal invading force. Well, that may well often eclipse the sober assessment of the value of the campaign. Now again, let me be clear, I'm not saying that the Ukrainians shouldn't be carrying out these attacks. I'm just wondering if the campaign against the generals, I suspect that you either need to be carrying out a attack at a higher tempo if you really want to start to to rattle the Russian officer core. Or else it may well be worth thinking about whether or not other targets make more sense. I mean, for example, the recent combination of covert operations and dronomy. missile strikes against Russian fuel infrastructure, I thought look particularly promising, but seems to have dwindled away now. So I think it's a question of these kind of attacks. They are, if you want to have a better word and I know we're talking about people's blood here but nonetheless, they are exciting and they are dramatic and they are eye catching and that all has a political value. Because after all politics is about changing people's minds and to do that you have to communicate things to them and to communicate we can find you wherever that may well be effective. But at present I think it's still a bit of a coin toss as to whether or not the outcome is a more amenable Russia or actually an even more vicious and violent policy being adopted. And the sad truth of the matter is we're only really going to know in hindsight. By the way if this whole question of COVID operations and the like is something of interest let me just flag up Rory Kormack's book Disrupt and Deny Spies Special Forces and the secret pursuit of British foreign policy from Oxford University Press which I think is an excellent and judicious study of post-war British operations which are rather less extensive but sometimes as subtle as the vaporings of today's Russian propagandists who after all see MI6's hand behind their every setback so Rory Kormack Disrupt and Deny. All I can say in hindsight though when we come to the more paranoid end of Russian pundits and Alexei is killing just thank heavens that they see the CIA as more SBU's patron than MI6 because otherwise there's no doubt they will already be adding the Alexei of shooting to their list of MI6's imagined crimes against the poor or benighted Russian people. Thanks very much for listening. Well that's the end of another episode of the Inmosco Shadow podcast. Just as a reminder beyond this you can follow my blog also called Inmosco Shadows. Follow me on Twitter @martgalliotty or Facebook @martgalliottyonrussia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page that's patreon.com/inmoscoshadows and decide which tier you want to join getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.