In Moscow's Shadows 231: Real Guarantees for Ukraine

With Kissed Armor and the Manuel Macron, both trying to do each other in sounding respectively Chichillion and DeGaulist in their pledges of troops for Ukraine, what do I think real security guarantees for Ukraine would look like? Ones that might actually end not prolong the war. Hello I'm Mark Galliotti and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast of varying length, frequency and format yet always reassuringly low production values is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you and also by the crisis exercise software company Conductor. Hello and first of all thank you to all of the owes of you who sent kind words about the criminal history deep dive in the last episode and yes there will be more, although I warn you that instead this episode is going to be a distinctly wonky one so probably rather less fun. Also let me just mention that I'm recording this on Saturday the 10th of January although it'll drop as usual on the Sunday so it's something particularly dramatic happens overnight and I don't mention it that's why. Now speaking of the news I mean really there's three points which people might expect me to talk about though I'm not quite sure how much there is to say. Obviously in Venezuela there was the abduction to use Trump's own words kidnap of Nicolas Maduro. Then there was the interception of a quote unquote shadow fleet tanker north west of Britain and then there was the Russian use of an aliechnik hyper hypersonic intermediate range ballistic missile on Lviv. Now in many ways I think that these are very good for taking up columnages and the newspapers but I'm not sure actually really how much there is to say about them. I mean in terms of the first couple wow Trump's willing to use force when he thinks it serves a national or indeed his own interests lots of great propaganda lines that the Russians and indeed the Chinese will be able to make use of that especially in the global south but I doubt anyone's really that surprised. Trump the peacemaker was always a bit of a clumsy fit. The fact that he is a certain sphere of influence over Latin America it's our hemisphere again is that a surprise hardly I mean even before the so-called Don Roe doctrine I mean we saw this embodied and coded within the national security strategy but in any case it's just taking America's long standing positions and in proper Trumpian fashion turbocharging it rather now. Again I think in many ways Trump's real importance is not just in or so much in terms of changing US policy as in his willingness to say the quiet bits out loud and not to feel the need to veil it with some kind of justification. One thing that was said I mean again this is usual kind of crass binary you know people wanted to write articles about why this will embolden Putin and others why this will chase Putin and the truth of course is somewhere in the muddy middle but certainly America claiming a sphere of influence is not the same as America being comfortable with Russia and China and whoever else can impose one acquiring a sphere of influence. As I said in a piece for the spectator blog this weekend I think for Trump America first also means America only. Remember this is not a man who has any particular problems in engaging in the South Caucasus or Central Asia and certainly not Taiwan so yes this is no particular invitation to other countries to follow his example and the idea that international law is really something that just only gets applied in and when it suits national interests well to a degree this is something that's been happening for quite some time or arguably has always been the case. I mean in many ways I tend to think of international law as being a little bit like international etiquette that despite talk of our rules based international order blah blah blah it wasn't ever really an order as such orders need to be imposed and enforced and it's hard to see really who does that instead it was an etiquette that for a certain period of time countries were willing to observe at least up to a point because they saw a common interest however the more countries break that etiquette the more they are I don't know it sounds like a very trivial word to use here but rude in those terms well the less the remaining countries are going to feel it is in their interests to keep up the same manners. So I think we should see it that way that for a while there was a period in which actually everyone felt everyone shall say quote unquote that mattered in other words the people who were actually major players on the world scene felt that to a degree they had to observe it but if you look at what China has been doing in the South China Sea alone what Russia has been doing but also on a smaller scale what all sorts of other countries have also been doing it is clear that this has never been anything like a strong watertight system I just think we're now in some ways again just seeing an end to that etiquette and the use of the Arashnik missile which again well it's on one level look it's just another missile so fine it could go at mark 10 and Ukrainian radars couldn't even pick it up until it was just going to about to send its payload slamming down into Lviv but you know it wasn't with nuclear weapons it in some ways I think that a certain amount of the international furore that has been raised about it is is performative but the point is yes it it catches the attention and that was clearly the idea this was as much as anything else a political as well as kinetic weapon and I think in the context of all the other things that have been happening this week in part this is Putin wanting to feel that he has demonstrated that the quote unquote attack on his residence at Valdey cannot go un avenged remember he's also playing to a domestic nationalist audience who otherwise would think he looks weak it is also about reminding the United States that it shouldn't get too cocky just because it's taken that tanker with a sort of questionable Russian flagging Russia is not Venezuela with baller-likeers and thirdly it is signaling to Ukraine and to Europe you better make a deal you better make a deal quickly because I still have escalatory options and that really brings me on to what I actually want to discuss in this particular episode of the podcast which is precisely this whole issue which is currently very much in the press and in public discussion about security guarantees for Ukraine and quite what they would look like and obviously at present the the big headline issue is the proposal from the so called coalition of the willing that there be a multinational force Ukraine MFNU which would move in in the context of any kind of peace agreement to set up what they call hubs will come to that particular bit of language in a moment and provide training but also provide reassurance and by implication a tripwire to try and deter any future Russian aggression. We had British Prime Minister Skiest Stama saying this I won't try and do the voice this is a vital part of our iron cast commitment to stand with Ukraine for the long term it paves the way for the legal framework under which British French and partner forces though precious few partner forces have come forward so far it's worth mentioning could operate on Ukrainian soil securing Ukraine skies and seas and regenerating Ukraine's armed forces for the future well look let's be clear I regard this as an absolute non-starter if Ukraine and Europe are determined to have European forces on Ukrainian soil in peacetime then I think that will stime me any attempts at actually securing a peace so it becomes a rather circular process these are forces that can only be deployed when there's a peace agreement and by their very notion they prevent one we have to realize how this is going to look to Russia and no on one level people will say well who cares what the Russians think and on one level that's a perfectly valid perspective except if you want the Russians to stop fighting given that there's no way that frankly they can be forced to and since there can't be a military victory there has to be some kind of political agreement to sort this out with the ebb and flow of the front line and operations behind those front lines clearly influencing the political decision making around it but still one way or the other the Russians are going to have to be willing to accept a deal and in so many ways this crosses what I think are the genuine red lines of Putin's there's a lot of talk about his red lines and the Russians play on this quite a bit they try to suggest that all kinds of different things are absolute and non-negotiable most of them are negotiable this is one that I really think isn't it's getting fun goes back to what Putin was saying before the February 2022 invasion he wasn't talking about a threat posed by Ukraine joining NATO he was talking about what he regarded as a very real threat if there were going to be NATO forces NATO security architecture on Ukrainian soil and that's precisely what this is you can call them hubs if you want but we're still talking about bases we're still talking about bases and troops and that is an absolute non-starter to quote Maria Zakharava the foreign ministry spokeswoman on Thursday the declaration is not aimed at achieving a lasting peace and security but rather at continuing the militarization escalation and further conflict aggravation she goes on the Russian foreign ministry warns that the deployment of military units and the setting up of military facilities storages and other western infrastructure on Ukrainian territory will be considered to be foreign intervention that directly threatens the security of Russia and other European countries all such units and facilities will be considered legitimate military targets for the Russian armed forces well I mean that last bit is just a bit of flourish and bravado because they would only be there in theory in in peacetime but nonetheless that does I think accurately encapsulate Russia's perspective and I look I find myself wondering don't do the British and French governments not realize that because this is why there is a certain conspiracy theory that basically says that they are trying to prevent there being any peace talks precisely through the guise of saying that they want to help secure Ukraine because they want Ukraine to continue bleeding Russia even the expense of being blood itself now I don't believe that I certainly don't want to believe that but nonetheless the alternative perspective is just that they are effing stupid and that they don't realize the degree to which this is just not going to work and maybe as I said they these are national leaders who are I think it's fair to say experiencing a certain degree of impotence at home and maybe they just want to be able to feel and look statesmen like and matcho in international affairs I don't know but the point is this is just a non-starter we're talking about a 1,300 kilometer line of contact any meaningful force which is one that it could if need be defend itself in time of god forbid war would have to be a really rather major force and remember this point that for every one soldier you've got deployed in theater you really need to have an overall commitment of three times as many because to put it very concretely there's one unit that's preparing to go in there's one unit that's in theater and there's one unit that is recovering from having been deployed so we're talking about quite substantial commitments from armors that are already overstretched and under strength I think Britain has almost no tanks it's given away not sure if it's all or almost all of artillery if it's artillery already to the Ukrainians it's air defenses are wrecking to be inadequate and remember these are armors that have not in any way adapted to the drone age the way the Ukrainians and Russians have and besides how long could these countries afford to keep forces in place it's expensive it's complex and it also hamstrings their militaries prevents them from any other deployments and in any case it all depends on the so-called US backstop now even if you think you have a promise of US support today can you be absolutely certain that you'd have it tomorrow because this is absolutely crucial remember a lot of this is about not providing train to the Ukrainians there's all sorts of other means of doing that or whatever no it's about deterrence it's about deterring Russia from coming back and having another go and deterrence yes it depends on capabilities to a degree but vastly more than that it depends on credibility there's no point having forces there if the Russians don't believe that they would actually put up a fight if need be you know if they're just going to be there to observe and to say yes we have seen Russian tanks passing on the way to Nipro or whatever then that's pointless and also they don't provide any reassurance to the Ukrainians if the Ukrainians don't believe that in some ways they are there as a genuine promise of wider European NATO even US military support in times of a renewed conflict and maybe they would be there maybe in practice what forces that were deployed would indeed fight and fight determinately and that then the rest of Europe or the rest rest of NATO would pile in to help the Ukrainians maybe but do you believe it do I believe it more to the point do the Ukrainians and do the Russians believe it because after all NATO hasn't been willing to fight for Ukraine up to now so I think it's the credibility that will be lacking and to be honest a deployment that lacks credibility is worse than no deployment at all and after all this is happening at a time in which international laws have already mentioned is so frequently flouted ignored redefined and generally folded spindled and mutilated so what is the real value in this much-vaunted legally binding guarantees however all that said I appreciate that there is a need to come up with these guarantees and it's very very easy to sit on the sidelines like I am and sniping so what do I think would be the real security guarantees and there's going to be a lot here I warn you but in part that's the point mistrust anyone who offers a simple answer that's a silver bullet whether it's article five or the sending NATO troops or Tomahawk cruise missiles or whatever no it has to be a whole complex package of measures which together would basically make Ukraine too tough a nut for Putin or a need a successor of Putin's to seriously contemplate attacking you know we must always remember Putin did not think he was going to be getting into a major war in February 2022 and I seriously suspect though obviously I don't know that if he had actually realized what was likely to follow he probably would not have sent in his troops he would have yes absolutely continued to try and bring us he saw Ukraine to heal but he would have probably continued to rely on non-military means on threats on politics on economic pressure and and such like he is still a pragmatist even it often a deluded or misinformed one and can be deterred especially when domestic security and domestic stability are in play you know consider he hasn't struck into the West he didn't for example fight Turkey when he was clearly furious in 2015 when they shot down one of his bombers over Syria he hasn't ordered a wider mobilization to really crime crush the Ukrainians because of the fact that he is appreciating the various risks and downsides involved in any of these acts so let's take a break then take a deep breath and I will rush into my lengthy shopping list of what I think a comprehensive set of security guarantees for Ukraine could look like just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the in Moscow shadows podcast it's corporate partner and sponsor is conductor which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare counterterrorism civil affairs and the like but you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com/inmoscoshadows and remember that patrons get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier as well as knowing that they're supporting this purely source at all things russian and you could also follow me on twitter at mark galleyotty or on facebook mark galleyotty on russia now back to the episode so you still with me I warn you that's going to be a lot packed into the second half but well I salute you for staying with me let's start with the most fundamental point of all it will ultimately be in my opinion up to Ukrainians to defend Ukraine it's not worth pretending frankly that Europe would go to war for Ukraine because well not least as I've already mentioned they haven't so far and to be perfectly honest there are too many other political and in need security demands besides the Ukrainians have demonstrated just how extraordinarily well they can fight the degree of imagination coordination determination that they they have deployed into trying to hold on to their sovereignty and then their land so instead I think we are back to what presidents of lensky as far back as 2022 maybe even earlier I haven't seen any references anyway call that the big israel model in other words a nation which thanks to ongoing foreign support is able to maintain a substantial somewhere would even say disproportionate until we look at the threat military force such that it punches well above its weight and can't be tangled with with impunity now part of that is obviously about the size of the military there is talk about a raising the cap of the maximum size to 800,000 now to be perfectly honest I think that's likely to be a ridiculous figure certainly the assessments I've seen are that 500,000 a peacetime army of 500,000 would actually probably overextend Ukraine anyway after all remember it's hard pressed in a time of war to maintain 800,000 now and it's going to need civilian workers for reconstruction so maybe if one can if one thinks of the israeli model we're talking about a moderately size standing force but with a very large and very capable and regularly retrained reserve force because remember that the Ukrainians aren't going to have advanced warning of any substantial Russian attack in the future they they had this time except they didn't actually believe it I think in the future we can be assumed that the Ukrainians will very much be in a mobilized first ask questions later mode so you know maybe I'm not going to put a specific figure on I'd know maybe 300,000 as a standing army which is still substantial but with a large reserve that they can actually bring up to strength in time of war and that will mean that Europe has to provide not just the funds to equip them again this is it Europe loves to basically buy or provide kit but it's more than that it also may well have to provide the money to continue to support that size of army with for example decent pay remember at the moment Ukrainian soldiers they haven't had any kind of a pay rise I understand since 2022 and obviously they're doing so because well either they've been called up and they haven't got a choice but also because they feel patriotism but a peacetime force is a rather different one you need to actually get have more people who are willing to fight because you don't want to just simply have a conscript army you need to have a solid core of long-term professionals who can provide the sort of the backbone for any kind of force so it'll be money and help that way to close the gap between what Ukraine needs to field and what it can afford to field remember Israel spends I think it's 8.8 percent of GDP on defense which is a lot but to a large degree it can do that because of US foreign aid which historically accounts for about 20 percent of its defense budget you know that's the kind of way which foreign aid allows countries to maintain quote unquote oversized military establishments so it's not just about the manpower well and indeed they can also draw more upon women so maybe person power whether not a ghastly word but also training now again here maybe it's worth kind of remodulating the thinking it's not about training the ordinary infantry necessarily though you know I absolutely would want to show respect for the UK's very well regarded operation interflex the UK leads this multinational program training Ukrainian soldiers for the battlefield but to be perfectly honest the Ukrainians have got rather more experience of real 21st century war than anyone else if anything they should be training us so at the at present moment what we really need to be thinking is training at a higher level because Ukraine has demonstrated that their soldiers and their units and their commanders can operate very very well on a tactical level but have show real problems in managing larger operational level operations operational level operations apologies for that now there are in the middle of creating new army cause which is a structure which is meant to help address this but it'll all take time and I think this is one area where actually Western assistance can be effective and if you are going to be defending your own country well you need whatever force multipliers you've got not just kit and I'll come onto that in a moment but also static defenses I mean I think there is a lot more that could be done especially when you've got the time to be able to do so in mining swathes of territory along the border in building more static defenses whether we're talking about tank traps or trenches or whatever else of course again you can't do this across a 1300 kilometer front line but nonetheless you can address key locations particular choke points and the like and the thing is this is something that then gets built up and built up over time assuming that let's say some kind of peace agreement is reached this year it's going to take years for the Russians to reconstitute their forces now quite how many years well that's a bit a big debate two years five years eight years ten years take your pick you'll find expertise to mobilize to all of these figures but the point is with static defenses you build what you actually you know really feel is crucial today and then next year you add some more and then next year and so on you can build it up and build it up and the virtue of that is it is wholly defensive there's no way that someone can claim that a tank trap is actually part of some kind of vicious offensive plan which of course the Russians are going to do if they feel that the Ukrainians are building up forces which could be used to launch some attacks to try and take back occupied territory which the Russians will regard as aggressive again yes I know you might say we don't have to care what the Russians think but we do because as we've seen in the past if the Russians think there is a potential threat then they will often move to try and preempt it which often will mean that they have misunderstood the situation and have started a war but then yes we must move into the whole question of of kit and look in the longer term this very much is going to mean not just giving the Ukrainians stuff but actually helping to helping develop a domestic arms industry so that Ukraine is not reliant on aid and the priorities concerns and fearfulnesses of other countries and this is going to make for some really difficult choices especially in the early reconstruction phase because obviously the temptation is well what do you rebuild you rebuild schools and hospitals and people's homes and it might be that in some cases those have to take second place to building arms factories terrible optics but quite possibly pragmatic but it's not just about building plant it's also about providing support through co-development of the systems that are going to be needed and again if we look at the Israel example the United States has specifically funded or co-developed all kinds of actually very effective systems like iron dome it's much-wanted anti-missile defense system David sling the arrow anti-ballistic missile program and so forth I mean this year they are slated to provide I think it's half a billion dollars just in 2026 to support that and the thing is this doesn't just simply mean that you get obviously defense production in Ukraine and newer and advanced systems to help defend Ukraine it also in due course can lead to Ukrainian arms exports and exports will be crucial both in just simply supporting Ukraine's own defense spending but also more widely helping the civilian economy so there is a double advantage there but of course all this takes time immediately well I think it's fair to say that probably the first priority ought to be to provide all the air defense and anti-missile systems that can possibly be provided and then yet more there's been something of a focus on the patriot the American built patriot a highly effective system but it's worth noting that Europe has the Franco-Italian S.A.M.P.T. Aster which is not quite as good against actual ballistic missiles as the patriot but generally speaking it's pretty damn good overall and the production of intercept as in other words missiles for these systems is already being ramped up I mean it was just about 40 or so in 2024 came up to 125 by 2027 it should be 300 now it could be even better but it gives a sense of the fact that Europe can produce a whole variety of systems that Ukraine needs and of course there's all sorts of other air defense everything from AI powered or AI targeted machine guns for very close-in defensive systems all the way up to anti-drone systems but also radars and the networks to coordinate all these various systems I think the Ukrainians have done a very good job obviously with a lot of Western assistance already but it could be even better about how you spot identified target and destroy incoming missiles drones even aircraft but it's not just about defense there's often a rather sort of foolish dichotomy created between offensive and defensive weapons the truth of the matter is no system is entirely offensive no system is entirely defensive because your offensive weapons can be used in active defense and and so forth but nonetheless that clearly is the need for the Ukrainians to also demonstrate that they actually can impose costs on Russia in case of further aggression and that means missiles it means long-range drones so that they can strike into Russia and again without needing foreign approval this has been one of the key problems and it's not because I want to see Russia attacking sorry being attacked by Ukrainian systems it's that Moscow needs to know that if it does pick another fight with Ukraine it will be Ukrainians who are making the crucial decisions they don't have to go and check with Washington or anyone else because otherwise and the Russians may well think well we can use other means to essentially deter or otherwise persuade the Americans or whoever to hold the Ukrainians back they need to know that if they start another war the Ukrainians will be out for blood and no one's really going to be in the position to stop them now of course a central element of modern warfare has turned out to be drones and here's a problem with drones the temptation is you think like with all ammunition well what we need to do is build up huge stocks so that in time of war you've got loads of drones ready the problem is that although there is scope with modern drones that can be have their software updated and so forth but given just how rapidly technology is changing if you produce a whole bunch of drones in 2026 their utility by say 2029 may well be very very limited remember this is if you go back in history this is a problem that the Italian fascist forces had Mussolini armed and he armed quite effectively but he armed too early which meant that in some ways he had he had spent the resources he would have at his disposal in building up a military which was actually not at all bad if war had come in 1932 but by 1939 it was already increasingly obsolescent so I think there is an issue here with drones that it's not about building stockpiles it's about building production capacity and the thing is then you're going to have to have factories that given that you can't just mothball them it's just not at all economically effective you need to have them working but always ready to be sort of turned to domestic production this is actually an area in which actually rather than thinking of domestic production maybe the Europeans ought to be ordering drones from the Ukrainians to keep the factories running and to keep the technology being updated all ready to switch to the domestic market in time of war and more broadly this means that we really have to be driven by what the Ukrainians themselves feel they need what will suit their emerging doctrine of warfare rather than as has been at the moment what we have and what we're willing to unload on them so often what that actually tends to mean is systems that we think are surplus to requirements or increasingly out of date or just simply that we the ones that we happen to have to have I mean take the M1 Abrams battle tank a very effective tank in the warfare for which it was intended but it really hasn't done all that well in Ukraine I think that actually Ukrainians have lost 90% of the M1 Abrams they they were given because when it's powerful it has very high fuel consumption which is a problem it requires a lot of specialized parts for maintenance tanks are strangely delicate creatures for huge slabs of war fighting metal anyway so it needs a lot of specialized maintenance and specialized spare parts and because of its size and weight it doesn't do so well in the thick mud that characterises a lot of Ukrainian battle zones and it's really designed for a kind of combined arms tactics which is absolutely what the Americans and their allies practice but it's not really the way it's being used in Ukraine so again that there it's a sort of a mismatch it's not the problem with the system it's a problem with just the how the system fits with how it's going to be used also though there are a lot of data designs handed over to the Ukrainians like well the French AMX 10RC for example which is really a wheeled tank destroyer designed to be relatively light but hard hitting the trouble is that in Ukraine it ended up being used really as a kind of little tank which was not designed to do it's not built to go nose to nose with a proper main battle tank and therefore has taken something out of a beating but even on a really mundane level if people look at the various of drone footage that gets put around on social media and so forth they'll have noticed the degree to which both sides are often using civilian vehicles pick up trucks 4x4's ordinary cars now in part that just because that is what is at their disposal but also actually represents a deliberate choice i mean the these fancy heavily armored that's called m wraps um you know the basically sort of super jeeps because they are armored obviously they are more survivable but on the other hand there also much less nippy and much harder to maintain but also much harder to replace so actually a lot of Ukrainian units like to have a variety of regular cars because these are things that might have a chance about running or dodging drones and if nippy you can just simply dive out of them let the drone hit the car and it's okay you can get another car if you're dealing with a relatively smaller number of rather more exquisite systems it doesn't quite work now again i'm not actually saying therefore we shouldn't be giving the Ukrainians m wraps we should be giving them just i don't know ordinary cars but the point is it's for the Ukrainians to tell us what they need of course weapon systems need ammunition and modern war is so very very hungry i mean the Ukrainians are using the last figure i saw was about 9000 drones a day i mean think of that but as i said it's very hard to stockpile that in the long term other forms of ammunition though artillery shells bullets whatever rather less so and i think for to this end obviously we can we can build stocks in Ukraine but then if there was a war that would be vulnerable to Russian first strikes so maybe what we want to be thinking about is building large stocks just over the border in NATO territory given probably priority at the moment even though european NATO countries want to build up their own stocks of ammunition and artillery shells and the like but nonetheless pre-positioned stockpiles just over the border in Poland and Romania ready to be rushed into Ukraine as needed in time of war i mean in 2024 after all Ukraine used over 5 million artillery rounds now it's gone down in 2025 in part as drones increasingly substitute but it certainly doesn't mean that artillery rounds are not important and in part it's precisely because of the problems getting artillery rounds to where they need to be so you know stocks that are already that they are relatively safe over the border but that they are available to the Ukrainians and the Ukrainians know that in effect they are already theirs they're earmarked to theirs same is perfectly true also of spare parts having stocks that are already none of these are nonsense about just in time manufacture or whatever you build up your stocks and let the Ukrainians know that they're there indeed there might also be a case for the safe storage of some Ukrainian planes on NATO territory so again so that they're not so vulnerable to potential first strike because we have to assume that if the Russians god forbid did come back for another full-scale war they will have learnt the lessons at the first time around and one of the things that they didn't do was a properly extensive and well-targeted what the quarter of a morale missile and rocket strike to essentially eliminate Ukrainian air defenses and air power in advance they probably would do it or try to do it next time around so if you have a certain stock of planes that are sitting in an airbase in Romania for example then they can still be ready to be brought back home okay so that's very much focusing on what can what might actually help the Ukrainians fight in in the future but of course it doesn't mean to say that the European role would purely be just simply say hey here's some money here's some kit now go and do your thing it's what is a credible and viable kind of European assistance now one of the the very sensible ideas that's been put forward is a so-called integrated air protection zone across most of western and central Ukraine this is a so-called sky shield initiative so the idea is that from their bases on NATO territory if need be NATO can use missiles and other systems to take down incoming Russian drones planes missiles and the like and the good thing is this can be done without putting man platforms in the air in other words not actually risking NATO pilots over Ukrainian soil or and also not necessarily targeting Russian man platforms because it's unlikely that they'd be trying to put actual planes into these parts of Ukraine's protected airspace so in other words we're not talking about NATO soldiers killing Russian soldiers and I think that is quite important in terms of managing the risk of higher escalation not only because escalation is a bad thing and we don't want to have a sort of catastrophic Russia versus NATO war but also because if there's too much of an escalatory risk the Russians might gamble that Europe would not be willing to try it so if it looks relatively safe for the Europeans to do so the Russians actually have a greater confidence that they will actually do it also it's possible to run drones into Ukraine from NATO territory you know we've already seen this to a degree but there's a scope to do a lot more whether it's in terms of reconnaissance drones to feed the Ukrainians information or even actually strike drones again this is question of how far we'd be willing to put Europeans into the combat situation but if all else fails you could have Ukrainian pilots piloting drones from NATO soil I think that's a bit trickier in terms of the escalatory risk but again these are things to be considered and if we talk about the big issue which is genuine military deployment into Ukraine as I say to try and reach some kind of agreement which would see that happen during peacetime is from my point of view a total non-starter a waste of everyone's time and if anything undermines any kind of peace process but that's in peacetime and I think that one might want to consider and at least explore the possibility for some kind of European military deployment into Ukraine in a time of war I'm not entirely convinced that it's credible that it actually would would be carried out but on the other hand if if if people national leaders do want to look tough well then by all means let them prepare for that with everything from plans and logistics all the way through to psychological conditioning of the domestic population to tell them this might happen you have to be ready for it again even if that is never actually invoked and remember the whole point of this is not to win a war it is to prevent a war but nonetheless again it might give the Russians an additional reason to be thinking twice and in this context the Russians almost certainly would scale up their operations inside Europe and again I'm not necessarily talking about firing drones and missiles across the border but sabotage all these sort of current activities that we've seen in the hybrid slash gray zone slash call it what you will warfare but ramped up considerably and to that end therefore again Europe needs to be ready and that means the psychological preparedness of thinking about it and I'm not talking about over the top books about how the Russians are going to come and try and kill us all on Wednesday but actually a serious sober national debate that does lay out the reasons whereby whereby this is a potential risk that we need to be ready for it means good security which means everything from yes the so-called idea of a drone shield all the way through to stepping up our measures and really our trade craft in how we deal with issues like for example potential sabotage and again strong deterrent signaling to Moscow which means we need to have more in the tank we need to actually have the capacity to escalate we need to be able to say to Moscow currently we're doing this to you for Ukraine and you are trying to mess with us as a result if you continue to mess with us we will actually do more and that more has to be something that is clearly spelled out but also plausible and in some ways that brings me on to the non-military means of providing security guarantees for Ukraine I mean the most obvious one is clearly a snapback of sanctions so whatever sanctions may well have been lifted as a part of the peace deal go back but it might well also be worth using this time to to war game in effect which would be the smartest forms of sanctions because frankly a lot of the sanctions are there just because people had said we need to have more sanctions or trying desperately to plug loopholes that they hadn't thought of the first time around I think there's room for us to be a lot more savvy in how we apply probably fewer but more effective sanctions and that brings me on to the whole issue of personal sanctions now the idea of targeting individual Russians frankly I think has been pointless useless and counterproductive it wasn't mobilized at the right time if it if this has happened right at the beginning maybe even before the war then the idea that it puts people in a position whereby they start to try and if in effect lobby Putin or the wider government to change policy is one thing once war had happened though it was too late and if anything what sanctions have done is apart from providing Putin with propaganda narratives about how this is the whole problem it's because the West hates Russians but in fact have made a lot of powerful people more dependent on the Kremlin not less because they have lost their foreign assets and now depend much more on the Kremlin's contracts but also they know full well that the Kremlin will if need be cracked down on them so I said I mean I'm I'm very very skeptical about the value these these personal sanctions some individuals you know clearly have been doing all sorts of bad stuff fine just as kind of a moral and political point but the these lengthy and ever extending lists of individuals yeah I don't think it works but I think there is scope if these personal sanctions are lifted as a result of peace then I think there is the possibility that if people know that they will be reimposed in if Russia launches renewed military operations against Ukraine then it gives them a reason to argue against the war and more to the point a space to do so the space to do so is after all in the non-war time it's while consideration of a new war is is is is underway that's when there's a chance you can't influence policy once the war is raging but maybe maybe they would influence it beforehand what else well obviously intelligence support we've provided a lot we need to decodify that there's room for a lot more kind of intelligence cooperation to be done we need to contemplate the possibility of actually launching our own sabotage operations inside Russia now again at present it's something that I'm opposed to not least because we haven't really prepared the ground for it whether it's in terms of domestic public opinion but also in terms of actually what what we could do you know the Ukrainians I want to talk about this in a future podcast this sort of this shadow war Ukrainians have had a lot of very high profile successes from operations spider web to assassinating generals and the like but it's worth noting that it's almost a daily toll of people arrested or indeed killed as a result of Russian security forces operations now in some cases the people arrested I mean they're not really in any way in any meaningful way supporting the Ukrainians there maybe there's retweeted something but actually you have to be willing to burn a lot of your agents to be able to maintain this kind of a campaign inside what is after all a pretty powerful counterintelligence state like Russia so as I said rather than just rushing into it now I think it is worth preparing the ground and making it absolutely clear to the Russians in advance that this could be a consequence that things like cyber attacks and so forth well might well be on the table remember we're talking about deterrence I remember once talking to a former British senior intelligence officer who said that you know he he would have thought it would have been wonderful if for example British cyber forces could actually reach into Putin's mobile phone I don't think he uses a mobile phone but bear with him this this was the tale and just change the ring to not for a moment because that in and of itself would really influence Putin but just to show him that we could do this and if we can do that God knows what else we can do I mean I think this is a wonderful example of the kind of ways in which one can be quite effectively sneaky and there are some particular vulnerabilities for the Russian state the systems that control the railways for example the Gossel sluggy public sort of site which is a you know brilliant aid to streamline e-government but you know if one can demonstrate without doing anything catastrophic which would force retaliation but if one can demonstrate that these things are vulnerable to western cyber attacks that might well be quite useful and a final element of this particular section there's sort of non-military means it's a bit of a tricky one this Ukraine needs people it needs people obviously as soldiers but also as a workforce it's currently experiencing a labor shortage precisely as conscription becomes increasingly like press ganging to be honest and if one looks at the current demographic situation in Ukraine let alone the projections they are really quite terrifying I mean this is a country which is going to go through a period of continued population decline much more so than is predicted for Russia it's worth noting and we have at present what six million refugees Ukrainian refugees abroad about five million of them in Europe now at present about 43% of these refugees are expressing a plan or a desire to return now that's considerably down since 2022 when it was about three quarters so from three quarters the less than half of these people actually say that they will want to return because you know you get settled and your kids go to school and you begin to get to know people in your your new home and frankly your new home is not being bombed and doesn't have power cuts in all of these are reasons to actually stay where you are now hopefully many of them will return anyway more than 43% to go back to help rebuild their country but the trouble is reconstruction is going to take a long time and there is the danger of a vicious cycle you don't have enough soldiers and workers as a result reconstruction is especially slow and the country feels insecure as a result of that people are less likely to come home as a result of that you don't have enough soldiers and workers and so the vicious circle continues so what can be done well I said this is a tricky one and one shouldn't move in any kind of precipitate way but it is worth thinking about measures that Europeans countries can adopt to encourage Ukrainians to head back home and in part this can be positive offering grants for example to people to cover the cost of return and to reestablish themselves back in Ukraine and maybe there is room for what one could think of as gentle negative things the very least scaling back the kind of special schemes and benefits that have been offered to Ukrainian refugees as is already happening in some countries so that their lives are and it sounds awful to be saying this when we're talking about refugees but you know a little bit less comfortable which makes the the disparity between your life there and your life back in Ukraine a little bit narrower as I said it's a really tricky one to think about because it sounds like I'm simply saying especially given that so many of the refugees are are women it's worth noting women and children but nonetheless they are needed back home and this is something to address and there's only so far that you can go with upbeat propaganda campaigns and everything else so finally let's just move on to the really big picture now NATO membership let's just rule that one out it's not just that NATO isn't planning on willing to let Ukraine in and actually hasn't from the first let's be clear it is also that polls are showing diminishing Ukrainian enthusiasm for membership let's be honest who wants to be in a club where the other members clearly don't want you as a joining and this also means that really we should put aside this talk of article five like which tends to mean article five light guarantees because as I mentioned in panel's podcast if one looks at the text of article five it's actually very woolly it simply offers a response not necessarily a military response and it's worth noting that it is also something of a hostage to fortune if for example the United States makes an article five type commitment to Ukraine with the implication or understanding that this would mean military force if it was attacked and it didn't follow through which is not impossible that would raise questions about the reliability of all similar US guarantees again there are times when in fact you know a bad agreement is certainly far far worse than no agreement at all now EU membership again there's something I've talked about in the past EU membership does carry with it a rather more robust security guarantee but obviously that depends on Europe also managing to properly arm itself so that this is a real deterrent but also it's worth noting that despite talk of early European Union membership for Ukraine the EU is a very proceduralist body and there are countries which may well have entire supportive approaches towards Ukraine but also have practical self-interested reasons to not want to see it within the EU and I'm particularly thinking about for example the agricultural lobby so in that context it may well be that the scope for a VIP entry lane for Ukraine into the EU isn't quite as clear as might be well look if big multi-lateral agreements then don't seem to be necessarily on the cards it's worth thinking about bilateral ones again think of Poland for example you know Poland may well be willing to reach some kind of agreement that doesn't mean that Ukraine and farm produce can freely pour across the borders but that in fact it is willing to provide support to Ukraine in case of attack now even if Russia thinks that it's unlikely that Poland would indeed intervene directly it's possible that this would be another little morsel of deterrence when they think about that 1000 strong tank fleet of modern versions of the M1 Abrams and the South Korean Black Panther tank crewed by Poles who let's be honest have a historical animosity towards Russia for obvious historical reasons so that you know in that case actually a web work of bilateral trial lateral and so forth agreements may well actually be more effective than relying on some kind of single catch or like NATO membership one of the other questions that is often raised is what about a Ukrainian nuclear program and sure if Ukraine had nuclear weapons it may well very much change Russian calculation however I would suggest that it will be a bad move first of all it would be very expensive it's not just about the warheads it's about the delivery systems and everything else but above all this a completed nuclear program may well be a deterrent but beginning to start a nuclear program and let's be honest there's no way that Ukraine could do this without the Russians knowing well that starts the Russian clock ticking if you think for example that Ukraine could have a nuclear weapon in say three years it may well be that you think okay well that means that we have to have reinvaded Ukraine or otherwise done something to prevent this in at most two and a half years so my suspicion is that in fact this would be a destabilizing force rather than thing else and also it would I think inevitably create all sorts of international tensions around it so in conclusion that's a whole array of different measures some of which I think are absolutely credible and plausible some of which are at least as worth exploring the key point is this again let me go back to it it's about deterrence and to that end what we absolutely have to do is finally not just kill but drive a stake through the heart and burn the notion of strategic ambiguity which was the approach adopted in 2021 2022 that fails so signaling it was essentially one in which the West told the Russians that bad things would happen if they attacked Ukraine but never felt the need to spell it out and no wonder the Russians didn't take a seriously well Putin didn't take a seriously this time we need to do exactly the opposite we need credible strategic clarity and what this means is first of all not indulging in overkill and overhype if we try to claim that we would do things that we wouldn't clearly do if we try to claim that threat is something that it isn't really actually we make ourselves look less credible to our own population to the Ukrainians and crucially to the Russians so we have to be plausible credible sensible that means obviously some tough signaling to Moscow in which we spell out the things that we will do if they do other which the Russians aren't going to want to hear but they need to hear and they're going to shout and bluster and say this is just proof of the degree to which the Europeans or the West depending on where Donald Trump currently fits in their sort of enemies to friends list but anyway that once again they're just trying to bully poor little Russia but that's that's fine that that's just in a way a a signal that they're actually listening to us it means providing realistic reassurance to Kiev so none of these empty mantras about as long as it takes as much as it's needed Russia must lose or whatever probably will involve gagging mark roota and kicking kaya kallas off her twitter account but nonetheless the thing is again we need to be basically demonstrating to Kiev that what we are promising is not an overpromise is both meaningful and something on which they can rely and of course for that given that we are democracies that's going to require consistent messaging at home it's going to require actually being able to argue the case in detail as to why we need to be spending a lot of money and also potentially putting ourselves at risk for Ukraine and again to present this is because otherwise the Russian legions will crash across Europe while at the same time we're saying that Russia is this basket case whose economy is about to implode is not credible so bit more common sense in this but as I say it's going to cost a lot of money there needs to be secure earmarked funds not dependent on some one-off gambit like seizing russian assets but yes for a five to ten-year window a willingness to take out loans tax do whatever is needed but to make it clear that the money it's not just now but it's going to be there in two years it's going to be there in five years it's going to be there in eight years if nothing else since we also want commercial investment that provides the guarantee there so or I watering sums of money are going to be involved but frankly so too does bankrolling war and to much less effect I mean at least this is largely going to be spent on things that aren't designed to be to be blown up in a day or a week or a month's time we cannot rebuild European economies on the back of boosting arms companies profit margins but a secure sovereign and prosperous Ukraine could actually be a very very positive partner and at the same time we also need to remember that an insecure Ukraine an angry one that feels betrayed not just by the russians in some ways whom it expected to betray it but also by the west by the Europeans who he thought it was his friends I think would make a very very dangerous neighbor and most important if all actually if we do all this we managed to demonstrate some degree of resolution commitment and capacity here not only does it actually make peace rather more likely especially because it'll make you feel it can afford to make what would otherwise would be painful embarrassing difficult territorial concessions but also it makes Europe as a continent look a little bit more credible in an age when sharp elbowed great power politics are back okay there you go gosh over an hour feel free to pick it feel free to do ride it but there at least is my blueprint for security guarantees that are worthy of the name and which can dovetail with Ukraine if need be accepting lot the loss of territory this is not about appeasement but it's about pragmatism so secure in Manuel Friedrich I'm sure your people can get my number and for everyone else well thanks for listening to this particularly lengthy episode of in Moscow shadows well that's the end of another episode of the in Moscow shadow podcast just as a reminder beyond this you can follow my blog also called in Moscow shadows follow me on twitter at marked galleyotty or facebook marked galleyotty on russia this podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons and you too can be one just go along to my patreon page that's patreon.com/inmuskoshadows and decide which tier you want to join getting access to exclusive materials and other perks however whether or not you contribute thank you very much indeed for listening until next time keep well