In Conversation: ASEAN's Special Mission to Myanmar

[MUSIC] Good afternoon, this is Welcome to another podcast by Fougram, which is a commentary and analysis website published by the ICS Use of Isha Institute. Today, we have with us two researchers from the institute. We have Ms. Moh Tuzah, who is the coordinator for the Myanmar Studies program here at the institute. And Ms. Sharon Siah, who is the coordinator of the ASEAN Study Center. I'm William Chung. I'm the senior fellow here at the institute and managing editor of Fougram. So today, the topic of discussion will be on the topic that is dear to many people in ASEAN is on the topic of Myanmar. As many of you know, since February this year, there's been a series of events that's happening, happened in Myanmar, there's of concern to people not only in Southeast Asia, but beyond. There was a historic coup in the country in February. And there has been subsequent protests by various groups of people in Myanmar and a crackdown by the military junta. In February, the 10 member ASEAN grouping came out of five point consensus on what should be done about Myanmar. And in August, there was a special envoy that was appointed. He's the second Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Erwin Paykin Yusuf, and he's been appointed to be the special envoy to Myanmar. And so this podcast will explore some of the political landscape that Dr. Erwin would have to traverse as he bates in into his role. And what are some of the challenges and opportunities for ASEAN in the months ahead? In the lead up to the November meetings, ASEAN meetings in November. So I'll just start off with a kind of a short recap. We want to provide you a short recap or kind of highlights of what's happened since February. Maybe we can ask more to give us a recap of the highlights. Thank you, William. And thanks for having me on this podcast to talk about this topic that sees us. The region very much because it's happening in a country that is part of Southeast Asia and it is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. And what happens in one member state, of course, affects the way the whole regional cooperation machinery moves along, even in these difficult and uncertain times that the pandemic has placed on us. So what's happened in Myanmar since first of February when the military seized power? I'll probably try to give a very quick rundown with reference to ASEAN's responses and statements as well, just to kind of like, keep us on the topic of Myanmar and ASEAN in Myanmar. So ASEAN I think was one among the earliest issuing a statement after the coup took place. So that first ASEAN statement on February the second, if I recall correctly, there was already reference to the principles of the ASEAN charter, you know, that was a message of, I believe, that was sent to the the junta, the state administration council, as they call themselves in Myanmar, which highlighted the ASEAN charter principles of, you know, the, you know, adhering to the principles of democracy, a rule of law, good governance, respect for, and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. So that was the first ASEAN collective voice, so to speak, on the situation in Myanmar. But, you know, as you observed in your introductory remarks, William, things escalated really quickly on the ground in Myanmar, the civil disobedience movement by the acronym CDM, as we refer to it these days, started a couple of days after the coup by, by a group of 70 or so medical workers protesting against the military's actions, you know, in the midst of a pandemic. So protests on the street started from Mandalay February 4th, it soon became nationwide across all the townships. And let's see, the committee on the committee representing the Piedaun Zulutor or CRPH was formed 5th of February, and, you know, that's after about 70 or so members of parliament Alex had taken an oath to live up to the people's mandate and continue serving the five-year term for which they had been elected with the nationwide elections in November 2020. So that's CRPH. And that was happening in the first week of the coup. Things really started getting very real, very grim, very fast because the military fired the first shot on February the 9th. To a group of young protesters in Nepidor, and the young lady, Mjada Thurakai, died of her head wounds 10 days later. Incidentally, that was the day that, you know, I think there were, well, there were other developments taking place as well. But I would just like to highlight that, that was when the first shot was fired. And the day before the military had imposed a curfew, senior general Min online gave his first live speech where he was trying to differentiate that what the SAC was doing would be different from the past and committing to continue with the foreign policy, the economic policy and the government policies of the National League for Democracy Administration. And then I think the grim reality really became much more vivid to the region at large when the military tried to break the shipyard protests in Mandalay. They shot into the crowd. And I recall that Singapore issued a statement at that time condemning this action. So the day after that, the CRPH, the committee representing the people's Lotto formed a cabinet and a kind of acting cabinet with four persons taking up multiple portfolio responsibilities. Later on in February, I think around the February 26th, State Administration Council announced the 2020 election results. And two days later, I think we were all taken by surprise when Myanmar's ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. John Moore Turn, made that publicly defiant statement, declaring himself for the side of democracy for upholding the 2020 election results. And basically, after that, the military hunter dismissed him and charged him with high treason. And well, then March, you know, the CRPH declared the SAC a terrorist organization. And on March the 2nd, we had, when all of this was happening in Myanmar, on March the 2nd, we had the ASEAN ministerial meeting on Myanmar. And the protesters in Yangon were all, I think, calling on ASEAN to intervene. And you know, the way that the protests were taking place, these were peaceful, unarmed protests. They knew how to go and, you know, put their message placards in front of the various ASEAN missions in Yangon. And they were also aware that Brunei was the chair of ASEAN. So, you know, there would be these protesters with messages, specific messages to ASEAN written in English on their placards in front of the various ASEAN missions in Yangon. And so that was the kind of a thing that was happening. And I think any attempt that ASEAN made for shutter diplomacy for trying to talk to or meet with the SAC as, you know, the perpetrator of what had happened to get a sense of accountability, on the ground the protesters, I think, really viewed this as, you know, ASEAN's engaging with the junta, with the military and why not with the forces for democracy. And so in April, then what happened was the CRPH released this federal democracy charter that was supposed to kind of provide the political roadmap towards towards the future of what the anti-co-resistance movement, the forces for democracy wished to see. And then the appointment of the National Unity Government by the CRPH, that was on the 16th of April. By that time, there was already a lot of discussion and anticipation about a special summit level meeting on Myanmar to take place. And again, with the appointment of the National Unity Government, There were also a lot of, I think, desire expressed by the protesters, by the forces for democracy. For the NUG to have a space at the ASEAN leaders meeting, but well, we all know what happened on the 24th of April. It was called the ASEAN leaders meeting on Myanmar, which issued the five-point consensus on Myanmar, which senior general May Online representing the State Administration Council sitting there at the meeting in Jakarta agreed to. He did not object, and of course, no objection means agreement. And that five-point consensus then was supposed to become the basis of how ASEAN's intervention in Myanmar would progress requiring Myanmar, in particular, the State Administration Council's cooperation and agreement to cooperate with the five-point consensus, shall I say. But very soon after that ASEAN leaders meeting, we were seeing news reports in Myanmar State media that the State Administration Council had tried to qualify their view of the five-point consensus and really saying things such as, of course, all these things can happen only once the ability returns to the country and their definition of once the ability returns and what constitutes law and order really was something that they would be equating with they're being able to establish control over the country, which to this point, more than six months after the coup, they have not been able to do so, protests have continued. And it's interesting that since the ASEAN leaders meeting in April, one of the priorities in the five-point consensus called for immediate cessation of violence. In fact, incidents of violence actually increased after 24 April. And the AAPB, which is the assistance association for political prisoners, which regularly tracks the numbers of people who have either been killed or arrested. As of yesterday, the number of people who have died since the coup who have been killed, killed because of the coup in relation to the coup, that's already passed the 1,000 mark. It's 2014 as of 24 August. And the total number of people who have been arrested is over 7,400 of which over 5,800 are still in detention. So that is the kind of the picture that we have when it comes to the situation in Myanmar on the ground. And the National Unity Government actually announced the people's defense forces on the 5th of May as a precursor to this federal army that they wanted to establish according to the Federal Democracy Charter Roadmap. And they started, the National Unity Government started also trying to engage in discussion with the ethnic armed organizations who have continued in various forms to engage in armed conflict with the Myanmar military. So really, I mean, all this was going on at a time when protests across the country were taking place against the coup. And the visit then by the second minister for Foreign Affairs of Brunei, Dato Eruwan, Behin Yusuf, together with the ASEAN Secretary General, to Nebidol, to Myanmar, in June, I think was also met with a lot of skepticism by the Myanmar public, which again felt that ASEAN needed to talk to all key stakeholders, as also highlighted in the fight-point consensus. And of course, now with the appointment of Dato Eruwan as the ASEAN Special Envoy recently at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting just held earlier in August this year, I guess, you know, if you ask me about how the average Myanmar citizen or even Myanmar intellectuals, I think, in the country, are thinking, viewing, and feeling, the way that ASEAN's response has been to the situation in Myanmar since February 1st, there's quite a high level of cynicism. There are a lot of negative attitudes, and I think, you know, I think this is the first time I've ever seen an instance of protesters in an ASEAN member's date burning the ASEAN flag that happened in June. So I think, you know, this is the landscape that we see, I think, in Myanmar, vis-a-vis ASEAN's response, ASEAN's efforts to implement or start implementing the fight-point consensus. And of course, through all this since its formation, the National Unity Government has been sending letters to ASEAN, to the ASEAN Chair, asking for its voice to be heard, for it to be able to, you know, give their views, present their views. But as you know, as Sharon knows, as most of us who are following these developments know, currently it is the SAC that dominates the Myanmar seat at the ASEAN table. I'll stop here. I'm sorry if I've gone on too long, but, you know, talking about my country and what's happening in Myanmar always brings up all these emotions. Thanks a lot, Mordell. It was a very masterful kind of overview of what has happened in Myanmar since February. I'll just kind of highlight some of the key points that you have listed. There is in April, there was a fight-point consensus, but even with the fight-point consensus, the protests have continued. And basically what you have highlighted is that since the coup in February to 24th of August, there has been a 2014 death related to protest, and we should essentially put down by the military, so 1,014 deaths, 7,000 detentions of which 5,800 people are still in detention. And of course, the very kind of heartbreaking image of these protesters in Myanmar asking ASEAN to take action and growing cynicism and negative attitudes towards ASEAN. And of course, what is a very sorry sight of Myanmar protesters burning the ASEAN flag? So I wouldn't call this the most salubrous environment for kind of the special envoy to tackle, but I think we need to kind of return to first principles. I think you ended your remarks by saying that whereas the NUG has written letters to the ASEAN chair asking for the views of the National Unity Government to be heard, it appears to us and it appears to most observers of ASEAN in the region and outside the region, that the SAC is dominating the kind of interactions with ASEAN at the moment. So I'm going to ask Pitch's question to Sharon first and then more can answer subsequent to Sharon, but essentially Sharon, what do you think about this environment that Dato Erwan is coming into and what are the challenges and opportunities that he faces. I'm going to highlight actually two points from the five point consensus. The second point being there needs to be constructive dialogue among all parties concerned and you need to commence a peaceful solution in the interest of the people. That's point two. Point five says that the special envoy in delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned. Looking at the text, all parties concerned is mentioned twice, but in reality it seems like the SAC is dominating the kind of official interactions with ASEAN so maybe you want to kind of start your answers based on that. Right, thanks William and thanks more for the very comprehensive overview of what's happened since February, even though it's only been six months, a lot has happened in that time. Before I begin, I think we mustn't see the five point consensus as a checklist that needs to be checked off. That would be very wrong. The five point consensus is a starting point. It's a package deal that goes in and enables ASEAN to find a way out for Myanmar, but alongside with that intent, other efforts should also carry on. For instance, efforts. dan lain berjaya kembali. Jadi, jika kita mahu melihat kata-kata-kata, jika kita berjaya kembali, jika kita berjaya kembali, jika kita berjaya kembali, jika kita berjaya kembali, mereka berpikir ke depan dan berkaitan dengan keadaan. 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The the committee representing the people first flood that the be down southeast or CRPH or the parliamentarians who formed the national unity government, the NUG. But under the federal democracy charter that they have announced, on that political roadmap, the NUG is meant to be an interim entity that will try to work with the other key stakeholders in Myanmar towards realizing this political vision and roadmap towards the federal democratic union. So there is supposed to be a national unity consultative council or NUCC that will be the platform where the NUG can engage with the many, the several ethnic armed organizations who are also engaged in armed conflict who have been engaged in armed conflict, several of them, with the military for decades, as well as participants in the civil disobedience movement and civil society organizations. Because, you know, as much as we also tend to view this from outside Myanmar as something between the SAC and the NUG as a kind of like a representative whole, but also very much with the input and participation of the National League for Democracy, the NLD, the Deposed ruling party. There are also many voices in Myanmar who may not necessarily subscribe to the NLD as the political leading force, but nevertheless are very much dedicated and determined to not subject themselves to yet another spell of military rule. So I think it's really to be able to talk to this whole spectrum of groups which have one overarching objective, of course, in the context of the coup, but also have their different views and so on. So I think I would try to continue keeping a closer look at the National Unity Consultative Council and UCC as we go forward. - Thanks a lot more. That was again a very good overview. on all the acronyms that observers interested in Myanmar since the first of February, we want to look at that. The CRPG is like, you know, led to the NUG and the NUG is part of a federal road map towards the NUCC, you know, and all that. So that's really interesting. But I think to just bring us back to the original point about the mission of Dr. Erwin. I think the Singapore Foreign Minister, Birren Barakrishnan, was quoted in a news report saying that he hopes that there will be progress to report on the special invoice mission to Myanmar. And he hopes that this progress report will occur before the ASEAN's leader summit in November. So Minister Barakrishnan also cautioned that the Myanmar military would have to grant the and the envoy access to all stakeholders for the visit to be meaningful. So again, you know, that this point about the envoy being granted access to all stakeholders and that of course, that will mean the NUG, you know, even the ethnic arm organizations or any other entities that are involved in Myanmar politics besides the SAC. So there are also reports more about how Dr. Erwin might not be so keen on actually engaging with the NUG. But so perhaps you want to shed light on on these two points, the progress report that the envoy is supposed to make before November and to kind of his inclination as to meeting out with all stakeholders. Mo. Oh, it's me again. Sorry, I seem to be hogging the microphone. It would be great to hear views from Sharon about how the ASEAN reporting process might be also with regard to the work that the special envoy now has to undertake for this mandate on Myanmar within the five point consensus. But I think, you know, there are ways and means beyond in person meetings to carry this out. There are several ASEAN governments who have been in communication with the NUG and before the NUG, the CRPH, since early on, since the earlier weeks and months of the coup. And that is not unknown, I believe, to the military. So, you know, meeting with all key stakeholders, I think, if the pandemic has brought any ease to communication, it is this means of the digital platform using technology to hold conversations, to have meetings across borders, across time zones. And that is, I think, one way in which the special envoy can start trying to reach out to these different stakeholders in Myanmar, who are also key to the anti-coup movement. So, I think that is the kind of view or the suggestion that I would have. And earlier on, I mentioned the National Unity Consultative Council as a possible platform that could probably bring together more of those key stakeholders other than the military to have this consultative engagement or dialogue with the envoy. So, I think these are, I think, opportunities, possibilities that the envoy will need to explore in carrying out his mandate to start really talking to, again, if we refer back to the five point consensus, all parties concerned. And in my view, you know, consultation comes before dialogue. So, it really is right now, that time to start all those conversations before any kind of constructive dialogue can be facilitated or mediated by the envoy among all these key stakeholders around the table, because right now, right, the military has said they don't want to talk to the NUG. The NUG is, you know, they've declared the military a terrorist organization. And it's kind of that scenario where really ASEAN's role, the envoy's role is to really, I think, you know, get their views and then try to find where are those maybe constructive or, you know, kind of a common objective on which ASEAN can try to, you know, put its, put its collaborative imprint, so to speak. And start those individual conversations first. That's what I would highlight. And of course, you know, I think since April, the violence by the military has not stopped, and now there are the PDF militia, as well as the ongoing clashes with the ethnic army organizations. So, the killings, I think, the number of killings have decreased, but the number of arrests did not, and that's what's contributed to those high numbers that you were citing earlier, William, just as an aside. Thanks a lot, Moe. And I think, you know, obviously, we are letting you hog the mic simply because you are a subject area expert here. So, but of course, now we will kind of move the mic over to Sharon. I think one point that Moe was highlighting is that, and you were highlighting earlier is that the five point consensus is by a way, a kind of a way map, kind of a path to more things to come. And Moe was highlighting the point that, you know, there are other ways to to establish contact with stakeholders in Myanmar and ASEAN, some ASEAN governments actually have been doing that, and they have been like exploiting kind of digital platforms to engage with stakeholders in Myanmar. So, perhaps you want to bring us back to, you know, some of the ASEAN processes that could happen to kind of facilitate the, you know, to kind of smooth things over, or makes things easier for the special envoy, ACP-PASS to visit Myanmar. What are some of the things that ASEAN can actually do to actually facilitate his expected visit to Myanmar in the coming months? Well, like, like what Moe said, technology has really helped all of us bring us all closer together. And I understand from sources that the various entities and stakeholders of Myanmar have been reaching out to the ASEAN Secretary-General and to the ASEAN Secretary-General as well as to the foreign minister himself. So, for all we know, these conversations may already be happening in the background, but of course it is not spoken off publicly. So, in that sense, it would actually work to the special invoice advantage if there were some kind of communications, regular communications to the people who are interested in watching this development to know, you know, what kind of progress has been made. Second thing that the special envoy has to do of course is to, you know, ready the assistance, the humanitarian assistance as part of the five-point consensus to get through to Myanmar through the AHA Centre. And that, that the delivery of the assistance has to be very well planned, coordinated and executed so that it makes sure that, you know, the assistance as needed goes to the right people who deserve it and who needed the most. That would be critical. And of course, securing that list of people to me, I think that should be the special invoice topmost priority where, you know, he has to basically come from a position on neutrality and to be seen as engaging with all parties. In terms of processes going forward, understand that the AHA Centre actually traditionally do meet in New York at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations General Assembly is slated to open on the 14th of September. So if a visit were to take place before the 14th of September, it would give the AHA Centre an opportunity to have a discussion in New York if they were all attending, if not certainly a hybrid arrangement can be made where they can exchange views and, you know, offer some recommendations to the special envoy. And at the same meeting, there's also usually an AHA UN meeting that takes place. I believe that would be an equally important meeting for AHA and the UN to, you know, together map out a strategy on, for instance, delivering humanitarian assistance with the help of the UN and engaging the UN in this process. Thank you. And so you're talking about kind of an AHA meeting at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. come 14 of September, possibly ASEAN United Nations meeting. And I'm going to pick from at this point, I don't pick up a point that more made about the United Nations actually devolving a lot of the management of what's happening in Myanmar to ASEAN. And we've already seen that even with important powers, external powers like the United States, I mean, Vice President Kamala Harris, when she was in Singapore earlier this week, she would say that it's sad to see what's happening in Myanmar and she hopes, the United States hopes that Myanmar returns to the powerful democracy, but she squarely laid the kind of responsibility of managing the conflict in Myanmar at the feet of ASEAN. But just talking about this brings out a bit like, in terms of external powers like the United States, China, maybe India, you know, other kind of interested countries that have to stick in Myanmar. Could they actually do anything that will kind of move the needle, kind of improve what's happening on the ground? Is there anything they can do to actually exist Myanmar at their primary responsibility or restoring some form of stability in Myanmar? Sharon. I don't want to answer that question. But I have to address the point of what Vice President Harris made, which is really the general consensus in the international community, because when you see the UNGA vote in June, the one where 119 countries voted in favor to one, in the resolution itself, it states very clearly that the central role of the ASEAN and the constructive engagement remains with ASEAN. And clearly that's the consensus of the international community now that, you know, all the other side engagements, international community members will play a supporting role. So, the UNGA is the central role as a part of the way of going in to Myanmar and starting the whole process. Mo, do you have any comments on that? Understandably, you know, the UNGA has laid the responsibility squarely at ASEAN's feet. But do you think that in this case, there's anything that countries like China, like India and the United States, even the European Union can bring to the table? Right. I think, okay, it's not the United Nations General Assembly that has laid the responsibility at ASEAN's feet. I was referring to a decision that was made some years back, where basically the United Nations agreed that for developments, for matters arising in different regions of the world, the regional organization that represents collectively that region and what's happening would kind of be the primary responder, so to speak, to deal with those matters. Of course, you know, when it comes to really important issues that relate to peace and stability and human rights violations and all of that, of course, there is still the United Nations Security Council. But so it was in that context of that overall decision by the UN that regional organizations around the globe would be the primary sort of responders, if you will, to developments that are happening in their respective regions. So it's in this context that I think everyone is looking to ASEAN. We're also looking to ASEAN since February 1st and continue to look to ASEAN up to now with regard to what it can do. And because the focus is on ASEAN, as Sharon has highlighted also, to be the main coordinator or the platform through which all these efforts need to come through, I think that's how we need to look at ASEAN's role as well. And the United Nations, the United States, China, the EU, India, Japan, all of these countries are dialogue partners of ASEAN. So it is natural also that as dialogue partners of ASEAN, these countries would also, I think, view or start, I think, discussing providing assistance for what's happening in Myanmar, for the Myanmar people through what they perceive as ASEAN's coordinating role. And that harks back to the regional diplomacy that ASEAN managed to broker way back in 2008, where, you know, ASEAN, quite bluntly, talk to the representative of the military regime at that time. That either, you know, you have the option to go with the UN or the option to go with ASEAN, or the ASEAN member states will just, you know, take a step back and let the responsibility to protect R2P process take over whether or not the authorities then in Myanmar liked it or not. And that was quite bluntly. Those three options were quite bluntly put to Myanmar in the wake of cyclone Nage's where Myanmar was accepting, I think, bilateral offers of humanitarian assistance, but basically blocking offers from the international humanitarian community. So I think ASEAN's value here, and when we look at the fourth point in the five point consensus about providing humanitarian assistance, if ASEAN can try to provide that coordinating platform and ensure that the much needed assistance and right now Myanmar still going through this very devastating third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. So if ASEAN's coordinating presence and interfacing with the military who sits in Nebidor and what tries to assert its control, if ASEAN can really, you know, provide that assurance that Myanmar people, communities across the country will be able to receive that much needed humanitarian assistance, medical assistance and support. So I think that's the kind of, you know, a plus point, if you will. Thanks a lot. That gives us a really good way of kind of shifting the topic of discussion to the people that matter the most in this Myanmar situation, of course, the ordinary citizens and people of Myanmar. We spoke about earlier about, you know, the process and how some of them have been detained and some have even have even lost their lives as a result of the process. So maybe now we want to shift to kind of in your view more like what's what's the general sentiment among people in Myanmar towards ASEAN right now. So what's the kind of sentiment and actually what do they expect ASEAN to do given that ASEAN now has the primary responsibility to kind of manage and shake this the current situation. And I'll let more kind of handle this question first and Sharon if she has any comments more. Wow, okay, you know, if it comes to, okay, what do the people in Myanmar think about ASEAN or how do they view ASEAN. I think I mentioned earlier the view on the ground is pretty negative and cynical. And I'm always reminded, you know, when we used to do these awareness surveys, right, in the wake of the suffering revolution in 2007, young people's attitudes then towards ASEAN were really split between wanting to believe in ASEAN's, you know, coordinating, collaborative kind of thrust as opposed to ASEAN's inability to intervene in the crisis that happened with the military suppressing the peaceful protests led by monks in 2007. Incidentally, that was the first time that ASEAN used a really strong, strong language in the, talking about the situation in Myanmar using the word revolved at the military's actions at the time. And that's the strongest language that ASEAN has used with regard to military responses to peaceful protests. So, you know, from that kind of, I think, cynical, skeptical attitude in 2007, as Myanmar opened up and you know, started stepping firmly more and more onto the road towards a democratic transition, if you use an attitude towards ASEAN in Myanmar also started to, you know, track the ASEAN positive attitudes that we could normally see in the newer members of ASEAN. And that was kind of like at its highest around the time that Myanmar took up a with ASEAN championship. So for me, I've always been looking at ASEAN and Myanmar. And what I'm seeing now, what I worry now, is that there will be a whole generation of young people growing up with very cynical, negative type of attitudes and very low expectations of what ASEAN can do. And what ASEAN has been able to do, as I highlighted earlier on, was in the context of bringing humanitarian assistance and support to communities in need. Of course, the situation right now is very different from 2008. Let's be clear about that. It's not 2008. But what can we learn? I mean, if ASEAN can break through to the military that aid and assistance should be provided regardless of whether these communities are in support of or against the military, that strong clear message needs to be sent. And I think the entity most able to, I think, reinforce and send this message would be ASEAN mainly because it has been cast into this role of being the interlocutor with the SAC, whether it is palatable or not. And we also need to look here. This is where we bring in that thing about consulting and talking to key stakeholders, our party's concerned, because the National Unity government has issued a policy on COVID-19 response and established the task force. And there are quite a network of health clinics by the ethnic armed organizations, say, in Kachin and in the Korean areas. And I think this is where working with different parties and not just through, say, one state entity, for example, would really be to ASEAN's advantage. There's a lot happening along the areas that are in the Thai Myanmar border. But we also need to look at the Myanmar India border because there is land access and crossing over. And therefore, if cases come in or if there are cases, infections going on as a result of that. So I think we need to look at it in that context as well. Of what kind of additional, I think, support that ASEAN can bring for Myanmar's COVID-19 response, including vaccinations. I think as of now, less than 5% of the country's population has been vaccinated. And a lot of people are still hesitating mainly because many view that they do not want to add to any pronouncements that the SAC might wish to make with regard to its ability to govern by having this COVID-19 response. But at the same time, also because of the type of vaccines that are available and the people's needs being acute. So these are some of, I think, the possibilities or the opportunities that we need to look at. That's a really good point more about ASEAN kind of telling the SAC that whether communities are supportive of the military or not that aid and assistance will be rendered to such communities and how you actually can work around the SAC by working with the ethnic arm organizations and their health clinics in terms of health and COVID response. Sharon, do you have any comments to add to that? I think it's very important that the humanitarian assistance to Myanmar is not politicized. In a way that's like what Mohs said, who gets to receive it, who doesn't get to receive it, that's already politicizing it. And in terms of delivering the aid, it should be through multi-stakeholders and not just through one central funneling channel because that increases the risk of certain communities not getting the kind of aid that's required. And also, let's now talk about direct cross-border assistance by the neighboring countries. It's certainly in the neighboring countries' interests to extend that assistance first, whereby you can vaccinate the people at the edges and then create the buffer zone between the bigger population and your population. So they should do it as well. And I hope that it's done with coordination, of course, with ASEAN so that it all comes together as one comprehensive and holistic approach towards giving aid. So Myanmar, whether in terms of COVID or just general assistance in terms of giving food, blanket, things like that. Thanks for that, Sharon. I think one kind of threat, one common threat that I can discern throughout discussion so far is that the special envoy is passed to kind of execute on the ground, the five point consensus that was arrived in April. But I think in Singapore, there's a kind of a saying that when you can't do things by right, you go by left. As in, if you can't do things formally, you try to find ways, creative ways to get around the problem and solve the problem. So what I'm seeing here is that although ASEAN is formally supposed to communicate with the SAC, some ASEAN governments are actually having kind of informal consultations with various entities in Myanmar. And this is thanks to COVID and the digital platforms that we are using. And ASEAN can always tell the SAC that you regardless of whether these communities support the Hunta, we will deliver aid to them. And they are creative ways of actually scanning the cat. So this health clinics that Moe was talking about. So I think this is the point that perhaps should be kind of suggested or proposed to the special envoy that they are creative ways of actually tackling the problem. So to come up with verbal solutions, because in the end, the people that need to be served here, the ordinary people on the ground, they are worried about the political situation and what happens at the national level. But on a day-to-day basis, I don't want to bring in this analogy here. But there's another big country that in the past 10 days, I've also seen a lot of political turmoil in Afghanistan. And kind of the same, but different. In the same way, there's a lot of political instability. But there are a lot of ordinary people who cannot carry on lives as per usual. They cannot go to the bank. They cannot go to work. They are short of food. They have lost income. And they are worried as to repercussions, depending on which part of the political spectrum they belong to. So I think that's a point that we have arrived that collectively is that we need to find creative solutions. And now I'm going to wrap up soon. But my last question to both Sharon and Moe is that-- so between now, August the 25th and November, the planned trip by Special Envoy, everyone, is going to happen. So what do you think are some of the highlights that-- or kind of the milestones that we should be looking for? What do you think are some of the unexpected surprises that we should be looking out for before November? I'll start with Sharon first and then Moe. OK. The first thing I think that's going to happen on the international stages, the United Nations credentials committee will meet in September. And I think those of you who have been following the news know that the current incumbent ambassador, Ambassador Chormotun, has openly declared his support for the NUG and has been removed from his post. And the military is appointing their own person. And that's going to be very interesting to watch, because it depends on what the nine-member United Nations credentials committee say and what they will recommend. It could possibly lead to a vote in the UNGA. And we don't know how countries will vote. But if the June vote or any indication, they could well go to keep Ambassador Chormot, or leave the seat to MTS. It has started before for other countries. And then beyond that, I think the credential committee position will also inform other countries' positions on the reappointment of Myanmar ambassadors to the post, accepting the credentials of other Myanmar ambassadors that have been appointed by the military. So the UN movement there will be quite telling for other countries and maybe influence their decisions. So the accreditation of the ambassadors to their country. So hopefully there will be a visit that will materialize. And of course, top of the-- we will be watching for who-- who the minister gets to meet in Myanmar that will be also again revealing of whether he has indeed been given access to all parties in Myanmar. But also going forward in terms of the official meetings, I think it becomes quite untenable to just maintain a business as usual kind of scenario, whether you speak to each other as if nothing has happened. I think Ayan has got to take a decision as to what to do. I mentioned in a commentary written earlier about several legal documents that are pending for the Ayan summit to look over and it really does have an impact. As to how they regard Myanmar, what they should do with these documents in which Myanmar is a party to, so these decisions must be made sooner, rather than later, because it impacts the working of Myanmar as well as all the other countries that engage with Myanmar. That's all for me for them. Thank you. Thanks for that, Sharon Mo. Yes, I completely agree with what Sharon has highlighted. I mean, basically what's happening in Myanmar is definitely not normal, not business as usual. And past precedents of how Ayan in the past has engaged with Myanmar probably do not fully apply or cannot apply here because the situation is quite different. I think people on the ground in Myanmar at various levels are also looking very closely at what's going to happen in New York with the credentials committee decision and outcomes. And there's a lot of online campaigns, movements and support movements going on to support the NUG's representation of Ambassador John Moton's continued accreditation at the United Nations. So I think there's a lot of interest around that particular development to happen in September at New York. And again, as Sharon has highlighted, if the earlier vote pattern from the UN General Assembly resolution passed earlier on Myanmar is any indication. I think that's what a lot of people in Myanmar are also looking at. So again, this I think really brings up the question of, do we all have to go in as one entity or do we also look at different creative ways of engaging, bilaterally albeit under the broad ASEAN framework and the adhering to the ASEAN priorities and principles to reach whoever we can. I mean, basically the United States, the EU, they've all announced and committed certain amounts of funding for the people of Myanmar for helping the people of Myanmar. They work through international organizations, civil society organizations and so on. So I think again, if I have to bring up the points I made earlier about knowing who you're going to talk to in Myanmar and who can deliver these kinds of assistance and interventions effectively on the ground to the communities in need. Of course, it's not just the ethnic armed organizations, health clinics network. I mean, the NLD's COVID-19 response has given the primary coordinating responsibility to Dr. Cindy Amal, whose clinic on the Thai Myanmar border has been in operation for the past 30 years doing a lot of great work for the people along those border areas. And there are many civil society organizations on the ground in Myanmar who can also help to bring those necessary assistance and support to communities in need. And they've been doing so amidst all these fear of arrest and detentions, braving those arrest and detentions in trying to get support to a lot of people in the country right now who've lost their jobs and means of livelihoods because they participated in the civil disobedience movement. Or just mainly purely because the whole logistic supply chain and economic infrastructure is crumbling. And they are these people. You might recall at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, similar to what happened in Malaysia, there was also a kind of yellow flag movement in Myanmar. But it's mostly I think in the urban areas, I didn't detect a nationwide movement where households in need of medical assistance put out a yellow flag. But yellow and white flags sewn together indicated that they were in need of both medical and food assistance. So again, the world food program has highlighted the kind of a precarity with which a lot of households are facing their food security needs. And I think these are important points that I think an organization like ASEAN and its member states can pick up with regard to what can be done for the people of Myanmar, for the immediate and short term, and then work on that intergovernmental process of engaging with key stakeholders over the medium in longer terms. Thanks a lot more and thanks a lot Sharon for those very insightful comments. I think we've really gone over the time that we were allocated for this podcast. What the tour de Horizon will be done on the issue of Myanmar, five point consensus, special I invite a different entities and acronyms involved in Myanmar's political landscape and ending with kind of the UN credentials committee and then the creative ways in which the United States and Europe and Union are trying to funnel kind of money in aid to underground organizations like the one that you mentioned by the whole I got the name right Dr. Cynthia Maung at the time in Myanmar border. So that's fascinating and that's enough material actually for another podcast. But in the meantime, I think we've covered a lot of ground. So I really want to thank Sharon and more for this time, for this podcast and I hope this has been a service to the readers and listeners and Fougram and we hope to see you again at a subsequent podcast in weeks to come. Thank you very much.