IISS Manama Dialogue 2026: Reflections

Hello, and welcome to Sound Strategic. I'm Maya Nowens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Security and Defense Policy and host of the IISS Sound Strategic Podcast. Today's episode reflects on this year's IISS Manama Dialogue, which took place from 30 October to 1 November 2026 in Bahrain. Here, political, military, and security leaders from the Middle East and around the world gathered to discuss regional security at a time of conflict. Over three days, the dialogue covered a wide range of issues, from the lessons of the U.S.-Israel war with Iran and Saudi Arabia's role in a turbulent region, to the foundations of regional security, defense, and deterrence, maritime security, new economic agendas, and the role of small powers in global security governance. Joining me to discuss these issues, Emile Hokaim, Director of Regional Security and Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, Air Marshal Martin Sammy Sampson, Executive Director of the IISS Middle East, and Tamisha Bino, Research Fellow for Energy Geopolitics. Emile, Sammy, and Tamisha, welcome to the show. Sammy, starting with you, what were the main themes of this year's IISS Manama Dialogue, and how did they compare with last year? Thanks, Maya. They were very much a continuation and a development from the previous year's dialogue. In 2025, we were regional power and statecraft amidst global change. That was after Midnight Hammer, the U.S. operation, prior to major combat operations, attacks on countries in the wider region, and the closure of the Straits of Hormuz. So this year's theme, Middle East Security, Interest, Alignments, and Integration, really focused people's attention on the specific situation that they found themselves in. Last year, it was all about regional stability, locally led, but internationally enabled. This year, it was definitely a case in terms of themes of being locally led, question about internationally enabled. Perhaps one of the key areas there was having to redefine what internationally enabled means and recalibrate how much locally led was going to have to be. The second one was last year, the Middle East was pretty conscious of its agency and yet frank about its vulnerabilities. This year, the Middle East is definitely understanding that it needs to rebuild and develop its agency, understand exactly how exposed they are to their vulnerabilities. So this is a continuation of that theme. The final one, perhaps the most important, was that last year, there was a theoretical discussion about security and prosperity rising and falling together. But aligned to that was a bit of cautious optimism that the region stood at an inflection point and they saw a positive inflection that was going to clarify choices, widen diplomatic apertures, and surface new economic opportunities. This year definitely reinforced the fact that security and prosperity rise and fall together, but that inflection point had a clear direction. As a result, diplomatic apertures are now closing, choices are much less clear, and rather than sort of new economic opportunities, really it's much more about rebuilding the foundations of the Gulf States economic models. When you stand back and look at where we were last year at the dialogue and where we have just been this year, there is more certainty on some of those themes, but less optimism. Perhaps the final one I would say is that last year, transitions in the Levant were very early on in the stages of the new administration in Syria. This year, very little discussion, very good representation from the Levant, but very little discussion on questions about the transitions in the Levant, more about the speed of their positive trajectories, particularly with respect to Syria. Taking a step back from these themes that you've highlighted and the changes over the last year, what are the two or three key takeaways from this year's dialogue for our listeners? The key takeaways from this year's dialogue for our listeners are that the transition most significant takeaway from everybody, from within the region and outside of the region, was the absolute need for a return to diplomacy and a stable security order. Pretty much every speaker mentioned that commitments were being tested, dialogue is under escalation pressure. In the absence of consequence and the selectivity of international law and norms, diplomacy was the only path really to come back to. The second one was the sanctity of state, sovereignty, the need for genuine regional ownership of security, not just the delivery of security, but the construct that needed to deliver security in a region. The other takeaway I would take, and particularly from those outside of the region, was the global concept of security, way beyond the military, much more into the economic and energy, freedom of navigation. It's a familiar takeaway that everybody is reminded upon. In times of crisis, which is that just the fact that it's impossible to regionally isolate or nationally isolate a security vacuum or a lack of security or a challenge to security. But very much this year, not so much on military, it was very much the broader construct of security and the challenges and ripples of the instability in the Middle East that were being felt elsewhere. The closing plenary examined global security governance and the role of smaller powers. How do Gulf states see this? Foreign Minister Al-Zayani of Bahrain probably characterised it best, that the smaller states and the states in the Gulf region want to recast their role. They understood, and particularly they experienced that the UN Security Council is a non-permanent member. They did no longer want to be an audience. Inclusion and agency was the title of that plenary. Inclusion, Foreign Minister Al-Zayani described as getting a seat. Agency is having a voice and a willingness for the region and countries in the region to have a voice and actually be a partner in order to deliver some agency. There was also, in that closing plenary, an absolute understanding that the Gulf states needed to cohere their own efforts. They needed to be the drivers of these regional frameworks. They needed to be able to create them. Dr. Gargash, this is very relevant to this region, spoke a lot about rebuilding and regaining confidence and solidarity. Both as nation states, but as a collective. And then I think one of the really interesting elements of this plenary was the example and the lessons that the Foreign Minister of Armenia brought to the table. And reminding countries that whether you're big or small, you have a large economy, a small economy, a large population, a large landmass, a small landmass, was not your defining metric in your region. It was the role that you choose to play in your neighbourhood. That is a message that came through very clear for the region. And the choices, that countries in the region have, a choice between choosing to bridge or to damage within the region and beyond. And finally, and I think this is a message that came across from everybody in the closing plenary, but everybody from the region that also spoke, the understanding that you have to make a deliberate and a strategic choice to choose peace and stability. That was a choice that the region could not take for granted and needed to consciously step into and make that very vocally. Now, looking ahead, what issue from this year's WSB Dialogue do you think will matter the most over the next year? I think it's a very simple one and a very high level one. How you recalibrate relationships internally within the region between each other, relationships with near and powerful neighbours that have different objectives, and relationships with powers outside the region that either have a historic or a contemporary interest in the trajectory of the region. Recalibrating all of those I think is going to be the key element going forward. Emile, turning to you, the IISS launched the new strategic dossier, the Gulf-Ed War, at this year's Dialogue. What are its key findings? The dossier is our attempt to make sense of what we think is a transformational conflict for the region. Our view is that this war has upended all the working assumptions that the Gulf states had made about their security and prosperity. And so we're looking at the many ways the region has been affected by this war. In security terms, we look at how significant the damage has been to U.S. military infrastructure, but also to their infrastructure, also their geoeconomic positioning as key energy powers. We've looked at how the U.S. remains central to their security regardless of Gulf concerns about U.S. wisdom and competence, but also how the Gulf states have and will have necessarily to diversify their relations. We're looking at how the U.S. remains central to its security relationships to obtain the technology, the capabilities, the security relationships that are needed at a time where the U.S. looks less and less as an all-weather friend. The dossier is a typical IISS product where we provide original data, rigorous analysis, and try to make sense of the position and preferences of those various actors. remains central to its security relationships to obtain the technology, the capabilities, and preferences of those various actors. conclusive and next rounds may not deliver better results. However odd you are with military power, that simple understanding and recognition is very useful. The second point is that the nature of warfare has changed fundamentally. We know that because we follow Russia-Ukraine, for instance. But that kind of war has come to the Gulf, where Iran, clearly an inferior military and intelligence power, has still managed to stay in the game because of the technology it has developed, its targeting choices, and its ability to show resilience. For the Gulf states, the question is, what is the right mix of technology, weapon systems, and others that will provide a good enough defense? How do you deter Iran? Some countries seek to deter Iran by entering wider regional agreements. We saw that with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey coming together, the so-called Mecca Pact. We see others interested in. in matching Iran's capabilities, looking for the long-range capabilities to tell Iran, "If you want to play that game, we too can also invest in capabilities that can hurt." Whether they will achieve deterrence is a different matter. They understand that total reliance on the U.S. is not a solution. I mean, they had invested decades and tens of billions of dollars in essentially buying an insurance policy from the U.S. This is why. this is what these relationships were about. Psychologically and politically, they understand that, first, it hasn't worked, and it's unlikely to work in the future. So you need to widen your partnerships. You need to be a lot more pragmatic, a lot more transactional, and a lot more cynical in conducting your statecraft. Finally, I think they are very keen to maintain their geoeconomic position. These countries feel that they had managed to stay at the center of the global economy because they export much needed energy, also refined products. That's a critical element. They can deploy capital. They're eager to be involved in the digital revolution that we see. So they want to host AI centers, data centers, and so on. And this war may threaten some of these ambitions. And so building the resilience and building the redundancy and capacity to deal with this moment is going to be key. That forces them, that compels them to rethink investment. Every spending and investment decision in the Gulf states from now on will be assessed against the risk of war and the urgency to prove themselves against renewed conflict. So suddenly, you may have to rethink some projects. You may need to harden others. You may need to work with others to build supply chains and connectivity, which were not planned for. It is a transformational conflict. I would argue it's the biggest shock that the Gulf states have suffered since their inception as modern states. And zooming in on one of those states, Saudi Arabia presented its view of regional affairs and its role in managing conflicts at this year's dialogue. What were the main points of its approach? Saudi Arabia, because it's in a very difficult position right now. It's a very big country with lots of critical infrastructure that is exposed to the east, Iran, the north, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, and from the south, the Hussites, all of which can do damage to the kingdom. That was my interpretation of the deputy foreign minister's comments at the Manama Dialogue. Saudi Arabia is seeking a new regional balance of power that would allow Saudi Arabia and its partners to contain and engage Iran at the same time. I don't think Saudi Arabia is interested anymore. I mean, that was a preference at one point. But, you know, I think, you know, there's a lot to be said about Saudi Arabia, but I in Iran is achievable or desirable. They realize that this conflict will have a long tail. It will don't think Saudi Arabia is interested anymore. be destabilizing over a long period, creating risks to investment, to the business climate in the Arabian Peninsula. And this will have a direct impact on Saudi Arabia's modernization efforts. So the view is, how do you engage your rivals, but also how do you implicate external powers? So, for instance, just after the dialogue, the Saudi National Security Advisor, Musaad Al-Iban, went to Beijing. He was part of the 2023 Chinese-mediated effort to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Obviously, this did not go very well, but there's still a sense that you need to reach out to your rival's friends and see if you can change or ban that preference, preferences to contain the more aggressive instincts of Iran. They're still prioritizing diplomacy because there's no military tactic. There's no military technology that is an answer to the current predicament. It's outside the framework that had existed in the Gulf for a very long time, in which the US was at the center of everything all the time. All initiatives were run by the US or were consulted with the US. I think at this point, anyone who has an influence on the warring parties is worth engaging in. So it's less a logic of blocks. There are no clear blocks in the region. There's much more fluidity in this sense. And Saudi Arabia is showing us that it will work with almost everyone to protect itself and its interests. And looking ahead, what issue from this year's WWS-Manama dialogue do you think will matter most over the next year? I think it's still about the management of the US-Iran conflict and Israel's place in those dynamics. Clearly, what we saw in Manama is a lot of anxiety from regional powers, you know, the sense that they have very little influence over U.S. decisions, Israeli decisions, and Iranian decisions. The view in the room is that it's unlikely that there will be a comprehensive settlement. You may have arrangements that contain the conflict at times, but those arrangements themselves can be problematic. They may set precedents, they may compromise some interests, but they get embedded over the long term. While everyone is focused on the risk of conflict, everyone seemed to be mindful of how flawed diplomacy could, over time, make things worse. An example is the discussion over the Strait of Hormuz. Obviously, everyone would like the to be opened again to maritime traffic, whether it's energy exports, Gulf imports as well. You know, we don't necessarily talk about what's coming into the region, but it is a global infrastructure and transportation hub. But on what terms do you reopen Hormuz? Is that a pure U.S.-Iran decision? Do regional actors need to be involved? What are the terms? Do we go back to freedom of navigation as it was before, those principles that are enshrined in international law? Or is it based on reciprocity? You do this, I do that. But if you don't do what you're doing, I will go back to my previous bad behavior that applies to the US and Iran. So there is a lot of anxiety in the region. I think it will play out in the next year, both in terms of diplomacy and military action on the ground. I think we're still likely to see a lot of kinetic activity in the space. Two critical maritime choke points in the region have been disrupted. Damesha, what impact has this had on Gulf energy flows and on producers and importers? The impact has been very disruptive. There's really no other way to put it. And the disruption has really been felt across the board for Gulf producers, for their customers, and the global energy market as a whole. For the Gulf states, the impact has been twofold, with production facilities being targeted and damaged, leading to force majeure announcements. But even where production continued, the squeeze came from their inability to transport the oil and gas out of the Gulf due to Iran's effective closure of Hormuz. On the importer side, especially for those countries that rely on Gulf suppliers for a large portion of their energy needs, it meant that they had to enact emergency conservation measures in the immediate to short term. In the long term, we've seen a number of them review their policies, looking at reducing their reliance on fossil fuels in general, but also especially from the Gulf, look at energy transition more seriously and just have energy independence, energy security really come into hyper-focus. The Economic Plenary looked at infrastructure, supply chains, and regional cooperation in a changing strategic environment. How is the war affecting regional connectivity and energy projects? So on supply chain resilience is really where we saw how the pain has been felt unequally amongst Gulf producers, with geography being the key determinant. Those states behind the strait took most of the brunt, and those with bypass options, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with their pipelines allowing them to reroute shipments through ports outside the strait, those fared much better. But it also spurred Gulf producers to invest in and expand existing bypass infrastructure to increase their redundancies and reduce the leverage that Hormuz has on their deliveries. The main measures really have been expanding, reactivating, or building entirely new pipelines. However, these are not without their vulnerabilities and limitations. I believe until a network of pipelines is extensive enough to replace the volumes that used to pass through the Strait, they are really only a stopgap measure, not to mention that seaborne transit remains the cheapest option. And what role are Asian energy importers playing in relation to Gulf Energy's security? Quite a proactive one, which makes sense given their large dependency on Gulf energy. I'd say the most prominent example has been the Japanese response. Japan relies up to 95% on Gulf energy imports. So we really saw the government of Japan take a proactive attitude, update an existing freedom of navigation and supply chain resilience policy, which is referred to as the free and open Indo-Pacific. And this was a direct response to the crisis. In addition to that, they launched a second initiative called Power Asia, the Partnership on Wide Energy Response and Resilience, to operationalize the first one. Power Asia creates a legislative basis for Japan to invest in bypass infrastructure in the Gulf, such as the pipelines, as well as expand existing storage facilities in Asia, so closer to consumers. And it also would allow Japan to have first dibs, priority access to those supplies, and thus have a stronger sense of confidence that cargoes won't be missed in case of further disruption. And looking ahead, what issue from this year's Deadline of Less Phenomenal Dialogue do you think will matter the most over the next year? From my perspective, as somebody who focuses on energy geopolitics, it'll be how the global energy market continues to adjust. We've already seen some adjustments, but I think as the crisis is dragging on, we'll see more changes. And then more importantly for the Gulf is what will their role and position be in this new global energy order. How will they be able to hold on to this long-held centrality to the market? Then based on those answers, what that might mean by extension to their security and geopolitical relationships, and key for them internally, their ability to sustain the grand visions that they have been pursuing over the last decade. That's all we have time for today. So thank you, Emile, Sami, and Tamisha for sharing your insights. And thank you all for listening. We hope you enjoyed the episode. For more information on the topics discussed today, including the new IISS Strategic Dossier, The Gulf at War, and further coverage of this year's IISS Phenomenal Dialogue, visit the IISS website at iiss.org. Please do follow, rate, and subscribe to Sound Strategic wherever you listen to your favorite podcasts to keep up to date with all the latest episodes. Thank you and see you next time.