How will Ukraine get through winter after the Trump-Putin diesel deal?

Hello, and welcome back to Independent Thinking from Chatham House. Every week we take a deep dive into the forces shaping world affairs. I'm Bronwyn Maddox. This week, Ukraine and winter. Things already looked pretty difficult for Ukraine before Donald Trump's surprise deal allowing Vladimir Putin to sell hundreds of thousands of tons of diesel to the US and other countries. And as we're recording, we're in the middle of a war of words, but almost worse, between Ukraine and the US over whether the US has chosen to make Starlink go slow on military communications or indeed has withheld other intelligence. That was very much dominating the Warsaw Security Forum that I've just come back from. We're going to be talking about whether Ukraine can survive this winter, whether it can survive with only European help, that is without US help, and whether there is anything that can be done to bring this to an end that protects what Ukraine is fighting for. We have three expert guests from the home team to discuss this profoundly important week and winter for Ukraine. Sitting right next to me is Arisia Lutzevich, who's deputy director of our Russia and Eurasia program and head of our Ukraine forum. Hi, Arisia. Good to be back. Sitting opposite me, we've got General Sir Richard Barrons, former commander of the Joint Forces Command in the UK Armed Forces and a senior consulting fellow with our international security program. Good to see you again, Richard. And I must say, I find it disconcerting because I have just been watching you on the war game, playing fiction in a uniform. Yes, it was quite difficult to reconcile fiction, with fact. Close enough to the times we're in. I and others found it gripping. If you don't know what I'm talking about, do Google it and indeed watch it. And also with us, Sharon Hudson-Dean, who's an associate fellow in our US and North America program with three decades of experience in US diplomacy. Welcome. Thank you. Great to be here. Great to have you. Well, look, let's plunge into the stark reality of where we are now. Richard, what is your take on this war of between Ukraine and the US about the degree of US support? So I think we need to look at the events of recent days in the context of the overall war, the war in its fifth year, finely balanced, much more finely balanced than anyone anticipated five years ago, but at a point where neither side is anywhere close to losing and neither side is anywhere close to winning. And it's becoming deeply attritional and the casualty figures are what we've seen in the last few days is an American political choice to favor its own judgment about its immediate electoral prospects, to favor Russia by breaching its own sanctions regime in a way that I think will make no practical difference to the price of diesel. But the message it sends is deeply unhelpful, not just to Ukraine, but to Europe, because it tilts at this idea, and it's Trump at least is inclined to favor a relationship with President Putin and Russia over a relationship with Europe and its enduring security interests. And the decision to do two things, one, to release sanctions on diesel and two, for a very short period, to message Ukraine by dialing down the technical support through the Starling system, although it apparently has been restored. And it seems to have just been designed to message that if America chooses to, it could so deplete support to Ukraine that it has to fold. And I don't believe that to be necessarily true, but the messaging is very unhelpful. And you're taking this as a clear message, for all that you use the word apparently there, that this did happen, Starlink went slow. I don't think there's any doubt that the Starlink, StarShield parameters were dialed down. This is the military version of Starlink. Such that it became very difficult to say, difficult for Ukraine to see incoming jet-powered drones because they go too quickly. And it became too difficult for Ukraine to intercept those drones. And to put that in perspective, the Guerin 5 drone is being produced at the rate of about two and a half thousand a month. And it's two and a half thousand a month that can be fired at Ukraine. As I said, this was very live when I was at the Warsaw Security Forum, which is one of these gatherings, particularly of security and defense people, but very much of active military. But this came in the middle of. So, as I said, this was very live when I was at the Warsaw Security Forum, which is one of these gatherings. just this is in the digital age, to wear down the way in which Ukrainians can support their daily life and existence and imagine their future prosperity. So this is a war on critical national infrastructure, power, water, food, telecoms, banking, designed to make Ukrainians feel that their lives are hard now, and they'll get harder over a very cold winter, and they don't see any end to this. And the point of doing that, if you're Russia, is to make Ukrainian people tell their government to sue for peace, almost on any terms. And one element of that is a very clear recognition, I think it's now uncontested, that Ukraine isn't close to breaking on the battlefield. It'll hold the line, but it's never going to take the territory back that Russia sits on. It's beyond them militarily. And so Russia either folds its tents and goes away, or is made to go away, and that absolutely can be done. It's going to take a long time. And the question is, do they have that time if they're being worn out in every other way behind the front line? I'm going to come back to that question of time, which is absolutely crucial. You were having a list there of things that Russia was attacking. I'd add agriculture to that in the sense that Ukraine is now deprived of much of its ability to get its grain out through the Black Sea, and therefore of income. And so I guess sending a message to Europeans as well, that Ukraine is vulnerable, and it's going to take lots and lots of money. Are you going to really, really pay up for it? Arisia, this winter, given the strikes that you and Richard have just described, can Ukraine make it through just on the help it's getting from Europe at the moment, and its own immense will to keep fighting and ability to innovate? Just to illustrate what Richard said by two numbers. So 30% of Ukrainians are ready for peace at any price. But 60% of Ukrainians are ready for peace at any price. But 62% are ready to carry on under extraordinary difficult circumstances in order to avoid a humiliating agreement with Russia. I'll ask you just one crucial thing. Is that Ukrainians in Ukraine? Because obviously many millions have left. Exactly. Ukrainians in Ukraine who are enduring this for a very long time. And they are hardened. You know, there are lots of psychological studies about near misses, people who survive, lose fear. They, try to adapt to this new reality. And when I talk to Ukrainians, all I hear about, did I buy wood enough for winter? Is there a small house I can move out of Kyiv? Where can I move my elderly mother from the 16th floor if the elevator is not working? So the key question right now is preparedness. So civilians are preparing the way they individually can. The city of Kyiv is the capital. The mayor is preparing evacuation plans. Resilience, tent, city, so to speak. We would use the special heated tents in case people need to spend some time there. The new prime minister, Mr. Koretsky, comes himself from running a big energy company. And he is a very skilled manager. So he is taking care of as much as possible alternative sources of electricity that mainly will be coming from Europe. Gas storages are quite well stuffed right now in Ukraine. And of course, President Zelensky and the foreign minister, they're all on the mission to, first of all, get as much as possible long range missile capabilities in order to attack launch pads, so to speak, go after the archer, not after the arrows. It's all about capabilities to disrupt Russian campaign of terror over this winter because Russia has it. So I have a feeling that Ukraine will survive over this winter. But we need to take very seriously, especially quickly, closing down gaps on, air defense. Okay. Air defense and long range striking ability. Sharon, targeting water and power supplies, these are war crimes, many international lawyers would say. Is that a factor that plays very much in the American debate? Overall, there are people, especially in the U.S. Congress and experts who follow this very carefully and are looking at details along those lines. In terms of the general debate, there's not a point that comes up for discussion, but there is a lot of support in the public when Ukraine is raised for the suffering that is going on in Ukraine and not a lot of public sympathy or connection to Russia overall, I would say. It is not a big point or topic for public discourse at the moment. I believe part of it is the nature of media today. And short attention spans and people very focused on I am not making ends meet. What can I do for my family right now? And how have I been disappointed? And this specifically to President Trump, where he came in on this economic platform, was going to fix a lot of economic problems. That has not happened. It has gotten worse. And so in that regard, I would say that for this particular moment in the American political discourse, I would say that there is a lot of support for the Democrats. Specific topics on Ukraine are not getting the attention that I would say they deserve. So let me just go on from that. You mentioned the midterm elections, which are nearly upon us. If Congress changes in the two ways you've described, Republicans losing the House, possibly the Senate, does Congress have an ability, if it chose, to circumscribe what the president is doing? That is a really hot topic right now amongst political commentators, because it is anticipated that if the Democrats take, well, certainly both houses, but even if they only take one house, the House of Representatives, there will be investigations, there will be inquiries, and that a true initiative will be made to put the brakes on many things that President Trump has done, at the very least, to stop what's happening at the moment and potentially reverse some of these things. And so we did see within a short period of time after this diesel deal was announced that a bipartisan group of senators came out against it very strongly. I believe that there are many others in the Congress who support that, but maybe have not put their names to it. Definitely, we will begin to see more outspokenness if the Congress goes to the Democrat Party. We've had many members of Congress here, more than I would expect in the run-up to their own election, very keen to make two points. One, that the Congress comes in and comes above the president in the Constitution, but also that things take a long time, which brings us back to this question of this winter. And Richard, I would really love it if you could take us a bit more into the assessment of how we should look at this winter, how we should judge it. What are the different options for how this winter can go? So I think the die is cast. It's the fourth winter of this war, so we need to recognize there's an accumulated toll, particularly on Ukrainian infrastructure and public spirit. On the battlefield in the east, it's absolutely clear that the Russian attempt to mount an offensive this year and breakthrough failed. And even if Russia had broken through, nobody ever saw the military capability to exploit it. But what we continue to see is an astonishing investment in assault in the east, consuming more than 32,000 people a month, killed and wounded. So Russia is still pressing, at that line of battle, as well as doing these strikes on Ukraine's infrastructure. And these things are clearly integrated. So President Putin clearly believes if he keeps at it long enough, sheer force of mass will break through the Ukrainian defense. But the Ukrainian defense is extremely skillful. It is falling back on a fortress belt, which just makes the offensive challenge for Russia much harder. And Ukraine has learned how to destroy the way Russia is fighting the war on the battlefield. So what was the first step? What was once an engagement almost within line of sight, you know, over a few hundred meters, is now being fought over 40 kilometers. And the Ukrainian side has the advantage of being on the defensive. So it should see off an enemy that's five or even seven times bigger. And its investment in particularly drone technology, but other forms of fires as well, means that it is work to have to destroy Russian people and equipment, not just as it were in the immediate battlefield, but now in the depth of the Russian occupation. So depleting logistics and command and control. And support. But that's not free. And every day they do this. Ukraine also takes casualties. And the mental toll on the Ukrainian people is hard because the one thing that they are not able to do is to mobilize their youth. They're not going to mobilize the 20-somethings in Ukraine because they have a democratic squeeze at that point. And the people who are in the front line, it is often genuinely a dad's army, average age often 43. I mean, that's it for years. And they don't know when this ends. So this is a time where they're going to have to do something. And I think this is just genuinely really hard. But it doesn't look as if Russia will break through. And it absolutely is the case that Ukraine won't go on the offensive. Okay, that's what I was reaching for. We've had a lot of Japanese delegations through Chatham House, corporate governmental NGO. Japan, a country that's been very, very involved in this, not wanting to see smaller countries trodden over by big ones, but also on principle. They're very invested in what happens to Ukraine, but very supportive of it. And several of them have said to us, look, we're going to have to do something. We're going to have to do something. We're going to We're worried the European press is too keen to say plucky Ukraine it may be winning and that it's not reflecting enough, though, how much pressure Russia is putting on Ukraine. And you've just given us there maybe perhaps a bit more hope that Ukraine is not about to give way. Ukraine is not about to give way. It's nowhere near being defeated on that battlefield in the east. And it has a strategy, which is using the way it's learned to fight and industrial mobilization. It will simply attempt to kill and wound more and more Russians over more of the battlefield. So if the price is averagely 1,200 casualties a day, we'll make it 3,000 a day because they can see Russia too running out of manpower and the cost of the war being felt much more by more of the Russian population. So there is a strategy that will make Russia stop, but it's not now. And it's going to be hard and costly, but they've got to tough it out through at least another winter and maybe another one after that. Meanwhile, Russia will continue to attack the depth of Ukraine in the way that we have discussed. We should see this as the same coin, essentially. It's all part of an integrated strategy. And in order for Ukraine to survive a winter with its public will intact, it needs more help because it's getting less help from the U.S. And this is where the big call comes for Europe. If I may just add two things that will make or break, you know, this particular winter, and I think one is Russia's race to create its own Starlink system with the help of China, and this is where I think they're trying to undo Ukraine's advantage of using the Starlink. And another one is the interceptors for the new type of drones, these jet-powered drones, where again, the jet engines are coming from China. And this is where I think we should really have a Ukrainian-European partnership, especially in scaling, because Ukraine can devise a technology, a prototype, a model, but it doesn't have industrial capacity right now, especially as its economy is up. And so I think we should really have a Ukrainian-European partnership, especially in scaling, because Ukraine can devise a technology, a prototype, a model, but it doesn't have industrial capacity right now, especially as its economy is up. And so I think we should really have a Ukrainian-European partnership, especially in scaling, because Ukraine can devise a technology, a prototype, a model, but it doesn't have industrial capacity right now, especially in scaling, because Ukraine can devise a technology, a model, but it doesn't have industrial capacity right now, very hard for at least the last five years to try to raise awareness. I was personally engaged in this when I was part of the State Department, going on tours around the continent to highlight this is what China is doing. When China and Russia and Putin and Xi meet, and they meet frequently, and they talk about their no-limits partnership. No limits really does mean no limits. And if this is a high priority for Russia, China is supporting it. So ironically, we were working very hard to raise awareness in Europe, as well as to get European leaders to implement policies that would push back on China and help to create resilience against Chinese pressure. And now, however, President Trump has taken a different tack in his own relationship with China, much less aggressive than I would say he did in his first administration, when he was president. Very much calling out China as a competitor. So now we're in a situation where China and Russia are working very closely together. We're seeing a lot of developments also like in the Arctic region, in the energy fields, certainly in defense and tech. And at the same time, polling shows that on the European continent, European publics are not seeing China as so much of a threat. And in fact, there's a sense that the United States is now posing more of a threat or, shall I say, less reliable that European publics are starting to say, well, we don't trust the United States, but we do trust China more. And that, I think, is very concerning, because I also think that depending how certain European elections will go in the next couple of years, we could see a I think you're right that there is a sort of a tilt. We've got people in-house, including our economics team, urging Europe to regard itself as the third pillar, not having to choose between the two. But Europe, perhaps at the political level, waking up a little more to what China is doing to Europe, including in economic competition. And the European Union is moving out on that. Yeah, it is suddenly, it's a long way away from where it was a few years ago, Germany, particularly saying, let's trade with it. Richard, these European elections heading our way, which are a sudden one in a few weeks, but obviously everyone is looking towards the French presidential election next year, the recent German victories at the state level and local level for the AFD, which is not only right-wing anti-immigration, but in distinct ways pro-Russia. And yet, as Arisius just told us as well, Germany pouring money into its own defence and into supporting Ukraine. What should we make of this? It is undeniable that we are seeing the rise of right-wing populism in bits of Europe that we thought would have no with that. And that seems to be because of a general sense of the failure of the politics that we have lived with for the last few decades. And this is not my core area of expertise, but the effect of it is it's producing equivocation in how people think about, understand and respond to the war in Ukraine, because it is absolutely clearly the case that a good outcome to the war in Ukraine is the best possible way of securing Europe's future. And a poor outcome opens a Pandora's box of potential confrontation and conflict with Russia, which everyone should seek to avoid. So I think we should see this, I think in some way, unstoppable ascendancy in Europe of parties like AFD and the right-wing in France as a wake-up call, that it is time for the greater bulk of Europe to realise the peril that they face. And three things are required. First of all, it's the political leadership to articulate the risk that we're all facing. And in articulating that, not just to admire the problem, but drive the hard choices that are required in order to deal with the problem at the scale and in the timescale that it has posed to us. And essentially, that means break out of where we are now, where there is substantial support to Ukraine and Germany as the poster child. But it's still effectively marginal work at the weight of the European economies. And leadership, hard choices, should then drive mobilisation in our own interests. And that's the industrial mobilisation that Arisa talked about. And it's also the mobilisation of the sanctions regime to a level where it's less equivocal. It's still being serious, but it's still equivocal. And we will be doing all of those things in order to re-establish the relationship through Ukraine between Europe and Russia for the decades to come, to remove the temptation. Or the prospect of this becoming a broader confrontation and conflict. So in our own self-interest. And do it in a way that begins to settle the question in Europe that can we or can we not establish politics that most people think is actually effective. And so doing well in Ukraine in time, settling the question with Russia, is a really important part of heading off what I think is a really important part of heading off what I think is a really important part of heading off what I think. I think it's really important for us to be safe proofing some of the resources from this populist politics that may be coming. One area of that is, of course, the Russian sovereign assets. The other area is long-term military financing for Ukraine, which is connected to these assets. And we have to have courage at this moment to have confidence to act without United States on some of the critical issues that are critical for our security. We have already several formats that we are setting up in addition to NATO. We should work as much as possible within NATO. We should also expand the possibilities within the Coalition of the Willing that includes already, for example, this anti-ballistic missile coalition that's under the umbrella. And also joint expeditionary force led by the UK. So it's almost like multi-tool. We have to have all formats on deck in order to protect Europe. And I think one thing we didn't touch upon today, but something we should discuss soon, is Russia's strategy to escalate against NATO. NATO against Europe, in order exactly to deprive us of this plan. In order to sow fear, in order to decouple Ukraine from European alliance. And we should be ready for that moment, because it may happen sooner or earlier than we expect. And we are ready. Actually, my colleague, Tim Ash, we published an expert comment today. Oh, absolutely brilliant. I was reading it over lunch and I thought, I can just read this. No, we don't need to do a podcast. Exactly. Everyone, you read it. He says, Putin's strategy is clear. Putin's strategy is clear. He hopes to increase the power of the EU. He hopes to increase the cost of supporting Ukraine at the time when Europe's public finances are at a perilous state. So he talks about it and Putin will do it. Not only he will increase the cost, but he will try to break the unity. And we need to insulate ourselves from this as much as we can by strengthening the collaboration formats right now, even without United States, if necessary. But Europe hasn't even been able to agree on releasing frozen assets, Russia's frozen assets for this purpose. But the conversation is restarting. And today, tomorrow, there will be summit of the European Council in Brussels. The question of financing Ukraine will be on the table. And there are already policy ideas about how better to manage those assets to generate bigger yields. It's a non-brainer that right now we only get three to five billion annually from these assets. Well, we could get much more. And there are financial solutions for that, which will be on the table. I'll read Timothy Ash's expert comment. Sharon. Do you think, given what I've described as confusion that Trump has injected in this, that in essence he's going to give Russia enough encouragement to keep going while he's in office, that we can't see an early end to this? He has repeatedly said he wants to bring it to an end. Ukraine wants to bring it to an end. I think a key point to keep in mind here is that Putin has not shown any evidence that he wants to bring anything to an end. And that's part of why this so-called deal, this diesel deal, really doesn't make any sense because the Russians didn't offer anything. So they're getting something that will definitely benefit their war effort. But what I would note in the bigger scheme of things is that there's a lot of interest in the United States in what is happening both in the bigger picture but also on the battlefield. And I think that that's an important thing to keep in mind is Ukraine, is making incredible advances in terms of military technology and military industry. And I hear that all the time in Washington is that the American defense industry has got to be part of this. NATO is very much paying attention to this. We are, of course, leaders in NATO, et cetera. That has not gone away. And so having the U.S. defense industry be integrated as they are in European defense and be following and taking very. very careful notes on what the Ukrainians are learning and creating and mastering in terms of defense industry is something well appreciated in the United States and in Washington. In addition to the fact that the NATO allies have stepped up on their spending on defense, so they are purchasing more. And while many contracts are now going to European producers, the big ones are still going to the American defense industry. So what I would say in the larger picture is that President Trump, President Trump comes in and this is, we've seen this happen many times before, will announce something suddenly without advance notice and something will go this way, a deal will get proposed, a new idea will be thrown on the table. It creates a flurry of activity and unhappiness frequently, and then it doesn't lead to the results that he says he wants it to lead to, and we go to something else. So let's see what happens with this one. Meanwhile, we remain calm. We remain committed to NATO. The summit went well this summer, and the defense industry work continues. Our militaries continue to work together. So I am keeping a close eye on developments over the next few days. And also a key thing to note is that Sunday is the deadline for the Graham Act. So this is the sanctions on Russia. By Sunday, the president must notify who he'll be sanctioning. He does have a lot of power to do waivers for that. So let's see what comes out of that. This is one of the many points of contradiction. And I guess the bigger one being that he's urged Europe, almost forced Europe to spend more on defense, but Europe's main need for defense is against Russia, which President Trump has been choosing to help. Richard. So I think this whole conversation we're having about a hard winter in Ukraine isn't so much about agonizing over what our American allies have decided to do of late or the trust that we may place in them. And it isn't just about agonizing over how hard things are for Ukraine now with a hard winter ahead. It is much more about what Europe does next. Because in the situation we find ourselves, Europe needs to find the confidence to source its own destiny out that should not be beholden to any other power in the world. It needs to find the courage to make some hard choices, do some difficult things. And that particularly means moving money from things it likes, to things it would prefer not to do in defense. And then find the competence to do. And you touched on the difficulties of European procurement and mobilization. Unless Europe finds a way through that, it'll either waste a lot of money or it'll waste a lot of money and fail. So the solution for European security lies through Ukraine. And those solutions lie in Europe. They don't lie anywhere else. So we've arrived at the point where a lot of Chatham House work at the moment is arriving. In a sense, this is Europe's moment. Absolutely, it's a moment to decide whether it really, really is going to help Ukraine through this singularly difficult winter, but whether it can coordinate not to the obliteration of national identities, but at least to get more cooperation on defense and on funding Ukraine. We're going to have to leave it there. So thank you, Arisya Lutzevich. Thank you. Thank you, General Sir Richard Barons. Thank you. Thank you, Sharon Hudson-Dean. Thank you. There is lots that we're going to be saying on this. Right through this winter. Please do look at the work of Arisya and her team, which is phenomenal. And as on our website, chathamhouse.org, as is Timothy Asher's expert comment and Richard Barons' contributions for us and indeed Sharon's. And as we come up to the American midterms, there will be an awful lot on that before and after. Good weekend.