How Superhuman Took Over Silicon Valley Email

Convincing people of things is possibly the hardest thing we have to do as founders, right? And there are so many different audiences, there's investors, there's future co-founders, there's your earliest users, there's the press, there's the industry you sell to in general. And I think each one is its own fun little puzzle. The best-most awesome thing you can do is basically have some form of narrative that sounds like this train is leaving the station and if you don't join now, I don't know that you will be able to join. The market doesn't care. Candidates and investors are looking for the storyline of differentiation sometimes just for differentiation because they're in the business of finding different things. Remember you have the right not to serve, that you used to have a survey, would be like what mobile phone do you have, they say Android and I said well you can't have superhuman. And people get confused like why isn't it my decision whether or not I buy and I'm like no it's my decision whether or not I sell. Most founders think product market fit is something you feel. Raul Vora tried to turn it into a system. Before founding superhuman Raul built Reportive, one of the earliest successful Gmail blockings. But with superhuman he approached the problem differently. Instead of chasing growth immediately he spent the years refining the product, onboarding users manually, charging premium pricing from day one and obsessing over every interaction. The result was not just a productivity app but a product that developed a kind of cult following inside Silicon Valley. In this conversation Raul breaks down the frameworks behind that process from game design principles and onboarding psychology to the product market fit engine that helps superhuman grow. Raul as I said is the founder and CEO of superhuman but also previously to that report. He started out with a CS degree at Cambridge. LinkedIn still says PhD on leave. I'm not sure if you ever if he's ever plans on going back. He started his career as a game designer working on a game called Runescape which was an early MMO RPG and he runs skate fans in the house here. Whoa a lot more than I expected love that. He then founded a company called Reportive that was acquired by LinkedIn in 2012 and then after that founded superhuman in 2014. Curious how many people here use superhuman as their primary email client. Me too it's life saver and very important to my day-to-day life. I can't live without it but in July 2025 superhuman was acquired by what was then called Grammarly who then renamed the company to superhuman where he continues as the head of superhuman mail. Why I'm excited to have Raul here is that Raul is one of the clearest product thinkers that I know and the story of superhuman is full of what I would consider highly opinionated and often very contrarian opinions that have now some of them have become sort of standard opinions for how founders think about building zero to one products. To start I'd love to talk a little bit about your start and your start in game design. So you started out as a game designer after you know after studying computer science. I'm curious one just like why that was where you decided to start and you know how you ended up there but what is the path from sort of game design to productivity software and how is that background shaped your vision for superhuman. Why game design? I mean who doesn't like games? That's a good boy. Every kid's dream. Every kid's dream. My first game's console was a super Nintendo. Super Mario World was the first guy. I see like nod heading here. This is great. And so those were my first games. I learnt how to program primarily so I could make games. Both my parents were doctors when they were working and they would pick me up late from school. And so I would read the books in the school library. And once I was mostly done with the fiction books I'd started on the nonfiction books and I found the programming section and I thought wow I can use this to make my own games. And so that was at the age of eight or so. Which I guess nowadays it would be normal. Back then it would relatively unusual for a eight-year-old to be programming. So I started programming. I taught myself how to do it and how to make my own games. And that sort of got me on this journey towards not just proficiency with building things but also I think as it's becoming increasingly important these days developing our sense of taste. So what actually is fun? Like what is enjoyment? What does it mean to play something versus not play something? And so I went to Cambridge as Farid said I did my undergrad there. I think I remember going around the careers fair and came just in the amazing university. But one thing it doesn't really have much of in terms of technology is the consumer internet. And so our specialities at Cambridge are things like hardware design, chip design, biotechnology, gene editing, some software, not that much software. One of the interesting software companies came which is actually produced is a company called Jagax which is the company behind Runescape. And so of all of the companies at that careers fair I was like this is the one this one's really cool. Also I played World of Warcraft at the time I hadn't played Runescape. But I went in for an interview and I was like wow that there were already 35 people at the time they were having so much fun that I just put all my eggs in that basket and said hey hi me I'm a great compute scientist I'll create amazing content for you on this gaming platform. And actually to the stage it was one of the most fun jobs I ever had. Interesting. Did you sorry to detour from some of the questions that we talked about earlier but did are you the type that always knew you were going to start a company or did you or and that was just the chance to sort of learn how to work at a small in a in a startup or did that come to you over time. I knew pretty darn early but again timelines are compressed kids these days know very early right turns out but I remember knowing at 12 or 13 I had this very clear insight that I was going to be a founder or an entrepreneur and for me it was again seeing my parents who were both doctors and in England doctors do well they don't do quite as well as here but they do pretty well not well enough to escape the rat race right like you know still had a mortgage until they like years stressed about money always did well enough to give us a middle-class life and I remember looking at that thinking I want to escape this particular rat race now it's a stupid thing to think because it's just right wases all the way up or down however you slice it but at my 12 year old self thought okay I want to get to the point where I'm financially independent without having to work and I think that's a reasonable first motivation as a kid it's actually a terrible motivation as a founder it's a really bad motivation as an entrepreneur which became obvious to me over the next 10 years after that but that's that's when I knew I didn't join Jaggex because I wanted startup experience I joined it just because it seemed fun right and so much I think almost every decision I've taken was oh this seems like the most fun optimizing decision I could take so let's talk about fun for a second because there's this idea of like game-ifying apps and gamification but I think a lot of what you talk about is bringing more foundational ideas of game design into product design what is the difference and how do you think about the difference and how have you brought that into the product so again this is probably dating both of us if you wind the clock back probably 10-15 years ago now gamification was a big thing in the valley and it was actually an investment thesis for many bench capital funds many founders were setting out to gamify things and it turns out it didn't really work and the difference is that it's because of the difference I should say between game design and gamification game design is when you really make your product like it is a game and it's much harder than it sounds you think about most software and versus most games what games don't need to exist there are no requirements the there only job to be done is to entertain you and so it's an entirely different kind of software design than regular software design when people think about gamification they're normally doing things like points and leaderboards and trophies and badges and streaks and all of these can kind of push behavior in a certain way but they don't actually make the underlying thing fun or intrinsically rewarding so a really great example of this by the way is is a research study that was done in Stanford in the 1970s they took kids who were aged about three to four years old I believe or maybe a little bit older for a five and they divided them into two groups and one of these groups was told that they were going to get a reward like a certificate with a gold ribbon and the other set of these kids were not told about any reward at all they would then put into a room one by one and asked to draw and so afterwards the kids who were promised to reward they would get their reward and the kids who didn't know anything about a reward didn't receive anything they then observed these children over the next few days to see how much of their time they would spend drawing the kids who didn't get a reward spent 17% of the next few days drawing the kids who did get a reward they spent eight percent of their time drawing and in other words the presence of the extrinsic motivator. reduce the intrinsic motivation. And that actually happens with game design and gameification as well. So one of the reasons, actually, the core reason why gameification didn't work is simply giving your users a reward for something, can reduce the intrinsic motivation for them to do that thing. And to actually build things that feel like a game, we actually have to go into the theory of game design, like what is a game, what is play, what is fun, and then build your product around that. And that's something that we did deeply with superhuman, now superhuman mail. - I'm curious, what are some examples of game design thoughts that go into the core loop, let's call it, of email, which is the most unfun thing ever. - Totally, I was like, how do I make the, and I didn't answer your previous question about why productivity? 'Cause it was the least fun thing in my life. - Right. - And I was like, how can I make this the most fun thing? Over the years, I came up with multiple principles of game design around 15 to 20, depending on the day. They draw upon different areas, like psychology and mathematics and storytelling and interaction design and so on. The principles cover areas like goals, emotions, toys, controls, and flow. Those are like the top five areas I often think about when it comes to how do we make something feel like a game. And I'll give you a specific example, perhaps in the context of toys. So what is a toy and how is it different to a game? The way I would summarize it is actually linguistically. You play with a toy, but you play the game, right? A ball is a toy, but football is a game. And you can actually use this when you're building products. It turns out that the best products are made with toys, because then, sorry, the best games I should say are made with toys, because then the games are fun on multiple levels, the level of the toy and the level of the game itself. And an example from superhuman would be our time or to a composer. This is what happens when you hit H to set a reminder on a new hell. And I noticed this in onboardings and we ended up deliberately designing for this, but people would start to play with this toy. Once I understood how it works, they'd start to play with it. So if you haven't seen this, you basically hit H, you type in when you want the email to come back and then it sets a reminder. And so if you type in 2D, it's 2D, 3M, O is 3 months, and so on. When people figure out how it works, they start trying to break it. So I saw people type in 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10. Like, what does that do? Oh, that's October the 10th at 10, 10 p.m. Or 2, 2, 2, well, that's like February the 2nd, 2022, or whatever it was. And then people start trying to type in random things, like, oh, I wonder if it will handle in a fortnight and a day, and it does. And even had one user type in, never, like, never bring this email back. (laughing) And we had a little funny thing over on the right-hand side where we have an interpretation of what you typed in in ASCII characters. And we had the shrug emoji guy when you typed in, never. It's like little things like that, which are fun. And the experience of a toy create these little localized moments of delight. And if you build lots of these in conjunction with each other, you now have a collection of toys, that by itself is not a game. For you mentioned the word loop, there's the idea of the game loop. You need other things as well, but that's an example of a toy-like experience. And so as you're thinking about your own features, I would ask yourself questions like the following. Is this particular feature toy-like? Is it fun just to poke? Does it have what we game designers would call a squishy affordance? Can you like bend it in an analog way and it will react back to you? What's good example of that? Oh, the jump in Mario. In fact, this is so intuitive. Most people don't even realize this happens until I point this out. Let's say you're running in Mario and you hit the A button to jump and you're flying through the air, you're holding down right. When you hold down left, what happens? You go left. That's completely a physical right. So you're flying, you're jumping, and you hold down left and you suddenly start steering left to avoid presumably the big chasm that you just found. But it's fun. That's an example of a squishy affordance that the control system has given you and controls a whole other thing. So yeah, so identify these squishy affordances, identify these areas where it can respond in an analog way and ask yourself the question, is it encouraging playful exploration? Because if you can say yes to those things you've made a toy and you're well on your way to making a game. In 2014, pitching a piece of email software just talking to people about this, how you convinced anyone that email, but we thought about it in a fun way. I'm curious how you came to decide that that's the company you wanted to build and also how you convinced anyone that they should build it with you as partners, as investors, as anything. 'Cause it is kind of like completely opposite the way people were building software. Especially productivity or B2B software. Yeah, yeah, totally. So convincing people of things is possibly the hardest thing we have to do as founders, right? And there are so many different audiences as investors, there's future co-founders, there's your earliest users, there's the press, there's the industry you sell to in general. For investors, I was fortunate to have sold a previous company. I sold my last company, Reporters of Tolington. By the way, Reporters was also in the email space. We built the first Gmail plugin to scale to millions of users basically on the right hand side of Gmail, we showed you what people look like, where they worked, their recent tweets. And that is now a feature inside of Superhuman Mail. I had some track record as a founder, which is a useful thing, especially when you have a crazy sounding idea. And so I could, I went to all the people I'd made money for. And I was like, "Hey, listen, I have this new idea. I think it's a great idea. It's probably gonna sound crazy." And I can pitch it to you, but I think you're going to want to invest in it just because it's me as opposed to the specific idea. And if you have a set of people who believe in you like that, then that's great. You should just go do that thing, right? And I think that's how I raised the first million or two million. I'd only raised a million for Reporters, and we're not giving all this money back. And basically my pitch was like, can I have the million back again? And plus, plus, I'm gonna do something great with it. When it came to, you know, that call out a pre-seed round. When it came to like the real seed round, or the series A or the series B, obviously that doesn't work. I mean, it can maybe work if you're well known in a founder, but I needed to tell a real story. And the thing that was really going for me with email is, and every VC knows this, 'cause every VC is drowning in email, it is just this absolutely ginormous market. And my pitch basically boiled down to you. I bet you this is the biggest market you will see for the next four weeks in your Monday morning partnership pitches. And let me show you the math. You have a billion professionals on average. This is still the average number we spend three hours a day reading and writing email. That's three billion hours every single day that go into reading and writing an email. That's north of a trillion hours a year that go into reading and writing email. And yet, before superhuman, we still had only a one-size-fits-all solution, which was Gmail and Outlook. And by the way, those things are nearly free. And they don't solve the problem for the people who do the most email. You find a more dislocated market than that. And this is just the start of what we're trying to build. We're actually building the productivity and collaboration suite of choice. Email, it turns out, is the best place to start because of all of these things. It's the most open ecosystem. You can literally even add a fortune 500, just bring your own email clients. And there you are, your past security. So we can use that as a way to grow and expand. And so that's a lot more of a strategic pitch. That's just like, OK, what do VCs respond the most to? Actually, VCs different, but the core thing is market size. So it's a pitch that and then figure out what unique things on top of that they're going to respond to. And it's funny that you mentioned the whole feelings over wants and needs. And maybe this was timing, or maybe this is a good example of founder, market, product fit, especially with my game design background. The investors who got the most excited-- and I think for our series B, we had like seven term sheets-- they all wrapped themselves around that idea. Some were like, oh wow, kind of slack came out of a game design background founder. Could this be like that again? Or consumer VCs who were doing their first SAS deal? Or SAS VCs who saw the returns that consumer partners were getting and thinking, maybe this isn't just your average boring B2B SAS company. And we never pitched it that way. In fact, we capitalized on that storyline by saying, this is absolutely not your average B2B boring SAS company, because we have this B2C motion. We're building a 100 year brand. This brand will be here for a very, very long time, as you know we-- that is so much more true now than back then. So it was a question of figuring out what storyline would most resonate with each person. particular partner in VC and then telling that story. When it came to co-founders, which was the other party your question, it's actually quite different, right? With co-founders, it was a single founder company for about a year before I brought on board co-founders. The pitch is very different. The thing that would resonate the most I found is momentum, which is actually ultimately the job of what we have as founders is to create momentum. And there's always cool stuff happening with other companies just got a raise or I need to see through the next Vestincliff or my company just went public and I need to hang around for a while. Like there are always these excuses, right? But you need to get those people with you right now. The best, most awesome thing you can do is basically have some form of narrative that sounds like this train is leaving the station. And if you don't join now, I don't know that you will be able to join. And so for me, ways I did, and I didn't even write any code, but it was stuff like the very first thing we did was buysuperhuman.com, which was kind of insane, by the way, 'cause I raised $250,000 first check into the company and I immediately spent $175,000 on it on the domain. But I knew that's momentum, like the I'm serious about building this company. And again, I'm speaking to like five or six potential co-founders, they're all watching this momentum take place. Then it was hiring one of the best design agencies out there. And then it was producing great designs. And then it was writing the landing page for superhuman, which is more or less actually still the copy that we have today, like really obsessing over that and making sure we're telling that narrative. Then it was continuing to raise more and more and more money. So over the period of about nine months to a year, my potential co-founders were seeing all of this happen. And by the time I had $1 or $2 million raised, the main name and place, the landing page and place, the storyline, the first designs done both to Y frame and high fidelity concept. I think it was just very obvious to them this was gonna be a very exciting thing and I wasn't messing around. And that's how we called them, boy. - The way to build a collaboration tool was give it, make it freemium, put it out there for free, allow people to just sign up for it, try it, get going with it, make it really, really simple to get started on. But there's a lot of things about superhuman that are actually the opposite of that. So one is this human touch onboarding. I'm curious like how you decided to do this because now it's pretty commonplace. I suspect a lot of you are doing a process like this, but in a lot of ways I think it was unique for a product like this at the time. I would love to hear some of the motivations for why you did that. Was it about discovery? Was it about activation and customer success? Was it about your price point? Like what are the things that fit into deciding to take like a very different world view on how to get people going on product? - So interestingly, when we started the company for a few years, I thought we would do it the quote unquote normal way. Again, if you wind the clock back 10, 20 years ago, 20 years ago freemium was considered a big deal 'cause it was a novel business model back then. Now it's sort of brain dead obvious. And I think over time it came into fashion and it fell out of fashion. Then we all realized what it really was, which is actually a relatively expensive way, potentially a financing you're marketing. And there are certain specific cases where it works really, really well. Slack is a great example. The product is multiplayer or collaborative by default. Like that is the primary use case, obviously true for Slack. And where in using the product, you build up a retentive moat, everything from the habit of going back to Slack every day in the morning to the data that you're actually putting into the product. Those are all things that, of course, you wanna treat it like, give it away for free because once people start using it, it'll be so difficult for them to stop using it. But email doesn't actually check those boxes. Email is, now there is collaboration and superhuman, but even today it's still primarily a single player experience. That 20% of the use case, perhaps, is collaborative and multiplayer. And because of that, you don't have the pull of other people bringing you back. There are some pulls, right? Your reminders are not gonna manifest in quite the same way in Gmail. Back then we didn't have split-in-box, but things like split-in-box are now a reason to come back. Things like the AI and the calendar, those are all now reasons to come back. But in those early days, we didn't have those things, except for the search was fast, it was really pretty, has keyboard shortcuts. The feel would pull you back. But if you were a lazy user or we hadn't quite sold you yet, then you'd be back in Gmail. I took all of this in and at the same time, I saw how easy it was becoming to get an initial set of users to try your product. Right, it is not hard for any one of us to throw something out there and with a little bit of grit, get 10,000 people to sign up, right? That is, used to be impressive, super not impressive these days, you can get 10, 20, 30,000 people to sign up, but basically anything. The problem is getting those people to stick around. And more importantly than that, even, what do they say about you to all of their friends and to the people that matter? Now it was obvious to me with superhuman, partial because I lucked on to it with reports of it, reports of just kind of like massive success all by itself, good product, perfect timing, very lucky, became a cult product. So I lucked on to making a cult product. Now I was like, can I recreate the conditions to create a cult product? And it turns out the answer is you absolutely can. You just have to be very strategic about how you do that. One of the most important things, is if that's your goal, is to have as few people saying anything bad about your products as possible. So how do you control for that? Well, just make sure everybody is deliriously happy. Well, how do you achieve that? Well, you just, the way you achieve anything as a founder is just maniacal control over every single detail. And so I insisted that we would only on board five people a week, that I would on board all of those five people. And that, and back then those on boardings were long. I was probably half an hour, but the first ones, they were like two hours each. And I would go to the office. I'd research people at a time. Actually, you came to the office. And I forgot that. It wasn't a Zoom call. That's right. I remember going to Slack. And we'd probably stopped doing gifting at this point. But in the early days, it was like, okay, it's a guy, a whiskey person, or a wine person, or maybe they don't drink. I'm gonna bring some tea or something like that. We'd research them. We'd figure out what they like, bring them a gift for a reason. I shall explain shortly. Sit down, I would say, okay, show me how you use Gmail or show me how you use, actually back then it was all Gmail. And I would take notes. And then I'd say, okay, this is superhuman. I do a quick demo, get them excited. And then I dropped the bomb, 'cause they weren't expecting this. Okay, now you're gonna pay for it. So pull out your credit card. It's $30, by the way, here's a bottle of whiskey. (laughing) Just make it feel a little bit less awkward. Slash deliberately invoking the reciprocity principle. And so they would, I think only one person ever was like, really? Everyone else was like happily paying for it. They were so invested by this point. And then I would watch them use the product for an hour or two. How much time they would give me. And if you haven't done this, please do this. And please never stop doing it, because even with a mature product, it is incredible how much you will see that maybe even your product engineers or your PMs won't see or your designers like you as the founder or you as the CEO are gonna see everything. You'll just see every single problem and write them all down, bring them back to the team. And what I did is I said to the team, 'cause they were pushing me to grow faster. The team wants to grow as fast as possible. Like I was always the ghost slow guy. And I said, no, we're not gonna import anyone else until we fix these issues. And they say, why? And I said, well, every user has bug fatigue. In the sense that they might tell you one bug, they might tell you two or three, you think they're gonna tell you 10 or 20 or 30? Hell no. You think we have less bugs than that? Hell no, we do. So the only way we'll find out about them is if we do the grind and we turn the spooker on very slowly to polish this thing. Like we just have to keep on doing this polish. So those were the initial motivations. It was control the blast radius, make sure every single person became a net promoter and also use it as a way to build the best possible product. To truly understand what people wanted, to understand about email workflows, we didn't understand of which though I'm plenty, we built for us as soon as we hit the market, we started encountering other email workflows. That's fine, that's normal. Then we just have to start catering for those workflows and also find all the bugs and fix all the bugs. Then we noticed something really, really weird, which is the metrics for these users were off the f***ing charts. Like the activation was crazy. The retention was crazy. The virality was crazy. The net promoter score was crazy. Our ARR was just sort of like going up without coming down in any way, like that the churn was surprisingly low. So I looked at that and I was like, "Huh, am I just that compelling?" (laughing) people. love it so much. So my brother used to work for the company. He was, I had a growth at time. I was like, "Why don't you go do this?" "Let's just disambiguate whether it's me or the process." Yeah. And he did it. He was actually even better than I was. I was like, "Huh, okay. Good reality check." Also, it's probably the process. So that's when I had the slight build moments. It was just before A-16 is being invested back in late 2018, early 2019, where I was like, "What if we hired a team of people to do this round the clock over Zoom 40 calls a week?" Why has no one ever done this? Why has no one run this play? And I start googling it. The closest I could find is what Jason Lemkin on Saster calls like, "Cool to close." These companies that have so much top of funnel volume, they just set up a round robin of people on a phone call to basically show you the product and take your credit card number. This is a little bit harder than that because you have to watch the user in Gmail, figure out their workflow, replicate that in superhuman, and then obviously fill the funnel. So that was the idea. I then had my brother hire two people to be the first test onboarding specialist. We came up with the name of this role onboarding specialist to figure this out. To disambiguate whether it was him, could we, the next test was, could we hire a smart person off the street and have them do it? And so we hired two. You always want to do this in pairs so you don't have the failure mode of you just hired a bad person. Also, it's nice if there's a bit of competition. They did, and they did exceptionally well as well. And then I was like, "Okay, this is it. We're scaling this up." And by the way, VCs love this. If you have a, because VCs are always looking for the alpha, they're looking for the edge. And we had like six or seven different aspects to our storyline, whether it is me personally or my game design background or this feelings over user requirements or the onboarding process or the price point or our product market fit approach, which you haven't talked about yet, like all of those together made it that like that the series be, it was actually really easy. It was like a week long process and even just the storyline alone was like, "Wow, there's enough going on in this company that is sufficiently different and thought through from scratch that that alone was interesting to the Valley's best VCs." So yeah, we scaled that team and the other, and then the limit, the net, detract aspect continued to be important for many, many, many years because it took us a long time to get to an Android app. It took us a long time to get to an outlook, outlook integration. It took us a long time to build our sales features and our salesforce integration and our pipe drive integration and so on and so on because this stuff just takes time to, especially back then, to build to a high degree of quality. And so what I didn't want was people signing up saying, "Oh, you don't have an Android app." And it turns out that guess what? I need a mobile email app to do my email. You guys suck. Remember, you have the right not to serve. I want to say that again, you have the right not to serve any customer, founders forget this. So people would sign up and say, "We had to use to have a survey." We'd be like, "What mobile phone do you have?" They'd say, "Android." And I said, "Well, you can't have superhuman." And people would get confused like, "Why? Isn't it my decision whether or not I buy it?" And I'm like, "No, it's my decision whether or not I sell." Yeah, it's interesting how these sort of different things, the dots connect. It's like one, by asking for money upfront, it's sort of like, "Okay, I'm committed to going through this process with you. By having a human there, I am going to walk through this sort of complicated set of use cases and be able to personalize towards like an aha moment that that drives really high retention, drives AR growth." But this piece about the net promoters is a really interesting one, which is if I got through all of that, I'm probably going to tell my friends about it, but not just because it was a great experience, but because it was different, that it was contrarian or different from what other people are doing. It seems like almost like by making very focused, strange decisions that kind of fit together, there's something new there or something. It wasn't being strange or different for the sake of it. Like I genuinely thought all of these things were the right thing to do for their own reasons. Let's talk about the PR out the product market fit engine because we talked a little bit about net promoter scores and about having people who want to talk about it and drive word to mouth. What other sort of looks in retrospect like a great decision, but odd decision is you spent almost three years working on the product before you launched it broadly. I want to start with how you would advise founders to think about their decision of when to launch a product versus continuing to iterate and improve with a small set of users. Well, it was a different world back then. Everything took a hundred times longer and I didn't feel like the market was moving at all. Yes, email clients are a dime a dozen and they come and go, but they're also all terrible. I'd just be like, there was never going to be an email app that would ever display this. I think if we were to fail, we'd either have to, like Paul Graham says, it would be a self-inflicted wound. It would be running out of cash, hope, or, and I don't see the one he says. Co-founder breakups, those are the top two reasons. You run out of money, you run out of hope, or your co-founder, partnership, thoughts apart. I was thought, that's the risk here. It's not competition. I think what I would do, if I were starting something right now, I would have a crystal clear set of ideas as to why the company strategy would succeed. This is one thing I used to be really bad at strategy. My first company report, it had zero strategy. It just called product, great, good go. As I've grown superhuman over the years, I've gotten better at strategy. It's still something I'm very actively working on. I think it's one of the last skills most of us acquire as founders and as product people. I would have a very crystal clear strategy that articulates why the sequence of steps that we intend to take we think will actually work and why they stand up in the face of competition. I'll give the example of superhuman mail. I knew how hard it was to build and I didn't think that anyone else would be as crazy about it. By that, I mean, raises much money and be as patient over it and spend three years building the thing. Eventually, when I realized this will sound like survival bias, but eventually the amount of time you've spent building something can be the most. If you've come out of a three to four year build, everyone else is looking at that thinking, am I going to start an email quiet company? I don't want to do something else. I think that's kind of what happened with superhuman mail. Tasionally, people have started email out companies, but they don't go anywhere and they want or two people and they are unable to raise any money for it generally speaking. It's like, obviously, did that to the chat space. There's this notion of taking the oxygen out of the room. I felt like we could get to that point with mail and that was part of our strategy. We're charging for it upfront. That was also a very deliberate part of the strategy. We talked about why not premium. We haven't talked about why a premium price point. That was $30. It was 29 for six months and then I had a conversation with a pricing expert who was like, 30 sounds more premium than 29 and it's basically the same. I was like, you're absolutely 100% right. We made it 30. Then we only changed it two years ago and now we have 30 and 40 to pay for the extra AI costs, which was a mistake, by the way. One quick aside on that mistake, we should have been changing pricing all along the way. If I were to go back in time, I think we'd have 30% more ARR now. You can basically charge me whatever you want. I'll keep paying it. So, right back down to the seat. I had a very clear thesis around pricing, which was one thing we didn't talk about with onboarding was it wasn't just five random people a week. It was the five most influential people a week I could find because there is this thing that I think we'll talk about called the highest expectation customer, which is most of your customers actually aspire to be like somebody. If you can figure out who they aspire to be like and get those people to love your product, well now you've just started to build a virality that doesn't rely on viral mechanics. It's what virality really is, which is just word of mouth. So, the five most influential people I could find, how could I price it such that it spoke to how those people think about themselves and how those people think about themselves is if you haven't noticed because you will probably are those people as well. Emails kind of part of the ego, right? It's like, oh yeah, I get this many emails a week. This is how much time I spend on email. Well, this is how much time I don't spend on email because of how many emails I I get a week. It's funny how the ego can go in both ways. Like the amount of work and the the pressure was part of the ego. And I was like, well, if that's the case, you know what's gonna make you feel good about it, spending a lot of money on fixing that problem. So that's part of how we priced it at 30. And then that was my initial psychological analysis. And then I took kind of a step back. And I was like, wait a minute, there's actually a bigger trend line here. There's a bigger story here, which is the idea of the prosumarization of the enterprise. This was roughly when 2019, when David Orwich made the investment race 16C. So we just seen the consumerization of the enterprise. We all know what that is, basically enterprise software sucks. What if it had the sensibilities of consumer software? And I was like, well, consumers are really, really wide bucket. And it turns out that the people who do email for a living, they're not consumers, they're prosumers. What's a prosumer? A prosumer is a power user, but we're not enough the time of the power user and all of the economic agency of the power user. They have all the money to spend, they don't have any time to figure things out. That's a prosumer, generally speaking. What is the prosumarization of the enterprise? And could we do that? Which is actually part of what we're still building now, but at the wider superhuman company in many, many different areas and many product verticals. And so I had this idea that that could also be part of our strategy. And there's a bunch of other things as well, like that there's positioning and how we thought about customer support and so on and so on. But all of these all added up to short of someone, short of the entire world changing. This strategy feels like it would be basically unassailable. It would have to be one of the three PG things, which is you run out of time, hope slash patience, or something goes wrong with the co-founders that would break the company. So let's talk about the product market for the engine. This is a product framework that I think you popularize. I would call it the product market fit score. I think a lot of people here call it the superhuman question now. Can you walk through what that is? Why you developed it in sort of the story around getting to a more scientific approach to measuring product market fit? Which to this point, I feel like there's always like a, you know it when you see it, but you built sort of a system around developing and understanding a product market fit. And I would love you to walk through that a little bit and just sort of give the two minute version, one minute version of what it is, and then sort of how to operationalize that for founders building and trying to get there. It was about April 2017, and we were two, three years in. The team were pushing really, really hard to launch. No one wants to work on something that hasn't launched. No one wants to not have use of feedback. But I believed deep down inside that this thing would just flop on first launch if we threw it out there. I believed that we did not have product market fit. But I couldn't just say that to the team, right? That is not a inspiring thing to hear from you. Yeah, we don't know product market fit. Keep working is not a good plan. Instead, doesn't work with investors either. Doesn't work with that. (laughing) Well, we don't have product market fit. Please invest. Yeah. Don't do that pitch. That pitch. Instead, I wanted to come up with a really, I mean, and if you haven't been able to tell, I just, I love unassailable stories. Like a narrative that no matter how you poke this, no matter how you peel it apart, it hands together so coherently, both logically and emotionally that people are just incredibly compelled. And so that was actually part of, people don't realize this. The goal wasn't necessarily to get to product market fit. That was the side effect. The goal was to inspire the team in a way that, in a way that would be long lasting, and basically forever. And as a really crazy side effect, it is now the most viral entrepreneurship obstacle. I think of all time. It's the most shared article on first round review. So that was the goal. And I was like, okay, how do we do this? So I researched everything that I could possibly find on product market fit. And I don't want to take credit for the question because it's not my question. It's actually Sean Ellis' question. And Sean Ellis was one of the first growth hackers ever. He coined the phrase growth hacking. He was the first growth marketer at logmeon event bright, drop box. And he was the one who came up with the question, how would you feel if you could no longer use the product? You answer on one of three dimensions, not disappointed, meaning you don't really care, somewhat disappointed. You're like, yeah, or very disappointed, meaning you would, you love the product and be very sad if it were to go away. And so way back in the day, he'd benchmarked this on hundreds of venture backed startups and found that the companies that grew to product market fits almost always had more than 40% very disappointed. And the companies that didn't grow to product market fit almost always had less than 40% very disappointed. And I thought, well, this is the only research that has ever been done, like ever, on this topic. And even, but it's enough. It's enough to build a process and an algorithm around. So the innovation that we came up with was, how do you turn that into an engine? How do you turn that into a repeatable process that any team, any company can run? And if you read this, like, again, it's very hard to poke holes in it, it will reliably make that number go up always. Now what we did is we added three more questions onto it. So number one is how would you feel if you could no longer use the product? Number two is, who do you think the product is best for? Number three is, what is the main benefit you get from using the product? And number four is, how can we improve this product for you? Now here's why those questions are so important, so powerful. So the second one, who do you think this product is best for? It gets to what founders most forget about product's market fit, which is you're allowed to change the market as well as the product. And it's actually way easier it turns out to change the market than the product. You could just decide. We're changing the market today, guys. Products are saying, OK, let's figure that out. Maybe change your packaging. Oh, by the way, before we ran this analysis, I ran the first question, and we had 22% very disappointed. 22. Way less than 40. And you might think, oh, you must have been really bummed out about that. Actually, no, I was excited. I was like, finally, I can explain what I'm feeling to the team in a way that is irreproachable. But you can't argue with these metrics. This is what the standard of success says, and we're hard-failing. So how do we fix that? Well, it turns out that the easiest thing you can do is change the market. So I was looking at all of the survey responses from the first 100, 200 people using superhuman. And I was like, I really want this number to be more than 40. How do I make this number more than 40? I'm just going to select a bunch of people where it goes more than 40. It turns out I'm segmenting the market. And I was like, what set of people makes this number be more than 40? And it turned out that if I just dropped data science, sales, and engineering, but kept VCCO founder BD, it was like 10 percentage points higher. It was 32%. That was as close as I could get it by doing literally zero work. So that's just the right to not serve. I could be like, and we did this. We deliberately didn't serve people who were in adjacent personas to the core persona to begin with. So that's the power of that second question. So we were surveying these people. We were getting these four questions back. The very first thing we did was change the market. And so we got from 22% to 32%. Then the question is, OK, what do you build to systematically get to 40% plus? And this is where I like to ask the question, who do you think the product is best for? And it turns out this is a very powerful question, because it turns out that your happiest users will almost always answer that question by describing themselves using the words that matter most to them. This is like product marketing ninja skills. You literally get your product marketing copy and you're positioning directly from your happiest users. If you just act on the feedback from your users, you will end up building a confused muddy mess. I mean, back then, we didn't even have the engineering cycles to act on all the feedback. We do now, right? All of us can build. We can vibe code whatever we want. But that makes taste and discernment even more important now than it was back then. So you need to figure out who to listen to and who not to listen to. So remember, we have a pie with three segments. We have the very disappointed segment. We have the somewhat disappointed segment and the not disappointed segment. By resegmenting, I'd got the superhuman segment from 22 to 32%. We want to make that more than 40%. So the question is, how do we grow the size of that pie? Well, we can't play with segmenting the market anymore. We already did that. So now the next optimization is trying to get people who are in the other two segments into the segment that we want. There are two possible segments, the somewhat disappointed segment and the not disappointed segment. And you might think, well, let's go to the not disappointed segment and see if we can convince those people to fall in love with our product. But the problem with those people is they are so far removed from loving your products that no matter what you build, there is literally nothing that you can build them that they would fall in love with your products on a short enough time scale. So don't tell them this, but just politely disregard, ignore all their feedback. That leaves the other segment, which is the somewhat disappointed use. And we've, and I didn't mention this question yet, but we've previously asked another question, which is, what is the main benefit of the product for you? This is a super important question. Back then, for superhuman male, it would have been things like focus, flow, speed, keyboard shortcuts, it's really, really, really fast. Today, it's a lot more about AI and stuff, but that's what it was back then. You go to your somewhat disappointed segment and you sub-divide it into two groups - Group one, the group for whom the main benefit does not resonate. They may have written down, for example, for us, "Oh, it works off-line," or "I like your mobile app," or "I like read receipts," or whatever it is. And then the set of people for whom the main benefit did resonate, these are the people who said, "I love the speed. I love the keyboard shortcuts." Politely disregarded Group one. And the reason is, even if you built everything that they asked for, fixed every bug that they report, the main benefit of your product still does not resonate with them. So they will end up falling in love with your product for, quote, unquote, "the wrong reason." And this is where founders and founding teams can get a little bit distracted and pulled into the wrong markets or building the right thing for the wrong reasons or the wrong thing for the right reasons. Instead, go to Group two, which is the somewhat disappointed users for whom the main benefit did resonate. Because only a few things, I would wager, it's only a stone's throw, a stone's gap is holding them back from falling in love with your product. And just systematically work down that list. And then the final piece of this is, because I promised it can basically generate a roadmap that will take you to product's market fit. One driven teams tend to focus just on the list of things for what do you love about this product. Data-driven teams tend to focus on just the complaints that are coming in. I like to start each planning cycle with half RNG going into building more of what users love already. In our case, making it even faster, even more beautiful, even more keyboard-driven stuff, nowadays, it would be something like integrating OpenCore into mail. So it works with your agent ecosystem, that kind of stuff. And half the time, just working down all the boring complaints that people have about the products. If you only work down all the boring complaints, someone's going to out-innovate you. If you only do the innovation, you're not, and this is more obvious when you sit down and think about it really hard. You're not going to grow the size of the pie that is very disappointed without your products. You do both of these things, and you will. And the results from superhuman were, we went from 22% to 32% just in a few minutes, just by segmenting. And then the quarter after we were at 46%, the quarter after that we were at 56%, the quarter after that we were at 58%. And it wasn't hover at 58% forever. Andrew talks about the law of shity metrics. This will come down for good reason, because hopefully you're expanding industry. You're going to adjacent personas. Those salespeople that we ignored before, we now have to figure out how to build a product that's good for them as well, and so on and so on. So the number will come down, but that's the art of building great products is you'll keep pushing it back up again. If I know that was a lot, and I know it was very long, but I have written this up at length online. So if you Google the superhuman product market, fit to engine, you can find it. What advice would now Rahul give first time founder Rahul starting a report back in the day? Oh boy, so much. Let's see if I can do this quick. Know what your strategy is and stick to it. For a positive, I equivated on strategy constantly, and we were lucky to have a good outcome, but I didn't really know what I was building and who it was for and what the company level thesis was. To have that, number two, have as many things as make sense be different and first principled about your company. I think we're living in a golden age where it's now even more possible to do those things than when I was building superhuman because you can basically build and do whatever you want. You can decide not to hire for a very, very long time, so you get to do the blueprints for your company from first principles. That is way more powerful than people realize, and I think a lot of folks take it for granted. Okay, I can put another way and hopefully your boards will tell you this. Don't just hire a bunch of VPs and do what they say. Like, literally have your own opinions on everything because they're probably best than you might think if you have in pasta syndrome. And the third really tactical thing is keep increasing prices every year. Stay ahead in the play. All right, thanks to Raoul. Thanks so much. It was great. Thanks for listening to this episode of the A16Z podcast. If you liked this episode, be sure to like, comment, subscribe, leave us a rating or review and share it with your friends and family. For more episodes, go to YouTube, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify. Follow us on X, A16Z, and subscribe to our substack at a16z.substack.com. Thanks again for listening and I'll see you in the next episode. As a reminder, the content here is for informational purposes only. Should not be taken as legal business, tax, or investment advice, or be used to evaluate any investment or security and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any A16Z fund. Please note that A16Z and its affiliates may also maintain investments in the company's discussed in this podcast. For more details, including a link to our investments, please see a16z.com/disclosures. [Music]