so I'm running super late. This is pretty typical for me. Hopefully I will pass quickly
through security. I'm in Strasbourg. I'm rushing through the elaborate entrance of the
European Parliament to get to a meeting. I came here because this plenary session
promised drama. Two motions of censure against Ursula von der Leyen. Two fresh attempts to
topple the commission president. It sounded like a pretty big deal. I have to get to the seventh
floor and I'm a little paranoid that like I'm gonna end up in an elevator or I have to have
some special badge. So I booked interviews with MEPs all over this confusing complex,
trying to take their pulse to see how they'd vote and whether anyone really thought von der
Leyen was in danger. I'm still recovering from a minor foot injury but ever the devoted reporter
I sprinted, limped, and climbed my way through the maze of corridors. Okay, I'll spare you the
rest of my journey but as you can tell we were really trying to sell this story as a high-stakes
political showdown. Me running, the clock ticking, the drama. But truth be told, that drama never
really materialized. The math was never there. The votes weren't close and even von der Leyen's
critics admitted these motions of censure weren't actually about removing her. They were symbolic,
a show of discontent rather than a real threat. Still I thought it was worth the sprint to find
out whether any of this carries political weight, what it says about power and politics in today's
European Union, and whether it hurts Ursula von der Leyen or on the contrary affirms her
image as a European leader. Almost a European prime minister? I'm Sarah Wheaton, host of EU
Confidential. So before we dive into the Strasbourg drama that wasn't, let's head 500 kilometers west
to the French capital because it was in Paris where the real political earthquakes struck
earlier this week when Prime Minister Sébastien Le Cronus government collapsed barely half a day
after it was unveiled. To help make sense of the turmoil, I'm joined by our senior correspondent
in Paris, Clea Calcutt. Clea, thanks for being here. It's been a bonkers week. We're talking now
Thursday morning. Can you catch us up in general on what happened over the past week in Paris?
Yes, absolutely. I mean, it's been a roller coaster week. What happened is over the last
weekend we had a new government. We've had these ongoing problems of Prime Minister's
governments falling in France because they can't agree on a budget. So we got a new government
over the weekend. But what happened is in a shock resignation, Sébastien Le Cronus knew the Prime
Minister stepped down on Monday morning. So that meant that his government lasted only 14 hours.
And so we were back to the drawing board. There was a lot of questions about who's in charge here.
French President Emmanuel Macron decided to give his outgoing Prime Minister Sébastien Le Cronus
the job of building a new government. So he just gave him his old job again. Literally gave him his
old job back almost. And so he was given 48 hours to basically bring everybody back round the table
and try and hash out a plan for the government, for the country, for the budget. That deadline
ended on Wednesday. And now we were hoping for some sort of conclusion to all of this. You know,
either that we're going towards a snap election or there's a new Prime Minister, but no, we were
left empty handed, except that now we're facing a new deadline for the end of the week. And
Sébastien Le Cronus told us that the President is going to appoint somebody and that he does see
some sort of a platform emerging of understanding between the different parties from the sort of
centre right to the left. That all feels very fragile. And now we're waiting to see who gets
appointed next. We want to be honest with listeners that this choice may have been made by the time
they hear this episode. But can you walk us through maybe who are some of the runners and riders here?
There are some names that are emerging. The latest name is Jean-Louis Borlau. He's a centrist,
but he's unrelated to Emmanuel Macron. And that's seen as an advantage because he would be able to
speak to the left and to the right. But at the same time, he won't be seen as a Macron minion,
which is something you don't want to be seen as at the moment. And who else might be on the table?
Well, for the past few days, we've been talking about a possible left-wing Prime Minister.
This would be somebody probably from the Socialist Party. They, in the last snap election that was
last year, won the most seats. So they feel that they should have their chance at trying to find a
compromise. So that would be the head of the Socialist Party, who's called Olivier Fort, or
the head of the left-wing group in the National Assembly, who's called Boris Valot. Now, the
thing is their price is very high. They want Macron to suspend his flagship pension reform,
which raised the age of retirement from 62 to 64. Now, that is a big ask. And that's something
Emmanuel Macron will really not want to do, because it was a reform he pushed through. It was
painful. There was riots in the street. It's basically his legacy. And so that's one reason
why we don't think it might be a left-wing Prime Minister, even though he's running out of options.
When you can't form a government, you would usually call snap elections again? Or even,
you know, if Macron is so unpopular, who just can't get anywhere, could he step down early?
Well, that has been the discussion in Paris for the whole week. We're stuck. What's the way out?
Snap election or Emmanuel Macron steps down. But what's really quite clear, Emmanuel Macron really
doesn't want to go. He said so repeatedly, he's not going to go. You know, we spoke this week to
people who know him well. They all say he's obsessed, almost pathologically determined
to keep going. He will never, ever give up. Now, a lot of that we believe is spin. I mean,
at some point, if he can't get a budget through, if he can't get a government, he will have to
give in. But I think we're quite far yet from that moment. I mean, if we do have these snap
elections, it would be really great for national rally leaders like Jordan Bardella and Marine
Le Pen, no? Absolutely. Because polls say that they would get a lot more MPs in parliament. And so,
therefore, they might be close to being in a position to actually ask to run a government.
It would really push the focus onto them and therefore might provide a sort of stepping stone
towards the presidential election. For Jordan Bardella, it will be a very good thing because he
would emerge as one of the leading figures of probably the biggest group in parliament. And so,
another boost to his popularity. He's already one of the most popular politicians in France.
Jordan Bardella has also been making a huge splash where I am in Strasbourg. He's the leader of
the Patriots for Europe group here. And there was this kind of interesting image of him on Monday,
you know, racing from national rally headquarters where they were talking about how to respond to
this latest upheaval, to then him peering later in the evening in Strasbourg, leading this Patriots
free motion of censure against Ursula von der Leyen. And ultimately, European People's Party
leader Manfred Weber said that both Bardella and other French leaders from the left are using these
motions of censure as propaganda tools for domestic politics. So, did the French public have any
attention span for what was happening over in Strasbourg? I think it's so peripheral to what
the French are seeing at the moment. I mean, it's a tragedy for European politics. But what happens
in Strasbourg hardly gets mentioned here. The focus is very much like on France, bread and butter
issues, budget. How are we going to survive? What about the debt? Are we going to have
an economic crisis? That's a real focus. However, what's been going on in Strasbourg
has had some echo here because it's really part of the sort of very radical policy and strategy
of the far right at the moment. After years of trying to become more respectable, wearing ties
and suits and appearing to be the reasonable people in the room, they've now adopted a much more
hardcore, radical anti-establishment platform. And what Bardella is doing in parliament reflects what
Marine Le Pen and himself are doing here, which is saying we need a total change of the system.
Von der Leyen has to go. Macron has to go. The European Union needs completely reshaping.
All of this is one big picture of them really pushing this kind of anti-establishment stance
at the moment. Okay, well, we'll leave it there and crossing our fingers that this conversation
manages to survive for the next 24 hours. So, Clea, thank you so much. I hope so too. Bye.
That strategy of France's national rally that Clea was mentioning was on full display this
week here in Strasbourg. It was Jordan Bardella himself who presented one of the motions against
Ursula von der Leyen. We'll get more into that a bit later. But first, I want to get a sense of
the broader context for these motions of censure, like how they've been used over the years and
what their true political might is. For that, I spoke to Sophia Roussak, a senior researcher
at the Center for European Policy Studies. Okay, so let's look back a bit at this as a tool,
you know, the center motions. They kind of remind me of like the impeachment process in the U.S.
where it's theoretically this tool that lawmakers can use in the case of serious misconduct, but
hasn't actually been used to oust anybody, although in the commission and there was a
squeaker, it almost happened once, right? True. No, but I think it's very important to remember
that indeed this tool, this instrument was never designed to send the commission home
for political reasons. It really was designed, and this is also where the thresholds are so high,
two-thirds majority of all MAPs, to not reach it that easily and to only really apply it if
there are serious cases of misconduct, fraud, nepotism, and so on. And indeed, you're right,
this was once the case in the Sante Commission in 1999. Technically, the commission stepped down
before the parliament could issue this motion of censor, but the necessary majorities would
have been reached. The core issue was actually only one commissioner, and there was a French one,
Edith Cresson. And she, there were multiple things that went wrong, but you know, one of the most
famous example was that she hired her, you know, hometown friend and dentist, so nepotism. You know,
she hired people that were not fit for the job in positions in her cabinet, for instance, and I
think also elsewhere in the commission. And then that wasn't the last sort of scandal that emerged,
and there was the Yonker Commission in 2014, faced some pressure after the Luxe League revelations.
That was a very, very different case. I mean, in the Sante case, it was really,
that was a proper good example of how to and when to issue a motion of censor, because there were
cases of mismanagement. With Yonker, what happened was that Nigel Farage, with his Yucca party,
tabled this motion saying basically, okay, you have been prime minister of Luxembourg at a time
where, you know, lots of member states lost money in alleged tax avoidance schemes. That was their
argument. But most of MEPs did not support this motion. And it did not cause any kind of hiccup.
And I think that is important to say that since 72, that was the first time one was triggered
until today. You know, we have now what 53 years and 15, that will be the 15th time. And all of
these times so far, except for the Sante case, did not cause any serious trouble. And a lot of
them, by the way, are triggered by the far right. The far right has discovered this as a tool for
them to make their voice heard on a specific issue, but mostly towards their national constituencies.
If you read in the news, you know, just on a regular basis, that there is again,
emotion of sense that you do get the feeling that something's wrong, even if he has not,
or maybe if you don't really understand what's going on, it doesn't matter so much, you know,
it's just the repetition that makes you, you know, get the feeling of something's,
something's off. Indeed, we certainly saw that play out this week, where both on the far right
and the far left, it was French politicians who were really the face of these latest censure
rounds. But just help us imagine this alternate Twilight Zone reality, where, let's say MEPs
did vote in favor of the motion of censure against Ursula von der Leyen and her commission,
what would happen next? So indeed, this will not happen. But let's just imagine it would.
The European Parliament has only the right to send home the whole commission. So they cannot
pick and choose, not even the president. Does that trigger a new European Parliament election?
Anyway, what happens? No, because the European Union is not a full-fledged parliamentary system.
So this motion of censure would not trigger a new parliamentary election. The Parliament would
stay in place. But what would happen is the ball would be played into Member States Court again.
First, the next commission president has to be appointed by the European Council,
so the heads of state and government, and then has to be elected by the European Parliament.
And then after that, the Member States would come forward with their proposals for their commissioners.
And okay, so let's go back into the real world reality. In July, when von der Leyen faced her
first no-confidence vote, you called it a proxy war. Can you tell us a little bit more about why
you saw it that way? And did you see the second round also in that same frame?
So I called it a proxy war back then, because the reasons that the far-right
tabled were not why they actually tabled it. The far-right did not care about FISA gates,
let alone about accountability and transparency. They care about making trouble.
And that is exactly the same now. I think they're better organized. So last time it was an
individual from the ECR, and then others signed up. But now it's the group of the patrists for
Europe. I think they professionalized their stance. But what is behind is exactly the same.
But then the difference is, of course, that we have two at the same time, and they both come from
the fringes. And the left, I think it seems to me that they're a little bit differently motivated
than the far-right, in the sense that, of course, they're also anti-establishment. I mean, for them
it's also to be voicing their discomfort. But then again, my feeling is they are a bit more serious
on the actual topics that the motion is tabled on. So for them, the commissions in action in Gaza,
and also the trade deal with the states, as well as Mercosur, these are really deep-seated issues
of concerns for the left. As a point of fairness, actually, at our episode on her first censor
motion, we interviewed MEP George Piperaya, the person who put forward the motion of censor.
He said he was quite offended by von der Leyen accusing him of being sort of a Russian tool,
and that he sincerely is concerned about her abusive power on things like FISA gate. But
he did also acknowledge that he wanted to take advantage of this rupture within her centrist
coalition. And so that brings me to your point. These motions of censor, are they harmful to her
because she has to go defend herself? It puts this message in the air that there's something wrong
with Brussels? Or is it helpful to her in the sense that it reinforces that she's the one in
charge, she's the one being tested? No, I think it's harmful. We see the effects of this in a sense
that the support for her is dropping, the support for her as expressed in the numbers of those that
reject the motion of censor. So the thing that we will be watching is the trend line, the support
for her and her commission expressed in MEP votes. That was Sophia Ruzak, and she's right. The final
vote count is something von der Leyen herself will be watching very closely. When she came to
Strasbourg, she listened carefully to her critics, including Jordan Bardella for the Patriots for
Europe, Eminem Aubry from the left. They accused her of a broad array of failings, reflecting
ideological differences and complaints about her leadership. Today, we're not actually going to
delve too deeply into the substance of their claims. We're more interested in the censor motion as a
tool for political pugilism in this increasingly polarized parliament. So as part of a once
unprecedented process that is already starting to feel pretty familiar, von der Leyen took to the
floor to defend her record. The point I'm making here is that we are in a period of maximum uncertainty
and explosive volatility. This chaotic and threatening landscape was the reason I started
my State of the Union address by saying Europe is in a fight. And it is why on that day I made
a pitch for unity. Today, I want to reaffirm my commitment to work with all of you to keep that
unity. Her speech lasted seven minutes and compared to July when she faced her first
no-confidence vote, she sounded different, much more conciliatory. Yes, she mentioned Russia's
Vladimir Putin several times, warning against his attempts to sow division in Europe. But this time,
she didn't call the motion signatories Putin's Stooges. She was nice and understanding.
Of course, I know there are some of you who are still unsure how to vote later this week,
but who are also concerned about some of the issues these motions mention in passing.
I know that they come from a place of genuine and legitimate concerns.
Manfred Weber, leader of von der Leyen's own European Peoples Party, spoke after her. He's
usually in high attack dog mode against the socialists. But even he seemed relatively subdued,
mainly training his fire on the far ends of the political spectrum. He said that the Patriots
for Europe and the Left group should just merge and create one party called WAA. We are against.
He also dismissed these motions as merely proxy battles for France's domestic politics.
The second time in a few weeks, I have to say it is becoming a little bit ridiculous.
A motion of censure is a serious tool for a parliament, an important right to defend the
democratic Europe. Currently, this last resort of a parliament is being misused by you as a
simple propaganda tool. And I hope you have collected enough video material now for your
French campaign, obviously, taking place here. Everything that followed made clear that von
der Leyen was never in danger. Erracha Garcia, head of the socialists, and renews Valérie Ayé,
both said they valued stability over chaos. And even though they might not be super happy about
von der Leyen, their groups won't support the motions. The Greens, however, were a different
story. The group's leadership has been trying to maintain some influence with von der Leyen
and other centrist parties. But some of the group's rank and file think it's time to be part of a more
vocal opposition. The French Green delegation, for example, said they'd break away and vote
against von der Leyen. One of them was Marie-Ytussan. So I decided to ask her why. We met at the MEP bar,
which is fortunately easy to find, but you need to be accompanied by a lawmaker to get in.
You'll hear my conversation with Marie-Ytussan right after a short break. Stay with us.
So back in July, you and the Greens did not back the motion of censure against
personal von der Leyen. But this time, and we're speaking right before the vote, the day before
the vote, the group seems split and the French delegation says that it will vote to topple the
Commission. What's changed for you? Well, first of all, we never vote for the censure resolutions
or any amendments or proposals from the far right, because it's quite clear for us that we need to
keep this Gordon Sainte on Thursday. We will have two different votes, one on the motion of censure
for the far right, which we will all of us vote against, and then one from progressive voices
that are calling on the Commission to change course, basically, which we will support. But just to
have it clear from the start, this motion of censure won't get adopted. There is no construction
of a majority behind, so it's merely a signal and a signal, so then a call for also Lavender Leyen
to change course, but also for Manfred Weber and EPP that this can no longer continue as it goes now.
Do you think that she has influence over him or that he just kind of does what he wants?
The reality of European political life is that the Commission, it is the one initiating new laws,
so Manfred Weber, as such, cannot initiate any single law proposal. He can only speak.
Grosse Lavender Leyen is the only one with her College of Commissioners able to put new laws on
the table. So the movement of the regulation, for instance, that we're seeing, each time she puts
a law on the table in the MSI call, especially on environmental issues, then she perfectly knows
that there is going to be the backup of EPP and the far right to dismantle everything that has been
done, not only during the grand deal, but also since Yonker and sometimes even since the 90s.
But of course, what we see Manfred Weber doing here is going further than Manfred Weber. And this
is why I'm saying this what is a signal, not only to her to stop opening new laws that she knows
are going to be destroyed, but also really to him and his group to say, stop blackmailing us with
the threat of making alliances with the far right, whether you do it and we're in your position,
or we can work constructively with you. But that means that you need to stop blackmailing us.
But Funderlayen and even some green colleagues of yours, such as Terry Reinkie,
they argue that in times of geopolitical turmoil, Europe needs to show unity rather than trigger
institutional crisis. I know that you say that you're not worried that this motion would actually
succeed. And you're just sending a signal. But is it dangerous to show a signal of lack of unity?
I would say that the responsibility is on also the Funderlayen and Manfred Weber,
really, because if they wanted to have a strong alliance coalition with the progressive forces,
then we would be in another kind of discussion. But it's not true. They say it, but it's not true.
And we see it more and more clearly every day. They bear the sole responsibility of making it work.
And as long as they don't make it work, then I don't feel any responsibility for the unity.
Is there anything Funderlayen could do concretely to regain your trust?
Actually, yes. Well, she could first stop deregulating the Green Deal. For instance,
we have the deforestation law that was supposed to be working last year already.
They postponed it once. They now threaten not only to postpone it, but also to weaken it.
She could refrain from doing that. We have, for instance, the Mercosur Agreement will be highly
hurtful, painful to European agriculture. So all of this they could stop doing. I guess she
cannot change the commission like that with a clap of hands. But we could have a gesture,
maybe rather like we just saw on the steel for a European preference, for instance, for pursuing
the ecological transformation that aims also a sovereignty, so consuming less fossil fuels
rather than promising Trump to buy a lot of US LNG. So a lot of possible things are in front of us,
but they have to choose. What we try to do here, and that's what we did not initiate this motion
of censure, but it's really to find the levers, the right levers to make them come back to the
progressive sides, to the pro-European sides, to the humanist side, to the, of course, the
green sides of politics. That is really difficult in a very difficult moment. Yeah, it's a really
interesting point that you make about the levers. So my question is, the greens have been part of
this sort of platform or coalition, whatever you want to call it, that's sort of this pro-European
kind of governing group. Do you still see it as possible for the greens to be part of that,
or does it make sense for you to see yourselves more as really an opposition force? We want to
work on every single file in order to get the best possible compromise, not to let them deregulate
the green deal without having a word to say. That's really hard work, I have to say, but I don't
consider that we are fully part of the governing parties, but at the same time, we have food for
the door. Thank you so much. Thank you.
It was, she told me, a signal, a symbolic gesture rather than a real attempt to topple
Vonderlion. So next, I wanted to check in with the socialists. They also say they're losing
patience with Vonderlion and seem to share Tucson's frustration with what they called the EPP's
political blackmail. But the socialists have been critical of abusing a motion of censure as a tool.
So I wanted to know, are they really going to rule it out?
Remember the seventh floor I was sprinting to get to? That's where Rene Rapassi's office is.
He's a top German socialist and one with a pretty packed calendar.
So fortunately, I wasn't too late for a good chat.
We're talking the day before the vote. And you're a law professor, an expert on ELaw specifically.
What's your view on how these motions of censure are being used today?
Well, they are certainly not used for what they were originally once created, namely as a tool
to hold the European Commission to account. This second, let's call it wave of motion of censures,
this is just for the show. But they don't have a chance for any majority. So that's just one big
show. Well, is the show going to go on? I mean, it only takes a pretty relatively small number.
Are you worried that we're going to head towards like a never-endum as we're calling it?
Yeah, that's a very good question. Surprisingly, they only discovered it now. We shall see.
We have now a motion of the two extremist groups that we have here in the European Parliament.
So if it actually fails, if media is not that prominently reporting on it, I believe those
groups will also see it's not really making the same kind of waves as we have it, for example,
in France. So that for now, I honestly do not expect an inflation of motion of censures.
And this time indeed, S&D is not supporting it. But last time, you know, the message was that the
support wasn't unconditional. You wanted stronger social guarantees. So has Commission President
von der Leyen delivered on the promises that she made last time? Now, the last time, obviously,
there was a lot of frustration and criticism that was built up since the moment von der
Leyen was elected Commission presidents. But it was clear we might not support it, but we will
also not support you von der Leyen. You have to fight for getting us on board. Well, she offered
us something which she wouldn't have needed to, because the majority wasn't there for a successful
motion anyway. But now we are three months later, we had a speech on the situation of the European
Union in which von der Leyen at least rhetorically has shown that she understood. Now she needs to
deliver. One month after the speech, we cannot expect her to deliver. But that's where we are
going to hold her to account. There might be in the future an S&D motion if we do not see that
except for nice words, anything has changed. But now it's just not the right moment to do so.
In the future, how far in the future, what would be the trigger for an S&D motion?
It's hard to say this in terms of time, because we don't have a crystal ball to see how future is
going to develop. But I'd say if in a half year's time we see that nothing of the promises in relation
to the S&D priorities was implemented, it might be a moment where critical voices might raise again.
Are you looking at the 2026 work program? Precisely. This is the next step that we need in this
2026 work program, concrete measures. At the same time, I also would like to see in the parliament
where there are S&D priorities, that then the S&D is the one who is in the lead on those priorities.
And it doesn't bring much if the Commission has a good proposal, which is then killed by a right
extremist majority. So there is the one thing that the Commission has, but the other one is
what is the party doing to which Ms. von der Leyen belongs to? Well, that actually brings me to my
big picture question, especially with the potential for the council of European leaders to move
farther to the right and the majorities that we see in parliament right now. How much longer will
it make sense for the S&D to remain part of this kind of centrist pro-European platform,
as opposed to becoming a true opposition force in the European Parliament?
Yes, this is actually the decisive question that the S&D group will have to answer. Of course,
the European Parliament works differently than national parliaments. We cannot send the government
easily home if a government or the European Commission has no majority in parliament anymore.
There will be no snap elections because that doesn't exist here. In that sense, it is more
built on this spontaneous sort of majorities. But we do see that any sort of cooperative style with
the EPP was not really honoured by becoming a reliable partner. With every file we have to repeat
the same kind of exercise. We have to present our requests. The EPP says we have to do it in the
platform. Then once you say this is our request, the EPP says that we have an alternative majority.
So if you are submitting yourself to 100% EPP, then we might actually do this thing with you.
Then colleagues ask, but what's the point of being a platform if it's 100% EPP?
Then we force each other to a deal because we need to strengthen the pro-European forces.
And the next, with the next file, we have Groundhog Day again. And the same story is repeating
itself and frustration grows. And then it needs again a moment where it can explode.
Yeah, I mean, I see your posture tensing as we talk about this. It seems like you are genuinely
frustrated. Yes, obviously, obviously I am. I tend to say that if the EPP wants to continuously
work with us, they must tell those who can have easy majorities with extreme right that there's
more EPP in the cooperation with the S&D than the previous term. Yet we are still in a situation
where it is not excluded that the EPP wants to make a deal with the extreme right because they
get even more of what they originally want. And that is the frustration in our daily business
that whenever the S&D dares to speak up for its own convictions, EPP says, I hear you,
but you know, I have the patriots. So just be silent and do what I say. And if this is
repeating and repeating and repeating, then this is also not an atmosphere of compromise.
I mean, we talk about the French melodrama, but there are also a lot of Germans of the
commission president, the head of the EPP group. You, is this a Manfred Weber issue? Is this
what's going on there? No, I wouldn't say this is a Manfred Weber issue. Manfred Weber has a very
difficult job. The EPP group is rather large. It is very colorful. It's also part of the EPP
strategy at the beginning to take in whatever comes there. And then it's of course very heterogeneous.
And then you have to lead this bunch of fleas. And then, of course, at times you have to
satisfy the one group and the other one. And I think it's in the interest of all of us if we
have a leader of the EPP group that is able to keep this group united and to vote in one line.
But whilst I can see this and I can respect it, it does require abilities of rich building to
say, I use this also in order to advance Europe and not just for the sake to keep my group together.
So I think there's a lot of Shakespeare going out there. There's maybe, if you take the German
one, also a lot of Goethe, the young Werther, for those that know a bit of German literature.
But I wouldn't say it's a German thing. Okay. René, Redassi, thank you so much for joining me.
And then came Thursday. By the time the day for the vote arrived, it was like people had already
moved on. The drama in France was only getting more intense. And MEPs had highly divided reactions
to the peace deal in Gaza and the detention of an MEP on a flotilla trying to deliver aid to the
enclave. Plus, a different partisan fight had reached its climax. Socialists essentially caved
to center right demands on a major deregulation bill after EPP lawmakers made clear that the
alternative would be an even more right-wing bill passed with the far right. It was exactly the thing
the socialists have been complaining about, but it was clear they weren't going to use the center
vote to make their point. But, you know, the far right isn't exactly thrilled with this situation
either. I checked in with Anders Vistisen, a Danish MEP who serves as the vote counter for the
patriots for Europe. Their attitude, "We're the third biggest force around here and you shouldn't
keep shutting us out." So you're one of the MEPs behind this no-confidence motion against
Fonderlion. Can you just walk me through why you decided to put it forward and why now specifically?
I think in every functioning parliament you would say that the leader of the government,
which Fonderlion has commissioned president more and more, is assuming the role of, if you can get
your key pieces of legislation through, and we are talking about the trade deal with Trump,
we are talking about the return directive, where we also know that she has a huge problem within
her so-called pro-European majority. This is the migration overhaul? The migration overhaul.
When you have that situation, I think it is the role for the opposition to challenge whether the
Commission president still have her majority behind her. And patriots are the biggest opposition
group in this parliament and therefore we decided that we thought it was time again to challenge
the Commission and her majority. But to be frank, we do know that we don't have the
votes to topple the Commission this time, but every time before the S&D, the Renew Group,
the Green Group, to go down in plenary and defend Fonderlion, which policies they clearly do not
support on key pieces of the legislation, we are creating a political dialogue and atmosphere
we believe brings Fonderlion in a more and more fragile position. So that is the reason
we are doing it now and that we also deserve the right to do it again. Indeed, we are discovering
that it's actually pretty easy. You don't need that many MEP signatures, so is she gonna face this
every time? No, it's not like we just automatically decided that every two months we're going to do
this. But to be honest, it is not us who is creating the uncertainty behind this Commission
President. It is her own majority. And also to be quite frank about it, the EPP seems more
mosquitosophrenic. They, on the one hand, want to reach out informally to us all the time on these
big pieces of the legislation, using us as leverage to get better views to the S&D coalition,
and at the same time, claiming from Manfred Weber that they are keeping the firewall. And I think
everyone who is looking objectively on this from the outside, the firewall, is more a thing in name
than in reality, because all the time they are using the right majority to leverage against the
center left. And of course, we want this to be a formality. We want to force the EPP to decide
whether they want to use it for the good of our common electoral goals when it comes to
strengthening migration policies, when it comes to deregulation, when it comes to
parts of the Green Deal. And of course, there's also that political cause that we cannot just
accept the situation where we're used as leverage and not being taken serious by the EPP.
So you're more saying you see this as more of a message to other members of the European parliament,
as opposed to Fonderland specifically? Of course, we've been never like Fonderland,
we voted against it from the beginning, we voted in favor of the center last time when
it was triggered by some ECR members. No, no, we don't see Fonderland as an EPP figure who can
work with the right. But of course, we tell the EPP as a political family, look outside Germany,
look at the many countries where we actually form alliances and do good for the citizens
who want center-wide policies to be carried through. And of course, you could just put forward a
commission, a president candidate, when and if we get rid of Fonderland, who has not discouraged
this possibility to actually make better policies that is closer to your own political manifesto
and will, in our opinion, satisfy the majority of the European electorate.
All right, Anders Vistusen, thank you so much for speaking with me.
Oh, thank you for coming by. Good afternoon. Can I ask you to take your seats, please?
Dear colleagues, that's European Parliament President Roberta Metzola trying to get the
voting started. Now let's come to the votes. We have a motion of censure on the commission,
B10, 0400, 2025. Vote is closed. It is rejected. We move to the next motion of censure on the
commission, B10, 0402, 2025. Vote is closed. And it is rejected. So I will notify the president
of the council. Okay, so that was candy anti-climactic.
After some more mini crises caused by my personal disorganization, I left my phone
in the press gallery. I had a debrief with Mark Botenga, a Belgian MEP from the left group.
Not only did his group's motion fail, but it had even less support than the one by the far right.
He told me he's not at all discouraged.
Thank you for joining me. We're speaking just after the vote. How are you feeling?
I think there's been a move. So first of all, we have seen that if you compare, for example,
the speeches and the rhetoric of the president of the commission, it has changed. She was much more
prudent, careful on Monday when she needed to defend her commission chairmanship. I feel today,
like if you look at the votes, I mean, she got the majority, so she's protected by a centrist block,
which I think is worrying that the especially groups on the left, the social democrats and the
Greens don't have a bigger issue with everything that's been going on in Gaza, for example,
where they have been outspoken, but then holding the commission to account apparently is a bit
difficult for them. But at the same time, you know, you can feel that there's a pressure on
Ursula von der Leyen. She's seen the polls as well. She's seen that most Europeans want her gone.
There was a very surprising poll that came out. Well, it was surprising not to me, to be honest.
You know, I mean, if I go and I'm lucky enough to be out and about quite often, be it in Belgium,
be it somewhere else, like I don't meet all of people that say, oh, I really like Ursula von der
Leyen. So I wasn't surprised when that came out that most people want her gone. But of course,
it's about policies. It's about policies. And so we're going to keep on pushing on the policies
that we want changed. At the same time, we had two votes today, and the one from the far right
actually outperformed the one from the left. And that was interesting to me because I knew that
people on the political left would not support the far right one. But we thought that people on the
right, on the far right and on the left would back the one from the left group. Well, clearly not.
And I think that also shows that the far right wants to get rid of Ursula von der Leyen to
replace her with someone worse. You know, that is what's really going on. They want worse policies.
They want a very horrible future commission president. We're fighting to say, listen,
and our motion was very clear. It was like, you know, we need fair trade policies. We don't
want complicity with the violation of international law. And we want to address the social and
environmental crisis inside the European Union, you know. So this was very clear. And clearly,
these things, the far right does not have an issue with. So I think it shows a pretty accurate
picture. And it also shows that we are clearly on the opposite side of the far right because some
centrist politicians, you know, they're unable to defend the thinking of Manfred Weber, for example,
you know, his or but others as well, saying, you know, you can see the far left and the far
right acting together. Now, I think basically this vote shows it's the opposite. You know,
we have very clearly different projects. We see that EPP has been flirting with the far right
over the last months. So what you can see today is that basically, you know, the far right comes
with a project that is has only really one strong opponent. And that is on the left, given though
that a kind of everybody knew that both these motions would not succeed and B, especially with
the council actually moving even further to the right, potentially, there is not really a chance
that we would see a more left leaning commission president, even if if these motions succeeded.
So why put them forward? Oh, I disagree with that. You know why? I mean, we've seen over the last
months and let me take the Gaza issue as an example. We have seen at the very beginning,
Ursula von der Leyen went to Israel and said, you know, you have our unconditional support
publicly forgetting international law. She then said, no, but I mentioned it, of course, at some
point. But we came where recently she in plenary here came to say, well, we'll take some measures
against Israel. I mean, or we'll propose some measures against Israel. Now, this is a massive
shift. Now, this shift happened without a change in majority, without a change in composition of
the European Parliament, without significant changes in national governments. So what happened
was basically that we articulated thanks to the fact that we insisted time and time again on what
was going on in Gaza and on EU complicity with this. And people started mobilizing and you saw
these mass demonstrations, you know, in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, recently,
Spain, other countries, which basically put such a pressure on the commission that they were forced
to move, you know, to step back from their initial position and to say, oh, no, we need to do something,
we come under international pressure, but also domestic pressure. So I believe that this motion
of censor is one of the elements in creating this movement. And if we would have succeeded now,
obviously from the left, that would have given also an impetus to, you know, we need to mobilize,
we can, we can push further. But I think it's already the fact that she needs to take a step back
compared to July in the rhetoric. It shows that public pressure does pay off. It sounds right.
You're saying like, you know, you're pretty pleased with the impact of this push for a motion of
censor. Do you see the left using this tool more often? It's one of the tools that we can use
again. I don't think you need to do it every month. That's not the objective, you know,
but it's something that you do responsibly. But in a strategy of saying, listen,
these policies need to change. Okay, believe it there. Thank you so much. Thank you very much.
Fondirlion herself wasn't in Strasbourg on Thursday. She was back in Brussels giving a
speech to celebrate the global gateway, Europe's initiative to invest in infrastructure in poorer
countries. Yet the bridge building she needs to do is closer to home. It's clear MEPs don't want to
make these no confidence motions a regular thing. But they're happy to keep the threat dangling there.
And that's it for us this week. Given how things have been going, I'll be lucky if I can make my
trains back to Brussels. If you haven't already, please press the follow button on your favorite
podcast app, rate us and leave a comment, or send us an email at
[email protected].
Thanks to Deanna Sturris, our senior audio producer, to Abigail Frison, our trainee,
and to Ann McAlvoy, Politico's head of audio. I'm Sarah Wheaton. See you next week. I hope.
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