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Speaker 4The foreign policy of the second Trump administration, has caused consternation to allies from Denmark to Korea. What has seemed solid and settled in the post-war world, has been thrown into turmoil. Till now, the president has enjoyed support from Republican majorities in both houses of Congress. But next week's midterm elections seem likely to change all that. The Democrats look to be headed for victory. But the question for the rest of the world is, what will it mean for us? Step inside the briefing room, and together we'll find out. First, who constitutionally has the power to set and implement foreign policy? Anthony Zerker is the BBC's North America correspondent. Anthony, what does the US Constitution say about who has foreign policy powers?
Speaker 5Well, to put it most simply, the foreign policy powers in the United States are divided between the president and Congress. And that's part of a larger structure of checks and balances that the crafters of the Constitution, way back when, devised in order to prevent one branch of government or another from having unlimited authority. So it's a balancing system. They spread out the foreign policy powers between these two branches of government.
Speaker 4Right. So when it comes to foreign policy powers, what powers, specific powers, does Congress have?
Speaker 5Well, first and foremost, Congress has the power to declare war. It has the power of the purse strings, so it can determine where funding goes, how much funding to spend on the military, how much to spend on military operations, including the use of force abroad. Also, the Senate, the upper chamber of Congress that has 100 seats, it ratifies any treaties that the president negotiates, and it can vote to confirm presidential nominees to foreign policy posts, ambassadors, and top military
Speaker 4officials. Now, let's look at what powers the president has, because the president seems to have quite a few.
Speaker 5Yeah, the president in the Constitution, it describes the president as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, so essentially the top military officer in the United States. The president also can negotiate treaties, those treaties that are then subsequently given to the Senate for approval. Also, he's the one or she's the one who picks advisors like the Secretary of State, top diplomats, ambassadors to key countries, top military officers like the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the people who are in the Pentagon making war power, war-fighting decisions, the Secretary of Defense, of course. So, the president, just in the text of the Constitution, already has all of these powers. And I think over the modern era of the presidency, you've seen the executive branch take on even more powers and even more authority for foreign policy.
Speaker 4How much can the president do in foreign policy terms as a result of declaring that something is an emergency? Simply saying, I think it's in the national interest that we have to do this, and I therefore declare it must be done.
Speaker 5Right. Well, built into the laws are flexibility for presidents to take actions in emergencies. And you've seen Donald Trump test the boundaries on a number of different ways on this, including enacting tariffs on countries by using emergency declarations, some of which have been curtailed by the court, as well as responding quickly to natural disasters, to imminent threats. These are things that, politically, the president has a lot of leeway in, so the Congress isn't necessarily going to check the president on this. But also, courts have been more than willing to give the president expanded authority to address emergencies. The Congress is a group of 435 people that moves slowly. The president is one person. And so, I think there's a universal recognition in the government and by the people of the United States that, at times, presidents need to be able to act quickly in order to respond to threats.
Speaker 4Now, the listeners may be thinking back to February when the joint Israeli-American attack on Iran happened, which was effectively a declaration of war. Did Congress actually make a declaration of war? And if it didn't, under what powers was the president acting?
Speaker 5No, no declaration of war. In fact, Congress hasn't issued a declaration of war since those from World War II. All of the U.S. conflicts since then—Vietnam, Korea, the Gulf War, the Iraq War—they have not been conducted with formal declarations of war. There have been other statutory grounds for presidents to act, but not this formal power that was delegated to Congress in the Constitution. Now, in the case of the U.S.-Israel attacks on Iran, it was done quickly. Congress was not even notified immediately. They were notified immediately thereafter. But in order to preserve the element of surprise, according to the Trump administration, there wasn't much prior acknowledgment or information provided to Congress. Now, the biggest check right now on presidential war-making authority or military operational authority is something called the War Powers Act, which was passed back in the early '70s as a response to the Vietnam War, which ground on for more than a decade, despite a relatively open-ended congressional authorization short of war, just saying that the president could take steps to protect American troops in Southeast Asia. And that War Powers resolution requires presidents to inform Congress either before or shortly after, within 48 hours of a military operation, and sets a time limit of 90 days for the president to seek congressional approval, congressional authorization for military actions before those actions are then limited. So Congress has to step in and approve it, or the president has to curtail that. In this case, however, Donald Trump has not sought congressional approval immediately, or even within the 90-day window that this War Powers Act provides. The administration has said that they didn't have to because the actual combat operations had ended prior to the 90-day deadline.
Speaker 4Sorry. So the president, Donald Trump, is able to overcome the War Powers Act by saying that the war isn't actually carrying on. Exactly. Now, Anthony, of course, during this second term so far, Donald Trump has had a Republican House and a Republican Senate. But if we go back to his first term, he actually lost the house in 2018. I think that's right. What did he do after that in terms of foreign policy? What did he feel himself enabled to do? And what did he feel himself constrained from doing?
Speaker 5Right. The Republicans lost the House of Representatives for the first time in eight years. And in 2018, Democrats took over in 2019. And one of the first things early in 2019 that the House of Representatives and Congress did was attempt to curtail Donald Trump's foreign policy with regard to Yemen. Trump had been supporting the Saudi military operations in Yemen for the first two years of his presidency. The House stepped in, and they invoked the War Powers Resolution, and passed a resolution both through the House and the Senate that was intended to direct the president to remove all U.S. armed forces from hostilities in or around Yemen. That did reach the president's desk, but Donald Trump vetoed that resolution shortly thereafter, as the presidential power also outlined in the Constitution, saying that it was an unnecessary resolution and that it impinged on his foreign policy authority.
Speaker 4If the president vetoes something, can it go back to either the House or the Senate, and they can attempt to overcome the veto?
Speaker 5It can, although it's a high bar for Congress to override a veto. It takes a two-thirds majority, supermajority, in order to override that veto. And in the Senate, that vote failed 53 to 45, so it didn't come close to the 66 votes necessary to override a veto.
Speaker 4So, except under most exceptional circumstances, presidential vetoes are likely to prevail.
Speaker 5Yeah, it is. It's a very difficult thing. There was a presidential veto overridden close to the end of Donald Trump's presidency in January of 2021 on a defense spending bill. That was the only time that Trump's veto was overridden. Biden never had a veto overridden in his four years. Barack Obama only had one veto overridden during his eight years in office.
Speaker 4Anthony Zerker. And just a quick reminder that if you visit BBC Sounds, you can find our entire back catalogue of programs, including the one asking whether France has become ungovernable, the one exploring how Gen Z moves movements are reshaping politics, and the one discussing how much the government should worry about debt. A vacation rental
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Speaker 3Okay, back to the midterms. And now I want to find out what
Speaker 4Donald Trump's foreign policy might look like in the next two years and how leaders around the world might react to it. Joining me to discuss that are Heather Hurlbut, Associate Fellow at the US and North America Program at Chatham House. Rebecca, Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. And Lord Peter Ricketts, former Diplomat, Ambassador and National Security Advisor. Rebecca, before we talk about what Donald Trump is likely to do about foreign policy after a midterm defeat for Republicans, what do we know about what American voters themselves actually want from American foreign
Speaker 7policy? It's such an important question. And over the past year, I've held conversations with more than 500 Americans to ask them, this very question. And I'll tell you that two things are immediately clear. The first is that the Iran war is immensely unpopular. Americans feel it's driving up their costs, that it's making the affordability crisis worse. It's affecting many families. I've heard about farmers who are struggling to afford diesel fuel for their equipment. I've heard about church volunteers who are cutting back their hours because of high prices at the gas pump. Second, I've heard that Americans really don't like President Trump's tariff policy. There are complaints about higher consumer prices because of tariffs, because those are essentially a tax on imports. And for many businesses, the unpredictability of recent U.S. tariffs has made it very, very difficult to operate. So I'd say that those two economic issues are the ones that are most likely to shape how Americans vote in the midterm elections. But taking a step back more broadly, my conversations with Americans have indicated that they actually really do not like the tariff policy. They don't like the tariff policy. They don't like the that's globally engaged, but not militarily entangled. They want an America that's principled, but modest in the emphasis on values and morality in US foreign policy. They want an America that's cooperative with our allies. And they really yearn for an America that's respected in the world once again. But in all of this, they do want to see a very clearly articulated return on investment for Americans for our foreign policy.
Speaker 4Heather, that's very interesting. Now, I imagine that what Americans want and what they ultimately get could be two different things. So what do you think Donald Trump's foreign policy priorities are likely to be in these next two years?
Speaker 8Trump has been quite clear, actually, in telegraphing what he wants to do foreign policy-wise. And really, the overriding priority, which speaks in some way to the broader trends that Rebecca outlined, is to keep driving towards a United States that is, in his view, independent. So not weighed down by alliances that, in his view, cost us more trouble than they're worth. A country that is independent on trade, which by his definition means not having goods trade deficit. A country that is supreme in its hemisphere and deals with other great world powers, that is to say China and Russia, as an equal. And last, I think he yearns for personal recognition, as a peacemaker and solver of global problems. So what all that adds up to is, I think, more of the same, frankly. More tariffs rather than less. More pushing internationally into places and in ways where the U.S. had traditionally been a bit more restrained in its use of military power. And more desire to flex muscles and create something that looks like a sphere of influence.
Speaker 4Peter Ricketts, imagine for the moment that you've just got a call from the Foreign Secretary, and I am that person. And the Foreign Secretary says to you, Peter, look, which Trump can we expect to come out after the midterms? Bold Trump or tamed Trump?
Speaker 1Yeah, I think we're going to have Trump unbound, Trump unconstrained, feeling he's got nothing left to lose. As we've been hearing, probably doubling down on the instinctive policy of Trump. He's been pursuing vengeful, vindictive, wanting to find scapegoats for what will be seen if he does lose either House of Congress as a major defeat. I think one clue to how he might be approaching foreign policy is his plan to have a three-way summit in Shenzhen at the end of November with Xi Jinping and Putin. I think he likes to think of himself as one of the three strong men in the world. He's also lined up a G20 summit in Florida in December and invited Putin to it, even though he's an indicted war criminal. So I think we may see more of that idea that he's trying to settle affairs at the level of the three major leaders. I think if I was Zelensky, I'd be very worried about that. And I would be warning the Foreign Secretary, we're going to be dealing with Trump untamed, not probably hobbled much by a Congress that is no longer sympathetic to him. And I think he's determined to get as much as he can done in the last two years that remain to him.
Speaker 4As Foreign Secretary, I've just been taking a call from the Chancellor who wants to know what you think is likely to happen with Trump and Iran.
Speaker 1I think Trump has three options. He can escalate, he can negotiate, or he can prevaricate. All the military arrangements look like he's building up for another go at military action against Iran. He's got three carrier battle groups now in the region again. He's got three carrier battles. He's been advertising actually that, you know, it's only until the midterms that he's holding off another strike. I think he thinks it's unfinished business and that another major military effort might bring the Iranians to their knees and deliver him the famous victory that he's been hoping for and of course has been totally elusive. So I think we have to expect another spat of military action followed then by Iranian retaliation against the Gulf and probably therefore winding back to another go at negotiation. That's I think the most likely thing, particularly if Netanyahu turns out to be Prime Minister of Israel after this current negotiation going on about the government there.
Speaker 4Rebecca, let's stick with Iran for the moment. We'll come on to Ukraine. How do you see the Iranian situation, the American and Iranian situation playing out? Do you see it broadly the way Peter does?
Speaker 7I do. I think Peter is exactly right. And the thing to remember with the midterm elections in mind is that military strategy is really the purview. of the president. So as Peter noted, the president has threatened further escalation militarily after the midterms. We've seen recent reporting that indicates the U.S. has actually told its Gulf partners already to prepare for a renewed military campaign, perhaps with strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure and nuclear targets. That could very well be the prelude to diplomacy. I do think that's the president's preferred outcome. But it's also been the case that he hasn't seen the president's preferred outcome, whether it's under pressure or under economic pressure that he wants to see. Now, if he does decide to try to make a deal, it's possible that Congress could have the opportunity to review that deal. It's possible that Congress will have a say over war funding if the war continues. It's possible that Congress will use its oversight responsibilities to investigate the conduct of the war. But it all comes back to Trump and his ability as commander in chief to really shape what happens next in the Middle East.
Speaker 4Heather, what do you think?
Speaker 8Well, I would stress that there will quite certainly, frankly, even if Congress doesn't change hands, there will be an effort to invoke our War Powers Act and tell Trump to stop the war. And then if, as I expect, and as you've heard earlier in the program, either that fails or it's vetoed, you will then start to see efforts to try to cut off funding. And that may not change Trump's military options for the reasons that Rebecca has outlined, but it will certainly complicate the political situation and give Trump a weaker hand to play. So you'll continue to see, I mean, going back to what Peter said, frustration, vengefulness, but perhaps less effectiveness and even more domestic turmoil around the conduct of the war, which is not, of course, a recipe for success.
Speaker 4That suggests not exactly limitations, but it does, well, it suggests limitations, possible limitations around the edge of what he may feel able to do, Peter.
Speaker 1Yes, and I think we have to assume that if he does return to attacking Iran, the Iranians will have got pretty well-prepared plans to go in hard against American installations in the region and Gulf countries' installations. You know, they held off the most sensitive targets in the first round. They didn't go after the desalination plants, for example. And I think that they would hit back very hard. And therefore, again, the Hormuz Strait will close. There will be another spike in energy prices. I think it might be quite a short-lived military campaign. Why? Well, because I think the Gulf countries will immediately put the pressure on Washington and others to get it stopped. And at some point, Trump will want to transition into going back to negotiation. If that doesn't work, beginning to walk away from it, claiming he scored a victory anyway, but not perhaps carrying on the pain and the risk of military engagement all that long. Rebecca, given what Peter's
Speaker 4just said, in fact, what you've all just said, one of the questions that suddenly arises in my mind is Donald Trump won't be standing again at the next election, clearly, because he can't. There will be Republican contenders to be the presidential candidate. How will they react to the scenario that we've just laid out of maybe Donald Trump trying to take further military action against Iran in what is already a very unpopular war?
Speaker 7So I think all Republicans are focused on the damage that this Iran war, has done to their political brand and whether Democrats only take back the House or take back the House and the Senate in the midterm elections, it is very clear that the Iran war is an albatross politically around the neck of Donald Trump and around the neck of the Republican Party and those who've supported the war in Congress. And as I mentioned earlier, the American people have a strong anti-war streak. This is something that President Trump himself ran on and won twice, is opposition to foreign military entanglements. And so the political cost of supporting this war will remain substantial. And I also think Peter is right that the war is likely to continue for much of the balance of Trump's term in some form or another. I don't see a definitive resolution on the horizon. So that means that Republicans running for president are going to try to figure out how they can, on the one hand, maintain support from Donald Trump, who remains the most important power broker in the Republican Party. And on the other hand, distance themselves from a very unpopular war. And if those candidates are Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio and Vice President J.D. Vance, both of whom are already very closely associated with this policy, it is going to be hard for themselves to disentangle from the unpopular Iran war, which gives a huge amount of space to Democrats to run on and run on in a way that's very popular and aligned with where the American people are.
Speaker 4Heather, can we go on to Ukraine now and talk about policy towards Ukraine? What impact do you think losing either house or both houses would have on Trump's conduct of American policy towards Ukraine?
Speaker 8I think the major factors will be, on the one hand, a desire to maximize relations with Russia and a viewing of Ukraine, the country, as problematic, and Zelensky in particular, as a personal opponent to Trump for reasons that date back to the first Trump administration. And on the other hand, there's a desire to maximize relations with Russia and the Trump administration. But you have to balance that with Trump's desire to be seen globally as a peacemaker and a dealmaker. And we've seen in recent days that he still seems to believe there's a deal to be made for peace in Ukraine. And so I anticipate more initiatives in that direction. Congress, the one area in foreign policy where Congress has really pushed back with any effect, has been Ukraine. And so I would expect that to continue to happen. I think that's going to be a big deal. But we've also seen that Congress, for example, can appropriate money, but has not had any luck in forcing the administration to spend money it doesn't want to spend. Congress can give the president sanctions authority, but cannot force the president to use it. So I fear that there won't be as big a shift on Ukraine as the rhetoric coming out of Congress might suggest. I will also just say quickly that both parties, in addition to Trump and his idiosyncrasies toward Russia and Ukraine, both parties have anti-interventionist wings that are somewhat sceptical of the war in Ukraine. So we're not done with that as a topic of struggle in American policy.
Speaker 4Rebecca, the perception over here, I think, is broadly that Donald Trump believes that peace in Ukraine will come if the Ukrainians essentially give the Russians what they want. Is that fair? And is it also, do you think Heather's also right in her calculation about the extent to which Congress does or doesn't act as a constraint upon that opinion?
Speaker 7I wish that I could say that I thought that Congress could impose a real constraint on the president's desire to resolve the Ukraine conflict so that he can normalize relations between the U.S. and Russia, and above all, re-engage in a commercial and economic relationship with Russia. But the reality is that Congress has shown little inclination or ability to constrain President Trump on the issue of peace. So I think that's a good point. I think that's a good point. And even in those instances where Congress has actually passed legislation, as with the recent Russia sanctions bill, the president has declined to actually use those sanctions, has waived the sanctions, and even in that case went on to lift sanctions on Russian diesel that had been in place since early in the war. So exactly as Heather said, Congress can still appropriate money for Ukraine, but it's up to the executive branch to actually spend it. The one place where Congress can signal support for Ukraine is with speeches. And I think that's a good point. With visits, with meetings. And the reality is President Trump is soon to be a lame duck. And as Russia, as Ukraine, as allied leaders start to think about what comes next, Congress has a role to play in signaling where American foreign policy goes from here and perhaps giving some hope to Ukraine that they can withstand the immense pressure from this Trump administration to cave and live to fight another day under a new American president.
Speaker 4Peter, arguably, this is the area that matters most to Britain currently. So let's go back to that wonderful office that the foreign secretary has overlooking horse guards, and we're still in conversation. And I say to you, Peter, what can we expect to happen over Ukraine in the next two years as a consequence of these political changes?
Speaker 1And my response would be, foreign secretary, I think we have to recognize, whether we like it or not, that Trump has decided that Putin is strong. He's a large country leader. Zelensky is a weak and annoying. The way to get a deal in Trump's view is therefore to appease and work with Putin and to strong arm Zelensky. And there's not much that Britain is going to be able to do to change that or other Europeans. I mean, Trump has already more or less cut adrift Ukraine in terms of no economic support, no military support, just about allows Europeans to buy American weapons to Ukraine, but that's it. And I don't see that changing for the reasons we've just heard. We just about managed to. Persuade him to at least put the intelligence back on that allows Ukrainians to get their civilians into bomb shelters before the missiles arrive. So I would say, foreign secretary, we in Europe and Britain have got to put the emphasis on supporting Ukraine, absolutely, working with Congress, looking beyond the Trump presidency, building on that quite strong caucus in Congress that was prepared to pass the Lindsey Graham Sanctions Act, the one that Trump then put on hold. So I wouldn't spend an awful lot of time arguing with Trump about this. I would try and look beyond Trump now.
Speaker 4Right. Though you do raise the interesting prospect of a British government somehow going behind the president's back to have a conversation with Congress.
Speaker 1Is that going to do much? Well, we always have done. I mean, the British ambassador in Washington probably spends more of his time on the Hill lobbying Congress than he does talking to the White House and the State Department. I did not know that. Because so much of that is done direct from London. So that was perfectly normal. And I think we should be doing more of it in these final two years.
Speaker 4Peter, let's talk about Israel. We've just had the elections. It doesn't look like quite who's in government will be resolved for good at any time soon. But given that our scenario is that the Democrats have taken Congress and are quite likely to have taken the Senate as well, how might that affect the US's attitude
Speaker 1towards Israel? Well, it's a complex attitude now already. And the two more expert witnesses than me can complete this. But clearly, Trump has fallen out of affection for Netanyahu. I think he feels a bit that Netanyahu talked him into the Iran war, which hasn't worked out so well. It was quite interesting that when the UK took action to sanction exports from Israeli settlements after the settlement violence there, Trump didn't take a position against that. So I think we first of all need to see who comes out of this discussion, which Israeli leader it is. I think that Trump will not change very much. He is prepared to work with whichever Israeli leader is there. But I think in Europe, it will matter quite a lot if we see the back of Netanyahu. There's a new Israeli leader. We can perhaps open up again discussions about Gaza. Heather, there's been
Speaker 4quite a lot of talk about how American sentiment towards Israel has really undergone significant change, not just amongst Democrats, but amongst Republicans recently. How do you see things playing out in the next two years?
Speaker 8There will be moves in Congress to do some things that are a bit more like what the British government has done and in fact, and look at both further limits on sales of weapons and some consideration of economic sanctions or trade tools. At the same time, you'll have real civil war within both parties, which are both split on the question of how to relate to Israel going forward. So you'll have in some ways a less coherent conversation and a conversation that has deep, deep ramifications in U.S. domestic politics as well, which it will, I think, prevent sometimes Congress from putting up a united front towards whatever's going on in the region. I will just also say that given how close what we know right now about the results in Israel are, I also think we may be looking at a situation where the change on the ground is less than we might have thought beforehand. And that will also have significant ramifications in the U.S. and I would expect in Europe as well.
Speaker 4Rebecca, I want to move on to one of those other great powers that Peter was referring to earlier, which is to American relationships with China. We've heard about this major summit that may be held. One of the big questions, which we've discussed here on this program, is China's intentions towards Taiwan and how they might be altered or impacted by what America is doing. Can you take us through your thinking on that one?
Speaker 7Of course. I would expect to see continued vigorous leader-level diplomacy between President Trump and Xi Jinping over the remainder of his term, certainly just this year. They're set to meet again in November and then again in December. So we have two Trump-Xi summits coming even just before the end of 2026. And I think in thinking about the Taiwan issue, it's important to understand what Trump is playing for and what Xi is playing for. Trump is playing for a trade agreement. And the truce that Trump and Xi agreed at their last meeting was only temporary. It only lasts until January. So there are really big trade questions that remain outstanding, including how the U.S. will ultimately respond to this Chinese overcapacity problem, the thing that many in the U.S. and Europe are calling the second China shock. So I think it's important to understand that trade is issue number one for Trump, which then gives Xi leverage on the issue that's number one for him, which is Taiwan. And Trump's softening support for Taiwan presents a real opportunity for Xi Jinping. Remember that Trump called Taiwan a bargaining chip in the U.S.-China relationship. He's held up arms sales to Taiwan as a concession to Xi. And so what I think you'll see is that Xi will be very keen to use Trump's interest in a positive relationship and his interest in trade deals to bank concessions on a major trade deal. So I think it's important to understand that over the duration of Trump's term.
Speaker 4Just to be clear, when we talk about Chinese overcapacity, we're talking about what we used to call dumping, right? We're talking about Chinese goods coming over more cheaply than we would want and therefore out-competing American domestic
Speaker 7produce, correct? And European as well. So a massive state subsidy in China to enable low-cost manufacturing that then floods markets in Europe and the United States and around the world, undercutting our manufacturing. And so I think it's important to understand that
Speaker 4right. Peter, again, back in the office, Foreign Secretary is a bit worried about Taiwan.
Speaker 1What are you saying? I am saying I don't think Xi Jinping will take the risk of a military invasion of Taiwan. He has just watched Putin fail to occupy Ukraine with an enormous land border to roll his forces over, bogged down now after nearly five years. It would be a massive military risk to him to try and send the troops, storming up the beaches of Taiwan. I think he will continue economic coercion, trying to squeeze the life out of Taiwanese democracy. He will like the idea that Trump has given him perhaps a longer leash, will not be critical of Chinese policy on Taiwan. I don't think we're looking at kinetic military operations. I think we're looking at continued economic pressure to gradually move Taiwan into China's orbit. So it's screw tightening.
Speaker 4Heather, I want to come back to something which we kind of touched on earlier. Donald Trump has used the story of the Chinese military operation as a means of moving Taiwan into China's orbit. Strange, unusual, quasi-diplomats who haven't been a part of the system. And one of the things that some people have been picking up is a determination by Democrats who might be a majority in Congress to go after these people. Can you take us through that and what impact it might have?
Speaker 8So one of the powers that any Congress absolutely has, along with the power of the purse, is the power of subpoena, the power to investigate, and the power to compel individuals to appear before them. And there's already been extensive discussion of plans to pursue both the ways that these senior figures who surround President Trump and don't have Senate-confirmed roles, don't have roles that have built-in oversight capacity. Number one, where they may have taken actions that break U.S. law. And number two, where they may have taken actions that break U.S. law. law. And number three, where they may be running U.S. diplomacy and personal economic diplomacy, let's call it, at the same time. So there's enormous, enormous interest in investigating this, actually for the reasons that Rebecca said all the way back at the start of the program, that right now the American voters are very keenly connecting what the administration does overseas and the damage to their pocketbooks. And so this will focus heavily on the idea that these characters are flying around the world, enriching themselves at the expense of the American voter who can't afford to fill up their gas tank.
Speaker 4Rebecca, what do you think about that?
Speaker 7I think Heather is exactly right. You see growing political momentum behind the recognition that the American people are really mad about corruption. And they're mad about this idea that the president, his family, and his associates are advancing their personal economic interests at the expense of the American people. And so I think that's a really important point. of the American national interest. So I do expect this to be a major topic for oversight and also a major topic as we go into the Democratic presidential primary season, which you have to remember will start right after the midterm elections are over.
Speaker 4Peter, I want to flip this on its head now and talk about how the rest of the world is likely to react to this period. I think we can probably start with Britain. What do you think Andy Burnham should do about
Speaker 1this next two years? He's a newborn. He's a young boy on the block as prime minister. He hasn't yet got an established relationship with Donald Trump. I can understand why he's been a bit cautious in the first weeks at not tangling with Trump in public. But I think other European leaders have increasingly found that there's no point trying to appease him. You've got to stand up for what you believe in. You've got to be straight and honest with him, perhaps not seeking rows in public, but very clear in private. And I think Andy Burnham needs to tack in that direction as well. There have been some occasions, for instance, where there's been an argument over Greenland and the risk that Trump might try and occupy Greenland, that tough, clear diplomacy, even from a small country like Denmark, had its impact. So I would be all in favour of honesty, making absolutely clear where you stand, being clear where your interests are. And as I've said, working in the wider American system, as it begins to turn away from Trump, and potential successes begin to profile themselves, to work that market to make sure that the British European view of Ukraine, of Iran, what's in the best interest of all of us as allies, is there in their minds.
Speaker 4Heather, let's look at some of the other countries who are hugely impacted by American policy, like the Gulf states and Iran. How do you think they are going to respond to this period?
Speaker 8As Peter said, the key learning from the last two years is that President Trump does respect strength. And when he's approached by actors who can demonstrate, strength and sophistication, even if they're ideologically very different from him, he'll respond more constructively. And I think you see, even right now, before the midterms, the Gulf states trying to sit down with one another, the diplomacy between Iran and Saudi Arabia in recent days, to say, how can we not wait for Washington and react to Washington, but be more proactive in determining the destiny of our own region? And I think just about everywhere in the world, but specifically in the Gulf, that kind of proactive thinking about how they want to shape the environment that Washington walks into is going to be the really important change from the way over the last two years that Trump has been quite successful in keeping the world on its heels and forcing it to constantly react to him.
Speaker 4Rebecca, what do you think?
Speaker 7It's important to distinguish between how allied leaders will be thinking about approaching Trump during his term, and how they will be thinking about approaching him during his term. And I think his lame duck era, and how competitors will be thinking about it. And for allied foreign leaders, they will face the challenge increasingly of needing to triangulate between the imperative to make nice with President Trump while he's still in charge, but also the desire to build new ties with a new cast of political leaders and look towards the future. So that balance will be tricky to strike, but they will aim to do so while also trying to wait out President Trump and just see what holds on the other side. By contrast, I think that's going to be a really important change for leaders in Russia, in China, maybe also in North Korea. President Trump may well be the friendliest American leader they ever get. And so they are going to be looking for ways to lock in agreements, to lock in new facts on the ground that will be hard for future presidents to reverse, either because they're of great symbolic significance, because they're costly to reverse, or because reversing them by a future president would seem escalatory or aggressive. And so for all of those reasons, I do expect to see quite a flurry of diplomacy, even during this period where President Trump has an expiration date on him.
Speaker 4Heather, how do you think the way in which Donald Trump has taken American foreign policy will be impacting the next presidential election? Will the candidates essentially be saying, yes, more of the same, but maybe with a different tone? Or will they be saying, we want a complete break with that? We maybe want to go back to the alliance system, the rule of law of the past?
Speaker 8I think it's important to put into this conversation that over the last, two years, President Trump has occasionally flirted with the idea that he would not leave the scene as the Constitution requires. And I do expect him to keep raising that as a way of keeping himself relevant. And in a funny way, that helps answer your question, because as long as he has a shrinking but still sizable core of supporters who quite like his approach to the world, every other candidate will have to ask themselves, what of Trumpism? Do I want to keep? And what of Trumpism do I want to reject? And that's not that's not as obvious an answer as the current poll numbers would would suggest. So I think it's wrong. It's wrong because frankly, things have been broken with our allies that can't be repaired just by someone going around and saying, hey, sorry, we're back now. And because something has shifted in the American conversation, we can't revert to, the world the way it looked in 2015, or 2000. So the question, first for the American electorate, and then frankly, for the relations with allies and partners around the world is, which pieces do we want to pick up? And what can we build in place of what was there before, given the lower levels of trust that will and the agreements and other detritus that Rebecca referred to, that we're going to be able to build in place of what was there before, will be in place for whomever a new leader may be?
Speaker 1Peter, I think for us in Europe, we mustn't expect that America will default back, as Heather was saying, to the America of 20 years ago, America has changed, Europe has changed. The tone can be changed easily by an incoming president of either party. And perhaps we can encourage them to look again at the issue of international engagement. So get back into the international climate business, more negotiation on issues of climate change, issues like trade, hopefully standing more behind the NATO alliance. But that will only work if we Europeans are doing more to support ourselves. I think any incoming American president is going to want to see the trend towards Europe taking on more responsibility for our security. And on that basis, I hope we can go back to a reasonably confident alliance between the two sides of the Atlantic. And that's all we
Speaker 4have time for, I'm afraid. My thanks to Peter Ricketts, Heather Fowler, and to all of you who have been listening to the Briefing Room with me, David Aronovich. The producers were Ben Carter, Alex Last, and Kirsteen Knight. The production coordinator was Maria Ogundelli, the sound designer was Peter Ricketts, and the producer was Peter Ricketts, and the sound engineer was James Beard, and the editor was Penny Murphy. Another edition of this podcast will be along again very soon.
Speaker 9The actor and comedian Russell Brand is standing trial for rape and sexual assault. He's been charged with three counts of rape, three counts of sexual assault, and one count of indecent assault. He has denied all the charges. I'm Anushka Matanda-Doughty, and for the BBC's Fame Under Fire podcast, I'll be inside the courtroom every day, and as always, I'm bringing you with me. in New York and Tupac in Las Vegas, and now we're heading to London for our first UK trial. For Fame Under Fire, Russell Brand on trial, join me for the testimony, the arguments, the moments that matter, and all the legal analysis. To get all the updates, listen and subscribe on BBC Sounds or wherever you get your podcasts, so you never miss an episode.
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