Hegseth’s Venezuela Visit Was Hidden From American Media
20m 30s
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s surprise, unaccompanied visit to Venezuela marks a dramatic and opaque shift in U.S. foreign policy, signaling a new defense agreement with Vice President Díaz Rodríguez. The announcement, made only to Venezuelan state media and lacking American press presence, emphasizes military cooperation and national security without addressing democratic reforms, elections, or human rights. This move is interpreted as a strategic pivot from Iran, reflecting a broader Trump administration narrative that Venezuela has been “liberated” through force and now serves as a compliant ally. However, deep structural issues remain—Venezuela’s narcotics trade remains entrenched, its government continues to function under the same authoritarian apparatus, and there is no evidence of meaningful reform. Critics argue the relationship is not one of partnership but of coercion, based on the threat of renewed military intervention. The agreement also includes a U.S.-backed oil consortium, raising concerns about economic exploitation and long-term benefits for Venezuelans. Overall, the narrative portrays Venezuela as a success story of U.S. power, but in reality, it reflects a transactional, power-based alliance devoid of democratic ideals or mutual accountability. The lack of transparency, absence of democratic promises, and reliance on force-based diplomacy suggest a foreign policy approach more aligned with imperialism than with global stability or human rights.
Hello, everybody. Welcome to Bullwark Takes. I am Andrew Eger with the Bullwark joined by my friend and colleague Ben Parker to talk about an interesting story that we've gotten. It's a foreign policy story not out of Asia this week. The president's been over in Asia, but this is Western hemisphere stuff because we learned yesterday very much out of the blue that defense secretary Pete Hegseth had traveled down, taken a surprise trip down to Venezuela, did not bring press along, but went down just by himself to suddenly pop up on Venezuelan state TV and announced that the United States had inked a new security agreement with the Delsey Rodriguez government in Venezuela. This of course comes just a handful of months after we went down there and and and popped the old president of Venezuela, Nicholas Maduro, popped him on an airplane, brought him to the United States to face trial, decapitated the government down there. And now we are apparently striking at an agreement with the very military that we went in the teeth of to carry out that mission just a little while ago. So it's sort of a head spinning story. Things have moved so fast in Venezuela since that mission. Very glad to have been here to talk a little bit about it. So why don't I just hand it to you first to like to like let you sort of freestyle on this story because I almost don't know what to make of this. It came out of nowhere like I said yesterday because the press didn't know about it. So what are your kind of baseline takeaways from what we've learned since yesterday? Well, I think the baseline takeaway is we're not supposed to know that much about it. That was obviously the case with the surprise raid back in January that removed Maduro originally. There was also the case with the huge oil deal we signed with Venezuela but it wasn't actually us signing it. It was a consortium of companies signing it with Venezuela but the government took a stake in those companies and it grants them certain rights to certain Venezuelan oil fields. And Trump was before the midterms were arguing about how this was like the biggest oil deal in history but actually doesn't seem like he really interested in the details of it. And it's weird that the government would take a stake in oil companies that might not actually ever turn to profit. Anyway, it's a weird thing. And then now we have this deal where Pete Hegseth shows up as you said in the capital of Venezuela in Caracas and is standing there with Kelsey Rodriguez who was Nicholas Maduro's vice president and announces a defense cooperation agreement. Now look, this means that maybe we'll do some more intelligence sharing. I guess that's kind of weird to come back to that. Maybe we'll do more training. Maybe we'll do, I don't know, maybe we'll just share some equipment with them. I guess maybe that that, I don't know if that's exactly legal. What's weird about this is that Hegseth gave this like 20 minute speech. Again, with no American media there, it was only Venezuelan media and he talked about the Venezuelans reclaiming their borders and sort of making Venezuela great again. He didn't exactly put it that way but they're going to reclaim their borders and national integrity and they're going to reestablish their security cooperation relationship with the United States, which is all well and good. He never mentioned elections. He mentioned something about American political prisoners, I think, being released, but he didn't say they're going to be liberalizing reforms. Venezuelan is going to become more free. He got very religious at the end as this is want, which is weird because it's pretty sure Venezuela is a predominantly Catholic country and Phoenix of this not Catholic. But he didn't mention really much of what's happening here apart from, well, now we're going to work with the Venezuelans who we have said this entire time are in bed with narcotraffickers against the narcotraffickers and just magically they're all on our side now. It is confusing and I think really what happened here is that Pete Hegseth is so sick of hearing about how poorly things are going in Iran that it's like leaving the racetrack where you lost the race, going to another racetrack to take a victory lap. I mean, that's sort of what he did here. He's like, yeah, but Venezuela is great. And in fact, he said that the deal in Venezuela is so good that hormones doesn't even matter anymore. Forget about it. It doesn't matter. Don't think about Iran. Think about Venezuela. So I think he was trying to distract people, but he's so skittish about any sort of media that he decided to take no one. I don't know. That's the best way to make him. No, you're definitely right. I mean, you're definitely right about the fact that the Trump administration has treated the Venezuela story in this way, right? I mean, they very much see it as a foil to Iran as a story that's like a success story of the Trump foreign policy where you went in, you got what you wanted, you got it done, you got out of there, you increased American influence in the regime dramatically by basically raw force. You didn't have a bunch of unintended consequences in the region that forced you to go back there militarily. And in their eyes, you end up with a more America-friendly Southern hemisphere or South America. That has been the way they have used this story. But when you look at the merits of just Venezuela on its own, there are still so many question marks. I mean, let's let's let's go to a little bit of what Pete Hegseth had to say himself. We'll play this second clip that we have here because I think it gets to what you were saying about how they just they they really do think that the whole Venezuelan state has just sort of flipped on its head from where they were before. So let's hear this. Venezuela has gone from our most aggressive regional threat to a compliant security partner on its way to rebuilding its military alongside the United States. We are restoring our natural and historic military partnership. >> Yeah, so the key phrase there seems to be that Venezuela has become a compliant security partner, not necessarily an enthusiastic security partner or a security partner that shares our values, but really a security partner that knows which side their breads buttered on a security partner. >> Not a trustworthy partner. >> Yeah, specifically a partner that in their telling knows that the United States could come in and overpower them again and is therefore willing to do our bidding to advance American policy. And I guess you could have a real politic conversation about the pros and cons of US pursuing that sort of policy around the world, but it is this sort of astonishingly thuggish way to run diplomacy and really remarkable to have it out in the open especially when you combine it with all of the aesthetic trappings of Hegseth going down there without any complement of the independent American news media accompanying him, which is very rare for these trips, even for these guys. I mean, the president has been on his trip, the normal complement of the White House press pool has been along with him. It's just sort of bedrock the way that are normal for these days. >> Yeah, I mean, obviously they have done things to chip away at that, a lot of different things to chip away at that. And I don't mean to whitewash that at all, but this is far beyond that. This is just Hegseth up and leaving, up and getting on a plane, going down there. And the only reason we know anything about it at all is because of Venezuela's compliant, propagandistic state run media and White House videographers taking sizzle real stuff of Hegseth and putting it out on their social channels. So it really is, it's very different from America sort of being a force for democracy and liberalism in the world and going out to find willing partners. This is, the might makes right version of America, the R way or the highway version of America, going and exporting the iron fist of the U.S. state and a different form of global leadership around the world. And I think, am I crazy? Is that like an unfair lens for what we're seeing here right now? >> No, I mean, I'll give you the most generous gloss on it, which is that there is a long and only semi-sorted history of the United States and during defense cooperation agreements like this with unfree countries. It happened a lot during the Cold War, the sort of definitive case for this was written by Jean Kirkpatrick, who was sort of a scoop Jackson Democrat, who at one point was American ambassador to the U.N. She called it dictatorships and double standards. And basically her argument was dictatorships are bad. We prefer democracies, but where there are dictatorships, we prefer ones that are generally helpful to America over ones that are generally hostile. So if what Pete Hegsett says is right, and we're just sort of propping up this government so that it is pro-American, that's not really that unique in American history. It's not the worst option. I mean, it's not great, and we like to use that leverage we get to help places democratize and liberalize when we can, or at least we used to. But what doesn't make sense to me here is that he keeps coming back to the issue of narcotrafficking and narcoteric. And the Venezuelan regime, as Pete Hegsett has repeatedly said, is so deeply intertwined with narcotrafficking and arguably narcoterism released by Americans. It's these groups that are now legally narcoteric groups that I don't understand why he thinks that all of a sudden on a dime, these people are just going to turn and like, oh, I guess we love America now. We're going to stop selling drugs. And I guess I'll find another way to feed my family, right? It doesn't make any sense. And also, he never mentions Cuba. And Cuba is the Cuban intelligence and security agencies are so deeply intertwined with the Venezuelan state. When we went and we snatched Maduro, his bodyguard role Cubans, that's how deeply intertwined it is. So like, what does he think the Cubans are just out of their net? Maybe that's true. Maybe he should say something about it. The whole thing is deeply weird. And you know, you can sort of look at a different ways and say,
Well, maybe this is sort of as you said, like a real politic. Like, we needed to do this for our national interest, and so we're gonna do it. Gene Kirkpatrick would be proud. Or you can say, you know, maybe this is sort of the long, slow process toward free elections. So I really don't think Trump or Isaac Care about that. Or you can say this is neo-imperialism, but whatever you think it is, and it's sort of got elements of all three, it's none of them done well. It's really confusing. And the fact that he doesn't seem to actually want to explain it to Americans doesn't help. - I think we can at least pretty safely rule out one of those, which is that this is actually an attempt to help the state democratize in any way. I think there was some hope among, you know, the Venezuelan opposition when we first went in there that that's what this would entail. Yeah, shoot, I'm blanking on her name now, the opposition leader who wants these parties. - Maria Kareena Machado. - Yes, I mean, she had been lobbying the president to get involved in the government's sort of suppression of free and fair elections there, you know. - She gave him her Nobel Peace Prize. - Yeah. - Like a physical version of her Nobel Peace Prize to try to get him to help democratize the country. He needed things for this, now get out. - And Trump very, very quickly shut that down and decided that Delsey Rodriguez was his kind of leader and that she was someone. I mean, Delsey Rodriguez actually does kind of profile as the perfect sort of underling that Trump likes, where she's willing to be a zealous convert, right? She's willing to come and play ball immediately, even though he had just swooped in and decapitated her regime, she's like, oh, I'm the next person up, I can work with this, you know. USA, USA, Donald Trump, Donald Trump. And that's exactly what Trump has wanted to see all along out of this, so it very quickly became clear that Trump was not going to call for for new Venezuelan elections, even though that would have been called for by Venezuelan, Venezuela's own constitution and Venezuela's own laws. And we're nearly a year on and that remains the status quo here. So the idea that there's any sort of push toward more self-determination on the part of Venezuela here, just I mean, I would need to see some actual evidence, any real data point pushing that way, before I really start to entertain that, that one as I hypothesis, at least myself. - Yeah, and I also would want to see some sort of evidence for excess claims that now the Venezuelan military and security services are going to be working with us to clamp down on drug trafficking. I would like to see some evidence of that somewhere, at least, and we've seen this pattern. Our colleague General Hartling wrote about this for the bulwark recently comparing what's going on in Venezuela now to what happened a quarter of a century ago with Plan Colombia, which was the agreement where the United States helped Colombia solve its own sort of internal related drug trafficking and terrorist problems. This is really what destroyed the Colombian cartels. It's also, according to some things I've read, there's some analysis I've read, what sort of created the Mexican cartels, right? All the drug trafficking left Colombia and just, oh, well, we could just go to Mexico. It's much closer to the United States anyway. So what evidence do we have that not only is Venezuela going to help us actually cut down on this drug trafficking, which again is so entwined with the Venezuelan state and is necessary for a lot of the people who are involved in this trade to make their living because their economy is so messed up? What evidence do we have that that drug trade isn't just going to bounce somewhere else next? I mean, honestly, what are we getting out of this? I mean, yeah, I think that's the question, right? Look, now, look, I don't want to undersell the idea that there could in theory be benefits. Obviously, it would be great. It would be great if the United States were through this able to somehow clean up corruption in the Venezuelan military and empower them to do more against the cartels in their own country. And I think as you alluded to a minute ago, that was what hurtling was writing about. It's not like we haven't had some success with also some unintended consequences with that sort of thing in the past. So if that were to happen, we would obviously need to give some flowers to all of this and say, you know, all these drugs pouring over the border into America, that's a bad thing. And we should be both addressing the poll factors here at home and the push factors down there. But it does, again, I mean, maybe I'm a cynic. And certainly, there's no love loss between us and Pete Hegseth, but I keep coming back to that compliant security partner thing. It just seems like the understanding between us and them just is continually predicated on this threat of violent force from the US against not just Venezuela's regime, not just that we are going to threaten more hostile economic policy toward Venezuela or something like that, but that if they don't give us what we want, we're just going to send more paratroopers in to, you know, decapitate the government again. Like, it's like we did this before and we could do it again. And so you better play nice with us. And I get what you're saying before about dictators and double standards. I know the United States does not have a clean track record, especially in this part of the world when it comes to meddling in the way people run their governments. But I just blanch, I just blanch at that. Like the idea that that's the way we're going to run things, that's, and it's going to be also out in the open and just brazen and blatant. I mean, it just seems, first of all, it seems unsustainable because what is it going to look like if and when Donald Trump loses in 2028 and we have some sort of a recommitment to a more rules-based approach to, you know, our strategic partnerships in the world. Well, then, like, what does the US-Venezuela relationship look like now? Because we have no confidence that these people actually have any convictions that would help them want to work with us in a long-term sustained way. They've just been doing that, you know, under threat of force. Are we going to continue to supply that threat of force and perpetuity to keep this partnership going? Like, it's just, it just seems like it's asking for trouble in a lot of different ways. The only thing that we're even realistically promise to get out of this is this really complicated oil deal that seeds a certain percentage of Venezuelans untapped or as it is, say, oil that is currently in the earth. Two-week consortium of American companies and that consortium, consortium, I should say, is partially owned by the US government. At least back when we made a habit of doing this kind of thing in Latin America and in Hawaii and elsewhere. And it was like on behalf of the United Fruit Company or Chiquita Banana or whatever, they said, like, we want you to depose the governments we can make bananas or cheaply or whatever. At least then, it was like a clear return. It was like, we are currently buying fruit. And we would like to continue to buy fruit cheaply. This is like, we're going to strong arm this government. And then at some point in the distant future, after billions of dollars of investment, we might see a return, but maybe not. And most of that return would go to oil companies and not, I mean, what the hell? This is what I mean. It's not done very well. We're strong arm in these countries. There's this great line that it's not original to Bill Clinton, but he used to quote it a lot and I love it. Actually, the origins of the quote are sort of obscure. But he used to say, I just drew my enemies, I turned them into my friends. And I think that's where American forward policy is at its best. Like, Japan and Germany after World War II, like a lot of Eastern Europe after the Cold War. Like, Vietnam, we have a pretty good relationship with Vietnam these days. I see no effort at all to do that with Venezuela. We're not actually turning them into our friends. As you keep saying, we're just twisting their arm. Yeah, it's more of a vassal situation. Yeah, and so like, we're not really destroying an enemy. We're not really doing much except for what? Taking a victory lap is the only thing I can keep coming back to. Yeah, yeah. Well, I will leave the say what you will about the whole Chiquita banana story. That you can have that one. I'm not going to take any stances on whether you know that the sort of banana republic thing done well was better or worse because I just don't want to get into it. But I do take your point on it. Yeah, I mean, let's just put a bow on this because I mean, we've kind of hit the whole story here. But again, it's just so strange that we have this regime that up until now was basically seen as a dictatorial narco state. Under Nicholas Maduro, big diplomatic and geopolitical problem for the United States, foe of the United States. And we have swapped out the one guy at the top for someone who is formerly completely embedded in that government, but who is willing to pay obeisance to Donald Trump personally and to play nicely with the White House, with this White House. But as you said at the beginning, for all intents and purposes, presides over the same state, the same constituted state, made up of the same apparatus, the same people, all of this same, same stuff. And even despite that, you have Pete Hegseth go down there. And you have Hegseth talking. You have Delsey Rodriguez talking. And in the way they come together where Hegseth also is completely unaccompanied by anything resembling free and independent press, where Hegseth is also basically not paying even lip service to American values in this stuff. Again, just sort of luxuriating in that master vassal relationship. It's just not that clear watching the two of them there who actually has any kind of moral of her hand in the relationship. It's all about who has more of the guns, and that's us. So that's an interesting dynamic to be living through. And I guess Ben, any last thoughts before we leave it there? - Yeah, I think you put it well. I would just say that right now, since the start of this year, I think the Iranian government has changed more than the Venezuelan government has. - Yeah, man. Wow. Well, mission accomplished in some ways, I guess. All right.
Leave it there. Thanks, Ben, for coming on to talk through Pete Hegseth's unexpected trip down victory lap through Venezuela. Thanks to you all out there for watching and for subscribing to the Bullwork. Thanks for subscribing now. If you do subscribe now, and if you don't, there's still time to get thanked because you could, you could subscribe. But before I'm even finished this sentence, it's right down there. The button says subscribe. It's right under our faces. It helps the channel. A lot helps us all keep a roof over our heads for crying out loud. All right. Thanks all. Thanks all. And we will see you next time.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made a surprise, unaccompanied visit to Venezuela, announcing a new U.S.-Venezuelan security agreement with Vice President Díaz Rodríguez without any American media coverage.
The agreement emphasizes military cooperation and national security, but omits any mention of democratic reforms, elections, or human rights, framing Venezuela as a compliant, not a genuine, partner.
The visit and announcement are seen as a political distraction from Iran, reflecting a broader Trump-era narrative that Venezuela is a success story of U.S. force and influence over a hostile regime.
There is no credible evidence that Venezuela will reduce narcotrafficking, as drug networks are deeply embedded in the state and the economy, suggesting the agreement may merely shift, not eliminate, these issues.
The arrangement appears to reflect a "might makes right" foreign policy, where U.S. dominance is maintained through the threat of military intervention, not mutual trust or shared values.
Critics argue that the U.S. is not democratizing Venezuela but instead reinforcing a vassal relationship, reminiscent of past interventions in Latin America, with little regard for long-term sovereignty or civilian governance.
A major unresolved issue is the lack of transparency or accountability—no independent verification of the agreement’s benefits, especially regarding drug trafficking or economic reforms.
The deal includes a U.S.-backed oil consortium, raising concerns about economic exploitation and unequal returns, with minimal benefit to the Venezuelan people.
Summary:
S. foreign policy, signaling a new defense agreement with Vice President Díaz Rodríguez. The announcement, made only to Venezuelan state media and lacking American press presence, emphasizes military cooperation and national security without addressing democratic reforms, elections, or human rights.
This move is interpreted as a strategic pivot from Iran, reflecting a broader Trump administration narrative that Venezuela has been “liberated” through force and now serves as a compliant ally. However, deep structural issues remain—Venezuela’s narcotics trade remains entrenched, its government continues to function under the same authoritarian apparatus, and there is no evidence of meaningful reform. Critics argue the relationship is not one of partnership but of coercion, based on the threat of renewed military intervention.
-backed oil consortium, raising concerns about economic exploitation and long-term benefits for Venezuelans. S. power, but in reality, it reflects a transactional, power-based alliance devoid of democratic ideals or mutual accountability.
The lack of transparency, absence of democratic promises, and reliance on force-based diplomacy suggest a foreign policy approach more aligned with imperialism than with global stability or human rights.
FAQs
Hegseth traveled to Caracas without any U.S. press, announcing a new defense agreement with Venezuela's government led by Vice President Delsey Rodriguez, signaling a shift in U.S. policy toward the country without public scrutiny or democratic accountability.
No, the agreement did not mention elections, political reforms, or democratic transition. Hegseth emphasized security cooperation and border reclamation but avoided discussing liberalization or self-determination in Venezuela.
It resembles Cold War-era tactics of supporting authoritarian regimes that are seen as pro-American, rather than promoting democracy. This mirrors historical patterns where the U.S. has prioritized strategic partnerships over political transformation.
Hegseth highlighted drug trafficking as a concern, but there is no evidence that Venezuela will reduce its involvement. The deal lacks concrete plans or data showing a real shift in the drug trade, which remains deeply embedded in the Venezuelan economy.
The absence of press suggests a desire to avoid public debate or scrutiny, emphasizing a top-down, controlled narrative. This reflects a strategy of projecting influence without accountability or transparency.
There is no verified evidence of such cooperation. Analysts note this claim is speculative and likely based on assumptions, as drug trafficking remains a central part of Venezuela's economy and state structure.
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