Global FX Outlook 2026: Bearish USD, Bullish Beta

[MUSIC PLAYING] Hello, and welcome to JP Morgan's At Any Rate Podcast. I'm Mira Chandan. Go ahead, FFX Strategy at JP Morgan. And I'm joined today by our global FX team. It's a special week. We published a year ahead outlook this week. And the title of that one, bearish dollar bullish beta-- so that's fairly self-explanatory. Basically, the takeaway summary there is that we are underweight the dollar versus pro-cyclical and high yielding currencies. That's the preference for us. The big picture here is that central banks are going to be going, transitioning from what was a simultaneous cutting cycle this year to a hold next year at somewhat high levels and with a punchline that some might actually be even hiking as we get into the latter part of the year. Now, our clients will have access to the full outlook on our website and, of course, can reach out to us statically for meetings. But for this podcast, we really want to focus on what's new going into 2026. So that's why we have the global team. We did this for our mid-year outlook, where we did a round robin across our global team, where I posed the question, what is new going into the next six months or so? So that's the question for everybody this year. We got some good feedback last time. So everybody's back. We get a three minutes per person, and we're going to focus on what the most interesting themes are going to be for next year. So I'm going to start. The first thing I'll say is we are polishing our dollar going into 2026. This isn't a new theme for us per se, but the new thing on this is that we're no longer looking for outsized gains. It's not like you're going to be getting another U-turn in German fiscal. That's going to propel the euro stronger. Also, more importantly, the new development, of course, in recent months is that US has been more resilient. So we have lowered our sites on the euro dollar, whereas we were looking for a 122 high-side target that's now down to 120 in your term, you're thinking 116 to 118. And the view is that you could see periods of consolidation unless US data weakens. So that's the thing that we'll be looking out for. The reason, however, we're still taking a more constructive stance on euro dollar is not because of the baseline gains here. It's because of the asymmetry that euro dollar represents. What we're finding is that euro dollar has been very asymmetric to Fed pricing. It strengthens more when the Fed terminal goes down, but it stick here when the Fed terminal goes up. So that's why still keeping our bullish bias there. And what I'd say there for the dollar as well, we are looking for weakening in the dollar, but we do expect that the scope will be narrower and the magnitude smaller than what we have seen in 2025 unless US data really slips. The second thing I want to say from a top-down perspective is that the dollar still maintains its yield supremacy on certain metrics. The yield spreads and aggregate versus a global median are still pretty high. The dollar is still yielding more than a third of currencies globally. What is new is, of course, that the carry-in vault set up as such that FX is actually offering many carry-efficient ways to hedge against volatility shocks. And there are certain new cyclical currencies that are showing up as candidates. That would be, I would put Kiwi in that bucket in DM. And Anashka will talk about some candidates in EM later in the podcast. And then finally, I think this is more to do with the lessons learned from 2025, which is essentially that what we did same time last year was to identify upfront what would actually change our dollar bullish view at that time into a dollar bearish view. And so what that helped us do is when these events actually unfolded, we were able to flip the dollar view pretty quickly. So as I've already highlighted, we are bearish on the dollar going into the new year. What would it take to change our mind and become bullish? I would say either Fed hikes would have to come back on the table or growth outside the US, particularly in Europe would have to turn over. So that's something that we're keeping in mind going into next year. So I'll stop here. Junior, let's start with you. Obviously, dolly yen, we've had a pretty big change in our forecasts and outlook. We've turned bearish the yen. Can you walk us through that and just highlight what's new as you're looking into the next year? Yes, thanks, Mila. So I can say that there are several misjudgments regarding the Takaiichi administration economic policy among the main reasons why we can't afford the revision for our Italian targets. The most important one is that the Takaiichi administration fiscal policy stands have turned out to be more expansionary than we had expected. According to the media reports on November 15, the size of the supplementary budget for this fiscal year was under $14 trillion, but within just a few days, it expanded to about $18 trillion. This might be because as the Takaiichi administration is a minority government, they need to accommodate the demand of various stakeholders. If this view is correct, it is likely that initial budget for the next fiscal year, which should be seen as even more important for assessing the government fiscal stance, will also be expansionary. The JDB and the FX market have already issued warnings. Since the beginning of this month, the rise in third year JDB aid has accelerated reaching the record high level. And this has been accompanied by further yen depreciation. As the Takaiichi administration set measures to combat domestic inflation as a priority, we had expected that they would not prevent the BOJ from hiding great to contain inflation. However, it has turned out that the government's measures against inflation is to increase fiscal spending to offset the decline in purchasing power caused by inflation, while at the same time requesting the BOJ to delay rate highs. Such a preference for high-pressure economic policy might suggest that Takaiichi administration is underestimating the risk of inflation and yen depreciation. Given that it is clear that the risk of rising inflation and further yen depreciation are now higher than initially expected. Even so, if the yen rally is significantly above 162 and yen depreciation further after rates, the Takaiichi administration would want to halt or at least slow the pace of yen depreciation. However, under the current environment, it is likely that the effectiveness of standard tools to counter yen depreciation, including the BOJ rate hikes or more intervention, will be limited. As the other JITEN countries are now reaching the end of their aging cycle or have already finished them, it will become more difficult for modest hikes by the BOJ to stop yen depreciation. Furthermore, unlike last July, at this time, the investors' yen short positions do not appear to be very large, which will also reduce the effectiveness of more intervention. That's for me. Thank you. Thank you, Junya. Certainly seems like the structural shift in Japanese policy is going to be quite relevant for yen and dolly. And now we're looking for definitely a test above 160. Benjamin, anything on the Anthropodians to report? Thanks, Mira. What we've been talking about Australia is achieving the soft landing in '25. And I think for '26, the story is emergence as the more convincing high beta, high yield as you noted up front. So that's still our view, but I think we're adding some new elements to that mix. Even just this week, we've had a strong inflation reading. That's moving the conversation from not just end of aging cycle, but to potential hikes next year. And importantly, you don't get the sense that the other policy arms will be doing much to offset that. The government had some fiscal reporting through October this week, which beat forecasts, giving them plenty of scope to ease fiscal policy next year. And the regulator, which has been looking into this housing upswing, has kind of showed their hand by announcing caps on mortgage landing, which are so high that they won't be binding any time soon. So both those fronts makes us think there's room to run here. And the data will keep affirming Aussie's cyclical bona fides in the first half of '26, at least. So that's the near term. Looking further out, we are flagging those some looming downside risks from the commodity complex. Previous consumers of our research will have heard us often argue that Australia's beta to China runs largely through commodity prices more so than volumes. So it's interesting that '26 seems like it's going to be the year where global iron ore supply finally starts to shift higher again after a decade of pretty tight markets. There's new capacity in Africa that's due to come online in late '26. That's worth keeping an eye on. Just as low a global iron ore prices will definitely disrupt some of those cyclical credentials I mentioned up front. And for Kiwi, we presented the economy as a turnaround story for '26 on growth, on policy, on market sentiment. Data this week seems to suggest that things are turning. Business sentiment had a pretty strong bounce. Retail volumes rose nearly 2% on the quarter. And the RBNZ really surprised the market with its hawkishness. They basically said the easing cycle's over. And that beyond the next three to six months, the hiking bias becomes likely. So they've kind of given their blessing for wholesale rates to move higher. And the market is now scrambling to catch up. So that's an interesting setup for Kiwi FX. It's obviously been a consensus short. And there's the clear carry headwind, which you mentioned. But we have observed in recent weeks just some evidence that leverage shorts are getting a little bit overextended in Kiwi as the FX forward funding has pushed above oil spreads in the very front end. In Tomnext, for example, pushing through plus 100 basis points. So eroding some optical carry there for Kiwi shorts. And I guess balancing out some of those optical carry negatives that you highlighted. Thanks for that, Ben. I mean, certainly the Kiwi dollar, the interesting thing is that you do have 2% rates in New Zealand, which in contrast to the dollar, will certainly be punitive as the year goes on unless, again, the Fed terminal is coming down. Arendam, what's new to report on Asia? And I know you're doing a podcast leader on derivatives. But any other comments on that that we should know from a high level? I mean, yeah. So across Asian FX, I think in 1H26 at least, is going to look not very different from what we saw in the last few months. You're talking about a global risk on lower beta, lower yielding Asian complex doesn't really fare well in that sort of climate. And it's being, I guess, amplified by two or three bottom up forces. First is the preferences of our policymakers themselves who don't like seeing FX too strong, especially when they're having to deal with the scourge of Chinese overcapacity. Second, I think most or several countries in the region have been running the suite of easy money and trying to run easier fiscal policies. And as Junior will tell you through his experience of the arbonomics years, that combination is corrosive for the currency, especially when it's turbocharged by domestic outflows. And Korea has been the poster child of that trifecta in '25. Can't see that state of affairs changing a lot next year. And then third, we have this kind of BOP imbalance in the region. Exporters don't convert all their dollar proceeds, domestics both in the private and the public/quasi public sector taking unhedged dollars out of the system and foreigners buying local equities only buy them with increasing amounts of FX hedges on them. So on paper, we are a current account surplus part of the world, certainly in the richer North Asian complex. But in reality, we behave like BOP deficit currency. So that's one takeaway. Second is we are going into the first few months of 2026 to be looking moderately constructive on CNY. This is a season when exporters supply a fair amount of dollars into the Lunar New Year. We also have similar sort of seasonal stories for some other currencies in the region. But let not this kind of tactical constructiveness on Asian FX fool you as far as the longer term sort of view on the region is, which is neutral to downbeat. I think there's a bigger story to be also told about CNY and the policy side, which is that we've seen a 20% plus drop in the CNY rear over the last four years. And there is a debate to be had on how this rear needs to correct if at all. If that rear doesn't correct, it will have an influence on how China's trade partners respond either by a trade policy or FX policy. If the rear does correct, then there's a question of how does it correct? Is it through the near or is it through Chinese inflation? Our economists don't have a very upbeat view on Chinese inflation, which opens up the room for potentially little more CNY strength than we are anticipating in the baseline, but this is a space to watch. And then finally, a couple of bottom-up stories that I'll quickly flag because I know this is a global FX podcast, we are watching INR very closely. It's a cheap currency. It is a carry currency in the region. And we are talking about a broad risk on carry on sort of world. So mean diversion in INR is a potential possibility for next year. And then we are watching Korea very closely. You know, big currency has seen huge outflows this year, but authorities are rightfully concerned. They're trying to take some steps to curb that weakness and that those measures potentially intersect with the WIGD inclusion-related inflows from foreigners next year. So whether Korea will mean revert or not will be an interesting storyline. And then finally, I conclude with some very high-level comments on vol. You talked about central banks going on sort of a synchronized pause in activities. Never good for vol on the monetary side. They're talking about better global growth, carry-seeking environment again. Those are all vol depressors. But the problem is that we are about 7% on VXY global, which are really low levels. We are about one standard deviation to low on our business cycling models on vol. So I can't really see vol compressing a whole lot more. And generally, history to see that a pattern in these sorts of setups is a protracted U-shaped bottoming out of vol. And I think that's what we're looking at over the next few months. There is a potential clearing event to be careful of though. We haven't yet talked about the Fed independence events, but there are a spate of things, including the LISA co-caring in January, and then the regional Fed President recertification in February. So that Q1 period, I think, is quite pivotal for Fed policy. And we are sort of recommending having a bullish bias on vol tactically over that period while we decide which way Fed policy goes. Thanks for that, Arun. Another case, I think, for looking for cheap hedges in currency land. Ikoi, passing over to you. Yes, so I can talk a bit about the flow side where we think-- where we saw multi-year high inflow from foreigners into Japanese bond and equities this year, in contrast with the limited appetite from the domestics to the Japanese asset. So starting from the bond space, we saw foreign investors bought quite a lot of Japanese bond this year, especially following the higher JGB yields. So the momentum was pretty strong in the first half of the year. The foreign investors net purchased about 12 trillion yen of Japanese bond, which is roughly 2% of GDP. And foreigners' strong demand has especially been observed in super long JGB, where the appetite from Japanese lifers, who used to be the main buyers, waned. And given only a small portion of foreigners' JGB flow involves direct FX transactions, we think the impact on FX is likely to be through indirect channels. So for example, if the foreign investors appetite on super long JGB wanes into next year, it could trigger further stifling and potentially be a negative factor. So on turning to the equity space, so not only in bonds, but we also saw quite a large equity inflow this year. So foreign investors inflow into Japanese equities in October just a month ago was the largest monthly inflow since the statistics started in 2005. And the pace of foreign investors buying Japanese equity this year has been about 8.7 trillion yen annualized, which is as fast as the initial stage of the abenomics period during 2013 to first half of 2015. And among those flows, we estimate the FX-H ratio for the foreigners to purchase Japanese equities is about 14% at the moment. Still pretty low compared with during abenomics period when it was near 50% hedged. So there's a rough correlation of dollar yen, to go three yen higher if the hedge ratio goes up by 1%. So if yen depreciation continues and the hedge ratio for Japanese equity buying by foreigners rises, we think it could potentially be an overlooked bearish yen catalyst that investors should be mindful of into the next year. And lastly, turning eyes on the equity outflow from Japanese investors, so in aggregate, NISA foreign equity buying is slightly bigger than the pension fund setting of foreign equity from rebalancing year to date. Despite Nikkei outperform S&P by about 10% in dollar term, similar to what Arndam mentioned about the Korea, the Japanese household continues to prefer US equities with NISA outflow continues to be pretty resilient about 1 trillion yen per month. There's a potential NISA scheme change to prioritize domestic equity holdings discussed among policymakers. And we think that is a space to watch for the next year. - Thanks Nikkei. So we're done with Asia now. Let's move on to Europe and start with DM. For Eurodollar, as I said, we're looking for modest gains, still bullish here. James, what about the rest of DM effects in Europe? - Yeah, so in Europe, I think one of the big view changes for us is on Swiss. So we're turning bearish Swiss. Quite simply, I think there's a kind of European growth story that isn't really priced across a number of European currencies, but particularly Swiss. So it's showing up as kind of four or five cents dislocated to European growth on our models in terms of Euro Swiss. You've had some support for Swiss this year and we've been bullish this year from the likes of the gold rally creating a kind of alternative reserve asset demand for Swiss. We just think that that kind of debasement trade morphs slightly into more of a cyclical trade, particularly in Q1, where for example, if you look at what our commodity analysts are saying, they think the likes of copper outperform gold. But more importantly, it's about European currencies and a kind of rotation back into Europe. As you've had the market be a little bit constrained by some of the more idiosyncratic issues like the UK budget and investors have kind of engaged more in the cyclical trade in EM than G10, particularly in the second half of the year. So we think that rotates a bit back to European Q1 and the likes of Swiss stocky can depreciate significantly in our view. Portfolio flows is a pretty important channel in terms of how long can Swiss domiciled investors just continue to ignore Europe in terms of flows? We think that changes. So we've raised our Euro-Swiss targets to around 96 for first half of the year, but we think that's quite conservative in our view. The other change in view is around sterling. So we've got a little bit of a tactical bullish stance after being bearish this year. Just that the UK budget was an event that the market's been obsessed with all year. It's driven the rally higher in Euro sterling all year. And the outcome was reasonably close to consensus. And it's one that I think has put the currency in a little bit of a sweet spot in terms of it's hard for Bank of England to turn to division on the budget. And the tightening in the back end of the fiscal profile has contained the long end a little bit. So you had an almost 4% sell-off in sterling over the summer. That's priced in a slowdown that's well in excess of what our UK economist is forecasting at a time where the employment now cast has actually turned higher. Positioning is very short. And again, I think it's going to be difficult for the Bank of England to turn to division on that kind of outcome. So we've downgraded our Euro sterling forecast to 85 in the first half. That's all from us. Thanks a lot, James. Aneshka, let's talk about EMEA and also anything interesting on LATAM. Hi, Mira. So three highlights from me from what is new and interesting. So the first one is we have a first EMEA hiker in 2026. Our economists are forecasting Chile to hike the policy rate by 25 basis points in the fourth quarter of 2026. Now that's far away, but still very interesting. Because the dominant team here is Kerry and the lower mid-yielders are kind of left behind in that theme. But for these countries, what sometimes has an important impact on the FX market is the monetary policy inflection point. When you go from pricing cuts to suddenly pricing a hiking cycle. And we saw that being very impactful on Czech corona in 2025. And in 2026, we think a few more countries can join that theme. Poland is one example, and Chile could be another one. So that's something to watch for the lower yielders into 2026. Second new thing is here in Europe, our economist base case has now actually shifted to a ceasefire in the conflict in Ukraine towards the end of 2026. Now it's not a particularly high conviction call, but the probability is shifting to be higher than 50%. That can be very important for the entire region. We've looked at the effect this can have through various channels on growth, inflation, et cetera. Broadly speaking, it should be supportive for CE FX, if it were to materialize later in the year. Final highlight is actually from a different angle. It is what we are less constructive on or where our level of conviction is shifting. In that camp, I would make two highlights. The first one is on the commodity currencies, especially the ones that they are exporting commodities used in the AI cycle or geared into the precious metals. We have two, basically. We have copper in Chile and we have precious metals in South Africa. Now what is interesting about both of these-- and don't take me wrong, we are actually constructive on both of them. But what is interesting in both of them is that now their central banks have announced reserve accumulation programs in Chile that happened a few months back in South Africa that's very recent. And it doesn't change that we are constructive on these currencies, but we are certainly noticing that the FX in both countries has become a bit more sticky and that changes how we are thinking about outright expressions and what the potential really is and how fast it can materialize. Second on the less constructive front, I would highlight is, well, if we are thinking about hedges, if something goes wrong and it's different than the environment we are assuming, I would say Sheco is one to look at. It's been our most constructive call in 2025. We were very, very constructive, actually, for even longer than that. But now we are finding is that Sheco has run a bit ahead of its comparative currencies in the tech equity group, especially in Asia. It's screening a bit expensive in our models, so it is a one that if something were to turn globally, we feel it could be more vulnerable than others. Thanks, Aneshka, for your comments there. I think to follow up on the hedges point, I think Kiwi and G-Tan, as I mentioned earlier, is going to be an interesting one as well. Taviya, let's turn to you now. Anything interesting to report from your end for 2026? Hey, Mira, yeah, on flows, I would make two new points. Firstly, for 2026, the European hedging story is not as urgent as it was this time last year. As we've discussed before earlier this year, European asset managers in some time-tier data sets raised hedge ratios sharply, but then it stalled around mid-year, and that was likely in part due to the fact that shorter-term euro-dollar equity correlations had normalized again. So now the new thing is that you're back to an environment where you have S&P up, euro-dollar up, and vice versa, and the currency is range bound. So the immediate need to hedge FX risk is no longer as pressing as it was, say, this spring. And so hedging flows may stay dormant unless we see a decisive dollar range break or a shift in these correlations again. And then at that point, hedging could accentuate the trend. And then secondly, for the dollar, it'll be more important to watch for FDI rather than equity in flows. One angle of the AI story that investors generally look at is that large equity inflows into the US will be dollar positive, but history shows that these flows don't actually reliably bring about dollar strength. And instead, the key metric to watch for is FDI, where the correlation with FX is actually positive over time. And so far, again, the new thing is that timely FDI indicators like announced M&A inflows into the US are not so far showing a meaningful pickup, unlike in the late 1990s. But they are slower moving, so it will be important to track as a metric going forward. And going back to the equity point, with the timelier tick data that we've been receiving in recent months, even with huge equity inflows in recent months, the dollar has often weakened or stayed range bound. And looking at it on a cross-sectional basis as well, the largest buyers each quarter were actually not the ones who sold off the most in FX and vice versa. So that also brings us to a similar conclusion. So the bottom line is that keep your eyes on FDI. Thanks a lot, Octavia. Can we move to you, Antonin, and have a discussion on FX macro quant, what really stands out from the models to you? Hi, Shamira. Yeah, I'm going to flag three important changes in our view. So the first one is on the dollar specifically, like things have changed compared to the same period last year. A simple metrics have improved. If we compare early 2025, we entered the year from a strong dollar rally. Now we entered 2026 from an 8% sell-off in the XY, 5% sell-off in trade-weighted. In combination with what you said, we have no negligible yield advantage for the dollar versus most reserves. I would also say for the dollar, one matter the most is the relative stance of the US versus the rest of the world more than the absolute performance of the US economy. And the bulk of the dollar sell-off this year in H1 was very well characterized on some of our metrics. Like in our relative equity momentum signals, our relative gross momentum signal, like in that period of sharp sell-off earlier in the years, the US was among the worst across 27 currencies. And some weeks, even the worst, this has stabilized. Like US equities are on average in-- like yes, equities' performance is on average with the rest of the world now. And our gross momentum signal, like the US is more mid-pack across G10 and EM. And I would also say that next year, our economics forecast shows that the Fed should be on hold starting to Q2026. So it should reduce the dollar pressure from the monetary side. So I would not say that necessarily what I just mentioned like is characteristic of a strong dollar environment. But this is a better footing for 2026 that should limit the magnitude of a downside. Another key change for next year would be like a lower level of central bank activity. Based on our economics forecast, we could have 8 out of 10 G10 central banks on hold by 2Q26. If we take globally, we should spend most of 2026 in the bottom quartile of central bank activity. So in such context, what are the best sort of strategies? If risk asset hold, which is obviously a big assumption, like a fixed carry is historically the strongest strategy, we have previously highlighted that the strategy is not very attractive in terms of yield differential, but it's working based on the broad cyclical component of the factor. And if gross metrics stay resilient, central bank activity is low. And as it remains, one of the top beneficiaries of the AI equity trade, like the factor should still continue to deliver in the next year, in our view. With obviously the caveat that it's very correlated to the performance of S&P 500 and other cyclical trade, such as a fixed shortfall. So it should not be a resilient in case of broad correction. I would just say on the slow level of central bank activity as well, leave a bit of a vacuum. And so in general, we see that also the commodity momentum type of signal via the term of trade have also been stronger over those periods. The performance could come from a more idiosyncratic move on currencies backed by metals, for instance. Obviously, fiscal discussions are not going away. And you can still have some pockets of performance related to certain events, like Japan's supplementary budget or US on dollar on tariff ruling. But without the start, we're aligned to the same extent next year, and we're into double-digit return. Because first, the UK budget is out of the way. And now our macro strategists are positioned more for sterling relief. The bias of our global race team is not for large stippling across the board. Like our US red strategy, for instance, they think the US curve should stay steep, but not break a neuron gene that's a long hand. And also, one last thing is like last year, the fiscal team was mixed with the external balance sort of, which is like the surplus currency, which are also the one the fiscal is strong benefited from repatriation during the first part of the year. And there is a two-team sort of intersected. And we don't think that necessarily this kind of thing will repeat. So for those reasons, we don't expect necessarily large return on fiscal backskets like we had in 2025. So that's it for my main three changes next year. Thanks a lot, Anton and Patrick. Let's move to Canada. And actually, US issues as well. What's really standing out to you there? Yeah, thanks, Mara. I think from this process, my main takeaway for next year is that basically, macrovolatility driven by US politics, I think we'll go down next year. I think, frankly, we're still living with this kind of long shadow from liberation day, kind of like still grappling with the unwind of risk premium that took hold basically in April. But I think looking forward, or even right now, I'd say trade policy and tariffs are generally at a relatively mature stage in kind of their life cycle. The effective rate has been stable for some time. President Trump has mentioned recently that he doesn't see the rate changing much through the end of the year. So that does suggest that things are settling in a place that they're relatively comfortable with. And of course, that's happened alongside some deals being struck with some key partners. So adding some sense of permanence, if you will, to trade policy and tariffs. So I think relative to this year, 2026 versus 2025, you'd expect less tariff and trade volatility generally. I'd add as well, you know, section 122, if that's kind of the next case, if AIPA gets struck down, you can't really toggle tariff rates on and off by country. So it has to just be kind of one blanket thing. So again, I think that adds a degree of kind of stability there. And then 301 and 232, if those are the next steps, you can change individual country's rates, but it takes a lot longer to get those up and running. Obviously, there will be a little bit of volatility we still have to deal with. The AIPA decision is looming. We said that there's maybe some winners and losers there, some economies like Brazil and India then might see lower rates. So that could be something. But there's questions, too, about the refunds. But generally speaking, I think tariff volatility should be a little bit lower next year, which basically means that USMCA, I think, will be kind of the main trade dealer next year. Our base case is that ultimately a trilateral deal is struck, and the deal is renewed following a formal review that starts in July next year. But negotiations are basically starting soon, and I would expect generally kind of like a fractious environment there. Canada and the US currently aren't even talking. So I don't expect it to be a particularly smooth process. That can definitely result in some risk premia that could, for instance, take $1 CAD higher like it did during the NAFTA renegotiation in 2017, 2018. But ultimately, while there are a few potential outcomes, which we detail in the piece, ultimately we don't see this going too far off the rails in the trilateral and world's largest free trade arena is generally kept intact. And then finally, on fiscal next year, I'm also not expecting more volatility than this year. Obviously, we had the OBVVA, which was a major package encompassed more than tax and spending. It had defense security. I think mechanically, it's hard to see something of that scope next year. Frankly, a lot was accomplished in that original bill. So I think the delta necessarily has to be smaller. The one caveat, of course, is that we're watching the midterms next year seeing if there's any kind of new policy that might be trying to try to get done before that. This $2,000 check has been floated. That could be a couple hundred billion in basically handouts to the US, which would be positive growth, positive inflation. So that's something certainly to keep an eye on on top of any, of course, fiscal risk premium that's required there. So that, I'd say, is the final theater. But again, not as much, I think, volatility there compared to this year. And then finally, on CAD, I mean, alluding to it on USMCA, Canada is one of the places that really hasn't had its trade conflict with the US resolved yet. You've seen other economies get trade deals. Canada has not, so they haven't had any tariff relief yet. And of course, Canada is the only G10 involved in the USMCA renegotiation, which has more, I think, tactical downside risk for CAD, even if over the longer term, things are ultimately expected to settle. And again, the trilateral agreement is struck. Thanks a lot, Patrick, for that. Kunj, last but not least, obviously, you and I work together on a few AI issues. Anything you want to flag here for our listeners? Yeah, sure. Thanks, Mira. And I think for 2026, we do expect AI to still be a prominent theme. And for FX markets, we're really thinking about this through three different transmission channels. So first, the US dollar itself, we do expect that the US should be the primary beneficiary of the AI wave. Yet we do think that the dollar outcomes could play out somewhat less bullishly, given that there are various offsetting factors involved. And in particular, to gauge how much AI pass-through would support the dollar, we think there are a couple of different key metrics to track. So these include relative US growth, US FDI inflows, relative equity market performance, and Fed policy. So we'll be watching to see how all of these evolve to see what the implications should be for the dollar itself. The second channel that we want to highlight is that carry is the AI FX trade. And we've highlighted for some time that FX carry continues to show elevated correlations with equities. And if you look at the subsector indices, it's really elevated correlations with sectors like energy and tech and communication services. So some of the key ones that we expect to be primary beneficiaries of the AI wave. And so this informs our view that FX carry can continue delivering so long as these equity indices are moving higher. And this suggests that even high yielders cannot perform even if they might be less directly exposed to AI than some other low yielders. And finally, the third channel that we're thinking about for the AI FX impact are commodity exporters. And we think that they do stand to benefit if demand for a lot of these commodities increases significantly in line with what our commodity strategists are expecting. And while there's several different commodities that are needed in the AI infrastructure buildout, we do think that the FX impact is likely to be most pronounced via copper, given the intensity of its use in the AI buildout process, as well as the empirical correlations that it does show with FX. So via this channel, we think currencies like the Australian dollar, Chilean peso do stand to benefit as well. Yeah, thanks a lot for that, Kunjan. Thanks, everyone, for joining. And thanks to our listeners for making it through the podcast. If you did manage to get this far. But please take a look at our website if you need more information. This communication is provided for information purposes only. Please refer to JPMorgan research reports related to its content for more information, including important disclosures 2025. JPMorgan Chase and Company All Rights Reserved. This episode was recorded on November 28, 2025.