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Global Disorder, Horn of Africa Turmoil. Can Europe Keep Up?

38m 1s

Global Disorder, Horn of Africa Turmoil. Can Europe Keep Up?

In a podcast interview, Germany's Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Haiko Nitschka, discusses Europe's evolving engagement with the region. He explains that his role was created to provide Germany with a dedicated, on-the-ground regional perspective, particularly in response to growing influence from external actors like Gulf states. While Europe's foremost priority is the war in Ukraine, the Horn remains a key focus within its Africa policy, comparable to the Sahel. Europe's traditional, long-term approach based on partnership, development, and democratic governance is now adapting to a shifting global order. Key adaptations include a heightened focus on Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime security—requiring both immediate hard security responses and long-term capacity building—and a strategic pivot toward more private-sector investment and results-oriented cooperation. Despite challenges to multilateralism and the rise of transactional engagements by other powers, Europe continues to support institutions like the African Union and IGAD. Nitschka asserts that Europe's strength lies in its reliability and predictability, positioning it as a durable partner whose long-term model will remain relevant.

Transcription

6489 Words, 35892 Characters

English
Hi and welcome to the Horn, a podcast from the International Crisis Group. I'm Alan Boswell and this episode is in partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or FES. Today we are speaking with Haiko Nitschka, Germany's special envoy for the Horn of Africa. We talked to special envoy Nitschka about how a changing global order is challenging Europe's long-standing approach to the Horn of Africa region and how Europe can adapt. Special envoy Nitschka, thanks for coming on and speaking with us. You're welcome, happy to be here. So first of all, I believe you are the first to hold this position special envoy for the Horn of Africa for Germany. Can you talk a bit about why this role now exists and how it relates, of course, to the European Union's special envoy role currently held by Annette Weber, who listeners will also know. Yeah, sure. The position was created three years ago and I took up that position about two and a half years ago and the reason was that there was a feeling in Berlin that the Horn of Africa deserves more attention and that there's lots of dynamics from outside of the Horn of Africa, especially from the broader Gulf region that influenced a lot the dynamics on the horn side. So there was a need from a more systematic regional view, a view on the region that takes into consideration the interest and engagement of external actors and how they shape the dynamics in the Horn. So the position was created and I'm based here in Nairobi, which also means it's easier to travel in the region. And as you mentioned, the European Union has for a long time has had that position. Now it's currently its Annette Weber and me, of course, closely coordinate both myself but also my French colleague with Annette and the broader group of Horn of Africa envoys. There's several countries and its institutions that have created that position. So we are in regular interaction, both virtually and in person to coordinate as much as possible our positions and our messaging and of course that coordination is much closer within the European context. So with Annette and Tronkoschri, my French colleague. Where does the Horn of Africa sit on Germany and Europe's priority list in terms of foreign policy? Obviously it's not a number one, but for instance, just as points of reference, how would it compare in Berlin to focus on the Sahel or the Middle East, for instance? There's a special envoy for the Horn of Africa. I would of course like to say that the Horn ranks among the top priorities in Brussels and in European capitals including in Berlin but I can speak for Berlin only but I have to be realistic here of course because with the ongoing aggression of Russia against Ukraine and all its implications for European security, the priorities lie elsewhere. So the absolute focus at the moment in Europe is on countering the threat that Russia's aggression poses to Europe and its neighborhoods. The Horn is certainly not off the radar in Berlin or in Brussels, quite the contrary. The new German government, for example, has in its coalition treaty named the Horn of Africa as a priority region for our Africa policy along with the Sahel. The Horn and the Sahel I would say are on par when it comes to our Africa policy. But then there's also an additional focus on maritime security which is of course extremely relevant for the Horn given that strategic location along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Eden. So while political attention in Berlin may not compare to the situation in the Ukraine or the Middle East, the Horn of Africa certainly up there when it comes to our Africa policy and you can see this that just recently for example all European foreign ministers adopted a common position on the Sudan conflict and its regional implications and the Sudan conflict features a lot in European and in German media not only because of their humanitarian catastrophe there but also because of its regional implications. So in a nutshell it's not top priority I have to say this very openly but it certainly is at the next level of priorities. A common theme in this podcast is of course the changing world order and how that's affecting this region before we get to all of these current geopolitical shifts. What would you say has been Europe's long standing approach towards the Horn of Africa over the past few decades and specifically what does a focus on the Horn of Africa's a priority region mean in practice? I would say the advantage of Europe is that its policy is not necessarily a changing according to the flavor of the day. It's a long-term investment in partnerships and it's a long-term approach so I would say there are a lot of constants over the past decades and this is of course a focus on peace, security, economic development, democratic governance. So those are the constants when it comes to Europe's view on and interaction and engagement in the Horn of Africa but I would say that over the past years Europe has adapted its approach given the changing circumstances and those are as you mentioned of course the role of other external actors in the region that have increased their footprint in the region and bringing along with them alternative norms and resources but I think more recently the issue of maritime security has really also changed the view on the Horn of Africa. We had the piracy issue a couple of years ago but with the Hussi attacks on the maritime trade and its implications also for Europe that has certainly shifted let's say the Horn to a more geopolitical and geostrategic level. So this is one factor which has in a way led to an adapted approach by Europe. The other one being the external actors and then we see also general weakness of the multilateral institutions in the region not only in the region actually but globally, continually and then with EGAD as the regional institution. So this is also something let's say more recent which Europe has to adapt to. So again I don't think you can expect change in the European approach a dramatic change the way you may see it in the United States or elsewhere but it's more of a constant with adaptation. So I just want to dig into that a bit more because I think this will be the main focus of this conversation to try to understand how exactly Europe is adapting amid all this especially on its approach towards Africa and the Horn specifically. I think for quite a while Europe's efforts were obviously much more in conjunction with American efforts but this is increasingly less especially now the US is pulling back under this administration but even when it is not pulling back it's often going its own way you have these other regional powers filling more of that vacuum of course the region itself is also in flux. So as Europe tries to adapt to all this how exactly does it try to fit in the world where often in some ways it feels like it's going alone in support of multilateralism and some of these longstanding models. That's a very good question because of course there's an ongoing discussion on this exact question in Brussels and in European capitals and including in Berlin so I'm not entirely sure if I can give you a definitive answer as this is very much work in progress but let me try to take a step at it. But what we see is that Europe is one among many now in the Horn the emergence of this middle powers has significantly changed the dynamics and you also alluded to a change in posture of the US when it comes to the Horn so this all comes with opportunities for the Horn but also challenges and there's of course a lot of discussion as to whether this null multi-polar world that plays out also here in this region provides the partners here with more agency so I think in this context and the question of where does Europe fit in we have to first and foremost and this is what we're doing we have to first and foremost define our interests in the region and if and what means we have and what mechanisms we have to achieve those interests so it is really the first step is to see what role can we actually play in what role do we want to play what can we offer our partners in the region and what can we get out of those partnerships so I think those are the fundamental questions that are being discussed in Europe and in European capital but then ultimately it's of course up to the partners here in the region to determine what role they want Europe to play here because there's of course some sort of a competition going on here over norms and resources among all those who engage in that region and we as Europe we cannot and we will not impose ourselves in this competition but I think I'm actually quite confident that in the long run the region itself will see the benefits of a reliable and transparent partnership that Europe has to offer Europe is very predictable in that way and I do think that while right now the mood is more into maybe short-termism and transactional interaction etc the reliability of Europe is something that is the strength of Europe and I do think that in the long run that this will prevail so you mentioned a newer focus in a sense on maritime security which in the context of the horn of course is mostly the red sea and the Gulf of Aden what does that mean in practice what is Europe doing exactly to try to increase security on those important waterways it's of course a complex and multi-layered issue there's one is the hard security response to it and you know about the European engagement in terms of providing maritime security with aspidas the mission etc a cooperation with the US and other partners on this so this is in a way countering the immediate threat that the Houthis pose to the shipping lane which is of course very important for European trade but also for the regional trade of course for the countries here in Africa but also on the Gulf side that have immense losses in terms of income due to that insecurity in a way you have the short-term hard security response but I think in the longer or medium medium to longer run the countries themselves the region itself needs to be able to provide maritime security and this is of course it's a public good so it's in the interest of all but it also comes with challenges and in terms of providing that so I do think that the capacities of the countries in the region need to be strengthened and there are some countries that the European union or also Germany is engaged with in terms of strengthening those capacities let's say of coast guards etc to respond to maritime threats but then this is of course a more longer term effort to build up the regional capacities to do that but then there also needs to be in a way a joint approach on both sides of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden on covering all the issues that come with maritime security we have the threat of terrorist groups we have the threat of piracy but there's also issues of how to respond to disasters that could happen oil spills etc so it's really a complex field and unless the region itself has the institutional framework and the capacities to respond to those I think this should be our goal in the long term it will take some time but to give you another example of where Europe is engaged in is for example trying to get a more systematic discussion and exchange and interaction between the EGA the regional organization on the horn side and the Gulf Corporation Council on the Gulf side centered around peace and development issues around the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to get those two or three institutions for that matter to engage to discuss where are the common interests how can they be addressed etc is something where I do think that these institutions have great value because to do this individually with every country is of course much more complicated so again there's not a short term fixed to the issue but it shows that there's lots of joint interests on both sides of the Red Sea but also in Europe when it comes to maritime security in this region and in practice does that mean for instance on a country like Sudan amid all the other issues European diplomats will be focusing more on that maritime security issue than perhaps it used to be I'm just trying to make it less abstract and more concrete given the situation in Sudan of course I think the maritime issue is not necessarily on top of the agenda it's mostly the humanitarian issue but also trying to get some sort of a cessation of hostilities or a truce access for humanitarian aid and then try to get a political process going so these are the priority issues but when it comes to the maritime space there's certainly great concern in Europe and in the US for that matter when it comes to potential let's say entry points to some countries such as Iran or Russia in Sudan there were some attempts to establish military footholds there and I think this is something which we also made quite clear to the Sudanese authorities and for Sudan that this is something which would be a very great concern to us and our American partners so this is where the maritime topic I think plays into the Sudan context okay to draw us back out a little bit more on the one hand there is these moves by the current US administration to take these aid cuts and also change America's approach towards a lot of the world besides that this is also a period where people are questioning old ideas and I'm wondering how much that's taking place in your estimation in Berlin and in Europe I'd say the old ideas were something like on the development side that long-term European support would help move many of these countries in this region up a spectrum out of aid, reciprocity and towards democracy eventually meanwhile multilateral institutions such as the African Union and EGAD would get stronger over time take on a larger role those sort of paradigms also feel under threat some countries in the region are not moving up the development chain so to speak some of these institutions appear to be stagnating in addition to disorderly regional politics with so many outside actors so I'm just wondering to what degree Europe might be selling itself for its long-term approach but is that long-term approach itself being rethought at this moment and should it be I think the beauty of long-term approaches is that you insulate yourself a little bit from short-termism and overreaction but certainly there's really real discussions going on in Europe when it comes to our role in the world but also our role here in the region and whether our mechanisms our approaches are fit for purpose let's say in this new multi-polar system of disorder rather than order there are deep discussions I can tell you in capitals around that but again it's nothing that you would change from one day to the other so in terms of the aid of course the US aid cuts have sent shock waves not only through the region but also through European capitals but if you look at it closely this didn't necessarily come out of the blue and aid budgets have been reduced before including in Europe so I do think that we see it not temporary phenomenon but a larger and more systemic change also when it comes to European aid and economic cooperation this is of course due to the economic and political developments in key donor countries including in Germany so I would say in general I will expect more it's a targeted and more results oriented corporation but also a much stronger push for private sector investment and linking development corporation with our let's say trade policy because as you said it's difficult to prove the counterfactual of course we don't know what the region would look like if no development corporation would have happened over the past decade so we don't know that let's say the expectations have not necessarily been met so one of the newer approaches also given the type of engagement that we see from others in the region is going to be much more private sector focused when it comes to European engagement here in the region and this is also because the private sector in scene as the driving force behind job creation etc which is in dire need in this region if you look at the demographics only so when it comes to that the aid from our perspective of course the main focus was to try to buffer the shock that the people experienced here in the region from all those aid cuts and we'd been I would say pretty successful in doing our best to at least maintain our level in the most critical regions but when it comes to the sort of the discussion on at the end of aid I do see it's sort of a silver lining in this and because in a way it may force the governments in the region and elsewhere quite frankly to reconsider whether the approach of more or less outsourcing much of their social services etc to partners whether this was the right approach and whether a new type of social contract is necessary and I mentioned the demographics in this region I do think that unless that factor is taken more into consideration by the governments here in the region but also the partners outside in terms of providing more benefits and more perspectives tool the younger generation that this can be quite a significant factor in terms of stability in this region we may see what we've seen also he and Kenya with the Gen Z protests is only the start of something bigger to come so again I'm trying to see a silver lining in this that maybe the rethinking of aid and cooperation may in the medium to longer term actually serve some positive effects okay and on the multilateral question europe has supported for a long time the african union e-gad in the horn of africa region in particular can and will europe sustain support for such multilateral institutions when we're entering a world where it seems frankly almost everyone else is less interested in those multilateral institutions and when it's also under question how much the regions often value those institutions themselves yeah again the question as the multilateral reflex is deeply ingrained not only in european minds but especially in german minds given our history and positive example quite frankly with our close integration into the european union NATO United Nations etc so of course it's no surprise that our support to multilateral organizations both in terms of the continental institution african union all the regional institution e-gad continues to be high on our agenda so you will not get that out of our system quickly I would say but obviously we can't want multilateralism more than the countries in the region wanted and as you rightly said I mean at the moment one can get the impression as an outside observer that multilateralism isn't really a hot commodity here in the region but one has to be of course honest and realistic it's not on a global level either countries everywhere tend to look at their narrow interests rather than to submit to multilateral constraints but does that mean we should give up multilateralism and the institutions that underpin the multilateral system I don't think so and I don't see Berlin thinking that way and I honestly don't think that the people in this region really want that just last week both the AU and the EU held their summit in Angola where our chance level is also attending and it was a clear reiteration of those two multilateral organizations and member states of the benefits of the multilateralism of course we can't just advocate for multilateralism is an end in itself so we do need to be maybe better in really proving the case where it actually delivers on peace and security on economic integration or and this is something which I think becomes more and more important is on securing a seat at the table for the continent but also for the Horn of Africa region and I think as Europe we do have a clear case to make we shouldn't run around preaching the European model as the panacea for everything because of course we have our own issues and challenges in Europe but if there's one thing that Europe can really make a case for is that in a world that has become let's say more complex and more disorderly by sticking together as a block by having a common market by having common positions we are in fact much more able to maneuver in that multipolar world and we have more bargaining power on so vis-à-vis superpowers and I think that's something that this region could really benefit from because we don't necessarily have that yet so yes on that let's say rather abstract level I think there is a case to be made when it comes to multilateralism and integration but I could also say in terms of concrete cases for example you have the Sudan conflict where you know most Sudanese themselves at least those that I talk to they see the African Union as the key facilitator for an eventual process they say it's Sudan is member of the African Union it's the continental institution and it should play the role as a facilitator whether alone or supported by others and I do think that when we speak of a Sudanese peace process which hasn't even started yet this will be extremely long and it'll be a challenging process and I fear that only the continental organization or the regional organizations will have the strategic patience to see this through to fruition so I do think that even here a case is to be made and if you look at Somalia another case in the region there's a lot of discussion on the future of the AU mission out some does it have a future if so how will it look like etc but what we see is an increased bilateralization of the security arrangements there's a plethora of external actors involved in Somalia it's a security cooperation so I do think that even if awesome were to eventually leave for have to leave there's some need of some sort of a multilateral framework on the security in Somalia where the AU and the United Nations are part of because otherwise it's going to be difficult to see how all these bilateral interests and efforts converge towards a common goal of building a stable and peaceful Somalia so again yes multilateralism in this region and globally is under strain but I do think that the benefits of it can be and should be demonstrated it's a bit of a paradox where with so many different outside actors the need for greater coordination among those actors is only growing starker at the same time as the existing multilateral institutions themselves feel under threat to a degree so to pivot a little bit one thing we mentioned up top was that in your role you engage a lot with these key external actors especially in the Middle East often referred to as emerging middle powers what do you see as the prospects for Europe to coordinate more with those regional middle powers in the Horn of Africa of course there are huge challenges there as well including in terms of just basic models and approaches towards the region and disagreements on that front so what do you see as the prospects of that based off all your engagements I think one of the benefits of this position is of course you clearly see that you cannot adequately understand the dynamics here in the Horn of Africa anymore without recognizing the interests and the different forms of engagement by external actors mainly from the Gulf or the greater Middle East the range from actually quite needed investments in infrastructure connectivity banking energy etc to you mentioned that varies degrees of security cooperation but of course many of those have also engaged in the mediation space so of course Europe is engaging with those partners more and more not only on issues of European security or Middle Eastern policy but also on the Horn of Africa so I would say the situation in Sudan Somalia Ethiopia Eritrea is on the list of talking points for every meeting now with officials coming from Brussels or European capitals and of course it's also our main mandate as a special invoice for the Horn of Africa to engage with our partners in the Gulf and elsewhere to discuss the dynamics here so there's certainly a greater need to intensify our exchange but first and foremost I think there's still a need to better understand the interests and the approaches of those middle powers because only if you really make an effort to do that you can then also use this as a basis to identify where the commonalities but also differences so this is certainly seen a huge uptick in the last years for example I organized the second ambassadorial conference a couple of weeks ago for our embassies from the Horn from the Gulf from Egypt and Turkey to discuss exactly that the role of and the influence of the middle powers in the Horn and what that means for our foreign policy but I do think that what is required in all of this is not to lose sight of the interests of the governments and the people in the Horn themselves let's become the discussion about the Horn but not with the Horn and I think that's something we have to be very careful not to go down that road too much because ultimately it's for the countries here in the region themselves to define what they want from those external partners and what type of cooperation they want and how they want to navigate in this multipolar world or this multipolar region from your engagements with those middle powers to what degree might there be prospects of greater coordination greater buy-in to a joint approach because if every country is going its own way the obvious outcome is chaos to a degree and sometimes unfortunately war and escalating war like we've seen in Sudan but we could see something similar in Somalia with so many bilateral countries both within the region Kenya Ethiopia especially but also then these others further afield all taking their own approach based off your engagements what do you think are the prospects to getting these middle powers together with Europe and the region itself to coordinate more because otherwise the outcome looks bad for everyone yeah I would say we are in a state right now of some sort of a new order emerging but we don't know yet how it looks like and quite frankly despite this let's say comparatively massive engagement of the middle powers here in the region I'm not sure as to whether there's a clear vision in those capitals on what sort of the new order should look like so I do think we are in a phase right now of positioning repositioning trying to get the first mover advantage etc because nobody really knows what is emerging here and at the moment as you mentioned we see more of a competition among those external actors a competition over visions and approaches we clearly see an economic competition over markets and maritime hubs etc we see as you also mentioned different approaches to the very notion of statehood in a way how do you relate with central governments or sub regional or even non-state actors in Sudan and Somalia of course cases in point but again I think if one looks at what could be the common interests of those middle powers and Europe for that matter I do see that there are some issues that could provide opportunities for more coordination not only among the Gulf states but also between them and us in Europe and the first one we spoke about is the maritime security space it is a public good it is something that no country itself can really ensure by itself there's lots of talk about the European interests in that and of course markets have been hit by that but it's mostly the countries in the regions themselves that suffer from maritime insecurities ultimately and I've spoken about this earlier there needs to be some sort of the regional approach to that covering both sides of the Red Sea so that's a field I think where there is space for more coordination among those middle powers the second one if you look at the nature of the investment that many of those middle powers undertake in the region that's infrastructure roads dry ports etc those types of investments in infrastructure but also in food security are of course highly vulnerable to political risk so again while right now there seems to be a bit of a staking the claims early on buying to secure maybe access nodes before others do it I do think that in the longer run those middle powers realize that insecurity conflict etc is not good for the investments because of the type of investment they're doing so again but maybe there will be some more of a coordinated approach towards peace and security in the region and then lastly another issue is of course the migration issue where we often forget that the main destinations at the moment at least for migrants from the region from the owner of Africa are the Gulf states there's also joint interest there between the Gulf and Europe that ultimately the factors that drive migration need to be addressed in the region itself be it the conflict induced migration or climate related migration and the need to create opportunities in the region itself for the younger population so here also I think there's a joint interest both between Europe and the Gulf but also within the Gulf that one can build on so right now the situation may look as if it's a free for all but I do think that in the more medium to longer term there's enough points of converging interests that could be an official to a more coordinated approach I'm conscious of time so just a couple for the questions to wrap this up first of all one question that comes up a lot that I'm sure you've heard as well is that we still see the US play a major role oftentimes one in which the US will swoop in in a sense and act as mediator of last resort within this region but also increasingly some of these other countries such as Turkey or Gulf countries come in and mediate in the horn there's often been a question of why Europe doesn't play a bigger role as mediator in the region of course I'm not saying it doesn't play any role but doesn't do some of this more high level mediation and take a lead role in ending some of the conflicts within the region I often hear this as a question framed as values versus transactional but it strikes me as more of a question about high level engagement or perhaps can Europe play more of a role moving ahead in terms of helping mediate this conflict especially given that the US role itself is a major wild card moving ahead yeah sure why not I think you mentioned that Europe is already quite engaged maybe more behind the scenes and not in the limelight on many of the conflicts or the dynamics here in the region the European Union was quite active in ending the Tigray war in Ethiopia even though the African Union was more in the limelight they paved the way for the Ankara agreement between Ethiopia Somalia very active in the Sudan conflict so the question is of course what makes a good mediator and first and foremost it's the parties that accept a mediator and a mediator comes with let's say enough incentives for the parties to stay engaged and I think when you look at the current mediation efforts of course the US still remains at the moment the go-to and I think that is something we have to underline a bit more we don't see a complete withdrawal from the US in the region but as you said it become a bit more unpredictable and when you see the Gulf involvement in the mediation space when it comes to the incentive packages I think they have a bit more of an advantage to Europe but again sometimes it's the long due later sort of the strategic patience that is required because these peace processes of course a truth or cessation of hostilities is not the end of the conflict it may be the end of the fighting but the conflict is not solved and this is where it gets difficult this is where you need really a long breath and strategic patience to mediate a process so that's something again where I would see Europe equipped because of our long-term investment in our partnerships in the region of course question is of priorities and we spoke about that in the beginning but I wouldn't rule out for say that the Europe can be more active here in the region as a mediator if again if the parties wanted but it's difficult also to see in these complex circumstances and these complex conflict dynamics that one mediator can do the trick I do think that it's become more necessary for a group of let's say mediators or a group of influential countries or institutions to play more in concert and to end these conflicts so usually you may have one or two institutions or countries as the kind of lead mediator but then you have many in the back that do the hard work and I think that's where the European Union is extremely good in it does so right now when it comes to the AU in the Sudan situation and it does so in the Sudan context with the civilians the Sudanese civilians in trying to prepare for a political process so yes I would say why not Europe can't pay that role but ultimately call me maybe romantic or naive but I would want to see the region itself engaged more on the mediation fight both EGAD and the AU have a successful mediation track record including in the Sudan and I see no reason why this shouldn't be the case began but it of course requires the adequate political will it requires dedication of time and energy and when you look at the Sudan let's be clear it requires a serious and dedicated and 24/7 mediation effort in the interest of time I want to ask you one final question I thought was useful to probe some of these bigger ideas so we haven't talked as much about dynamics within the region itself and you were previously posted in Addis Ababa we were all watching the Sudan conflict of course very closely but the other major huge concern within this region is the dynamics between Ethiopian Eritrea and the fears that there could be a new war between those two countries how worried are you on that front well very much so I'm very worried about that not necessarily because I think that either side actually wants an escalation or a conflict but if you look at the history Addis Ababa in Asmara have sleep walked into a devastating conflict before so there is of course a risk of history repeating itself and if that were to happen there are many that fear that this would quickly embroil neighbors and others that's turned into a regional war with really devastating consequences and this is of course the last thing that this region needs so yes I do think there's reason to be concerned to be worried and as you mentioned I've lived in Ethiopia I frequently travel to both Addis and Asmara and the fact that we're actually talking again about the possibility of war between those neighbors is in my view the real tragedy of the one of Africa without peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea let's be clear the entire region will not find lasting stability so it's unfortunate but maybe even symptomatic of the state we live in that we see the very basic principles not only of the African Union but the UN Charter put into question sanctity of borders respect for sovereignty territorial integrity refraining from the threat of use of force if those fundamental principles and guardrails of the international order continue to be questioned or undermined I think this region will become a free for all and we cannot let that happen so I think we must collectively do our best so that Ethiopia and Eritrea find back to a mode of cooperation rather than confrontation and they've done so before and I'm hopeful that they will be able to do so again thank you very much for coming on the podcast we really appreciate your time and all your insights thank you very much pleasure to be here thanks for listening you can find out more about crisis group or read our reports at crisisgroup.org once again I'm Alan Boswell and the horn is produced by me Francis and Ida Halli Nambi

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. Germany created the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa position to provide a systematic regional view, acknowledging increased influence from external actors like Gulf states.
  2. While Europe's absolute foreign policy priority is countering Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Horn of Africa remains a top focus within European and German Africa policy, on par with the Sahel, with a newer emphasis on maritime security.
  3. Europe's long-standing approach emphasizes long-term partnerships focused on peace, security, economic development, and democratic governance, but is adapting to a more multipolar world and increased maritime threats.
  4. Adaptation involves redefining European interests, strengthening private-sector engagement alongside aid, and building regional maritime security capacities, while maintaining support for multilateral institutions like the AU and IGAD.
  5. Europe positions itself as a predictable, reliable partner, believing its long-term, transparent partnership model will prove valuable despite current trends toward short-term, transactional engagements by other actors.

Summary:

In a podcast interview, Germany's Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Haiko Nitschka, discusses Europe's evolving engagement with the region. He explains that his role was created to provide Germany with a dedicated, on-the-ground regional perspective, particularly in response to growing influence from external actors like Gulf states. While Europe's foremost priority is the war in Ukraine, the Horn remains a key focus within its Africa policy, comparable to the Sahel.

Europe's traditional, long-term approach based on partnership, development, and democratic governance is now adapting to a shifting global order. Key adaptations include a heightened focus on Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime security—requiring both immediate hard security responses and long-term capacity building—and a strategic pivot toward more private-sector investment and results-oriented cooperation. Despite challenges to multilateralism and the rise of transactional engagements by other powers, Europe continues to support institutions like the African Union and IGAD.

Nitschka asserts that Europe's strength lies in its reliability and predictability, positioning it as a durable partner whose long-term model will remain relevant.

FAQs

The position was created three years ago because Berlin felt the Horn of Africa deserved more attention, especially due to increasing external influences from regions like the Gulf. It aims to provide a systematic regional view that considers how external actors shape dynamics in the Horn.

While not the top priority due to focus on Ukraine and European security, the Horn is a key region for Europe's Africa policy, on par with the Sahel. It also gains importance through maritime security concerns in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Europe's approach has been a long-term investment focused on peace, security, economic development, and democratic governance. It adapts to changing circumstances, such as increased external actors and maritime security challenges, but maintains these core constants.

Europe is redefining its interests and role in a multipolar region, emphasizing reliable and transparent partnerships. It focuses on what it can offer partners and adapts by strengthening private sector engagement and targeted, results-oriented cooperation.

Europe engages in hard security responses, like EU naval missions, and works to build regional capacities, such as coast guards. It also fosters dialogue between regional organizations like IGAD and the Gulf Cooperation Council to address common interests.

Europe is shifting toward more targeted, results-oriented cooperation and greater private sector investment to drive job creation. This reflects a broader systemic change, aiming to buffer aid cuts while encouraging governments to reconsider social contracts.

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