Global Data Pod Weekender: Now what?

(upbeat music) - Welcome to the JP Morgan Weekender. I'm Bruce Cazman, with me, it's Joe Lupton. Hey, Joseph. - Hey, Papa Bear. - How you doing? - Pretty good. - I'm not doing so well. - It's jet lagging, peril lagging. - I don't jet lagging payrolls. You're never gonna let me hear the end of this one. - We're gonna talk about it. I guess, you know, from my point of view, the point about what we're seeing is the juxtaposition. So I think what we're getting on the growth data is not only strong, but it's broad-based. You know, I think what we're getting is evidence that we're running, you know, more than a half a percentage point above trend globally. Most everywhere in the world is looking solid as we move through the third quarter. It comes on the back of what has been, actually, now looking even better as a first three-quarters of the year, 'cause we've have provised up where numbers and second-quartered numbers when they've come in have come in stronger. You know, so we've got this world that's been doing well as increasingly show-oving breath, doesn't have any real sign of losing momentum at the end of the third quarter. That's certainly the message from the PMI's here. But it's not showing the kind of rebound and labor demand that we thought we'd get with it. And I think, you know, that's the message not just from today's payroll report, but it's a message from what we saw from the ERA report, which is an August report earlier this week. And more generally, the numbers are, at best, a smidgen better than they were six or nine months ago. So, you know, I think the idea that central banks are on the move makes sense 'cause inflation is sticky and because growth is strong and people are feeling, hey, we need to calibrate to that. I think the idea that they don't need to move aggressively right now, and certainly the concerns that we might be starting to see in October round merge has gone away. But I think we're sitting here with this fundamental debating point, which is, you know, our view is that the cyclical lifting demand is going to come together with a pickup and labor demand, which is a good thing 'cause it generates income that's more balanced. But that also creates some pressure on vital labor markets, pressures on wages. And that's part of what gets us into trouble with central banks. But, you know, this same time that we're getting our cyclical lift, we're also not getting the labor market. And that does bolster what has been in some ways the alternative narrative here that technology is doing the work of generating growth. We're getting it from productivity. We don't need job gains to get that growth and that, you know, therefore something is changed here. And in some ways, that's a significant story if we're on that path because it doesn't put the pressure coming from labor markets onto central banks. So I could keep going here, but that's kind of, you know, where I am, I haven't lost confidence in the view that we're going to get the labor demand. Well, let me say this is, I haven't lost broad confidence in it, but I'm certainly not happy with what I saw today. So, I lost your marbles. I, you know, two out of three reports in a row that were weak. Was I reminded you two out of four were good? Yeah, whatever you want to put into that mix, it still doesn't change the fact that today was a weak report. So, yeah, yeah, no, absolutely. I would just kind of maybe add and extend a little bit of some of the way you're characterizing things. I mean, you said 3Q is looking strong. And yes, it is the GDP numbers as we're tracking, not just the US, but I think broadly where we kind of are feeling pretty good when you look across-- By the way, it's not two out of four, Joe. The June report was 31,000. Last four months with 31 minus-- How does revised up? No, no, 31 minus 10, 133, and 29. So, I think it's fair to say one out of four. OK, well, I box you into the corner of taking the more downbeat Joe's side of this conversation. I'm just saying what the reality is. OK. I mean, look, what I want to highlight is that while the third core is looking good, I do think there is a tension here, and it's a tension in the data tracking, where I would say, you look at the employment news that you just gave on the US, and yes, it was important for you to note that the European news is also-- was not great. I think, when you look at the way August industrial production numbers are lining up, there's some softness there. And again, none of this stuff I am raising alarm bells on, but retail sales, I think, outside the US, it seemed like things weren't really doing as well. I think the non-tech story-- I was talking to Maya about this. She's saying the non-tech lift story is starting to look a little less strong versus the tech story, which is just going gamebusters. None of this, as I said, is alarm bells, but it just felt like when everything was firing on all cylinders, a number of parts of those stories are looking-- I would take issue with the way you're looking at things. I don't think that's the right way to look at the data. Well, I wanted to say-- you can just say, this is all noise, and then the most important thing that I was going to say is that all the surveys are still very strong. And I'm going to stand by the PMI's, which right up through September-- I mean, these are-- we should-- and listeners should know. These are the types of PMI signals and trends that you see when you're in a cyclical lift. And it's importantly, services are a big part of that lift. The employment numbers in that are like gamebusters. So it's just kind of hard to square some of what is noisy data, which maybe is what you're going to say with these relatively-- not relatively-- these strong survey readings and a third-quarter overall GDP number that's holding up well. The other thing that I want to say here, though, just to kind of respond to some of your opening comments, is you say we still believe you're going to get more of the R narrative, which is labor markets kind of picking up to generate the grill. That gives you some of the tension for central banks to start hiking and that opposed to this other kind of tech-driven AI-driven-- no labor-type story. And you say we're sticking with that narrative. I would argue-- and I think you do, too. So not only is that our story, we need that story for the cycle to continue, right? The argument-- and you kind of hinted at it-- that labor markets recovering is what gives you the labor income that is going to keep and sustain consumer spending because we don't think consumer spending is going to keep going. Well, I don't want to-- I think we're going to end up going down-- a road we've gone down many times before. I think if you want to tell the alternative narrative-- and I agree, if you're not getting the jobs, then you have a more difficult time continuing to support household income. But just look at the last four quarters through Q2. There were no jobs in the US. And US personal income grew almost 5%. Now, you can talk about what your view on energy prices are and where your potential for inflation is here. I can also say just because something's happened in the last five quarters doesn't mean it's going to keep happening. So saying is there are things that can happen here that could get you pretty decent labor income, pretty decent personal income, without an environment in which you need very strong jobs. So if I wanted to argue for the alternative narrative, I would argue that what you're seeing is a world in which income is being generated for the household sector, but it's not coming from job creation as much. And I would suggest that what we saw this week, in terms of the revisions to US income, is actually supportive of that notion, because we just had a significant upward revision to income over the last year, without it obviously being with any change in jobs. But through is that income half a trillion dollar upward revision to interest income. By our own internal numbers, that's going to about 20% of households. Wait a minute, you had an eight tenth upward revision to labor compensation over the last four quarters. Yeah. That's what's labor compensation in dollar terms. I don't know what 16, 17 trillion. That's a data that you're talking about the revision over three years. I'm talking about the revision over four quarters. I'm just talking about the level, the level which is a revision. The level revision is over three to five years. But then Bruce, you know, the interest income is something they just found in the last kind of four quarters with the rise in interest rates. And that's a very recent phenomenon. I think both have moved sympathetically over the last four quarters. I think the rise in interest income, and I go back and over it has actually been more sustained. But anyway, the labor income is growing. Forget, forget the interest. income, which I think is important in this story, but labor income is growing 4.8% in the four quarters through Q2 without any job growth to speak up. Where's that coming from, Joe? Well, I think you've had pretty strong wages, but those are falling now. Well, right? We've had significant wage. Over the last four quarters, most of the wage numbers are running three and a half or less. If I look at the, I mean, this is another thing where we can go around and round. My point is, Joe, you're right. There's a risk here, and I'm very sensitive to the risk, but I don't think it is implausible to think about a scenario where you can get solid GDP growth, solid household purchasing power, and not much in job growth. It's an alternative narrative to ours. I do. I do. I don't think I'll stand by that call that you will not get that type of outcome. If you're going to grow zero jobs for the next year, you will not sustain this expansion. Okay, 25,000. We're going to like quibble about 25,000. Sure. I'll give you. If we get 25,000. Let's just say we put in a U.S. forecast of somewhere over 2% GDP growth. What do you think you need in terms of labor, in terms of labor income, nominal labor income to deliver that nominal labor income? Yeah. I think I want to see 5% and you don't think other sources of income are going to add to that? No. And I do think a distribution. I do think the distributions, you just talked about interesting income isn't that going to be going up over the next three or four quarters? Again, for 20% of the households out there. Why is it that you only think 20% of the households have deposits and money market funds in 401(s). If you think this interesting income is going to people with deposits, I'd like to know what bank you've got your check in account. That's not where the income is going. Well, I would just say the following. I would just say that the upward revisions to income that we saw over the last year, which are labor income and interest income, proportionally to the balance sheet, is probably more important for middle-class households than upper income households. I think that, again, let me finish my point. In that context, what our card data is telling us, which is that the middle income households have been holding up like the upper income households, and this K-shaped story about the household sector has nuanced in it, which is that the middle income households have been doing quite well, and in some ways, I think, been the real heroes in this story, is now a little bit more consistent because of what we see in the income revisions. Okay. I don't think you're going to sustain it. I don't think you're going to get it just off interest income. I don't think people are going to keep spending if you don't have jobs. I also think the-- I also think the deal of $60 percent of the distribution is going to become increasingly a problem and a political problem. All I'm saying to you is that there are paths that get you an outcome of decent income without much in terms of jobs, decent purchasing, power, and obviously it helps a lot if energy prices are coming off if we follow our house forecast. I'm not arguing that I wouldn't be concerned and I certainly would be obviously wrong if that were the case, but I think you could be wrong with weaker job growth in a scenario where the economy turns out to be weaker, and you could be wrong with weaker job growth in a scenario where the economy looks different in terms of its outcome. It's the return of the Rontier consumer living off asset income for the next business cycle. Yeah, anyway, I say maybe. I don't think so. I think I'll stand by what I started where we started. If you're saying you can contemplate a expansion continuing with 25,000 in jobs for the next year, I'll take the other side. If we had started the year and I told you that US jobs for this year are going to average 50,000 a month, what would you have been comfortable with the idea that the economy was going to grow two and a half to three percent? At the start of the year? Yeah. No, because I didn't know the stock market was going to go up another 30 percent or whatever. You know, so I do think that has helped a lot, and I'll admit, I'll admit that the length of this story to stretch has impressed me, Bruce. And so, yeah, you could say, but that's where I started with is just because something keeps being right doesn't mean it's going to keep going forever. And now you have a humility, which is nice. You know, you're like, well, maybe I don't know, maybe it can go another four quarters. I just, I have a hard time, see, I have a harder time seeing that than you, I guess. Well, I think there's two sides of the story of being wrong here. One side of the story is we're wrong and everything falls apart, which is to say as you're describing, if you don't get jobs, you don't get growth. That's the other side of the story. Well, the other side of the story is we don't get jobs and something is fundamentally shifted here in a way that you can get growth without much in the way of jobs, because households are benefiting in other ways, and the economy is being driven by other sources of that. I just think there are no households that are getting that story. Well, maybe, but I would just say that I think there are two sides to this sort of story of us being wrong. And we can be wrong about everything and we can be wrong about the composition of growth, even if we get growth. You know, we're in the solid growth camp, so we could be wrong if we are wrong. If we're wrong, of course, that we get the solid growth without much in jobs, then we're probably going to be much more in a, in a macular disinflation, you know, fed, not having to do much. Well, if we're wrong on the growth side, I think then things I didn't say we're wrong on the, I said if we're wrong on the job side, but we write on the growth side. Oh, I see. Yeah. Yeah. What will then our inflation call be? That's more, that's complicated. Yeah, I agree, because I probably even more than you have been pushing the labor market story as under the foundation for the inflation side of this. And I think you're right to say that it's more complicated and that there's the number of inflation forces that are working through the system right now that are somewhat detached from the labor market story. You know, whether it's, you know, the kind of the tech prices, you know, the energy shock pass through, you know, you've got things like food prices. I mean, goods prices right now are, our core goods prices are really taking off. Well, the pressures are taking off. We had a low side reading for September this week from the euro area. I mean, I'm talking, yeah, global, right? We're talking global here, right? No, I'm saying that the, the pressures are there. The import price pressures, the commodity price pressures, the survey pressures are all there. I don't think we've got it fully in the actual readings on, on core goods inflation. The US has been lagging behind. And the euro area at this week and the September reading, it was starting to move up, but we had a number which was close to zero in terms of the monthly ECB report. So where we got over all core, are you talking core goods? I'm talking core goods. I mean, I'm just looking at the numbers that Nora sent around today. I'm seeing core goods inflation in the euro area, over 2% on a three month run, right? And I mean, Japan's core goods are running close to 9% for Japan. Japan is a, well, I mean, you know, I mean, it's, no, no, but the euro area number, the number today was, you say, you say, forget Japan, but maybe you're looking at the same chart. I mean, everyone's kind of moving together. So it's not like Japan is this weird kind of crazy story. You're seeing a lot of these others kind of, turn a corner and accelerate. Yeah, I know, I'm saying there's, there's some pressure there, but I don't think it's reflecting what some of these, yeah, I mean, just to bring this back and so we can kind of find a nice useful way to pivot. This was just to say that you're contemplating a forecast where the gross story is right, but the labor market isn't right that stays weak. And so we're asserting that I have a hard time seeing how that works out, but we're asserting that what does that mean for inflation? And I was just saying there are a number of inflationary forces that work that go beyond the labor market story. So it's not clear you get the immaculate disinflation in that scenario, in which case you could still be, you know, kind of hawkish on central banks here. That'd be an interesting one. If you have weak labor markets in central banks, we're still forced to be hiking rates. Well, it's certainly possible in the certain circumstances. I mean, they're hiking now. We don't have have the live market kicking into gear, although the U-rate in the US is down three-tenths or so. - Yeah, we felt like we did. - Yeah, yeah, we felt like everything was fallen into place. - So, Joe, where's your best job? - 12 hours on where global GDP is in Q4 at this point. We've been running high twos pretty consistently, which is about a half a percentage point above our estimated potential. Are you comfortable that we're gonna keep that going into the fourth quarter? Are you starting to worry about the downside or the upside, which way? - So, you and I have always, I mean, this call has been dominated by talks about risk distributions for much of this year. And in that, I'd like modal forecasts, you and I tell the story a little differently here and there, but I think for the most part of telling, we're singing for the same, him note here. I think on risks, you're gonna start in arguing, 'cause you know, I've always been worried about more of the downside. And I would say, yeah, I mean, you know, you could look at what this kind of third quarter tension that I raised earlier, which is-- - That's why I was getting it. I was trying to figure out if you're really starting to worry about the fourth quarter. - I've been saying, like, even any of the clients are listening to that, but it keeps the equilibrium here. - Right, exactly. - So that I've been talking to clients, like, I always kind of end this very constructive story of what strong growth, sticky inflation higher rates, with the idea that, hey, we're not wearing rose colored glasses. We recognize there are some real risks here. And I think the thing that's always been on my mind is that are we just seeing this kind of sugar high from US fiscal stimulus? Are we, you know, our kind of equity markets, you know, and you talk to the equity guys, I think they're actually starting to sound a little bit more cautious in a way that I hadn't expected. And they're kind of-- - Well, let me stop you there, 'cause I think it's an interesting question. If we actually believe the US grew three and a half in Q3, and we actually believe that labor income is growing, you know, effectively little less than three, less than four, excuse me, like I was gonna say, yeah. You know, we've got inflation running around three, and we got like something like a 7% nominal GDP quarter with about a 4% labor income quarter. You know, how could this not be a quarter of road-based, strong profit growth? On the back of what-- - Yeah. - Well, it was 20% gains in NEPA profits in the four quarters through Q2. I mean, I don't understand where that concern about profitability is coming if our macro picture makes sense. - No, it does, and if I can, you know, just kind of-- - I mean, that's an upset of the line from-- - Lack of jobs, right? - If I can extract everyone's mind from the everyone jumps to tech and is kind of a lala over tech, I think you'd have to look at the three and a half percent consumer spending number and say, that's revenue going to not the, and videos of the world, right? That's like going to just broad-based, you know, spending and in companies should be seeing those revenues. And I agree, and yet, you know, if you look at some of the kind of consumer stocks, they're really taking a hit in the last-- Now, I will say that this really highlights I'm three Q versus the momentum heading into four Q, 'cause I think a lot of this concern when I talk to the equity guys, it's a very recent thing, right? And like, it's the last four weeks. And so maybe the third quarter is just not capturing that, you know. - But let me go ahead and follow the other side. Is it, is it, is it because one of the things that certainly I have on my mind is how people are shifting their views on equity valuations in a world in which interest rates have moved significantly higher here. - Yeah. - So one of the questions here is what's happening is not the earnings on the ground story, but the degree to which a path now that has interest rates higher is changing people's views about what the economy is gonna deliver three and six and nine, 12 months from now. - Yeah, I, you know, I had, this is a huge topic, 'cause probably the topic has come up the most over the past week until this morning's payroll report, which is like, you know, how can the economy tolerate this fairly significant interest rate shock that we've seen less about the, well, I mean, you know, front end, we've swung 100 basis points from 70 of cuts to 100 of 170, right? 70 of cuts to 100 of hikes. I mean, I've been giving the stock answer, which I'm sure is, is our, are you, which is that when rates are going up because we have a strong economy, you know, it's not that can the economy tolerate is that the economy needs higher interest rates just to, to calibrate. - Well, I think, I think the argument people would give is in this is not necessarily where I would tell the story, is that the economy's strength is very concentrated. So if you can't, if interest rates are going up because growth is being driven in a narrow space, the other parts of the economy, do you get hurt? - I was gonna get to that. I was saying the stock answer is what I just said. And, but I think the concern is twofold. One is the concentration within the US. And then I think when I talk to some of the, in the kind of the EM side of the universe, they're saying, what if this is the US can tolerate this, but the rest of the world can't tolerate this. And it kind of flies in the face of the common notion that I know we've been putting out there as a theme that that no, this is a global economy. - Well, that's my point. I see strong shots. - Maybe it's not. - And the US getting very strong support this quarter. And I see breath across the world. I also see a world in which the stuff that is traditionally introsensitive is not that important a driver of growth in the business cycle with some exceptions. I mean, obviously where mortgage markets are very sensitive to being reset with short-term interest rates of place like Australia. Maybe even we have to think about a, you know, Canada, even a Japan there. I don't know, you know. But the broad story, I think, is the standard one which is interest rates going up because there's growth, but it's broad-based growth, there's profits, but it's broad-based profits. So as long as the central banks are not out to me. So why isn't this, you know, you're starting to lean in the direction of downside risk. The PMIs are gonna hit five-year highs in September. Equity markets are gonna record highs. Why are you, why are you, why are you, why are you, why are you, why are you, why are you leaning in the direction of downside here? Because I've been worried about these kind of fundamental narratives, it's pretty plausible that you had a big fiscal stimulus that's gonna roll off. You've got the energy shock which is picked back up, right? So I mean, August was a relief period. And now the energy shock is kind of back on. Diesel prices are like, you know, incredibly high right now. Which by the way, that also goes into the goods pricing we were talking earlier, I've got to mention. You know, I think that shock is there. And you know, this kind of K-shape stuff worries me a bit more that we're getting income, but it's very, it's in a way when I talk about wealth effects is driving the K-shape recovery, telling me that we're gonna get a half a trillion of interest income is just a mapping of capital gains into asset income, right? They're kind of two sides at the same coin. So, well, I would challenge you because I've already asked you to do this. So I challenge you to kind of look at what our card data is saying about middle class. And then line that up with what the balance sheet from the flow of funds is doing. And challenge me in a world where I'm arguing that what you're missing here is that the middle class has actually been getting very meaningful balance sheet gains from interest income, from a dynamic where people have jobs but are maybe insecure, but they have jobs and they're still getting decent labor income. And they do have some sensitivity to the equity market. And what you got is rather than talk about a K-shape economy where people tend to think, well, that's the top 10% and then we're talking about the lower, you know, 40 or 50% than what we really have is very large units at the very extremes, but a very solid middle that we should actually pay more attention to in terms of the way we tell the story. - Yep, maybe. - Tell me, no, tell me if I'm wrong, I don't know. - I don't know. - I tell them, I think, you know, you're the consumer guy, you're the card data guy. - Why? - I want you to give me a recent thing, I know the data. I know the data, I know what you're talking about. - I mean, so disabuse me of my bias. - I can't. - Okay, then don't, then don't, then don't you. (laughing) - Look, I don't think, I don't think there's any doubt that there's a balance here of some supports and some drags, but what I guess I'm saying here is within a range of trends who are meaningfully above trend, I don't think we're gonna break out of that anytime soon. So, you know, we could end up being surprised to the downside. We're running like two eight, two nine right now on global GDP for the fourth quarter. For the third quarter, excuse me. You know, so could we be two five or could we be three in Q four? Yeah. If we get two five, are we going to start to say that's a week outcome? Two for what? Global GDP. Global GDP. Global? Yeah. No. I mean, I thought that is our forecast. You're really what you're going to say like your downside is two five if our forecast is two seven. I thought you're going to say my range is two five to three for the fourth quarter. And if we're going from my point is exactly yours. If we're going to end up at two five starting from two seven or two eight, is this going to really change the messaging on what the global economy is doing? I don't think so. No, I'm more worried about one five. Yeah, I'd say that's almost certainly not going to happen here in Q four. Certainly. I'd say probably that's less than 10%. And for the US, what's your downside? US for Q four? Yeah. US is two to three, I think is a reasonable range. Yeah, but what's your downside? Your two is the lowest you can contemplate. Well, no, obviously anything can happen, right? Four can happen, five can happen, one can happen. I feel like you would have said 12 hours ago or a week ago. 12 hours ago. Well, whatever until you got this morning. Yeah, two to three is what I would have said a week ago, yeah. Yeah. So I was saying news of kind of on the margin feeling like things are. I'm saying to you, I'm saying today's number doesn't change my view about four quarter growth. Yeah, it changes my view about whether or not we're tracking the the labor demand and the labor heighting story. That's what's amazing. You're willing to like use so in other words, what you're going to do is you're going to put you're going to lower your conviction on the labor side of things, but up your conviction on the productivity side of things. Well, I mean, there's a part of this story, which is you may not you may not put too much weight on it or any weight on it, but I'm putting some weight on the fact that hey, I now have a year of a 1% higher income, labor income almost than I had before. And I am willing to extrapolate some of that upward revision into the future as well. Yeah. Okay. I think there's more labor income being generated here than the payroll report suggests. That's certainly the message now from the last four or five quarters, the gap between what personal income is doing. Until we get the next revision. Well, that's that's been one of my points to you. I don't care if you have any bias. Suddenly, suddenly we get an upward revision and you're like, I'm going to put my weight on that. No, I've been saying to you consistently here that we probably have more economists who end up in the forecast graveyard because of their views about what the level of the savings rate is in part because the saving rate and income more generally has a very strong bias to get revised upward over time. I've been saying that consistently. Right. And this week we saw it in the data. And that has and that has. Let's see if you've been listening because I could have told you that. And what if I said in response to that? You don't know. I'm going to tell you what I said. I don't look at the level of the saving rate. I look at the change in the saving rate. The saving rate is still trending out. Joe, I look at the change in income. Yeah. Change in labor income over the last four quarters is almost 5%. That's a percentage point more than where I thought it was 72 hours ago. That matters to me. Yeah. That's what I'm saying. That's going to and that's going to drive your consumption forecast for the coming year. I'm saying it tempers my concerns to the downside off of a one month weaker job number than I expected. You could put these things in perspective. Right. You're asking me how do you put more weight on payroll data or income data? I'm not sure. I don't think I can answer that question in the way that you can. Yeah, you can. No. No. If you're asking me, if you're asking me how much weight do I put on a one month surprise in joint growth? No, no, no, no. That's what we're talking about. No, it's not because this member where we started and I was laughing because I was like, oh, you're putting you in my car because you corrected me and said, well, Joe, it's actually three of the last four payroll reports have been weak. That's right. The three of the four last four payroll reports. That's news today. And that's still makes you pretty good about that news today is that the September report was weak. The other three months we had went downward revisions. Yeah, but the down revisions are small. That's not changing anything. So if you want to say, you want to say what is your perspective? The news that I have this week is the September payroll report and the revisions, the data that's coming in on consumption, the data that's coming in and PMIs and a lot of other things. It global or we're talking U.S. right now. Okay, we want to talk global global does matter as well because there's there's reasons to think about the world from the point of view of connectivity. But I don't feel I don't feel particularly worried about the all we were talking is I don't feel particularly worried about the fourth quarter on growth, either in the U.S. or the rest of the world. I think if all we are looking at was the U.S. I would be a bit more balanced in my feeling this week because I think, you know, as you said, the survey data were great. The employment data in my mind sucked. You also got the these these kind of income revisions, which were better, although like when we're talking about that, we should only talk about the labor income because the interesting income doesn't get me too excited. But then I think when you talk about the the global, I think, you know, the rest of the data flow is not been great. And by the way, you know, we haven't talked about the other major topic with clients this week is, you know, what's happening in kind of European, you know, sovereign debt markets and the pressure coming from that. Well, unfortunately, we don't have time because we've taken all our time going over our debates about converse numbers and households saving rate. So, you know, and it's unfortunate, but we're going to have to call time on this conversation right here. All right, so hold that thought about European sovereigns and we can talk about it next week if we're still both able to. Okay. All right. All right. Well, there we are. The end of another one of these calls. Take take everybody.