The podcast uses Robert Frost's "Mending Wall" to analyze the philosophy and impact of borders. It contrasts the poem's debate with the real-life story of General Leonard Chapman. After commanding the Marines during the Vietnam War—a failed effort to secure a border—Chapman sought redemption by leading the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). He transformed it from a lax agency into a more enforcement-focused organization, tirelessly campaigning to convince the American public that illegal immigration was a serious problem. His work began a decades-long process of fortifying the U.S.-Mexico border. This militarization fundamentally altered a long-standing circular migration pattern documented by sociologist Douglas Massey, where Mexican workers would freely cross a porous border for seasonal work and return home. By dramatically increasing the cost and danger of crossing, these policies disrupted this circulation, ironically leading to more migrants staying in the U.S. permanently rather than returning home. The episode questions whether "good fences" truly make good neighbors or simply create new, unforeseen problems by disrupting natural human and economic patterns.
[MUSIC] Pushkin. [MUSIC] When it comes to love these days, we like to think that we've got it all figured out. We have this false sense of I have control over this. I can filter for someone who's over six feet tall. I can filter for this religion. But not a filter to turn on to say, how kind am I? How loyal am I? This Valentine season, the happiness lab is digging into what really shapes our closest connection. With smart practical insights from experts on love, intimacy, and belonging. Listen to the happiness lab with me, Dr. Laurie Santos, wherever you get your podcasts. Something there is that doesn't love a wall that sends the frozen ground swell under it. Robert Frost, one of the greatest American poets, reading Mendingwall. I let my neighbor know beyond the hill and on a day we meet to walk the line and set the wall between us. They walk together down the border of their properties, between his apple orchard and his neighbor's pine trees. Every spring they have to mend the wall, hauling stones to fill the gaps. The narrator asks his neighbor, do they really need a wall to keep pine and apple trees apart? He only says good fences make good neighbors. Spring is the mischief in me and I wonder if I could put a notion in his head. Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it where there are cows, but here there are no cows? Before I build a wall, I'd ask to know what I was walling in or walling out, and to whom I was like to give offense. My name is Malcolm Gladwell. You're listening to revisionist history. My podcast about things overlooked and misunderstood. This episode is about the most famous line from Mendingwall. Good fences make good neighbors. Written in 1914 as if it were yesterday. The historic home of the US Marine Corps is the barracks in Washington DC, eight Deny streets near Capitol Hill. From May until the end of August, every Friday night, the public is invited for evening parade. Good evening ladies and gentlemen and welcome to the oldest post of the Corps, Marine barracks Washington DC, celebrating over 60 years of performing evening parade. It starts at 8.45, precisely, on the Immaculate lawn in front of the Commandant's house. The ritual of honoring the flag, the famous silent drill, the drum and bugle core. Marines in the traditional white with dark blue tunics, one hour and 15 minutes of precision marching. Evening parade was the creation of General Leonard Fielding Chapman Jr. when he assumed the command of the Marine barracks in 1957. Chapman believed marine parades had become anglicized, too many theatrical flourishes, trick drills, frivolities like the Queen Anne salute, the small hats the British favor, the heavy double-soul shoes with cleats. My policy was that we will be regulation. Chapman once said, "We will be US Marine Corps regulation, we will do everything in accordance with the Marine Corps regulations and we'll do it perfectly." I've been a handful of senior military leaders in my life. They're not like CEOs who represent an infinite range of variation on the general theme of tall white guy. Generals are the product of one of the world's largest and most rigorous meritocracies. To get to the top, they've had to be more disciplined than the disciplined people, and then at the next level up smarter than the smart people, then at the level after that, more charismatic than the charismatic people, and on and on all the way up to five stars. Generals are the winners of a single elimination tournament that goes on for 30 years. Chapman was appointed commandant of the Marine Corps in 1967, served with distinction for four years during one of the most difficult periods in Marine Corps history. He was a southerner who loved Lincoln, a voracious reader, an intellectual, the man who did as much as anyone to bring the civil rights revolution to the Marine Corps. Chapman was once interviewed by a Marine Corps historian, and by the end of the recording, which runs for hours, you want to follow him into battle. Toward the end of the war when we were pulling out of Vietnam, I came to the decision that we were going to clean house, shape up or ship out. Chapman shrank the Marines from 300,000 to 200,000 men. Let go every Marine that he felt did not measure up. Make sure everyone who remained knew what the score was. And I'd make my speech about tightening up the Marine Corps and going back to our standards, and I got applauded every time. And it was in such sharp contrast to what was happening in the other services. See, the other services loosen their standards. Long hair, beer in the barracks, Navy especially, Navy especially, yeah. We went exactly opposite directions. The Navy loosened their standards, sort of the army. Tell me what did he look like? Well, he was very handsome. He was, you know, the pictures of him when he was young and a pretty incredibly, you know, dashing sort of man. This is the general's granddaughter, Danielle Chapman. And he was still very handsome when he was in his 60s and 70s. And tall, you know, he still had that military posture to him, also just an incredible stamina. And he actually was very proud of that too on the golf course that until he was in his 80s, you know, he walked and carried his clubs. And he would really rib his buddies about that. And he would say, you know, they would ride in the cart. And he would say, oh, they're over there riding in the cheeseburger wagon, you know, but he was, he was, he was walking and carrying his clubs the whole way. General Chapman retired from the Marine Corps in 1971. But he didn't take a lucrative job in the defense industry like so many ex-military brass two. Instead, he goes to his boss, the Secretary of Defense, and asks for help in finding another job in government. He gets his wish. In 1973, he's named Commissioner of what was then called the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the agency responsible for securing the borders of the United States. Now, why does he do that? Being head of the Marine Corps is a job of enormous prestige. The INS in 1973 was a backwater. Why would someone take such a big step down? It's not obvious until you think about what Chapman has just been through. Vietnam. He ran the Marine Corps during the worst years of the war. And what was Vietnam? A war about a border. The country was split in two, with a communist government in the North and a pro-Western government in the South. And the North kept sending insurgents across the border to make trouble in the South. That's why the US went to Vietnam to secure the border. The Marines were in the thick of it. They were way up in the farthest corner of South Vietnam right on the border with the North. At one point, the Secretary of Defense wanted a wall built along the border to stop the North Vietnamese from trickling in. It was the job of the Marine Corps to build it and they couldn't do it. They couldn't secure the border. Nothing worked. Chapman saw the failure firsthand. The trouble with Vietnam for the Marine Corps was that the army was in charge of the whole thing. Chapman Sun Walton joined the Marines and served in Vietnam. And the Marines that were there, my dad had no tactical control. In other words, he couldn't tell the 26 Marines to leave a case on and go somewhere else. General Chapman would make the long journey to Vietnam many times, but all he could offer was moral support. There's a moment in his oral history when Chapman describes the orders that came down from the Pentagon when the US military shipped out of Vietnam. Each branch of the military was supposed to pack up and send home anything worth more than $50. Chapman said no. The Marines would bring home everything worth $5 or more. Furthermore, I issued an order that we'd leave our spaces in Vietnam ready for inspection. Everything cleaned up, all the trash buried, all the temporary buildings knocked down and disposed up. And we did that too. We left every one of our
areas in impeccable condition ready for inspection. That's what the Marine Corps was reduced to in Vietnam, being the best at tidying up behind them. How could someone like Chaman be satisfied with that? If he couldn't defend the borders of South Vietnam, then maybe running the INS would be his second chance. He would have liked nothing better than to be able to say, yes, the border is secure. Mr. Secretary of the Interior, the border is now secure. In the 1970s, a young sociologist named Douglas Massey became interested in the subject of Mexican migration. It was then, as now, a matter of political significance. The Massey was struck by how little was actually known about the problem. Nobody really understood exactly where migrants were coming from, or exactly where they were going, or for that matter what they were doing once they got to the US and what happened to the families they left behind. Sociologists are the great note-takers of the social sciences. They're used to projects that stretch out for years that even consume entire careers. So Massey decided to be a good sociologist and study migration properly. He found a partner, a Mexican anthropologist named Jorge Durand, and the two of them began systematically interviewing families of migrants around Mexico. We pick communities. We pick four to six communities every year. We do a complete household roster and collect basic social demographic information on everybody in the household. Plus detailed information on everybody's first and last trip to the United States and the total number of trips they've taken. The survey is called the Mexican Migration Project. After 30 years, it's massive. Millions of life years of information, case histories, extraordinary detail. It's the gold standard. This has got to be one of the world's biggest migration databases. It's certainly the biggest and most reliable on Mexico-U.S. migration when the government wants to know what goes on. They don't go to the border patrol because their data are lousy. They come to the Mexican Migration Project. In all of your work with this project, was anything you ran across that really surprised you? I guess what surprised me in the late 70s when I first saw this was just how routine it had become and how institutionalized the circulation was and how it was woven into the fabric of Mexican life at the time. How institutionalized the circulation was. The principal finding of the Mexican Migration Project is that Mexican Migration to the United States has a distinctive pattern. It's overwhelmingly circular. What does circular mean exactly? Means they work seasonally in the United States and return home on an annual basis to be with their families. These workers, are they leaving their families back in Mexico? Yes. It's overwhelmingly male, young, young males. And the typical pattern is you go for several times to earn some money to help you back home. What made the back-and-forth circulation possible was the fact that for most of the 20th century, the border between Mexico and the United States was porous, more of a line on a map than an actual border. The border patrol was a tiny force in those years. There were no walls, no surveillance drones. If you got stopped, you got turned around and sent back home, then you try again. Our family is mainly a family that was born and raised in the border area. Carlos Marrentes, a labor organizer and former migrant worker, talking about his childhood in the 1960s growing up in Juarez, Mexico. He and his friends used to swim across the Rio Grande, carrying watermelons that they would sell on the American side, like the river was a pond in their backyard. Within a heavy sense that we were living in two different countries. To us, being children means that we were living in a big city with two neighborhoods, one south of the river, one north of the river. What Marrentes is saying in economic terms is that the cost of crossing was effectively zero. It was free. And what happens when something is free? You use as much of it as you can. Usually, they leave in February March as the season starts picking up and then they return in December for the holidays. And there's a big fiesta in migrant-sending towns. Marrentes saying that Mexico was where family and roots were. It was cheap and close. America was where money could be made, easily and quickly. This is not the way, say, Jewish immigrants came to the United States in the 19th century. They didn't go back to Eastern Europe every summer. Nor did the Italians who came over in the same period. Entire villages moved on mass from southern Italy to the United States, permanently. The price of returning where they came from was not zero. Their homeland was not welcoming, and even if it were, the cost of crossing the ocean was so high that it could not be done routinely. But Mexican migration was different. Carlos Marrentes remembers his grandfather telling him that he wanted to return to Mexico, to Zaca, Texas. So the attraction to go back to Mexico will be to go back to your real homeland, to the rural community that you left behind with families, with your history, with everything, the old your identity. This is not the story the United States tells itself. The inscription on the Statue of Liberty does not read, "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses, yearning to breathe free for six months, until you make enough money to go home again." When we think of immigration, we think of the Jewish and the Italian model, "Permanence." Second thing, circular immigration is very hard to measure. Border controls are designed to count the number of people coming in, not the number of people leaving. Because we assume the number coming in is what matters, which it is in most cases, but not in the case of Mexico. Because if a huge group of people eventually go back home again, the only number that matters is net migration. Those who come in minus those who go home. And thirdly, most importantly, circular migration is the result of a zero-cost border crossing. It is what happens when you can swim across the Rio Grande or walk from Juarez in Mexico to El Paso in Texas. So what happens to circular migration when the cost of migrating is no longer zero? One of the things that General Leonard Chapman heard when he took over the INS was that his predecessor had never left Washington, DC. For someone coming from the Marine Corps, that was unthinkable. Chapman's review their troops. So Chapman set out to visit every INS field office, close to 400 of them, all over the world, some with no more than two or three people. And it took me three years to do it, but I did. I got there every single one of them at least once. So I spent a tremendous amount of time traveling, talking to my troops, from whom I built up a very high regard. Chapman modernized the agency. When it came to information management, he thought the INS was 30 years behind the Marine Corps. Chapman set up a public affairs office, the first in the agency's history. He became a familiar face on Capitol Hill, and the more he learned, the more alarmed he became. There was, as he put it, a general laxity in the enforcement of immigration laws. We're good to say, kids were swimming across the Rio Grande, selling their watermelons and then going back home again. People were treating the border like it was just a line on a map. I mean, it's easy to visit. 25 million, 50 million, 75 million, 100 million. They're really liars. Why not? There's no machinery to stop them. In 1973, when Chapman took over the INS, the cost of crossing the Mexican border was effectively zero. By the time he left in 1977, it was not. And so it begins. In 1986, comes the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which militarizes the border. Then Operation Blockade, which stiffens up the border crossing in El Paso. And Gatekeeper, which stiffens up the border crossing in San Diego. The budget of the border patrol between the mid-1980s and 2010 increases tenfold. And then today, with the Attorney General of the United States, sometimes sounds like common-dont Jefferson sessions.
I have put in place a zero tolerance policy for illegal entry on our Southwest border. If you cross the border unlawfully then we will prosecute you. It's that simple. The cost of crossing the border has been escalating for a generation and it began with Leonard Chapman. We ran a Gallup poll right after I first got there that showed that over something like 15% of the American people that ever heard the problem. When I left, three years later we had another Gallup poll and or 85% had heard of it. In his years in office Chapman made 250 speeches across the United States. This is at the same time that he's personally visiting every INS field office and overseeing the complete overhaul of the agency and making his argument over and again on Capitol Hill and giving hundreds of press interviews. The United States went from an INS headed by someone who never left his desk to an agency headed by someone who couldn't stay at his desk. He was relentless. We can America first stop. We're telling America about our problems. Americans didn't think they had an illegal immigration problem. Leonard Chapman convinced them that they did. I'm Jonathan Goldstein and this spring, heavyweight, revisits some favorite episodes. Yeah, I think I want to know why she made my life so difficult if she had some kind of thing against me. Plus we check back in with our guests to see what's changed in the years since. How long has it been? Things have transpired. Yeah, the last 10 years. Everything's changed. New updates begin March 12th. Listen to heavyweight wherever you get your podcasts. When I was 14 growing up in Canada, I went to a week long track and field training camp at the International Peace Garden. It's a park straddling the border between North Dakota and the Canadian province of Manitoba. I go for long runs each morning with two friends. One day we noticed a diner on the American side so we hopped the fence and got a burger. I say fence because the border in that stretch your prairie was just a fence. The type that someone in the suburbs might have around their backyard. On our way back to Canada, we were spotted by a border patrol officer. He arrested us, put us in the back of his car and took us to the nearest INS office. We had to put our names in a book underneath a big photo of President Jimmy Carter. I decided to be clever and wrote my name as William F Buckley. Then we got dropped off back at the border fence with a stern lecture. When I got home and told my parents they found the whole thing hilarious. But as you can imagine, it left an impression. That burger at the diner was my first visit to the United States and I ended up in the back of a patrol car. I first read Robert Frost's Mending Wall not long afterwards in school. The poem is a back and forth between a man and his neighbor over the value of their fence. One side says good fences make good neighbors. The other side, the narrator says, maybe not. It all depends on who the fence is keeping in or out. Right from my first read, I sided with the narrator because all I could think of was the fence I'd just jump between Manitoba and North Dakota. We were 14 year olds and the fact that there wasn't much of a fence between the countries at that point meant that we could do normal 14 year old things like get a burger. Would a better fence there have made us better neighbors? Or would we have just gone hungry? Frost's neighbor thinks good fences solve problems and the funny thing about that poem is how many people agree with him. But do good fences make good neighbors? Or do they just disrupt normal patterns of behavior? So what happened when the Mexican border became a good fence? Well, the historical Mexican migration pattern was that young men came to America, worked, went home, came back, went home again. That's what Douglas Massey documented in the Mexican migration project. Our data from the Mexican migration project indicate that between 1965 and 1985, 85% of all undocumented entries were offset by departures, so the net inflow was small. In 1965 and 1985, lots and lots of Mexican migrants came to the United States without legal status. But almost all of them eventually went home. But then the border patrol was expanded. The crossing opportunities through El Paso and San Diego were shut down and migrants had to adapt. They shifted from the fortified crossings in El Paso and San Diego to the most brutal parts of southern Arizona. Now you're out in the middle of high desert, open desert. It's bitterly cold at night, boiling hot during the day. There's no water and death's mount. And when you're out in the middle of nowhere, it's more costly to stage crossing. The financial incentive to come to the United States remains. But returning home is now suddenly so risky that you don't do it every six months or every Christmas or maybe even ever. You stay. And as the male workers stay longer and longer, family reunification occurs. They send for their wives and younger children and those younger children are today's dreamers. In 1980, what was the likelihood of a Mexican migrant returning home after his first trip to the United States? According to the Mexican migration project's data, it was about 50%. By 2010, it's zero. We built a wall to keep Mexican migrants out. In fact, the wall has kept them in. People who would otherwise have gone home stayed so long they put down roots. In March of 2016, Douglas Massey, along with Jorge Doran and Karen Prehn, published a brilliant paper in the American Journal of Sociology. Why border enforcement backfired? In which they asked a hypothetical question. What would have happened if the United States had done nothing over the past 30 years? Frozen the budget and staff of the Border Patrol at 1986 levels. Allow for some circular migration. The researchers estimate the undocumented Mexican population of the U.S. would be about a third lower. A third lower than it is now. This is according to the people who know more than anyone else about Mexican migration, who have access to one of the biggest immigration databases in the world. And what is their conclusion? That the attempt to solve the problem of illegal Mexican migrants is what has caused the problem of illegal Mexican migrants. You can just hear the frustration in Douglas Massey's voice. For me, I've been watching this train wreck in real time for the past two decades, really. I kept trying to tell people that when it comes to border enforcement, less is more. If you militarize the border, you're going to produce a larger undocumented population. I said this before the House Judiciary Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee, subcommittee on Immigration. And what happens after Massey testifies? The same thing happens every time. And then the ranking minority, member, who's representative King from Texas, gets up and basically says, take your lion data and go home because we know what the truth is. We're being invaded and we've got to stop this. Massey says, we need to do the exact opposite of what we're doing now. When we raise the cost across in the border, that shutdown circulation. If you want to restore circulation, then you should make the border easier to cross. Reduce the size of the border patrol, don't increase it. Make it easier for migrants to get legal status, not harder. If you wanted to lower the number of Mexicans living in the United States, give them green cards and a lot of them won't go home. The US is not that nice a place for people for Mexicans these days. But they have families here. They've got US-born kids. They know they can come back. They'll go home. If we had kept things the way they were in the early 1970s, the same badly run border patrol, the same ineffectual leadership, the same indifferent public, we wouldn't be tearing our hair out over immigration. If there was ever a place for bad government, it was on the southern US border. But what did we get? We got the one guy who couldn't do bad government. The man haunted by his country's failure to build a wall in Vietnam. "I think you came out with a comment about the wall marines are green. Mm-hmm, that's the thing." There's a fascinating moment in General Chapman's oral history. His interviewer asks about racial troubles that rocked the Marine Corps in the late 60s. The civil rights movement was at its apex. There was a near race riot at Camp Le Jun. Fist fights among soldiers in Vietnam. Black Marines wanted to be treated with the same consideration as white Marines. Chapman's response may be his most memorable part.
announcement. All Marines are green, not black, not white. The color of the uniform is what matters. Backed up by a directive on racial discrimination sent to every officer under his command. He even made a solemnonic ruling on the prohibition against black soldiers wearing their hair and an afro. Hair, he said, was hair. The concern of the Marine Corps was not with its form, only with its length. What it said was that within those limits a Marine can style his hair anyway he wants to. Yeah, that's what it said. So that if a black Marine wanted to have an afro that was no more than three inches long and was neat and trim around it, so fine. Why not? Yeah. And the evening parade? To participate in the evening parade at 8th and I, you used to have to be a perfect specimen of military manhood. More than six feet tall, no glasses, and white. Chapman says, why can't you be a perfect specimen of military manhood and black? He desegregated evening parade. That got him hauled before a congressional committee full of angry southerners. Chapman describes the experience with typical understatement as a quote, "interesting few hours." But I'm a deep southerner myself and so I was able to battle them with good effect." Unquote. I'm curious if you were here today, but what he make of the way we talk about immigration and where that debate has changed. I'm not sure what he would say. This is Chapman's granddaughter Danielle again. He really disliked complaining. And he would always say if anybody was, well, okay, what are you going to do about it? He was incredibly pragmatic. So I think that he would probably view a lot of the current conversation as just a bunch of noise without a solution. So what was his solution then? General Chapman did what came naturally. He enforced the law. He drew the line. He made a complicated issue clear. He didn't like the idea of mass illegal immigration, but at the same time his views had none of the tone that the immigration debate has now. He just didn't think of it in racial or ethnic terms. I never heard him talk about it like that or attach the kind of emotions that you hear people attaching to it in the current debate. General Chapman traveled to every corner of the United States and stood up in that deliberate Ramrod straight Marine Corps way and told the American people plainly and clearly what needed to be done. Can I fault him? I can't. I wish there were more people like Leonard Chapman, especially these days. It's just that in some cases complicated things are best left unclear and we're better off letting whatever it is that doesn't love a wall. For its course. Something there is that doesn't love a wall that wants it down. I could say else to him, but it's not else exactly and I'd rather he said it for himself. I see him there bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top in each hand like an old stone savaget. John, he moves in darkness as it seems to me, not a word's only in the shade of trees. He will not go behind his father saying and he likes having thought of it so well he says again, good fences make good neighbors. Revisionist history is a panoply production. Senior producer is Miele Bell with Jacob Smith and Camille Baptista. Our editor is Julia Barton. Floon Williams is our engineer, fact checking by Beth Johnson, original music by Luis Guerra, special thanks to AC Valdez for capturing the sounds of the evening parade. And for the audio of Robert Frost, thanks to the National Council of Teachers of English. And thanks as always to Andy Bowers and Common Dund, Jacob Weissbrick, I'm out in gravel. I think the only time I can remember him really getting angry with me was when I kind of blasphemed the Constitution and I don't know why I would do that except I was a teenager. When it comes to love these days we like to think that we've got it all figured out. We have this false sense of I have control over this I can filter for someone who's over six feet tall I can filter for this religion but not a filter to turn on to say how kind am I how loyal am I. This Valentine season the happiness lab is digging into what really shapes our closest connections with smart practical insights from experts on love intimacy and belonging. Listen to the happiness lab with me Dr. Laurie Santos wherever you get your podcasts.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
The podcast explores the famous line "Good fences make good neighbors" from Robert Frost's poem "Mending Wall," using it as a lens to examine real-world borders.
It details the career of General Leonard Chapman, who, after leading the Marines during the Vietnam War (a conflict about a border), took over the INS to secure the U.S.-Mexico border, significantly increasing enforcement and public awareness of illegal immigration.
Sociologist Douglas Massey's research shows that Mexican migration was historically circular—workers would seasonally cross a porous border to work in the U.S. and return home, a pattern dependent on a near-zero cost of crossing.
Chapman's and subsequent policies (like Operation Gatekeeper) militarized the border, raising the cost of crossing and disrupting the long-standing circular migration pattern, leading to unintended consequences like increased permanent settlement.
Summary:
The podcast uses Robert Frost's "Mending Wall" to analyze the philosophy and impact of borders. It contrasts the poem's debate with the real-life story of General Leonard Chapman. S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). He transformed it from a lax agency into a more enforcement-focused organization, tirelessly campaigning to convince the American public that illegal immigration was a serious problem. -Mexico border.
This militarization fundamentally altered a long-standing circular migration pattern documented by sociologist Douglas Massey, where Mexican workers would freely cross a porous border for seasonal work and return home. S. permanently rather than returning home.
The episode questions whether "good fences" truly make good neighbors or simply create new, unforeseen problems by disrupting natural human and economic patterns.
FAQs
The poem explores the tension between the idea that 'good fences make good neighbors' and the questioning of whether such barriers are necessary or beneficial, reflecting on human connections and boundaries.
General Leonard Chapman Jr. was a former Commandant of the Marine Corps who later became Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), where he worked to secure U.S. borders and raise awareness about illegal immigration.
The Mexican Migration Project is a long-term study by sociologist Douglas Massey that documented circular migration patterns, showing many Mexican migrants worked seasonally in the U.S. and returned home regularly, rather than settling permanently.
In the mid-20th century, crossing was effectively free and easy, but starting in the 1970s under leaders like Chapman, enforcement increased, making it more difficult and costly over subsequent decades.
As border enforcement tightened, it disrupted the traditional circular migration, making it harder for migrants to return home and potentially leading to more permanent settlement in the U.S.
Chapman sought the INS role as a second chance to secure a border, influenced by his experiences in Vietnam where the Marines struggled to defend borders, aiming to apply military discipline to immigration control.
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