Gefährliche Front (mit Franz-Stefan Gady)

At the moment, it is really so in this phase of the war that the front strip is 30 kilometers wide. That means, from the first contact line, so to speak, the Ukrainian soldiers, the Russian soldiers, some meters or some hundred meters across from Schützenkreme, are up to 30 kilometers behind the front. At the moment, it is artillery, rocket artillery, but also drones for use, and that can never be very secure in front of the Russian attack drones. And I would also like to say that perhaps the biggest change compared to other journeys we have gone through in the past three years is that the danger, especially in the depth of the room, has greatly increased. This is how the military expert and writer Franz Stefan Gadi describes the situation directly at the Ukrainian-Russian front line in Donetsk. He can do that, exactly, because he visits Ukraine very regularly and is still under the impression of a new journey from which he has just returned. What has changed at the front, at the Russian war leadership, in which the Ukrainian army must fear, and why there is still a long way to go for it, where we are standing at all, three years and five months after the Russian full invasion. I have spoken about this with Franz Stefan Gadi. And with that, welcome to Stride Powers and Strategies, the podcast of NDR Info for the Russian War against Ukraine. I am Kai Küstner. And I am Astrid Korall. Today is Friday, July 25. We are recording this podcast at 11.30. And we are talking in this broadcast, as in almost everyone, now about peace, about peace views, as Marga also likes to be. And about the fact that the Ukrainian president is very much involved with Putin, the Russian power. We are talking about Russian attack and Ukrainian defense forces, or how the Ukrainian president is looking to increase this. There is now the financing for three Patriot missile defense systems. Zelensky has announced it. Germany is looking for two of them. He is looking for money for seven more Patriots. But Astrid, we also have to talk about Bolodimir Zelensky himself. And with that, we also start your view of the situation today. Over Zelensky, namely, in the past days, a true storm has collapsed. At the beginning of the week, a law was decided that the independence of two Ukrainian anti-corruption authorities is limited. The official grounds are under Russian influence. Zelensky's announcement followed clear criticism from abroad and in Ukraine itself, where in several cities, in the middle of the war, people went to the streets in masses. And here, I would like to note, it shows that Ukraine is a completely different, free country than Russia, which the Ukrainians and Ukrainians also want to keep. Astrid has now calmed down a bit for Zelensky, hasn't he? That's right, Kai. There are still protests, but they have become less and that is because the president Zelensky has now calmed down. But Kai, maybe the series after, let's look back at the beginning of this protest. Because the president Zelensky had a law by the parliament. And then also indicates that the general-state lawyer, which he called Zelensky himself, has more control over two authorities. They are called Naboo and Sab and are supposed to go against corruption in the country. In this respect, what is more important than that is that Ukraine is still one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. And the fight against corruption is a very important proposition, so that Ukraine can contribute to the EU. And exactly this European contribution perspective was threatened by the new law by parts of the population. And that's why they went to the streets. And also, Astrid, you know the EU well as well as the criticism of Brussels from the European Union. Yes, but in the past three and a half years since the beginning of the war, I found it difficult to perceive from Brussels critical tones. And this has changed this week. The EU commissioner, Chairman Ursula von der Leyen, talked about serious concerns and the EU commissioner for expansion, Martha Koss, she spoke with a look at this new law from a back-up. And she explained that she has a clear message for Zelensky and his government. I'm worried because the fight against corruption is one of the reasons to become a member of the EU. And it is a proposition that the state has independent anti-corruption authorities. I expect that we will return to independent negotiations. Criticism, for example, came from Foreign Minister Johann Wadefuhl, German EU representatives and politicians in the foreign country always connect with warnings that Ukraine is taking the wrong path on the way to the EU. And Zelensky has earned high and high points in the network. And even at the front, Ukrainian soldiers have expressed themselves critically. As a result of the Kiev independence, this step of Zelensky feels like a blow to them. And this massive pressure has shown quick effects. On the day of the Donnerstag, the square wall came. Zelensky presented a new law. And the anti-corruption authorities wrote about the fact that all processional powers and the independence of the authorities were re-established. Zelensky announced in his evening video message that employees with access to state secrets will be subjected to lie detector tests in order to close a Russian influence in the state affairs. In total, of course, one wonders which motives, which goals Zelensky has set out to achieve. And I also asked Rebekah Bart, the IED correspondent in the studio Kiev, who is regularly a guest with us at Streitkräfte und Strategien. That is still unclear to many here in Ukraine. And personally, I haven't found an answer to this yet. Because it was a real real process. Real days, a real approach, what we have experienced here. And rational, only very, very difficult to explain. On the one hand, you can see that this administration under Zelensky likes to have a lot of control, in order to express it diplomatically. Another possible explanation is that Zelensky and his environment want to protect their own trust. Naboo means a whole series of orders in the Ukrainian parliament. And he also means trust by President Zelensky. We know that. We can't rely, at least, on the fact that this was actually a challenge for this development of the last few days. But of course there is a temporary connection. In the past few weeks and months, there has also been pressure on anti-corruption activists, on critics of the Ukrainian president. Officially, the explanation is that Naboo, the anti-corruption bureau, is under attack by Russian spies, by Russian agents. There was a whole series of rations against several employees, detectives of this government. They are investigated, they are promoted as high-ranking, state-ranking, collaborated with Russia. We can't check this independently. Personally, I wouldn't be surprised if that's the case. Because Russia is not only leading a conventional war against Ukraine, but also a hybrid. But you have to say that even if this government was to be under attack by Russian spies or was to be, this law is the resolution of the independence of the government. It is now the case that the parliament still has to vote for this law. The events will probably not go smoothly to Zelensky. And Rebecca, the consequences for the presidents are so much appreciated. I believe the Ukrainian president has actually caused great damage, also long-term damage. I see a great loss of trust within the Ukrainian population, but also with the European partners, with the western partners of Ukraine. He is now trying to protect himself. We can see that very clearly and that seems to be successful for the first time. But nevertheless, in general, everything throws a very bad light on his administration and also on the Ukrainian parliament. You definitely notice that the pressure from the inside and from the outside has affected the Ukrainian presidents. As far as Rebecca is concerned with her assessment, and of course, what happened in Ukraine was also followed in Russia. The Institute for the Study of War has reported about fears that this political crisis in Kiev could play a role in Russia. Kremlin-functional propagandists and spokespersons instrumentalized these protests to spread existing Russian narratives that the Ukrainian government should represent as corrupt and illegitimate to prevent such further western support for Ukraine. And this propaganda was widely taken here and there in Germany from an interested side. While it was protested in Kiev, the third round of talks between representatives of Ukraine and Russia took place in Istanbul. I have already talked about this in our exhibition on Tuesday, that the predictions before this talk are not so grave. And also the results were a bit predictable. There was actually little hope for hope at the end of the war. There was really little of this meeting expected and little has been achieved. As already in the previous round of negotiations in June, there was another captured exchange. This time the number was 1,200 prisoners. Moreover, Russia is obviously ready to hand over the death threats of more than 3,000 killed Ukrainian soldiers. Otherwise, the Ukraine demands, like the West, a immediate and unconditional weaponry, which Russia has been leading back for months. Russia has really short weaponry with a duration of 24-48 hours on the front line, so that at this time the soldiers and the soldiers would be able to get injured and killed. Russia stays with its maximum demands. These are also known, among other things, that all 4 of Russia's promised territories and the Kremlin completely rejects Russia, that it is against Western military aid, just like NATO does. By the way, we will hear from Stefan Gadi, who we will hear from later. He told me that he has no evidence in Ukraine on a peaceful will of Russia in any case with his visit to the front. The Russian attack operations continue to go on, regardless of what seems to happen at the diplomatic level. How is it going on at this diplomatic level? I think that the Ukrainian President Zelensky is very concerned with a meeting with the Russian power "Putin". At least I have the impression. The impression is true, Kai. According to this conversation, the subordinate of the Ukrainian side said that the Ukrainian meeting between Zelensky and Putin was scheduled for the end of August. On Friday Zelensky explained that subordinates from Russia would have had conversations about a possible meeting between the two leaders. Nevertheless, of course, there is a skepticism. The Ukrainian side has already addressed such a direct encounter several times. For Putin, she is only in a final phase of possible negotiations. And the Russian exchange leader, who was part of the meeting, also did not make the impression that there could be a joint term as soon as possible. What also shows from my point of view that Moscow is eating these 50 days. The US President Trump has not really impressed the arrival of an air force. On the contrary, according to the newspaper "Kiev Independent" Ukrainian and Western military experts assume that Russia could escalate its offensive operations during this 50-day period. At the same time, the US Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes new weapons deliveries of the USA and Ukraine. In height of about 275 million euros. This includes equipment for aircraft carriers, armored vehicles of the type Bradley. In addition, money for maintenance and repair. In addition, Trump had already announced further deliveries. The Ukraine should, among other things, get aircraft carrier systems, which we have already reported several times. Germany and other NATO countries should carry the costs. There is no new state in this matter. Germany is ready. You have already mentioned two Patriot systems. But wait for the US to quickly set up a replacement. Whereas Boris Pistorius, the defense minister, has expected about six to eight months. Because you just mentioned Boris Pistorius, the Federal Cabinet has made a new law this week to be able to quickly create equipment. If the creation takes as long as you need to pronounce the name of the law, then we are afraid that we will have more problems, in order to overcome this. The Federal Recreation Act includes a somewhat complicated name of this law. The government wants to make more time for equipment. The process should be accelerated. The federal equipment should be faster and easier to buy. An example for more deliveries should be given directly without a subscription. So far, subscriptions are necessary, if you have more than 15,000 euros and this limit is now increasing. Boris Pistorius also expressed himself. In the future, we want to set up a new value limit for our defense abilities. The new value limit is at 443,000. After that, the formal delivery process is needed. In total, it is necessary to sort almost 8,000 orders that can be made faster. The law includes, for example, environmental standards, for example, the construction of barracks should be unlocked. In total, this law is a quantum leap for Pistorius. But of course, there was also criticism, for example, of the left. About the current military situation in Ukraine, I will speak with Franz Stefan Gadi. That is why Astrid is now a rather short summary of you. I'm really making it short, Kai. Donnerstag was attended by the famous old town of Odessa. Some historical buildings that were damaged due to UNESCO's World Cultural Heritage were damaged. You can see on pictures that the famous brand Privos hit flames. Ukrainian President Zelensky has announced a response to these and other attacks. As always, this response looks like this. Ukraine has been trying to attack drones for a long time. In the night on Donnerstag Russian Defense Ministry destroyed 105 Ukrainian drones according to the Russian Defense Ministry. There was a response for Ukraine during the air defense on Wednesday. For the first time, it lost one of the France-launched fighter jets of the type Mirage 2000. Due to a technical defect, it crashed according to the military. The pilot was able to save himself. And with this, we now have another Kai in your conversation with Franz-Stefan Gadi. Thank you for this overview, Astrid. It's a great contrast. While in Germany, the summer holiday is on the rise or is already on the rise, the front lines in Ukraine are being continued to fight every day. And also the people in the Ukrainian cities have to fear their lives due to drones and rocket terror. We thought it was time for an emergency recording. Five months after the Russian full invasion in Ukraine, almost a year after the Ukrainian surprise attack in Kursk. How is the military situation? Where is hope? Is there hope at all? Also in terms of diplomacy. I discuss this with Franz-Stefan Gadi, military expert and author of the book "The Return of the War" that is presented for the German budget. And the time for the conversation is also especially when Franz-Stefan Gadi has just returned from a visit in Ukraine. A visit directly to the front lines. And so I wanted to know from Mr. Gadi first where you were and how it is to be there as an observer at the front. I would like to underline that I cannot give the details about security reasons. We were close to each other in front and I would like to briefly explain what it means. At the moment it is really in this phase of the war that the front lines are 30 kilometers wide. That means from the first contact line from the front edge of the defense where, so to speak, Ukrainian soldiers, Russian soldiers, some 100 meters across, up to 30 kilometers behind the front, it is now artillery, missile artillery, but especially drones to be used. And that I can never be sure of the effect of Russian attack drones, especially drones with glass fiber cables that operate in depth. And I would also like to say maybe the biggest change compared to other flights that we have carried out is that the danger, especially in the depth of the room, has taken a huge toll. You have to look in the sky again, you always look at what is there that the danger of drones of the rotors is huge. It is always good when it is clouded, if it rains, then less drones can operate. But this danger and also this feeling in your own body is in comparison to the past here really increased during this journey. Yes, it is relatively uncomfortable, especially if you think you could always be a victim of a drone attack. The Russians are also very good in the background, that is, they position drones in the background that are positioned on the street or are lying on the lawn and should they offer a worthwhile goal. They get up and grab this goal behind their backs, always support vehicles, soldiers, the wilfulness is what causes the biggest stress. That you can be hit by a artillery shot or, above all, by drones. And yes, in this regard, security conditions are of course increasingly increased, also within our group. We have to take a very precise distance where we are going, where we are not going. A few months ago, we still had problems going to the most brigade fighting stations. Now it is the case that all brigade fighting stations that lie several kilometers behind the main line are also lying below the bullet line or on the road below the bullet. And yes, it simply conveys the feeling of insecurity and these fighting lines are now 30 kilometers wide. Full understanding that you don't want to give your exact locations a price, but so that we have a bit more orientation, they can tell us roughly where in Ukraine they have found themselves. Well, we were at various places the front with the heavy point of course in the south region of Donetsk. Why of course, because there the main attack axis or the main attack axis of the Russian strike force is located. Here is clearly the heavy point of the Russian offensive operations. I don't really want to talk about a Russian summer offensive here. I think here convey the media a wrong picture. The Russian offensive operations, that is, the attacks on Ukrainian positions have already taken place in March. And I don't think that in the summer it will be the end I think the Russian attack operations will win in intensity. They will probably also win in size and they will, but with great probability in autumn, maybe even further. So here from a summer offensive to speak I hold for wrong. Well, we were in the southern area of Donetsk where at the moment it is very burning about the city of Prokofsky and Konstantin Nefka. Here it is so that the danger the Ukrainian troops are involved in the delay. The big question is, can the Ukrainian troops on the right from Prokofsky or also from Konstantin Nefka pull back, can they also take their material with them? What we have seen in the last days is that the Russians have made a flank progress. That means they threaten the connecting streets, especially in the area of Prokofsky. And here the question is, will the Ukrainians defend themselves here? Will it possibly be a second Bachmut, the known battle that took place in winter in the winter in the city, where the Ukrainian forces, but also the Russian forces, fought for months around the city of Bachmut, also in Donbass. And both sides had very high losses there. Will there be a replay, so to say, of Bachmut in Prokofsky? That remains to be expected. Will there be a withdrawal order of the Ukrainian forces? Yes, that is for me at the moment perhaps the most urgent question and here it is very clear that Russia has set the difficult point. That's why a lot of time has passed in this region along this main attack axis in the last few days. Now Mr. Gadi has already talked a lot about what we can talk about in a moment. I will now take the term "summer offensive" out again, because you say that it is actually not. It means that you are already aware that the Russian attacks will still be added. So we already had a few weeks ago in our podcast that said, yes, this summer offensive probably started now, but there was such a huge shift so far not on the battlefield. So where do you go from what is still coming? First of all, I don't know how this expression has come into the media from a summer offensive and who really found this expression. I think it will come again every year that it will be a summer offensive. And as I said, my attention is to a completely wrong picture that actually happened. In reality, it is so that the main eye of the Russian attack operations is not a very territorial win-win moment, but really the use of the Ukrainian strikes. And I think that's why it is so important that you don't focus on social media or contacts from the distance or on the anecdotal with single-sided officers. So it really looks systematically how the Russian attacks take place along the whole front. How do the operations take place? And then you come to the conclusion relatively quickly. Okay, a really large assigned officer would be structured differently, would start differently, would be carried out differently. And what we see, in fact, is that Russian groups attack in smaller numbers. Two or four soldiers maybe even supports through motor vehicles, mechanized forces that attack in smaller frames and to protect tanks, combat tanks that attack here. But continually, 24 hours, seven days a week, permanently attack in smaller frames in order not to give the Ukrainians a sinking break. That means that this large attack or this large-scale attack, which would take place in an offensive where it is really about going deep into the enemy space, is not only not possible due to the permanent danger of drones or in the fighting field but much more, it is not the opinion of the Russian troops to attack here in large numbers, but slowly and steadily simply attack the Ukrainian troops here. At the same time, it happens that the Ukrainian troops have to carry out tactical retreats. But there is not this summer offensive, as it may be shown in the media. It is much better to talk about it. There are Russian attack operations in March, which will take place throughout the year. The limiting factor will be more natural and human nature. That means that the personnel could possibly attack the Russians or the material. That means the ammunition or the vehicles, the artillery, the drones. But at the moment, it does not look like it will attack the Russians until at least the end of the year. Therefore, the appeal is clear to me. Please, let's not talk about a summer offensive, but simply about these attack operations. That means, you have also indicated that personnel and materials could possibly be a problem for the Russian side. However, Putin seems to be at the moment of the opinion to be able to sustain this use war longer in the end than the Ukrainians and the West and to be able to win it, or am I wrong? The big question in the military lies to say that Russia may not be able to sustain this use war for a long time as one would think. First of all, I am not an economist. I don't know exactly how the economic situation is presented in Russia with the exception of the equipment industry. Here I can see that the production can continue to this day, at least in the year 2026. I also see that enough ammunition is produced. I also see that enough armored vehicles, that this war can continue. I can also see that the Russian, North Korean, Iran, and China, of course, are supporting Russia in the background. But I think we have to choose other criteria that we might have chosen a year ago to contribute to the fighting power of the Russian forces. I will now give you an example. The role of artillery has changed a lot, that is, both sides prefer less artillery grenades. That means, if we set up a metric for how many grenades Russia has produced in the year, and we say that Russia has produced fewer grenades now, we would blame the Russians for not being able to proceed with the war. And that might be a wrong conclusion because artillery in comparison to drones in the last few months had less importance. The same goes for armored vehicles. We always talk a lot about when the Soviet arsenals would be empty, and when Russia would only have newly produced equipment. Yes, that's true, but the question is if the attack tactic changes when armored vehicles are not used in a larger frame, is that also the right focus here? I'll give you just two examples that you have to give very carefully here. And you can draw very difficult conclusions, what actually happens here, and who could finally win the overhand here. What is clear is, of course, that the military production power of Russia and the Ukrainian is almost the same as Russia has a larger personnel reserve. But that has rarely achieved that alone in order to win the war or in order to win the war. Now you have already mentioned the drones, because the development is sometimes so fast that we all have a few weeks of new status. You have mentioned the control per glass phaser. I have also heard reports that it is almost as old-fashioned again. What is happening in this field from your point of view and what have your experiences shown there on the front lines? Well, I think the most important experience in this regard is that we waste too much time to analyze a single weapon system in detail, a single technology. And that we see that the connection, actually, or the fight of the combined weapons in the end is the most important element. Yes. There are always these statistics that 70%, 80%, 90%, 95%, 98%, depending on the front line, the losses on both sides are now to be added to drones. But this statistic is a little wrong, because it is actually the case that without the artillery, that is, without the explosive shells that are shot from tanks, tanks or other drones, actually only the drones are able to effectively fight their targets. What do I mean by that? Artillery is used on the modern battle field in Ukraine to suppress the enemy. That means to keep it low, to attack in the rear. But it is also used at the same time to destroy various coverings. That means, in the meantime, it is so in the battle field that there are almost no more positions in the open field, because these positions and these training systems can be easily fought. That is why it is so that, if you look at the front and look there, all positions are somewhere along from forest lines or in cities, in villages, in houses, somewhere in the built area. The artillery can call these areas under fire and that is perhaps a terrible word that they can use to block. That means shooting in there with bullets, that the coverings will be shot away, that the trees will be shot away and only then come the drones that can destroy single soldiers or single positions. Drones play an extremely big role here, but it is connected. It is not just the drone command alone, but it is the combination with artillery, the combination with infantry, which of course also takes attack systems and which then occupy territory. That is the important thing. But specifically on the question of drones I would like to say that the most important thing which I take from this journey is that the Ukrainian forces slowly cross the border in the drone command along single attack axes, but especially in the southern area of Donetsk, where the Russians are coming from. And that is very dangerous and can also be very dangerous. If I may ask a question, does it come from hand-to-hand because Russia's drones are currently producing drones? Exactly, that is one part. But what is much more important is not only the quantitative consideration of Russian drones and also not technically qualitatively. Both sides are approximately on the same level in one category, although we have to say that in the area of the airfield Russia has clearly shown a lot of consideration here and the Ukrainians are just trying to close it. This is the most systematic approach of the Russian drone operations that I have seen, which I have also personally felt in the area of 20 to 30 km behind the front, which was maybe 5 to 10 km a few months ago has now been expanded to 30 km in a larger number. This is the most systematic approach which has given me to think on the Russian side. Russia has really managed to establish a drone control system where the front is divided into individual sectors and where in these individual sectors individual units are targeted, attacks do not lead very much to the overall width of the Ukrainian troops, but are targeted to Ukrainian drone teams, to the Ukrainian logistics to support drone operations and thus slowly but steadily launch the Ukrainian airspace in the lower heights. This means between the ground and 3,000 to 4,500 meters in these lower heights the airspace is slowly fighting. This is a huge problem because the entire Ukrainian defense system is built up in the drone area when you look at the Ukrainian defense system it is like this, on the ground there are the infantry, the fortifications the positions supported by mines or protected by mines in the hinterland supported by artillery but above all it is about the fact that Ukraine has tried over the last months because of its material and personal and personal maintenance because of a drone control system here the Russians to resist in such a long time to use the Russian airspace for longer time. Therefore the center of gravity was chosen by the Russian side to collapse this system or this Ukrainian defense system by setting the center of gravity on the key how this system could break together. We are seeing this now. I am not saying that Russia will have success winning the airspace but the situation is quite tense and in parts the front has already happened, at least temporarily the Russians have overlaid here and this is a very critical phase which could have a greater influence on the battle of the entire front. You also said if we look at the individual front sections clearly in the focus of the Russian war leadership of course the Donbas and the Pokrovskaya when I understood them correctly then I probably at this critical moment when the Ukrainian army asks when is the right time to give up the defense lines there, right? I think to move back to defense lines in the hinterland that is definitely true and I think it will be unavoidable that the Ukrainian forces will have to move back to defense lines. As I said, the focus is of course on territorial superiority which is also quite clear. The Russian view at the moment is mainly to increase Ukrainian fighting forces as much as possible. Of course the same applies for the Ukrainian fighting forces and here it is so that in the past the case was that the Ukrainian fighting forces have often been counterattacked and have often led to counterattacks. To wait if there will be a change here that not every meter of the territory actually has to be protected until the last man. That there is a certain flexibility in the defense on the Ukrainian side that then keeps the own losses lower. The biggest uncertainty for me is when will the Ukrainian troops keep a withdrawal order while they keep a withdrawal order and if they can move back in the coming weeks and months as soon as the situation is established and is it actually so that the front can stabilize in the southern part of Donetsk? At least that doesn't sound like the Ukrainian would come back to the offensive in the initiative. If we are talking about individual front sections, a section that we should pay special attention to from Donbass. There were reports that a few weeks ago the Ukrainian troops entered the oblast in the oblast of Denier pro Petrovsk. Is that threatening in your opinion? Well, first of all in the comments the whole situation in the southern part of Donetsk doesn't exclude that the Ukrainians don't go into the offensive. The situation was on fire in the last months and in the last summer when they could come here in August? I wouldn't exclude that and I have to say that the situation in Donbass wasn't stable over the last 12 months and beyond. The situation isn't catastrophic I would also like to stress that the Ukrainian front won't come to a collapse. The front is relatively stable in the southern part of Donetsk. I think what we see is that a new attack operation in the Saporizhia area could take place in the south of Ukraine so that the Russians could increase their attack operations and increase their increase in the coming weeks. I would also like to point out that the Ukrainian front is relatively stable in the southern part of Donetsk. I would also like to point out that Russians could increase their attack operations in the coming weeks and months. It could also be that the Russians want to continue their attack operations in the next few weeks. The question that I always get is whether there are enough forces within the Russian fighting forces so that they could close their attack operations at the same time. Then there could also be a new attack operation in the direction of the Nipro. At the moment I don't think that the Russian forces could have come here. But that can still be changed. Sumi, just to explain the northern part of Ukraine the Russian is also constantly trying to create a "puffer zone" from my point of view a bit of euphemism because that means that you occupy an Ukrainian territory as if you had to defend yourself against Ukraine. But actually it's the other way around. Has Putin somehow succeeded or why does he even talk about the need for "puffer zones"? One thing is of course to secure the own population in the border region that the Russian fighting forces protect their own country and second, especially what Sumi does is that Sumi is a huge important logistic area. I think that the Russian ambitions are to connect these logistic operations sooner or later. That means to attack with tools to threaten the city step by step and then to do it unaccountably. The question is what the time will be and will it succeed? I don't see that the Russian forces would have the power to enter the city themselves or would like to have these puffer zones. I think they will stay as long as the Ukrainian fighting forces are not strong enough to destroy the Russian occupation. I'll put it together. They hold the situation as a catastrophe for Ukraine. They said that breakthroughs from the Russian side are not expected. I think we should have already talked to the staff about the equipment of Ukraine. There is a new movement because the Trump government has already explained to deliver new weapons to Europe and the USA. They then deliver to the Europeans and the Germans what they have given to Ukraine. What is particularly needed from their point of view from the Ukrainian side and does it also have a psychological effect? Do you take it to the front and do something about it? The general impression is now much more positive than a few months ago when I was the last time in Ukraine. You can feel that there is a certain mood of breakthrough that affects the American military support. The so-called "worst case" scenario is not accepted because Ukraine was left by itself. The fact that the Trump government and the USA clearly underline that they want to deliver the Ukrainian problem to the Europeans. We as Europeans have to think strategically and I think the most important thing is that we define what Ukraine means and what it does not mean. Only then we can reduce what we want to do to maintain the sovereignty of Ukraine or let them fall under Russian influence. I think that is the one important point. The second point that I want to briefly mention is that I say that the front is stable and that the military situation is not catastrophic at the moment. Of course, that can change relatively quickly. It really must be necessary. I can only look forward for a few weeks and that is why I am always there with my team because the data is very long-lasting and these data only have a production power of few weeks. The situation can change relatively quickly. I always want to underline that the war situation is a complex business and you cannot only break down three or four data points. What is the air defense? I think in this area it is also necessary. Especially in the area of the long-distance air defense over ballistic missiles and Marshal bodies. And here it is, of course, that additional air defense missiles are needed for the Patriot air defense systems. Here, of course, Germany is asked. But I had the impression that the situation is less critical in the area of air defense missiles than maybe in the area of media. And that Ukraine may still keep up with the existing missiles. I believe that the greater danger is at the moment how can you get the threats of these mass attacks by Russian drones. Here, too, I have, and this is an optimistic note, technological solutions that are very effective against the newest variants of the so-called Shahid or Geraintrona can be active. So it is possible that even in Russia in a few weeks thousands of drones overshadowed Ukraine and these attacks lead to the possibility that there will be countermeasures on the Ukrainian side. The question is how quickly they can be produced and implemented. At the moment it is so that the Ukraine has to adapt to the front, but of course also the own air defense has to adapt to the growing threat from Russia. That would be the so-called Interceptor drones. What you need to fight with Patrick or Iris T. What is very expensive, as we know. On the one hand, you are speaking the right way, the Interceptor drones, but there are also other systems in the field of electronic warfare that are tested, additional short-distance aircraft systems, a combination, as I said, I always underline this approach in the combatant-related weapons, but I think Interceptor drones can be played in the coming weeks and months, which are the combatant of Shahid drones from Russia. Gadi, I would like to ask you a question about diplomacy. There is now a trade table in Istanbul. There were direct talks again, Russia, Ukraine, but very short and actually without progress on a diplomatic path. What would be necessary from your point of view to move Putin seriously? First of all, I would like to mention that not in the last weeks, where I was in Ukraine, for a long time, or what I experienced or even in the early stages, I would have shown in some way that Russia would be willing to reduce its attack operations or that there would be a manifestation of the Russian peace treaty that is, the Russian attack operations continue. There are also many civilians in the Russian attack at the stage of the victims, i.e. 10, 20, 30 km behind the front. And the Russian attack operations continue to be reduced, no matter what happens on the diplomatic level. I think the only real way or the theory of success, so to speak, for Ukraine, is to increase the total losses in the counterattack to very low territorial accelerations, so that sooner or later there will be a change in the Kremlin. Whether this will work, I can't say anything. Of course, you have to increase escalation risks again and again in this respect. But that seems to me the only real way to be to simply take the costs for Russia to lead this war further. Then it is very easy to say that if I say this here as in Austria, in the country that is in peace or would also be in Germany. I mean, this war goes on every day, enormous losses that you also get here and the population is also now a war myth in Ukraine. Of course, it still has the will of an unbroken resistance. I have spoken with some people in Kiev himself, a young father who had a three-month-old child and I asked him, "Do you not know how to get away from Kiev with your child?" "Do you not know how to live your youth safely?" Because all these attacks are taking place in the city center, in Dusha-Hitron, ballistic missiles, marshal bodies and so on. He said, "No, if I leave Kiev then I have to be carried out out of this city." This resistance will is, after all, unbroken within the Ukrainian population and you also see, I think, that the only way is to show the Russians that this will of the resistance is unbroken and that they are able to make the Russian aggression even more significant losses. So in this regard, I see this as the only way. Of course, it is so that the political level, the decisive level is and would Vladimir Putin say in the morning, "Now is the war to the end." Of course, it would be a clear signal that the war could actually end sooner or later. And in reality it is only one person to end this war. We all know that. And that is Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin or the system that Vladimir Putin has established. And in this regard, it is actually the decision-making of one person to influence whether this actually happens by the Russian forces' greater losses. Of course, I cannot say now, but I think it is the only tool that we can work with at the moment. One last question at the end, because we also talked about it in our last interview, for example, how necessary or meaningful it is to station US missiles, Tomahawk and so on in Germany. There is an intense debate here about how strongly Russia influxes, how much we should take care of ourselves as NATO states in a few years. How do you see this discussion at the moment and is there in some way new insights, which are also the strength and the war machinery, that is what you have to call them in Russia. I think it is important to distinguish between the intention of Russia, possibly to attack NATO or the war after the war in a few years and then the ability, the capacity and the willingness, that the Russian forces will have in the medium to long-term future. The intention is, in my opinion, to do so. There are signs, of course, that Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin, want to test NATO in the Baltic or in other parts of Europe. What makes the willingness or the capacity, the size of the Russian forces and the abilities of the Russian forces to deal with this? I think that the high-intensive phase of the war in Ukraine should be slowed down in this year in the next year. In a few years, a much better educated, better cared for, better equipped Russian army will possibly stand on NATO's side. They will be able to profit from several years of high-intensive war in Ukraine and, of course, possibly the intention will be changed by the Kremlin partly in smaller units. There are different scenarios. It's not about a thousand-kilometer-long front across Europe between the Russian forces and NATO, to deal with the war. It's much more about the confidence of NATO in a short, intensive war to discredit, by overtaking a piece of NATO territory and, possibly, using an escalation-to-de-escalation strategy. That means, the use of nuclear weapons to signal NATO should carry out counterattacks to spread the Russian territory and NATO territory in the Baltic, for example. And NATO should risk a nuclear war in the whole of Europe and to return a piece of the Baltic territory. I always want to stress that there is a direct connection between the political, strategic and operational level. And here's the question, what is the Russian intention in this regard? I would like to say, it's true that, of course, the Russian combat forces haven't made it in the last few years to conquer Ukraine. How could they ever stand against NATO? I think we have to be careful here, because one thing is clear, that the Russian combat forces, which would lead to NATO war, would be better trained with greater security, better equipment than the allies who are marching into Ukraine. That doesn't mean that we have to be afraid of this Russian steam engine, in the whole of Europe. We shouldn't be afraid of the danger of the Russian combat forces in the coming years and decades to come against Europe. These are scenarios that will hopefully never be introduced. Thank you very much, Mr. Gadi. Thank you very much for the invitation. The military expert Franz Stefan Gadi was that. If you want more of his expertise, we will put a link to his book in the show notes. And that's it for this edition of combat forces and strategies and one more announcement on our own. We are now taking a short summer break. The next episode will take place on August 15th. And until then, we are always happy about summits, praise and criticism. Please contact us at strietkrä[email protected] Astrid Koray and Kai Küstner and now we have a tip for the Audiotheek. Hello, I am David Krause, one of the hosts of 11 km of the Tagesschau Podcast. In our latest episode, I spoke with Julio Segador about the current situation in the Gaza Strip. Julio is a correspondent for the Audi in the Tel Aviv studio. I wanted to know which strategy the Israeli army follows in Gaza. He also told me what has to happen so that a weapons peace in Gaza is urgently needed. The entire episode of 11 km can be found now, for example, in the ARD Audiotheek.