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Former CIA Officer Explains Why Trump’s Nvidia Scandal Is So Serious | Bulwark on Sunday

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Former CIA Officer Explains Why Trump’s Nvidia Scandal Is So Serious | Bulwark on Sunday

The scandal described is not a minor personal or sexual affair but a deep, systemic failure involving the deliberate diversion of critical U.S. technology—specifically high-end NVIDIA AI chips—to China. This diversion, facilitated through a Singapore-based front company, Megaspeed, and offshore data centers, has enabled Chinese AI models, including those linked to the People's Liberation Army, to advance rapidly in artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities. The U.S. government, despite multiple intelligence warnings and internal briefings, failed to act on known risks. Key decisions—such as refusing to issue a defensive briefing to AI advisor Jensen Wong and allowing the sale of advanced chips to China—were made without adequate oversight or coordination, indicating a breakdown in policy and inter-agency processes. There is strong evidence of personal financial interests tied to the same decisions, including investments by the Trump family and private firms in NVIDIA, suggesting possible corruption. The situation has been exacerbated by the continued operation of loopholes, like the offshore data center loophole, and the refusal of Commerce to act on executive orders. While the scandal has been widely reported, no meaningful policy change has occurred, exemplified by Megaspeed still being listed as a supported provider. Experts argue that the administration’s internal dysfunction has created a dangerous precedent where national security is sacrificed for economic or political gain. Congress is urged to act urgently—through investigations, transparency measures, and new legislation—to close loopholes, enforce export controls, and hold individuals accountable. The continued normalization of this crisis, especially with the president planning high-level summits with China and Russia, raises serious concerns about the integrity of U.S. foreign policy and national security. This is not merely a scandal—it is a fundamental failure of governance and technological defense in a strategic competition with China.

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- Hi, Bill Crystal here. Welcome to Bullwark on Sunday. I'm very pleased to be joined today for conversations that I think will be very, I know will be very timely and I think will be important with Julia Curly. Now with public service fellow at Law Fair, a former CIA analyst with 25 years of experience in national security. Julia was the NNSE Director in the Biden administration and for the first two months, the second Trump administration working on helping direct at-a-c efforts to organize the intelligence community, I guess that's the right word. And we organized the collection of intelligence and presented to people in the White House. Julia also was a PDB, the Presidential Daily Briefing, Briefer to Vice President Pence. And when in the agency, I think we're allowed to say this, you, it's public, it's in your bio. So I think we're allowed to say you worked on many issues, including serving in the CIA's China Mission Center. So you know something about China and some of our intelligence challenges there. So we're going to talk about this scandal and conspiracy or whatever you want to call it. That we're now that's really broken and exploded, really, I have the last two weeks. So Julia, thanks for joining me. - Yeah, thanks Bill for having me on. I really appreciate it. And I want to say that I'm wearing my leather jacket today in solidarity with Sarah Longwell and all gay women who refuse to give Jensen Wong and all these tech oligarchs. The ability to take this away from us, really. - That's really excellent. I was going to probably not mention the leather jacket because you know, I don't believe in commenting on other people's apparel. But that's great that you and Sarah are. Yes, that's important. That's an important sub-theme of this scandal, not the most important. - That's fair enough. - Perhaps the most important. - You know, it has its place, it has its place. So look, Julia, you've done this professionally for over two decades and done it at the agency and at the White House. So you really understand, I think, in a way, that very few of us do sort of what happened here and what the key moments were and what kind of scandal this is and could turn out to be. So walk us through it if you would. - Yeah, it's a counterintelligence nightmare. It's the trifecta of an adversary of the United States getting an intelligence asset right at the side of the key AI advisor to the president and influence up. But then it's also the massive diversion of chips. The critical technology to the geopolitical competition with China are these GPUs that Nvidia sells and all of this has resulted in a true breakdown of our export control regime that's gonna strengthen China in many ways. I think that there are six moments that we can briefly walk through that would give the audience a clear reading of what happened here. - Great. - So, I mean, this all really begins in 2024 to 2025 and the administration had a chance to act. And so they were given intelligence that Megaspeed was the Commerce Department was detecting that these still boxed Nvidia chips that were export controlled showed up in Malaysia. And this Singapore-based company Megaspeed, the Alice Wong, it was at the center of this. They had an opportunity to move forward, but they did the opposite. They did not get to the chips in time. The chips got to China. And then the Commerce Department let the Biden anti-smuggling rules that had just been put into place expire. They pushed them aside, so they were able to move ahead with that sale. Singapore said-- - And a ton of evidence that Megaspeed is kind of a sketchy operation. - A front company basically. - A front company based out of Singapore. - Right. So then you have just a few months later, Trump briefed that the woman with direct access to Jensen Wong, that we're having a fair, that she's believed to be a Chinese intelligence asset. So this is briefed to the president. No action is taken. No decision to give a defensive briefing for Wong. And at the same time, or right afterwards, Trump approves the sale of H200 chips from Nvidia to China for this 25% cut of the revenue. Then you fast forward-- - Yeah, go ahead. - The defensive briefing thing, that means just to clarify for people that the person who's perhaps the object of the spine gets told, "Hey, this person may be aware," kind of thing. And I spoke with someone very senior like you in previous administrations. And you were in this one too, though, for a couple of months. And this person said that that for her was a tip off. I mean, the failure to get the defensive briefing, that things were not right. That was, is that correct? And sort of say a word about what that means. What did they have? Why wouldn't you want to? If you thought it was an authentic spy operation where someone was being a victim of a spy, wouldn't you want to let that person know? - Right, I mean, if you warn Jensen that he is in bed with a Chinese spy, the relationship is going to-- And she's going to know something is wrong. You will have tipped off the Beijing to the fact that you know. The only reason to not do that is to run the-- is to try to work against the opponent, the MSS, the Chinese intelligence service, that's running this asset at you to either try to double this person, to run them back at China, to do something offensively with this opportunity intelligence-wise. And that-- I mean, obviously, we're not on the inside. We don't know what's going on, but that does not seem to have happened. And so how they made a decision not to do the defensive briefing, but also not to do anything to limit Wang's access to the president, knowing that he was so close to a Chinese spy, that is one of the real unanswered questions at the White House, it just can't explain. And so a deliberate decision to prioritize the economic interests of the United States, over cutting off a Chinese spy with access to someone who's influencing the president, you could make that argument in public. I don't think it's a very good one, but they haven't even bothered to make that argument. Good, OK. Right, so you then advance to May of this year, you've got the classified Rubio Memo, which he seems to have tasked CIA to produce for him, which is then briefed to the president on Air Force One. This is the same flight that then diverts at the president's orders to go pick up Jensen Wang in Alaska, to have him then join the delegation that's going on their way to Beijing. Again, an incredible counterintelligence situation where you have a person close to a Chinese spy whose phone may have been an unescorted access to this person now joining the delegation that is about to go negotiate with Beijing on a trade delegation. So there was a decision to just plow ahead and allow this to go forward, no matter the counterintelligence risks. And that was a decision made by the president, obviously. Obviously, he asked for the plane to be to pick her up, to pick Jensen Wang up on the way. And then this keeps going and by this point, the president has now been briefed twice. Commerce is clearing additional Chinese firms to receive the advance chips. Trump has failed to take action in both of these cases and you have policy meetings in the May, August, and then finally in October timeframe, where you have cabinet agencies, treasury, almost certainly you have the intelligence community weighing in, you have Pete Hegseth at DOD, all saying that Chinese companies linked to the PLA are receiving chips and that they need to be cut off and treasury refusing to act. At one meeting in May of last year-- The Commerce Refusing Act. Commerce, excuse me, refusing to act. In May of this year, you have Trump twice approving action against trip chip diversion that's obviously taking place and neither order is carried out. Then again, you have this happen in October. That order is not carried out. Let Nick of Jax and the rules to restrict mega-speeds access to chips stalls. So you have at least three occasions where the president has been known behind closed doors has been reported to have ordered commerce to take action and commerce does not. So you have two choices there. You either have the Commerce Department ignoring the president's orders, which is a problem. Or you have a separate command chain where, well, in front of other cabinet members, the president is directing action. But once they leave, he's privately giving Howard Lucknick the real order, which is to not take action. And so you have a real process breakdown at the heart of the administration's decision-making. And I think that's an area so important because it's sinkable to me that Lucknick is deciding that it's all going to participate in Trump. I mean, they're all such great buddies and co-conspirators and so many things. So yes, the Trump maybe personally or through the National Security Advisor will be a quote, "Waters" or says, "Oh, we should act on that." And that's what other people in the room. And so that's kind of a standard thing that some types of, you know, that you want to do if you want to pretend you're a Bangalov but not, but then you, of course, see a lot. The fact that Lucknick takes no action is pretty amazing, right? I mean, that does not happen in a normal administration if it's a real order from the president of the United States, you know. Right. And by this point, they've all received the intelligence briefing from Rubio from the intelligence community. They know what is going on behind the scenes. And I just would want to take a moment to point out the process side of this. I mean, I was at the NSE when the National Security Council was purged under this administration and really it broke down the basic coordination system that would help the US government move in concert on exactly this type of a case. So if there have been a normal NSE process with deputies and lower level meetings happening frequently. it would have forced decisions up the chain, you would have had the question, does Jensen get a defensive briefing? Does he keep his access to the president? Should we move more aggressively on relooking at licenses that we've already given when it's clear there's being chips diversion, being diverted to China? Should he be on the plane to go to Beijing? There would have been these opportunities probably to create paper, might have put the president in a bad position, but instead you had these silos where nobody knows what the president's real intentions are, no one is providing warnings, and it leads to this counterintelligence nightmare of festering for almost a year. And if you want to do corrupt things, you want the process to break down. I think people are sometimes treating this as if, you know, they kind of, they didn't know what they were, they were rookies for sure. They weren't trumpet in there obviously for four years, and most of those other people have been around government some at least, many of them really. And secondly, yeah, but if you want to do corrupt things, you don't want a process in which, incidentally, because it's a real process, a lot of career people would be involved, a lot of people who would be trying to do their job and wouldn't be have been picked personally by Trump, or by Latinick, or whatever, right? So I do think, I think the breaking of the process is a feature, not a bug of this administration's way of going about doing business. Right, and it's speculative, of course, but it seems clear that there were at least two major factions in the administration on this. You have the economic faction led by, you know, Bessent who's, or by Latinick, who's trying to do deals and cut the obstacles to exports to China, and which is clearly getting its way with, obviously, with the president's backing. You have this Chinahawk National Security Caucus, which is clearly not succeeding, and without a functional NSC to force multiple competing U.S. interests to be bubbled up, you probably have some that part of that side of the administration, finally leaking this into public to just force the president's hand and force the administration to take some sort of an action on this. And how about from what we've learned publicly, do you think, can we say that this economic faction, there is an argument, it's not public, it's a very good one, but, you know, economic policy argument, other kinds of complex arguments that, you know, we want to be selling these ships to China, or whatever, but there's also a real, it's not the U.S. economic interest entirely, it's also Trump and Latinx interest, right, the degree of corruption, honestly, and we make it up. I mean, I feel like, you know, one can have a legitimate policy disagreement, one could even have spying what's the analogy. There were people who had, were in favor of a dovish policy towards the Soviet Union in the late 40s or early 50s, legit, you know, honestly, I thought it was better for the world than there were Soviet spies, but it doesn't, you know, but the two things happen at the same time, but it doesn't, the first, we're not necessarily tools or agents, of course, of the Soviet spies, but if it's corruption, it's a different story, I think. Right, I mean, you could see a world where there's a good faith economic argument being made that either China's going to get these ships somehow anyway, we want to entangle them in the U.S. technology stack, and they would then be in public saying, look, these export controls are just bad policy. They're not going to work. We have to engage China. Of course, they did not have that. They tried to get the trappings of restricting technology while it was simultaneously being run around the export controls. And then on parallel, as you as you mentioned, you have some really interesting, in quotes, investments happening at the same rough time that the administration is making these decisions. So the Trump family is making record investments into Nvidia. You have Nvidia donating to the ballroom. You have, then on Howard Blutnik side, you have Howard Linux kids, the Cantor Fitzgerald also making major investments into Nvidia while they're relaxing the export controls and while this diversion scheme is going on. So these are definitely things that Congress should be pushing for more details on what were the considerations that were in play. And when that happened, unfortunately, it's going to be difficult to pursue real criminal investigations against the president's children and the children of the sitting commerce secretary. But there's a lot of smoke here that suggests a very clear, personal financial investment in the subject in which we're making public policy on behalf of America. And just and the consequences, you touched on it, but maybe say we're more about the actual, this is sometimes people do corrupt things in the real world results of trivial apart from someone ripping off the taxpayers for a few billion dollars or something like that, but it doesn't damage the country in some fundamental way. This is a pretty big deal with these chips, right? I don't say a word about that. Yeah, I mean, this is not a sex scandal. I mean, obviously it has that element, but this is industrial scale diversion of technology that's at the heart of the competition with our primary strategic rival. And the effects of it are very clear that Chinese AI models for their top end and video have been using these top end in video chips and training these frontier AIs to compete with the US. Why does that matter? So it's just it's not just that these AI systems are important to our future economic competitiveness, but we have PLA linked firms receiving direct support from these Chinese AI systems to developing weapon systems to sort through intelligence, drone and signals data to build cyber offensive and defensive tools against the United States. And if you think about a scenario like a Taiwan crisis, you know, sifting through massive amounts of data to figure out what the adversary is doing is something that AI is being increasingly deployed to do on both sides of this divide. And we have basically given our potential adversary the brains to do it faster and keep up with us and have potentially real decision advantage heading into a Taiwan crisis. China by itself cannot make these chips at scale. They can't meet their own demand. Leading Chinese AI companies, including those affiliated with the PLA, say the shortage of chips, the compute shortage is the worst problem in keeping up with the US. And so if we can't stop the technology from spreading, we at least were trying to slow it down so that the US would maintain an advantage in time ahead of these Chinese models. And the gap unfortunately has been closing. They're just now months behind not years. And we now see another reason why that's the case. Yeah, when you and I were texting tomorrow, just preparing a little for this discussion. I think we were both struck by a report about this wasn't a theoretical problem that there was forensic evidence that these chips the Chinese were not supposed to have access to and presumably got access to but they got access to somehow. So very much more likely I should think through the Nvidia make a speed kind of pipeline that they have used them, right? I mean, I think it's right. They they they linked in the forensics of it and the data analysis of the actual Chinese open source models, which computer scientists can dig into and see that they see these signatures of the US chips of the Nvidia chips and the highest end NVIDIA chips, the black wells, built into the the Chinese AI models, suggesting they're using these ban chips. And we we have seen just in the last few days reports, especially in the Wall Street Journal, how mega speed led by Alice Wong who is having the affair is routing hundreds of thousands of these chips through herself or families, companies to China up to, you know, four to seven billion dollars worth of hardware and hundreds of thousands of chips depending on the the the the various estimates. And this is being added to the offshore data center loophole, which which this administration has allowed to continue despite Biden administration attempts to to close it where Malaysia has is becoming one of the world's leaders in offshore data centers. I think they said that it's now second only to the state of Virginia in the number of data centers operating. And these are all to service Chinese demand. And so they can use NVIDIA chips offshore for Chinese models being built on the mainland for potentially for PLA usage in this offshore way to and run around our export controls and mega speed and Alice Wong are right in the middle of that. But it does have some of the reporting that the Congress Department was also turning a blind eye to more more broadly to the export of these chips to, I guess other companies as you were just sort of saying in Malaysia and in Singapore, they were kind of basically just conduits to to Chinese companies, which in turn were closely linked to say the least to the Chinese government and the Chinese and the people's liberation army. I mean, so it's a broader administration problem, even then there's one particular, you know, NVIDIA to mega speed. Right. I mean, there's obviously a huge problem here. And it goes way beyond, you know, the the spy story here you have. I mean, this just didn't happen on its own. You must have people across NVIDIA itself running these exports and supposedly monitoring end users. There is a serious core at best corporate governance failures here. If not complicity with an open effort by Chinese intelligence services and others linked to the PLA to to and run our export controls with the willing cooperation of a company, which obviously had massive financial interests in assisting them. So across the board, beyond Jensen Wang, there needs to be an investigation at NVIDIA of who knew what and when. and an investigation by Congress, I suppose, of what of that with respect to our government. Yeah, I mean, because again, I think, well, you've been, well, I guess, two separate questions you can take them, whichever order you want. You've written intelligence officer in the government for a couple of decades, you've seen a lot of this, this apps and this steps and probably some minor scandals actually that we maybe don't even know anything about that were handled. If you haven't seen anything like this, I guess, that's my first question. I mean, there have been plenty of intelligence failures, but I've never seen a persistent and repeated failure to act when now that we know what we know, this has been going on at scale for at least a year. If not more than that, I know that the US government has been tracking this chip diversion story for years. And so the idea that this would have been known that this critical technology was reaching a future, the real competitive opponent of the United States and no one was taking any action. This was not an intelligence failure, just to speak up for my former colleagues. Like they warned, the president was warned twice. This is a policy failure or a coordination failure within the administration failing to act on obvious and available information that would have been in our national interest and prioritizing something else. And they can explain to the public what that something else was. Yeah, I mean, it was the way I would think of it. It was a purposeful failure by the administration. They can say we had good purposes in choosing not to act on this intelligence, but it was a choice. It wasn't like we didn't get the right, you know, the paper memo didn't get to me. It was confusing. It was confusing. I was, you know, whatever, you know, we dropped the ball somewhere. There was no ball. No ball was dropped, honestly, or if a ball was dropped now to get the touches metaphor as well. Yeah, it was done so on purpose. Right. And, you know, one thing I think we all should remember. I mean, it'll be hard to investigate while this administration is still in office, especially given how high up the level of decision making is here. But these crimes of technology diversion. They have a five year statute of limitations and violations carry up to 20 years of time in prison. So the people involved are not off the hook. And I think what the most important thing Congress can do now is to gather as much evidence, expose it to the American people. At very least, it's clear that people in the administration have allowed this to go on making America's national security weaker. We also want to know whether they have personally profited from it so that the weakness and the corruption are very much linked together in this case. Oh, that's so important. I mean, I was thinking about this about Iran culture, which blew up shortly after I get to Washington. I was, you know, a million miles away. I was at the education department. I nothing, not only had nothing to do with that. I know nothing more about it than anyone else does who's read about it. But I mean, that one thing that helps expose that was the justice. We did not have a justice environment that refused to investigate crimes in the executive branch or lights crimes or problems, even in the executive branch. And so they appointed a special counsel and they and the White House Council's office also locked things down and they did a serious investigation. They ended up being a commission on that. I think Prince Gocroft ran from within the government and Congress act. And I do a cyber call it. And I think this is true and you go back to war to gay too. Obviously, you have a combination, therefore, of the justice to our investigation using tools that they have as as the Department of Justice and kind of criminal law and and so forth on the one hand and Congress on the other. In this case, for two years or at least, we have presumably just Congress on the other. So that maybe think of how much can they really discover on the other hand. I was talking to her friend, he used to work on the hill in these areas. They can call a lot of people there for private sessions. They don't have to just call Howard Lutnik. They can call the person who runs whatever their bureau is called the Tuskegeeck's work control. Right. BIS and commerce. BIS. They can call people four steps down at BIS and say, well, whether did you know about this, whether memos, do you have the, did your boss know about it? Did you ever hear that your boss had briefed the secretary about it? Did you ever hear about a White House or National Security Council? I feel like there are a lot of, am I wrong with this? I mean, there are a lot of strings one can pull on if one hasn't, if Congress investigates this aggressively, though totally legitimately, I would say. Right. I mean, if you can't get to the senior people, if the executive in the White House going to claim executive privilege, there's plenty of people in departments and agencies who clearly have had strong suspicions of this going on and have been trying to blow the whistle for many months now. It's been an open secret reported in the press that on issues involving Nvidia within the commerce department. They are, this is very centralized and at the highest levels of the commerce department. We have Lutnik in the head of BIS and the undersecretaries taking direct control of this issue for some reason. So that is, of course, spawned a lot of concern more broadly within the commerce department of why that is the case. And so I think there are going to be a lot of lower level people who have witnessed things, who will want to save themselves. And, you know, honestly, they'll be able to testify what has occurred above them. And then that'll give Congress more witnesses to dig into. Yeah, I was thinking of Watergate, which I college, I guess, for sure. You know, following just a few distance, I was doing other things, obviously, but, you know, people we had never heard of testified both privately and then publicly in some cases to Congress and discovered there was a taping system in the overall office. And then John Dean decided to turn states evidence and then a lot of other things came out. I mean, you don't need the, you know, you don't need Howard Lutnik to explain, discuss his conversations with the president. If one knew more about them, a lot of people might have been in some of those meetings too, but anyway, but I'm just even at the level of the staff, I guess is what I'm trying to say, the congressional investigators who can do a fair amount, I should think. I think that's right. And I think that we don't necessarily have to wait for future criminal investigations down the road. There are things Congress can do now and is already in motion, which hopefully will have strong bipartisan political support behind them. We should say that the, for example, the House subcommittee on China, which has been led by Republicans has been very strong on these issues and has been often at odds with the White House from what they see is a lax approach to export controls, you know, to China. And so whether it is moving ahead with the offshore data center loophole trying to close it, which the House already did earlier this year voted overwhelmingly to try to close that the Senate still hasn't acted. They could act, they could move ahead and close that loophole before the end of the term, they could also pass much more aggressive strong export control rules that will make it completely unambiguous to to Nvidia, who they can and cannot sell this to and make it clear that violations of this export controls by this US company will carry significant ramifications for the people involved, including jail time. And then, you know, it's right, I was just myself thinking of getting to that point that people talk about, well, you just, you're going to investigate, but also you can propose and pass legislation that goes into effect in real time, right. And, and that would, I mean, some respects, it's like I was locking the barn door after the horses given not not really at it would show incidentally how serious this is and that we're certainly going to stop it from going forward. And these people still in office and they will have to act or not, if they don't, they're violating not, I don't know that this much ambiguous, but the current law, honestly, I haven't said it at all, but certainly you can make it all less and less ambiguous as you say. And you can also require reports every 30 day, I mean, I'm just making this up, or you can require reports to Congress to develop a committees at least classified and unclassified every 30 days on what's happening, how many chips are being exported, what's happening in Singapore, right. People sort of don't actually people, but I feel like yeah, there's a lot Congress can do if they get a little imagination about the combination of how much what they can investigate and what they can legislate. And the legislation has a kind of investigatory side to it, right. I mean, as well, so yeah, they're not going to be, maybe it's not having just. The government isn't quite as much of an impediment as I originally thought. Well, it will be to seek criminal, you know, prosecutions in the near term, but they can establish that that contemporaneous record for at all. And frankly, they can force the president to veto if he's if he's so committed to a different approach to export controls and to selling chips to China, let him defend it in public, let him defend a veto of what. It would be probably an overwhelmingly bipartisan act to try to close off China's access to this technology. I feel like it's almost novelistic that the president is flying off. When is he flying off later this week? It's not even that later this week like like Tuesday or something like that. But then I think he goes first to Philippines and then to China, but then he has this meeting in China with apparently Xi Jinping and Putin. Yeah. I mean, say, you've re-presidents and vice presidents before such meetings, you've prepared materials over at the agency. I'm sure that was used for briefings in these meetings, but I don't know what do you make of that. I guess I'm sort of stunned that everyone just assumes, well, of course they're going to go ahead. Yeah, I'm just going to meet with Xi in the light of this massive scandal. He's just going to go meet with Xi Jinping, but I guess he is. I mean, like the act finale of his part of the drama that he would be sitting across the table from the Chinese leader who's been running a spy, who's been sleeping with his closest AI advisor. And he's going to be talking to him about among other things, the AI competition between the US and China. I think that if the past is prologue of how little this administration is prepared for these presidential summits where staff have been basically cut out of it so that the president can effectively wing it in the room because he's the world's greatest dealmaker. Who knows what will be discussed and approved in this. I mean, the administration's goals going into this were to try to extend the trade truce for another year of Trump's term. But I mean, we'll see on the Chinese side how forgiving they will be of him knowing that he's suffered two major setbacks. Obviously, the midterms were dealt with a real political blow to the president, but now he's in the middle of this scandal as well. I imagine that Chinese may try to press their advantage on trade on continuing the suspension of sale of arms to Taiwan, which is now many, many months past the point in which Taiwan had inked the deal, or the president might agree to basically put off Taiwan arm sales for the rest of his term, which would be a huge setback to Taiwan's defense. And then there's this issue with AI chips where Congress is going to be pushing the president to close off this loophole, which China is obviously going to do a response to that. And so you could easily see the Chinese and she putting things back down on the table like the rare earth minerals allowing US companies to purchase them in some quantities as a part of the trade war. And so if everything is on the table, everything is on the table and God only knows what we're going to trade away to get what the president wants on tariffs. I mean, a final point just with the administration. I feel like some people in the administration pretty clearly have been leaking or having others leak on their behalf. Stuff that makes them look good and by comparison as they tried to raise this issue and they wrote a memo in the case of Rubio where they hadn't argument in the sit room in the case of treasury secretary of essence, but at some point the intelligence community has been totally silent so far as I can tell which I guess is their journal. But it is a little startling that we're getting all this reporting. And I don't know there's no comment for the record about what did it didn't happen. No defense actually. It's sort of striking to me to some of these people at some point, I don't know what they have to be held accountable for just going along with this. I mean, did they get a pass because they they had a 10 minute argument in the in the situation room with with with with cough. I don't know. Well, I mean, I think for personal intelligence officers, their job is to deliver the best information they can, but they're not in charge of making decisions and they shouldn't be. And that they have done their part at that point and they should speak truth to power and warn of the effects of going ahead with these policies. And then they step back and it's the policy makers obligation to step forward. If those intel officers feel like they have to speak, they should do what I did, which is to resign and leave and be able to speak in public in places like this and warn the public of what the administration is doing to the institutions and our to our national security. I think there's one other point to make. Which is not that I didn't mean to simply apply the intelligence officer, but I think I mean the actual head of ODNI or the actual secretary, the treasury, national security advisor, I feel like some of those people might speak up and there might be people pretty high up in those organizations. I should think at the NSC and who will feel that it's become untanable and they might leave. Maybe not who I guess we'll see. I would hope so. There will be opportunities to grow these individuals in public. I mean, you have the you know, the director and the the DNI, the director of CIA and the DNI Clayton, they will testify in early next year in the annual threat assessments. There will be opportunities to depress them in public about the threat of diversion and what we have known that has now come out in in leaks, what we have known and what was briefed at what points. Honestly, I would not be surprised if there have not been many more times than just the two occasions that we've we've talked about the president being briefed. This kind of information would be briefed all of the time across the US government at lower levels. So there are many other people that were warned by the intelligence community and that failed to act here. Yeah, interesting. I'm sorry, you're going to say one last thing I think. Yeah, well, just just on the summit coming ahead because I know a lot of people are very concerned what the president will do if he's winging it off the cuff. Going to this summit at all is a pretty risky proposition for what he might do. Clearly, it was she's intentioned to have these kinds of photo ops of himself, Trump and Putin all on the stage together, giving the idea of Yalta for Altacy where the great powers will be carving up the world. And there's a real danger that she and the and Trump and Putin will send the message to the middle powers to NATO, Europe, to Japan, and other US allies that we three are the ones who are going to be carving up the world and we will settle matters between us. And you can easily see Trump whose ego demands such such treatment and wants to be seen in the in the ranks there going along with that. And there's implications potentially for future peace settlement in Ukraine where where Putin could give the impression that he and Trump are now working out at the end of the war without the Ukrainians being in the room. I think a lot of people are clutching their pearls, hoping nothing happens that the summit is a non-event. But then, of course, Trump has agreed to another summit at the end of the year at the rawl. So this summit diplomacy will will keep going. And many people in the intelligence community, of course, remember Helsinki in 2018 where the president sided with Putin over his own intelligence agencies. And I certainly hope that there is not such a moment where, you know, Pond reassurances from Xi Jinping, he says that he believes that there was no such spy scandal in this place, but I guess we'll all see. We will. We'll have to talk maybe. Let's figure out when we should talk next. Right after that summit at the end of this week. And as you say, this is not like this is a one-off thing and there'll be another one afterwards. But the most important thing is the ongoing policy. As you say, right now, as of right now, is it your understanding of closer this, that current policy, the policy that is enabled this massive diversion, a very important technology to our main adversary. That policy continues. We have no reason. We have no evidence that anything has been stopped at this. Yeah, shockingly. You go to the Nvidia website today. I believe it was true as of yesterday that mega speed is still listed as a cloud provider that Nvidia was supporting. And it still hasn't been added to the entity's list. Right. The Commerce Department has not changed anything, right? I mean, at least in previous scandals around controversy, they, you know, said, no, well, okay, we did it. That was terror mistake. We lied to Congress about it. That's even worse. But we, it's not happening anymore. We can't say that now. Right. And now it's, it's in public. So all excuses have been removed, which may have been why this was leaked in the first place. But it is truly amazing that after all of this, nothing seems to be happening. And I think it's just part of the internal dysfunction of this administration that clearly ripped the wiring out of what normally governs and coordinates US foreign policy. Yikes. Julia, thank you. Thank you for your service over more than two decades. And thank you for really for educating us on this today. We'll have to stay in close touch because I think it's so important. I mean, I'm right about that. It really isn't important. It's not sex and it's not even spying in a way. You know, it's a major issue of what the US government has been doing over the last couple of years. Yeah. I mean, we reaching for the analogy, you know, people have often said that AI is like the nuclear weapons of our age. And so this is the Rosenbergs again. This is not just a sex scandal. This is the people leaking the key technologies at the heart of a strategic competition with our primary geo strategic competitor. And something must be done. Something has to come out of this besides a shrug. And I hope that Congress is up to the task. I do too. Well, thank you, Julia, for, as I say, for your services to say, but also thank you, really, for joining us today. And we'll stay in close touch. Thanks. You all really appreciate it. And thank you all for joining us and we'll work on something.

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. The scandal involves a coordinated counterintelligence and technology diversion crisis where Chinese intelligence operatives gained access to the U.S. AI advisor Jensen Wong through a front company, Megaspeed, based in Singapore.
  2. Critical NVIDIA chips, which are essential for AI development, were diverted to China via illegal export routes, including through Megaspeed and offshore data centers in Malaysia, undermining U.S. strategic competitiveness.
  3. Multiple government failures occurred
  4. A breakdown in inter-agency coordination and decision-making—especially within the National Security Council—enabled unchecked policy actions, with Commerce Department officials, including Howard Lucknick, refusing to act on presidential directives.
  5. There is evidence of personal financial interests, such as Trump family and private investors making major investments in NVIDIA during the time of chip diversion, raising concerns about corruption and self-dealing.
  6. The U.S. intelligence community and key agencies were briefed on the risks, yet no action was taken, indicating a systemic failure to prioritize national security over economic or political interests.
  7. Congress has a critical role to play in investigating the diversion, exposing financial ties, and passing new export control legislation to close loopholes and prevent future abuses.
  8. The ongoing lack of policy change—such as the continued listing of Megaspeed as a supported cloud provider—shows that the administration’s failure to act is not only political but institutional and deeply damaging to U.S. national security.

Summary:

S. technology—specifically high-end NVIDIA AI chips—to China. This diversion, facilitated through a Singapore-based front company, Megaspeed, and offshore data centers, has enabled Chinese AI models, including those linked to the People's Liberation Army, to advance rapidly in artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities.

S. government, despite multiple intelligence warnings and internal briefings, failed to act on known risks. Key decisions—such as refusing to issue a defensive briefing to AI advisor Jensen Wong and allowing the sale of advanced chips to China—were made without adequate oversight or coordination, indicating a breakdown in policy and inter-agency processes.

There is strong evidence of personal financial interests tied to the same decisions, including investments by the Trump family and private firms in NVIDIA, suggesting possible corruption. The situation has been exacerbated by the continued operation of loopholes, like the offshore data center loophole, and the refusal of Commerce to act on executive orders. While the scandal has been widely reported, no meaningful policy change has occurred, exemplified by Megaspeed still being listed as a supported provider.

Experts argue that the administration’s internal dysfunction has created a dangerous precedent where national security is sacrificed for economic or political gain. Congress is urged to act urgently—through investigations, transparency measures, and new legislation—to close loopholes, enforce export controls, and hold individuals accountable. S.

foreign policy and national security. This is not merely a scandal—it is a fundamental failure of governance and technological defense in a strategic competition with China.

FAQs

The scandal involves the systematic diversion of high-end Nvidia AI chips to China through companies like Megaspeed, bypassing U.S. export controls. This enables China to develop advanced AI models and weapon systems, undermining U.S. strategic and economic competitiveness in the AI race.

Multiple intelligence briefings, including the classified Rubio Memo, warned of risks involving Chinese-linked firms receiving Nvidia chips. Yet key decisions—like failing to provide a defensive briefing for Jensen Wang or blocking chip exports—were made without action, despite clear warnings and available information.

A defensive briefing would have warned Jensen Wang that he might be under surveillance by a Chinese intelligence asset. Failing to provide it likely compromised counterintelligence efforts and signaled a failure to protect the U.S. from a potential espionage operation.

Yes, multiple reports indicate that despite repeated warnings and presidential orders, Commerce Department officials—including Howard Lucknick—refused to act, creating a breakdown in coordination and suggesting deliberate inaction to protect economic interests over national security.

Megaspeed, a Singapore-based front company led by Alice Wong, is believed to have routed hundreds of thousands of Nvidia chips to China. The operation has been linked to Chinese firms tied to the People's Liberation Army, using offshore data centers to circumvent export controls.

Yes, there are reports of the Trump family and associates making record investments in Nvidia during the period of policy failures. This raises concerns about a conflict of interest where personal financial gain may have influenced decisions to weaken export controls.

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