Europe’s New Nuclear Deterrence Debate and France's Answer

(upbeat music) - Hello and welcome to another edition of Brussels Brouts. I'm Andrea Kendall Taylor. - And I'm Jim Townsend. - And we're so glad you can join us. On March 2nd, in a speech at France's Il Long Base, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled major changes to France's nuclear deterrence doctrine. First, Macron announced an increase, the first since 1992, in France's nuclear stockpile. France currently maintains 290 warheads and will increase that number to a now undisclosed count. He also announced a new doctrine what he called forward deterrence. This is a partnership with seven European countries, including Germany, Poland, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden on strategic issues. That cooperation will include partner participation in nuclear exercises and the potential for France to temporarily deploy nuclear armed fighter jets to other European countries. While France will maintain the independence of its nuclear command and control in, remain outside of NATO's nuclear mission, this extension of the French nuclear umbrella represents a significant shift in French policy in response to the new realities of the European security environment, which includes a less reliable commitment from the United States. So to help us understand these changes and to talk through broader implications of a declining US presence in Europe for European strategic deterrence, we're very excited to welcome Claudia Mayor and Bruno Tattray to Brussels sprouts. Claudia Bruno, welcome. - Thank you for the invitation. - Thank you. Very quick introductions. Claudia is the senior vice president of Transatlantic Security at the German Marshall Fund. And to note, she is the co-author of a new report that is relevant to our discussion today called "Mind the Deterrence Gap" that they launched at the Munich Security Conference. And Bruno is the deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research and non-resident fellow at the Institute, Montenegro. Bruno, I'm gonna start with you. I was just reading the economist this morning in which both you and Claudia were quoted. And I'm gonna start with the quote you gave in there where you describe Macron's speech and the changes made as the most significant update to French nuclear deterrence policy in 30 years. So let's start there and why don't you unpack that for us. - Right, yes. Well, the French presidents have taken the habits so to say of giving a full speech devoted nuclear deterrence devoted to nuclear deterrence every five years or so. They've done that since the early '90s. It's a very French thing to the best of my knowledge on the French president do that. But this one is particularly indeed. First of all, because it's the second and almost certainly the last time Macron does one, the previous one was in February 2020. And it's the most significant also because this one has been prepared by a full scale on nuclear posture review, so to say. I mean, it was really in eight months work where involving the whole administration and involving reviewing the principles, the posture, the doctrine, the force, everything. So yes, it was also a significant instance that indeed in terms of the new orientations that were made, I would say that the combination of an announce and a heralded increase in the French stock buy, the much stouted forward deterrence concept, but also the opacity that France is actually showing now with this speech. So in a sense, the speech is also interesting as almost as much as what it does not say, as much as what it says. So the combination of these three elements, adding to the very important northward French-British declaration of last July, that does amount from my standpoint to a real overhaul of French nuclear policy, even though some of the most fundamental elements remain intact. Okay, so put this in the context Bruno of what's happening in the transatlantic relation to kind of give it, you know, why this speech and why now? - Well, the why now. - Other than what they do it every five years. So yeah, you've got that, but you know, the changes. Why is this happening now? Talk a little bit about what, you know, some of the reasons, justification, Macron gave and set the stage of the context that this is happening in. - All right, well, very simply, it's the combination of Putin and Trump. It's as simple as that. I mean, the importance of nuclear deterrence for the French was reaffirm as early as February 2022, when Macron actually, although he was never acknowledged publicly, I mean, literally put the whole sovereign forces C as a message to Putin, that is, for us, for us French, the message was, the message was that for us French, the possession of independent nuclear force is also a way to have a dialogue among equals and also to be prepared for each and every possible eventuality. So that was, you know, that was Macron's messaging. As you know, I'm sure that many listeners will know, the France have always had over the past 30 years. This mention or emphasis on the so-called, quote, European dimension of nuclear deterrence, unquote. And as many people did not know 10 years ago, but those who do a bit of nuclear history know, I mean, even since the days of the Gauls, surprisingly, from many observers, that European dimension was always there, but the growing of European integration and of course, the uncertainties that have been increasing about the reliability of the US nuclear guarantees for some of our allies, that's definitely a very important element of the context that led to the speech. Yeah, Bruno, I agree with Bruno's analysis, said it was a combination of Trump and Putin, but if you zoom out a little bit, I think you can say that the perspective of the Europeans is that some 30 years of a period of 30 years is over, where European thought they can organize security in Europe with less nuclear weapons. And at least since the 2022 Russian renewed Russian invasion in Ukraine, Europeans figured out that that time is over, because the Russian invasion is not only conventional, but since the first day, the Russian president has used nuclear signaling. So he is annexing Ukrainian territory, he is raging a conventional war with regular nuclear threats that worked pretty well on some countries a bit less. He probably had three intentions, the first to pressure the Ukrainians and to a capitulation, it didn't work, to limit Western support for Ukraine, which worked a little bit because you still have a very calibrated European support for Ukraine, it has been growing, but many countries, including my country, Germany was very concerned about the nuclear threat, and Russia sanctuized the annexation of Ukrainian territory. So the nuclear dimension and that war is very important and really woke Europeans up. And the second shock, the Trump shock, as Bruno said, is a political one. Since 2025, European allies wonder how reliable the US security guarantee still is. I mean, if you read the National Security Strategy or Defense Strategy, Russia doesn't seem to be a big problem for the US. It's a regional, manageable problem for the allies. So the Europeans wonder, are they going to come, if they are the Americans going to come, if there's an issue with Russia? There is a more confrontational approach, if you think about the Greenland incident, which for many Europeans was crossing a red line, where they thought one ally was threatening another ally with military force. So the willingness from the US to condition defense support with a broader political agenda is deeply disturbing the Europeans. So the conclusion, most Europeans were making from that, is that we have an increasing risk that maybe the US might reduce their commitment, or a second risk, even if they don't reduce the commitment, we don't really know whether we can still rely upon it. So the fear in Europe is what we called an hour report, a deterrents gap. The Europeans define their interest, but they don't know whether the Americans will be there to support them and ask Europeans, "Well, probably not in a place to do it on our own." And if, from a Russian perspective, there really is such a gap. We don't know it, but the Russians might think there is one. It might invite the Russians to use nuclear coercion. And that's the fear. And this is why so many Europeans, second of March, were watching Paris, and they're wondering what the French president would say. And the expectation was that there would be doctrinal change. as Bruno already outlined. And particularly, there would be practical steps forward to implement that European dimension of the French vital interest. So we wanted practical steps because there's urgency. And there's also political urgency, because many Europeans look at the French presidential elections in 2027, and they wonder what would happen if a right-wing populist would win that election. So it was really ice on Paris, despite the Iran war. And everybody was looking at the French president standing at the Ilong base ahead of a submarine, very impressive setting, if you haven't seen the pictures, watch the pictures, and listening to what he's going to say. - Clad, get to the European dimension a little bit, because in his speech, you Macron described Germany as the key partner. And so in this speech and in this concept of forward defense, what is the envisioned role that the French German cooperation is going to play? - The Franco-German dimension is, in fact, fascinating in that speech, because not only in the speech, Germany has mentioned several times as the crucial partner, the key partner, but also in parallel, or right after that, a bilateral Franco-German declaration has been published. And you could see those two, the speech, and the bilateral declaration, they have been synchronized. And this bilateral declaration takes this particularly partnership even further. And that's fascinating in the kind of broader context for several reasons. First, if you remember, just the week before that Macron speech, at least in Europe, the news were all about Franco-German relationship, asic catastrophe, because the future combat air system is going to fail. So it was all about it doesn't work. And just one week later, France and Germany are signing up for nuclear cooperation. And they were able to shield that from this F-Cars problems. The second is, and Bruno knows that very well, that for a very long time, I would say, until 2022, Germany looked at nuclear weapons mainly as something to get rid of this armament and arms control, but not so much as an element that helps us for our defense and security. So now, engaging as the first conventional state in a nuclear-steering group is France, the first is the UK, it's an also declaration, and the second is Germany. That's a huge step for the German, I would say, nuclear DNA, which was very reluctant. And particularly Germany was reluctant to talk about nuclear deterrence outside NATO. Germany used to look at that only through a NATO prism. What helped is that in this speech, but President Macron praised NATO underlined that the French forward deterrence is complementary to NATO and how we are all perfectly friends. That helped the Germans, obviously. But this bilateral dimension is really remarkable. In the last speech, Bruno mentioned this, the 2020 speech at the E. Col de Guerre, the German government was apparently informed ahead. And France was hoping for a friendly reaction, and it simply didn't come. And they have been waiting a long time. So this time, everything was different. Synchronized reaction, deeper cooperation, and nuclear, I mean, German talks about nuclear outside NATO in a nuclear-steering group. It's not called planning group, because France were not sure planning, and it would look too much like the NATO planning group. And France very clearly said, there's no joint planification and no joint use and no joint nothing. But talking about deterrence together, thinking about the articulation of conventional and nuclear together, it's a huge step for France, reaching out to Germany, and it's a huge step for Germany making that step. So for both sides, I thought that is, I'm tempted to say revolutionary. - Well, thank you to both of you for coming today. This is, there was a huge deal that speech and the follow on statements. It's really a lot to take in. But I have a question for you. Do you see in the future any kind of UK play in this? And I know that the France UK have a number of documents that have been signed. I think Bruno referenced one of them. And so there is this relationship that began a couple of years ago with France. And I don't think there's a German UK thing, but is there room to be adding on the other European nuclear power into this? Is that something that makes sense? And then the second point is, Claudia, you know, the native planning group point. I watched to see if maybe France was gonna inch towards that. But Bruno, it would be, I think maybe for Brussels-Brasilist, there's it'd be good to talk about why that would not be part of it. And I think it's maybe in the future, we'll see if this is, 'cause I would love to see France rejoin, maybe just from nostalgia or something, but anyway. But do talk about a UK play somewhere in this. And then tell us all why France chose not to rejoin the native planning group. - All right, Jim, first of all, the couple of additional comments on the French German angle. I fully agree with what Claudia says, but I would call it revolutionary only in the sense that this is a major step forward. - I said almost 12, almost 12, almost. - Right, that's fair. That's fair. I can share with that, because some of your listeners might not be aware that there's an extremely long tradition of French German nuclear deterrence discussions starting in the modern era, so to say, in the 1980s. I wish told that, first of all, the mid-round call nuclear deterrence conversation was extremely intense. There was even at some point a discussion of having a nuclear hotline between Bonn and Paris. This was Bonn at the time. This was not, this has never been really made public, but I can testify that it was considered. And, you know, I mean, it's a theme that Claudia and I have discussed several times, but never underestimate the strengths and the solidarity of the French German defense and security relationship. I mean, those were surprised by the single link, single out Germany in the Macron's page and the joint community, which came immediately on the heels of the speech, are those who can't separate the wheat from the shaft. So to say, I mean, the controversy, which is a difficult one about F-Case is one thing, but the strengths of the partnership is another. Now, on the UK dimension, look, one thing I was a little surprised about is that the UK French dimension was slightly separated from the forward deterrence concept in the speech. Now, I think this was a mistake because in a sense, it's a coherence system. I call it a nuclear backstop. Yeah, I think I was quoted in the New York Times, but it's a backstop. It's a backstop because as long as the US formally says, the extended nuclear umbrella is still there, the French don't want to give the impression that they are competing with it. So we say, hey, Washington, we hear you. Okay, so we don't want to create a competitor at this point because there's no need to. So I call it a backstop, but the backstop is actually made of two components. One is the French British axis, so to say, and actually France does or can do joint planning now, but with the UK, it's explicitly mentioned, and I was quite revolutionary. Both of the French and the British, the idea to say publicly we're ready to do joint nuclear planning with another country that was revolutionary for France, and the idea that we are ready to do joint nuclear planning with another country than the US is revolutionary for the British. Now you have that, so to say that, undersea part of the backstop, the French British one, and then you have the visible air component, which is what we could do in the future with those, European partners who are interested and able to. Now, very may also that this may have adventures in crisis time because it's already some form of sharing nuclear risk, and it has adventures in terms of dispersion, survivability, it has adventures also in complicating the adversary calculation, which is part of the terrain because all this is not only about reassurance, it's also about deterrence. There's always a dual component in these matters, as well that is, there is deterrence and reassurance, reassurance and deterrence, and the speech plays on both things. Now finally on Jim's question, most of the French establishment would answer, why would we, why would we join the nuclear planning group? Now, some of you may know that I've pushed for France to be an observer of the nuclear planning group for two decades, that's a fighter that has always lost. I thought that it would be a good thing as a confidence-building measure vis-a-vis our European allies. It's not a question of transparency and mutual information. Believe me, the French know very well what the nuclear planning group and the HLG and other nuclear institutions. Well, there is mutual exchange of information, but that's not happening formally in the HLG, the high level group or the nuclear planning group. It's still a political taboo, and that allows me to say very briefly something about 27. The speech was deliberately constructed in ways which would make it very difficult for the potential national rally candidates in the presidential election of 27 to say, oh, this is an a-thema, this is no longer a call-ism, this is betrayal of the fundamental, the French nuclear DNA, et cetera. So one additional reason why it may have been difficult to consider even becoming an observer, the NPG, may have been the fact that you don't want to give arguments to the national rally to say that this is nuclear betrayal or whatever. And in fact, I think Macron won his bet in that respect because the immediate reactions from the national rally were actually not negative. No, they did not support it, but they, and that's what the political victory, and also I would say an insurance, or maybe even a guarantee for our allies, that if a national rally candidate is elected in 27, he's or her first priority will not be to actually go back on these commitments. He or she would have the ability to go forward in ways he or she would want to, but actually that new president, if it's a national rally president, will not, that's my guess, an informed guess, not be eager to, you know, to re-neigh on all these new commitments. - I mean, the president Macron had to strike a really tricky balance. On the one hand, there was a criticism at home, is she going to sell out the national deterrence, which is the heart of the sovereignty and everything? And on the other hand, there was the expectation of the European allies to make a credible offer, and I'm simplifying, and not be too antennato, which is the kind of assumption, even if it's not, it was the kind of prejudice against France, but this was the expectation. And if you look at the speech, you managed really, really well. Bruno already explained the domestic scene, but for the European partners, he was able to kind of calm the criticism at home, and he was able to calm the varies, we see allies, who were afraid that that would be a typical French NATO critical speech, and it was full of a appraisal of NATO being complementary and NATO being important. So that was a fantastic balance. And Bruno, I agree that there has been a longstanding Franco-German nuclear cooperation, but setting up a distinctive nuclear steering group, is something that I think would not have been thinkable before 25, before Trump. So it puts it on a different level, and having a kind of even very loses structure where Germans think about deterrents outside NATO, being an active member of the nuclear chairman of the NATO, was, I mean, you know, the Germans pretty well, Bruno, that was really a tough thing to do. So I think the context really is important here, and out that this context, I think it would not have been possible. On the German UK, obviously, there's not, the nuclear cooperation is not at all on the same level, but there is indeed a very strong and German British defence cooperation. There's an overall agreement, Trinity House, where Germany and the UK want to deepen their cooperation, and it would naturally include also a nuclear dimension. And that brings me to a point that Bruno mentioned that many things have not yet been addressed, or are not need to be defined a pretty wake. And one thing that many European allies wonder, obviously, is if France has now seven special allies, Germany, Denmark, Greece, and they have bilateral dialogues with each of them, how is this coordinated? In particular, if you have countries like the Netherlands or Germany who participate in the nuclear German arrangements, how do we coordinate those various formats, maybe not coordinate, but how we assure that they don't hamper each other with a nuclear planning in NATO. And this is something that is very revered dear to the Germans, to not, that this should not be seen as questioning NATO, undermining NATO, looking for alternatives, kicking the Americans out, this turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now we have a response, we don't need you. So there's a huge fear of getting this right to not question NATO. Well, Claudia, that was great, and Bruno, it's just really, this is really exciting. I don't have much of a life these days, and I really find this kind of stuff just really fascinating. So just a quick follow-up to both of you. Bruno, I was wondering if you have you heard from your government, whether there's been any response from the US. I know our ambassador isn't quite talking to everyone there in Paris, so I'm not sure our ambassador knows anything, but it'd be interesting if there was any kind of response to the speech, maybe at the staff level, I mean, who knows. But the second point, though, is in Claudia, you were kind of hitting on it. When you think about it, I would think, and I'm not talking about the NATO planning group here at all, but you would think that at some point, they were on an operational level. There would have to be coordination between NATO and this group in terms of, in a crisis. There's a crisis broiling, and there's Putin shaking the nuclear saber, and you would think that there would be a need for a hotline between this group and NATO or whatever, so that God forbid suddenly, there's becomes a nuclear aspect to this that there's some coordinating between the two or something. So I would think that that's probably at a time that'll be a ways from here, because this is just begun, and this is paperwork and this kind of thing, meeting, coordinating. But at some point, I think there's going to have to be a cooperation at the operational level or something where those two sides can talk to each other in a crisis. So I throw that out just for both of you all to see if there is any comment on that. - Yeah, I can comment on that. First of all, the one quick, very quick comment to conclude on the German-French angle. Claudia, you and I discussed six years ago in Berlin during the first term of Trump, a public opinion poll in Germany, that stated that basically at that point in time, the Germans trusted more a British and/or French nuclear protection than a US nuclear protection. Now, my point is the following, I suspect that not only would this not have happened without the Trump too, but maybe we needed, quote, unquote, a Trump one, which laid, which was, I guess, also in the German mindset, also a first, it was a warning shot, so to say. But that warning shot, remember Claudia, it triggered very interesting debates in Germany already. So I just wanted to flag that up. On Jim's question, I can guarantee you that the French have consulted the Americans very early on at a very high level to make sure that whatever the president was going to say and announce would not be a problem for Washington. That it was very important for the French, of course. So the reactions were muted or have everything that, you know, anything that reinforces the talents is good, but that was the reason is that they had been prepared very, very seriously by intense French American conversations at a pretty high level. Now, on your question, Jim, I think this is an important question and not only one, just for geeks. You know, I can very well imagine a situation in Christ's time where, you know, the NATO allies are interested in putting some, you know, some DC on the alert, dispersing them, then the French are saying, hey, should we do the same thing? And then yes, you do need to coordinate that. Absolutely. Now, I think it should be early to say that there should be, or there will be in the near future procedures to that effect. But once again, I think this is a problem that I understand the French and some of the allies understand that we'll have to address at some point in time. We're not there yet. It's not urgent, but that, you know, that makes the question also why is it not some form of multilateral multinational consultation structure? I think the reason is that, again, the French didn't want to give the impression that they were competing or creating a competing multilateral deterrence process. By the way, I think Claudia or Jim or Andrea, I can't remember, mentioned seven allies, there will be more. I mean, it's the seven names that were mentioned were those countries which agreed to be mentioned by name in the speech, okay? Now for some others, it was more difficult Finland, for instance, but that was because of the domestic political and legal debate that there were having a conversation about whether they should modify the legislation about present nuclear weapons in peacetime, so it was not the right moment, but there will be others. By the way, there was a surprising guess, so to say which was Greece, not everyone expected Greece to be mentioned. I can talk about that if you want. It's an interesting story. - Yeah, yeah, not on my bingo card, yeah. - Yes, okay, but Jim, your board is very well taken. I think it's a bit, we don't want to jump again, so to say, I mean, this is a problem that has been recognized, but it's not the most urgent problem in a sense that we're talking mostly at this point in time about reassurance mechanism. We're not deployments in crisis time are not impossible, are clearly left open, made supposed to be that is left open in the speech, but that's not the main thrust of the speech, and that's not for the immediate future. Bear in mind that Macron has deliberately left open the question of whether or not the French nuclear weapons could eventually, at some point, be deployed outside the national territory. - And just to put a little spice into the pot, of course, the Germans are participating in nuclear sharing. So they've got their dual-hat in a sense, if there is, you know, I mean, to stretch the point a little bit, their dual-hat with a NATO nuclear sharing hat and a French German agreement hat. So it's very interesting, it's just fascinating, it's wonderful. Thank you. - Maybe just one point on what the French new idea of forward deterrents, so this version, I won't say, is not because there were many comments about a new kind of extended deterrents and all that, and I think it's very important, Bruno outlined that, the very heart and basis of the French doctrine has not changed. So France is not offering extended deterrents, it's not offering a share of deterrents. The vital interests will be defined by the French president, the planning will be done by the French, and the launch authority will lie only with the French president. So there's no offer for extended deterrents, and there's no ambition to replace the US, just to make that again, very, very, very clear, because I think there have been many misunderstandings, I tend to think. And there's also, in the front, there was a fascinating sentences in the speech, there's no guarantee of deterrents as there is no guarantee in other alliances. So it's a very sobering and a very clear speech about what France has in mind. And this idea of a desuasion avocés, so forward deterrents according to the French president in the speech, is to be progressive. So you start with observing exercises that you might participate, then you do signaling together, then you might have the temporary stationing of strategic assets, so you can do one step after the other. And that also allows to lock in cooperation, coming back to the French domestic scenario, if there's a political change, so many things of cooperation have already been locked in, and it's more difficult to undo it. There's one fascinating aspect where France is separating the nuclear and the conventional dimension very clearly. But there was also a paragraph, or several, in the speech about the conventional needs Europe has, and where other allies can contribute. And Macros, single out three areas where Europeans altogether, also France, need to do more. And that's intelligence, air and missile defense, and deep precision strike. And this is where the, also the articulation, don't know how to translate that in a better way, that being the conventional and the nuclear has to be thought, addressed whatsoever. Maybe a last point, what it is not, because I have also heard interesting things, France is not asking other Europeans to finance the French deterrent. And Bruno correct me if I'm wrong. My understanding is if somebody else is financing your deterrent, you're not longer sovereign. And the heart of the French nuclear deterrent is sovereignty. That's a lesson from 1940 and 1956, Suez. It's about sovereignty. So as soon as you have someone paying, or somehow, or otherwise intervening, this sovereignty is not longer there. So I'm sometimes surprised how often this topic comes back. So they only want us to pay. I think if the conventional Europeans invest far more on the conventional areas, we have lots of noor plate. And it will be already very expensive. Yes, I mean, I wanted to kill the, they just want our money, bird. So I was really glad that when I gave an interview to a prominent German dating newspaper a few weeks ago, they choose to headline it. We don't want your money, says French experts. So I thought the message came across pretty clear. And Claudia is absolutely right. But bear in mind that European allies who have DCA, they don't pay for the US nuclear deterrent either. I mean, so fair enough, the French don't do extended deterrent. I think we're getting close to something which is extended deterrent by another name. But I think that really the reassurance component is as important as the deterrent's component. Now of course, you don't decide that you deter. And you decide that you're reassure. I always say, it's not up for me to say whether we reassure allies, allies should say whether we are sure. Now sharing is not on the agenda at this point in time, but it was definitely not excluded. So I think that option for the future, if needed, remains I think open. And finally, on the point of launch authority, look, I was looking at another thing, thanks. Just published something. And this can't again, darling. Experts give their opinion on the crawl speech, et cetera. And some of them, some of our experts, some of the European experts say, well, Macron did not say anything, about sharing the decision to use. Doh! I mean, no one does. I mean, this is a very important point, just like the point that Claude made about sovereignty. Yeah, it just so happens that neither the US nor the UK nor any other nuclear power on Earth shares the decision to use nuclear weapons. It's very clear NATO and Jim knows that very well. Ultimately, the decision to use nuclear weapons and thanks God is made by those who actually have nuclear weapons. Finally, on a very important point mentioned by Claude, the non-nuclear dimension. That was indeed an important component of the speech. And in a sense, I was a bit disappointed that Macron did not use the expression that he used in the MSC in Munich. He talked about, quote, "holistic deterrence." And I thought it was good because the French are often accused, rightly, of seeing deterrence in the military sense of term, only as being nuclear. Now, it's actually not completely true, but the French have perceived that way. That's correct. And he did not use that expression, but he did go pretty far for a French leader in making it clear that non-nuclear contribution, including by European allies, are very close to a contribution to nuclear deterrence. When Macron talks about early warning, for instance, which is a component of how you manage a nuclear crisis, he made it clear that this could also be an allied and European contribution. He also states without saying it too clearly, but having a strong capacity ability for deep-precision strides, for instance, is also a way to make sure that we will not lower the nuclear threshold. So I think it was important and noteworthy that Macron did say that the contributions to European friends and allies to deterrence was also non-nuclear, and that reinforces the nuclear component of deterrence. Yeah, a really important point in the small amount of time that we've got left. Claudia, I want to zoom out just a little bit and get to your report, which it's on this point about the deterrence gap. What are some of-- and the big question-- I mean, as you all have laid out, A is the United States a reliable partner, B as the United States is saying it wants to do less in Europe. Do European countries have the capabilities to plug the gaps that the US would leave? such that you can maintain the credibility, especially of the conventional deterrent. So there is this risk, Claudia, as you said, as Putin is waving the nuclear saber, and as the United States is signaling it wants to do less that we could be left with this deterrent's gap. And so talk to us a little bit about how Europeans are thinking about filling this gap and maybe start with this speech and the changes that we've all been discussing over the last 40 minutes or so. Is this a credible fix to the gap? Is this going to plug the gap or and comment on that and some of the other options that Europeans are talking about? The speech and the suggestion of forward deterrence is a huge step forwards. It's not going to fill the gap. So what we did and our report which I did together with a group of researchers from the MSc and from Zangalan to BSBund and James Davis and many others, we looked at the options that Europe have and we wanted to look at all the options even if they are some which we think are really not convincing, but we wanted to compare them all with the same criteria from credibility to feasibility legal aspects and all that. And we come up with five options trying to keep doubling down on the US X and the deterrence, building a genuine European deterrent around France and the UK. The Euro deterrent, so a kind of super European super state integrated that would have its own deterrence. We think it's an illusion. It's not anywhere soon and it would not be credible. Then national proliferation, there's lots of talk from time to time coming up again about a Polish bomb, a German bomb, a Nordic bomb. We also think that that would be a dangerous wrong decision and the last option we have is focusing on conventional deterrence where most experts agree it is not enough. So the conclusion we take from the analysis of those five options is to say they're all bad. The very simple conclusion is all options are worse than what we have in the moment. But Europeans might still be obliged to think about the future if the worries about the US will persist. So the question is how do we deal with the bad options? And what I would personally say after the analysis is that we should do a combination trying to maintain the transatlantic relationship. I mean, we have all been working on transatlantic relations in our professional life. It has always been ups and downs. I remember the Iraq war. It wasn't all sunshine and roses. I would still say this is different now, but we should still try to keep the transatlantic relationship going and looking what we have. And it's difficult on the political realm, the military dimension still works. So trying to maintain the transatlantic relationship, talk to the French anthropists and develop, identify, discuss, France and Britain, how a genuine European deterrent could look like, what state should play, what role the conventional and the nucleus. And the third home work is invest in the conventional. Bruno and myself, we just said it. We all know that the biggest holes are in our missile defence and in deep precision strike. So we know what we have to do. And if you combine those three work strands, keep them Americans in, talk to France and Britain, think about the future of European deterrence as a genuinely European one and invest in conventional because we needed anyway, that would be a step forward. And I think that the French speech was a really important step forward on the Franco-European debate. The most important is probably what for a very long time, we call the nuclear IQ or the idea to say Europe should give up on this strategic complacency and outsource all this deterrence thinking to the US or to France. So the Europeans should accept that it's their responsibility to think about it, to discuss it. And there these nuclear steaming groups, France, UK, France, Germany, France, many other countries are important. So the Europeans develop their own strategic thinking and kind of come back from their strategic holiday, which they had for many for a very long time. One quick follow up, it means if you give listeners a sense of how serious do you think the discussions are presently about the Polish bomb, the Nordic bomb, the kind of proliferation question. Well, if we can't rely on the US, we all need our own kind of credible deterrent. How would you characterize where those discussions are presently? They come up regularly in Germany, and in Poland, and now more recently in the Nordic countries. I don't, I would be curious to hear what Bruno says. I don't see this as a serious endeavor in Germany. It comes up, but there's no really ambition behind and just to make it very quickly. For Germany, it would mean a total break with the legal obligations and the priorities of German foreign policy, two plus four treaty, the NPT treaty. There is behind the wrong thinking that having a bomb means security means deterrence, which is a bit more complicated. I think it's a wrong incentive because the threat from Russia is not only on Germany. It's on the whole of Europe. It's on the European idea. So if one country makes a unilateral step out, it means the end of Europe. If Germany would go down that road, breaking with the NPT and all the other priorities Germany had, it might incentivize other countries worldwide to also proliferate. So the search for more security would lead to more unsecurety internationally. And finally, the nuclear states, Russia, the US, they are unlikely to support Germany going nuclear. I mean, the nuclear sharing was also a mean of non-proliferation. So I think the whole idea is totally counterproductive and wrong. My impression is in Germany, it's not a serious debate. It seems to be a bit more serious in the Nordic countries. Maybe important, but I think overall, my analysis, it would be a dangerous anti-European wrong decision. Yes, one thing that was not mentioned in the speech because I don't think it's really an important argument in the French debate is we're doing that to avoid that one day Germany or Poland builds its own nuclear weapons. So being a little familiar with the French strategic conversation, I'm really not sure that this was an important argument in the French internal discussions. Now, in a sense, it's an additional argument, so to say, that is, oh, and also if we do this, it might lessen the incentives for our neighbors to think about going nuclear one day. Yeah, but that's just a bonus, so to say. It's not an important argument. Now, to answer your question very quickly, I think that one of us has to go. I think these are not important conversations, but they are important messages. And I also think that the debate is very different in Poland than it is in Germany, for instance. I think the polls are having serious, you know, so searching about the long-term future of their country. They do need reshorns. And I call them distress calls, just not unlike the way the Japanese, the Koreans, the Taiwanese, in the 1970s, where, you know, telling Washington, basically, you better ensure that we are protected, otherwise we may have to go nuclear. So I think the polls are serious when they think about it, but not serious to the point of engaging in a conversation. Why? If we wanted to do this, why, what are the steps we should take? So again, you know, the polls need, the polls are probably the ones that needs the most nuclear reshorns at this point. They realize that, and it's a trauma for them as much, I guess, that for many Germans, that they couldn't, they can no longer count on, you know, only the United States. But I think this is a, you know, proliferation in Europe is, is a non-starter at this point in time for all the reasons that Claudia mentioned. And quite often, actually, the way some poll to Koreans or fans of Sweden talk about it is a bit like the way the South Koreans talk about it. They don't really realize what it would mean. It would basically break everything. So as long as the NPT exists, as long as the EU and NATO exist, I see zero pathway for a national nuclear program in Europe beyond those of Britain and France. On that note, I'm going to thank you for joining. I know Claudia has to run, so we'll have a little bit of an abrupt end to Brussels sprouts. But Claudia Bruno, this was fantastic. This is an issue in the United States that was greatly overshadowed by the beginning of Operation Epic Fury. And so thank you for shining a light on this and explaining it so comprehensively. We really appreciate it. Thanks for having us. It was wonderful and a great sign of Frank Benjamin Corporation, wasn't it? It was. No big fight. So positive. It's the gold standard. Thank you. 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