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Episode 94 – South African and Russian tanks go toe-to-toe at the Chambinga river in southern Angola

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Episode 94 – South African and Russian tanks go toe-to-toe at the Chambinga river in southern Angola

On November 9, the SADF advanced on FAPLA's 16 Brigade near the Chambinga River, executing a plan by Roland de Vries that prioritized mobility and disruption of enemy logistics. Combat Group Bravo's diversionary attack on 59th Brigade to the south found empty positions and withdrew after an Angolan tank counter-attack. Meanwhile, Cleon Marais's Combat Group Charlie pushed toward 16 Brigade, triggering the first South African tank-versus-tank battle since World War II, as Olifant tanks clashed with Soviet T-54/55s. The SADF destroyed or captured numerous tanks and overran 16 Brigade HQ by mid-afternoon, but suffered casualties and faced relentless MiG-23 air strikes. Marais halted to regroup rather than pursue the retreating enemy, allowing many FAPLA troops to escape—a decision that frustrated Commandant Ferreira. The battle exposed SADF vulnerabilities, including ammunition and water shortages, exhaustion, and loss of air superiority. FAPLA's 16 Brigade was badly mauled but not annihilated, and the SADF prepared to renew the offensive on November 11 with a flanking maneuver, setting the stage for further fighting.

Transcription

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English
Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 94. It's early morning November 9th and the SADF is advancing towards 5 plus 16th Brigade based at the source of the Jambinga River. The Angolan Brigade had received orders to shift east and the units were about to move when the SADF launched their attack. The first sign of the impending assault was an artillery bombardment and a South African Air Force bombing raid on the eve of the assault. Commandant Dion Ferreira was OIC of Task Force 10 as it was known, although the main battle plans had been drawn up by his 2IC Roland de Vries. It was a plan that was based on the principles of fluid operations with the South African mobility exploited to the full. De Vries had also decided that the SADF was going to attack the South African Air Force. De Vries decided that one of the main aims was to destabilize the enemy's logistics and communications, disrupting their plans and likely counter-attacks. Robbie Hotsleaf's combat group Bravo had unleashed on 59th Brigade to the south, creating a diversion. But when his units eventually overran the position, the South African commander was surprised to find the brigade's positions were empty. They had already withdrawn north towards the 16th Brigade. The Angolans then counter-attacked with tanks and Bravo retreated. De Vries' actions had confused the enemy and he didn't want to continue a needless fight against Fapla, which was using heavy weapons, including T-54 and 55s. The Soviet advisers thought they had won a victory and began exchanging congratulations. Little did they know that the main SADF assault was going to take place further north, close to the source of the Chambinga River. That's where Cleon Marais led Combat Group Charlie towards 16th Brigade, although the going was slow, hampered by the thick bush around the river. In June 1657, on the morning of 9th November, the Requis posted near the 16th Brigade radio to say that they could hear Fapla engines start up. Moments later, a G-5 bombardment hit one of Fapla's ammunition dumps. It exploded. Marais' Charlie Group approached in close formation, with four size 2 mechanized infantry companies and Ratel 20s on both sides at the front, and an armored car squadron of Ratel 90s, as well as a platoon of 3-2 battalion troops between them. The company of 3-2 infantrymen were all black, led by four white officers. We moved 30 kilometers west from the lagoon riding on Ratels, said Fanzel, quoted by author Fred Bridgeland. We passed the tank squadron and its support Ratels under the command of Major André Ratif of Forsyth. That man really knew how to look after his troops. You see, Ratif had brought a refrigerated canteen truck all the way from South Africa, and Fanzel organized a raid on the truck when Forsyth... and Forsyth was looking the other way, liberating two cases of arse-cold beer. Man, that was nectar from heaven, said Fanzel. More importantly, there was a squadron of Major André Ratif's Ulefant tanks behind 3-2, followed by an anti-tank platoon of Ratel 90s and the Ratel 81 mortar section joined by the assault pioneer platoon on board the Ratel 20s. Bringing up the rear were four more platoons of 3-2 battalion in buffles, as well as a combat engineer, a troop in Ratel 60s. Junita actually spearheaded this assault. They were on foot, moving rapidly as the vanguard, trying to flush out Fafla from their positions. Once they'd completed this task, they moved out the way, allowing the South Africans on 3-2 to thunder past them. Earlier that morning, South African Air Force Mirages had bombed 16 Brigade. The Angolans still believed that the SADF was attacking 59 Brigade further south, but that all changed just after 7.30 in the morning when 16 Brigade comms reported that... ...South African tanks appeared to be about to overrun their positions. The Angolans were calling for reinforcements, and one of their tactical groups moved up, including a section of T-54-55s. The Reckies, who'd found some high ground, had been sitting here for days, and spotted the tanks and warned Marais they were heading towards Battle Group Charlie, saying they would probably arrive in a couple of hours. The South Africans were going to be taken by surprise because these tanks arrived just after 0800, with confusing reports being received from the spotters and uniques, along with 3-2 battalion officers, who also heard the sounds of these heavy weapons approaching. The tanks were supported by the much-feared ZSU-23 rapid-firing cannon, as well as heavy machine guns and three BTR armoured cars, and they were now approaching Charlie Battle Group's left flank at speed. The problem for the South Africans was that their artillery had stopped bombarding Fapla because the two groups of combatants were too close to each other. At first, Marais found it difficult to believe the call about the T-54-55s, and he was told that the T-54-55s were actually the T-54-55s, and he was told that the T-54-55s were actually the T-54-55s. Tanks, are you sure? Marais decided to wheel his entire force to the left to face the oncoming heavy metal, and at 0800-10 in the morning, the Ulefant guns began to hit the T-54-55s. This was the first time since the Second World War that South African tanks were going into combat against enemy tanks. Unlike previous attempts by the RATL-90s to damage the T-54-55s, which often took at least half a dozen shots before they were knocked down, this time, the Ulefant's powerful 105mm guns penetrated the Russian armour easily. According to the official report by Forsyth and its logs, the first Soviet T-54-55 was hit by Lieutenant Hein Freeh, otherwise known as Millipop. A BM-21 multiple rocket launcher was also hit. Twenty-two Angolan soldiers died in this initial assault, and a second BM-21 was also captured. The SADF took no losses. This, though, was just the beginning. It took a long time for the Ulefants to manoeuvre back into line from the flank, van Zyl told Bridgeland later. My infant three men were deployed 600 metres ahead of the main force with a dozen RATL-90s and RATL-20s. At the same time, three T-52 soldiers were being peppered by fire from 16 Brigades HQ because they had now arrived at the perimeter of this heavily defended position. MiG-23s then appeared overhead bombing the SADF, but no casualties were reported. Later on, though, troops said they had been, "terrified" by these assaults, although the bombs fell way off target. The enemy controlled the air. The SAF could not face the MiGs and preferred to come in to bomb ground troops, then speed away rather than indulge in dogfights. South Africa had only a handful of Mirages, which were too valuable to send into a long-range support role, while the MiGs were all around. The SADF assault on the morning of November 9th was now two hours behind schedule after dealing with the first T-54/55s, and FAPLA prisoners had told the South Africans that their main Brigade was based slightly south of this initial FAPLA defensive position. Maps that had been seized pointed to a large minefield between Charlie Battle Group and FAPLA's main 16 Brigade battalions. There were two infantry battalions at the HQ, codenamed "Adar Ness" or "Adar's Nest", comprised of as many as 750 men, at least 10 T-54/55 tanks, heavy machine guns, and half a dozen 120mm mortars. The intelligence had underestimated FAPLA's force. There were closer to 20 tanks waiting for the South Africans. This despite the fact that the SADF Forward Artillery Observer Major Kassi van der Merwe was hiding in a tree half a kilometre away from 16 Brigade Headquarters and feeding information constantly back to his own side. Combat Group Charlie swung south-westerly and were heading straight towards the Adar Ness with the Rattles and 3/2 Battalion ahead, acting as the shock troops who were going to slam these tanks. The bush thickened at first. Visibility was only 30 metres, a dangerous situation. Around 10 in the morning, FAPLA spotted these troops in open fire, killing a 3/2 Battalion soldier with a mortar round and two members of Forsyth Alpha Company. A soldier in Bravo Company was also wounded, along with one from 3/2. We crossed the first trenches and the FAPLA infantrymen withdrew under our rifle fire, recounted van Zyl. Grenades were now also being tossed towards the Angolans. Twenty-three millimetre anti-aircraft guns began to open up on the SADF and the troops ran forward in a crouch. Suddenly the bush thinned, opening up into flat terrain which revealed the copse of trees. That was where the 16 Brigade HQ had been set up. Two companies of Forsyth's mechanised infantry were now supposed to rush forward and take over the fighting from 3/2 Battalion, but they had run into difficulty in the bush. van Zyl and his men were now ahead of their support and exposed. They used their heavy fire smoke markers to indicate to each other where they were. But that meant that FAPLA's artillery spotters could also zero in on the formations and heavy mortar and 23 millimetre fire began to rain down on both 3/2 and the RATLs. A RATL 90 was badly damaged by 23 millimetre fire and the tail gunner was severely wounded. Then an infantryman was killed by small arms after he jumped from a RATL 20. An intense tank battle began to develop. The HQ was heavily defended with machine guns and mortars. Bravo company was pinned down. Marais realised that his combat group was losing momentum, which could spell disaster. The entire plan called for mobility, quick action. There should be no stopping or FAPLA's significant firepower and control of the air would be catastrophic for the SADF. Marais called for fire belt action, where all weapons and all the RATLs would fire together at a specific target or a direction, which often broke the will of the enemy. Moments later, at this point, the T-55 lurched into view in front of a RATL 20 of Bravo company. The RATL's gunner stayed calm, firing one round after another from his lightweight gun at the tank, the armor-piercing rounds hardly powerful enough to cause damage, but somehow gunner A.M. Tom succeeded, the tank began to smoke, then suddenly another enemy T-54-55 blew the Rattles turret right off its chassis at point-blank range. An Olifant tank fired back, destroying the Russians, but Tom and the driver had both died when the turret was blown off. Forsyth's Alpha Company on the left was also facing tanks, so the infantry dismounted from the Rattles, but a 120mm mortar shell fell right amongst them, killing two more South Africans, wounding four. Meanwhile, Bravo Company's right wing was pinned down by accurate fire coming from Faplos positions. Another section of Olifant tanks was sent in to deal with this, but the track was shot off one of these, it jutted to a halt. There, in the midst of the battle, the Tiffies rushed in and shortened the track. The Olifant could now move, but only just. Marais was having trouble controlling the battle, he couldn't see what was going on. The thickets across the plain made it difficult to spot both enemy and friend. The fire from both sides was heavy, and just before mid-day, the Olifants hit two more T-54-55s and captured a third. Versailles and 3-2 battalion heard the noise of battle behind him, but his men were pinned down in their forward positions, lying in Faplos trenches. The SAGF artillery then opened up to spot the combat, but they didn't realize the combatants being so close. Within a few minutes, Versailles noted that Faplos' stream of projectiles and bullets was slowing. The bombardment appeared to be working. The South Africans were also being pinned down by Faplos' snipers who were hiding in the nearby trees, and most of these were eventually dislodged by small arms and 20mm cannon fire. Just then, two MiG-23s swooped in overhead, and the rattles fired in the fighter's direction. The rockets from the aircraft struck the ground more than 3km away, and yet, the arrival of the MiGs meant the SAGF was forced to stop and throw camouflage over their tanks and vehicles. It was this air support that froze the South African attack, allowing Faplos a chance to retreat. A few pockets of Angolan troops remained behind, and Battle Group Charlie had to pick its way through these defenders. Eventually, by 14:30, they had overrun 16 Brigades HQ. Russian interpreter Igor Zhdakin was jotting down in his diary that the 16th Brigade appeared to be retreating in some disorder, saving themselves from the SAGF's inexorable assault. The South Africans began clearing the trenches and checking their abandoned equipment, but that wasn't easy, because MiG fighters appeared overhead once more. The assault vehicles adopted their Fischgrat or fishbone drill, moving off on both sides of the central line to provide the smallest target. The MiGs dropped their bombs, which just missed the nearest soldiers, showing how the loss of control over the air war was going to play a significant part in the coming months of fighting. This stop-start battle had worn out the South Africans, and worse, they were now running short of ammunition and water. They were also worried about their wounded, which they couldn't move during the day. The MiGs would have shot the Pumas out of the sky. The medics were keeping the casualties alive, working hard until the Kazabak choppers could fly in after sunset. The SAGF by now had suffered seven dead, nine wounded, one Rattle was destroyed, one damaged, along with an Ulefant tank. FAPLA had lost at least 75 dead and dozens more wounded. Hundreds had run off into the bush. At least eight tanks were destroyed, nine were captured. They'd lost two BM-21s, one BTR, and a 76mm gun, along with a number of other guns, captured or destroyed. A diesel bunker was on fire, and another had been captured. Twelve of their vehicles were blown up, 18 others seized by the SAGF and its allies, UNITA. There was now an opportunity. To round up virtually all 16 Brigade had combat group Charlie continued, but Marais decided to halt to regroup. The original plan called for him to move to the source of the Hubei River immediately in order to prevent 16 Brigade escaping. His decision to stop meant many enemy troops got away. FAPLA had not been destroyed east of the Cuito River. Commandant Dion Ferreira could not understand why Charlie halted and an argument developed. Marais actually ordered the men to pull back to a larger area a few kilometers north. We needed to rest and regroup, but we couldn't believe it when we got orders to pull all the way back to our original deployment area, said Fonseil. The usual approach in conventional war was to occupy the ground that you've taken, particularly ground where your men have died. The next few weeks may have been decidedly different had Marais advanced. The SAF was supposed to crush the 16 and 59 Brigade, having already dealt with 47 on the Lomba. Instead, the SAF was supposed to crush the 16 and 59 Brigade, the Angolans withdrew, albeit having experienced defeat. Later, Marais explained that the long hold-up after the tank ambush, the order to lose no men or equipment, which created operational confusion, the slow release of the Ulufone tanks as reinforcements, the unexpected aggressiveness of the T-54-55s, and the unanticipated denseness of the bush all combined to affect the most important thing of all, the South Africans' morale. The National Servicemen had been particularly surprised by the aggressive maneuvers, especially the T-54-55 tank commanders, and Marais wanted to provide time for his soldiers to regroup, rethink, re-motivate. Replenishment and repairs began as the sun set, while military intelligence assessed the outcome of this battle. The wounded were cazabacked. It was during the debrief that SADF officers realized why so many T-54-55s had brewed up. It wasn't just the powerful Ulufone 105mm gun. The Angolans had carried external fuel, the T-54-55 tank commanders had carried external fuel drums on the Soviet tanks because of their logistics challenges. When these were hit, they were like giant Molotov cocktails, which set the entire tank alight. It also transpired that a truly bizarre incident had taken place, explaining how so many Brazilian Engaza trucks had come to be in the SADF's hands. As the battles raged, the Engaza trucks loaded with FAPLA had stopped less than 100 meters in front of Combat Group Charlie's 120mm battery. The SADF battery commander saw these trucks through the trees and presumed it was UNITA because the soldiers seemed so relaxed. When his guns opened up on a target far off, the infantry standing alongside the Engaza trucks fled in panic. They were actually FAPLA, who had no idea that the SADF's artillery was so close. Overnight, new plans were laid as UNITA moved equipment away from the battleground to swell Jonas Savimi's inventory, although the SADF held on to them, with the T-55s to take back to Arms Corps in Pretoria. One of the SADF TIFIs climbed aboard a T-55 to drive it to a pickup point, then a UNITA echelon opened fire on him, luckily only with machine guns. Eventually the section ceased fire, the shaken driver managed to climb out unscathed. The Russians, meanwhile, were monitoring proceedings and reported that 16 Brigade had been crushed. Soviet advisors were disgusted. Zhdakin wrote that the remnants managed to come out of the T-55, and that it was about 30 kilometers in a few hours, and were now around 5 kilometers from Kwito Kwanawale. A few hundred men were left of the two battalions of 16 Brigade, along with two tanks, one BM-21 rocket launcher, seven Grad PE portable guns, one 82mm mortar, and an automatic grenade launcher. The SADF's plan was to attack the next day, the 10th of November, but shortly after Charlie moved off in mid-afternoon, one of the Foresight Troopers shot himself in the stomach accidentally as he jumped from a rocket. That was when MIGS swooped in once again for a bombing raid. The medics operated on him immediately, and Marais decided to wait until the 11th of November to renew the offensive, after cazabacking this troopee. While all of this was going on, the guns of Sierra and Quebec batteries kept up a constant fire at the departing Angolans, while troops of Juliet Company harried them as well. The guns fired 1,134 of the 154, and one 155mm rounds on the 10th of November alone. The gunners were beyond exhausted. Then their morale suffered a grave knock, when one of the men, who was asleep in the bush, was run over and killed by a truck bringing in food supplies that night. The SADF was now also beginning to suffer from serious logistics shortfalls. Each G5 battery had 10 ton ammunition trucks attached, but these only carried 960 shells and propulsion packs. There was no need to store meters of fuel and water and food, let alone their spare shells. The Papa battery of mobile rocket launchers fired more than 1,000 127mm rockets on the 10th, aiming at the 59th brigade at the Myane River. They were also running short of ammo. Then the artillery commanders were forced to use HF radio to call for more ammunition, leaving them open to FAPLA comms interception. The brigade's C-130 aircraft were landing in Mavinga with G5 ammunition and MRL rockets. Each plane could only bring in 100 rounds at a time. That was not enough to keep the guns fully supplied, so the artillery could never pressurize a target area for long enough. Both sides were now trying to cope with these logistics challenges. By the time the SADF was ready to redeploy on the morning of the 11th, 16 Brigade had also redeployed into two groups: a strong battalion south of the Chambingo source and the other east of the Hubei River. At least a dozen tanks from the Myane area had joined up with them, with the southern battalion. The Angolans were expecting the South Africans to relaunch the attacks from the north-east. Marais was briefed about Fapler's position and decided that he'd redeploy combat group Charlie south, criss-crossing behind combat group Alpha. Charlie would head south, then turn north once more, as Alpha halted, and Marais hoped this would catch 16 Brigade unawares. As with other plans, this one was going to face its own set of challenges, as you'll hear next episode. For those of you interested in SADF and SANDF merchandise, head over to wardogactual.co.uk. Check out Nick's designs at wardogactual on Instagram. That's wardogactual.co.uk. Please rate the podcast on iTunes. It helps raise the visibility of the series. If you want to contact me, head over to abwarpodcast.com. There's a contact form on the homepage. Or you can direct message me on Twitter, at Des Latham. Until next, dot zines. ♪ music playing ♪

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. On November 9, the SADF launched a major assault on FAPLA's 16 Brigade near the source of the Chambinga River, part of a broader plan to crush the 16th and 59th Brigades.
  2. Commandant Dion Ferreira led Task Force 10, but the battle plan was devised by his 2IC Roland de Vries, emphasizing fluid operations and disrupting enemy logistics and communications.
  3. Combat Group Bravo under Robbie Hotsleaf attacked 59th Brigade to the south as a diversion, but found the positions empty and retreated after an Angolan tank counter-attack.
  4. Cleon Marais led Combat Group Charlie toward 16 Brigade, and the assault featured the first South African tank-versus-tank combat since World War II, with Olifant tanks engaging Soviet T-54/55s.
  5. Despite initial success, including destroying and capturing numerous tanks and overrunning 16 Brigade HQ by 14:30, the SADF faced fierce resistance, MiG-23 air attacks, and significant casualties.
  6. Marais halted the advance to regroup instead of pursuing the retreating FAPLA forces, a decision that allowed many enemy troops to escape and sparked disagreement with Ferreira.
  7. Logistics shortages, especially ammunition and water, along with exhausted troops and loss of air control, hampered the SADF's ability to maintain momentum.
  8. The battle ended with FAPLA's 16 Brigade badly mauled but not destroyed, and the SADF prepared to renew the offensive on November 11 with new plans to outflank the enemy.

Summary:

On November 9, the SADF advanced on FAPLA's 16 Brigade near the Chambinga River, executing a plan by Roland de Vries that prioritized mobility and disruption of enemy logistics. Combat Group Bravo's diversionary attack on 59th Brigade to the south found empty positions and withdrew after an Angolan tank counter-attack. Meanwhile, Cleon Marais's Combat Group Charlie pushed toward 16 Brigade, triggering the first South African tank-versus-tank battle since World War II, as Olifant tanks clashed with Soviet T-54/55s.

The SADF destroyed or captured numerous tanks and overran 16 Brigade HQ by mid-afternoon, but suffered casualties and faced relentless MiG-23 air strikes. Marais halted to regroup rather than pursue the retreating enemy, allowing many FAPLA troops to escape—a decision that frustrated Commandant Ferreira. The battle exposed SADF vulnerabilities, including ammunition and water shortages, exhaustion, and loss of air superiority.

FAPLA's 16 Brigade was badly mauled but not annihilated, and the SADF prepared to renew the offensive on November 11 with a flanking maneuver, setting the stage for further fighting.

FAQs

The SADF aimed to attack 16 Brigade near the source of the Chambinga River, destabilizing enemy logistics and communications.

Commandant Dion Ferreira was the Officer in Command (OIC) of Task Force 10, with his 2IC Roland de Vries drawing up the main battle plans.

Combat Group Bravo, led by Robbie Hotsleaf, attacked 59 Brigade to the south, but found the positions empty as the enemy had withdrawn north.

It was the first time since World War II that South African tanks engaged enemy tanks in combat, with their 105mm guns easily penetrating Soviet T-54/55 armor.

MiG-23s provided air support to FAPLA, bombing SADF positions and forcing them to halt and camouflage, which allowed Angolan troops to retreat.

The SADF suffered 7 dead, 9 wounded, and lost one Ratel and one Olifant tank, while FAPLA lost at least 75 dead, 8 tanks destroyed, and 9 tanks captured.

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