Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Deas Latham. This is episode 90. One of the most crucial periods of the border war is underway, although military strategists didn't realize this until a little while later. It's imperative for FAPLA to take Mavinga in 1987. This would have pushed the South Africans much further south. And factored into Luanda's plan, along with the Cubans, to begin building longer runways for bombers and fighter aircraft to take full control of southern Angola. And who knows? I'll get some of the Russians' views as we go. They were also aware of this ultimate plan and to set up a possible jump-off point to invade Avambola and should this war continue interminably. While Moscow's original strategy was to avoid this kind of incursion, by 1987 the Soviet Union was underheeled. It was under a huge pressure economically and wanted the War of Independence in Namibia to end ASAP. FAPLA's 21st Brigade had been stopped twice from crossing the Lomba River in September and October 1987. It was a visit by SA President P.W. Butte on the 28th of September, days before the Battle of the Lomba really broke out, that set the tone for the next two years of this war. He'd flown into Mavinga to meet with the commanders of 20HQ and was joined by Defence Minister Magnus Malan and Defence Force Chief Yanni. It was Butte who decided to give his blessing to the offensive phase of Operation Modula. The aim was now to utterly destroy the enemy brigades deployed west of the Kuito River and south of the Lomba. This was planned before the onset of the rainy season, only a couple of months away. The bigwigs were very clear: they wanted FAPLA to be beaten so badly that there would be no thought of a counter-offensive for at least another year. This would buy Butte and his National Party time back home, and this would be the end of the war. This would buy Butte and his National Party time back home, This would buy Butte and his National Party time back home, This would buy Butte and his National Party time back home, This would buy Butte and his National Party time back home, where the ANC and PAC attacks on infrastructure as well as the civil uprising was causing him some strife. It was also noted at the time of the Chief of the SADF that Butte had said he'd authorize whatever additional forces would be needed, and by that he obviously meant tanks. We'll hear more about the South African battle tank, the Ulefant, at the end of this episode. Butte is reported to have also rapped various officers on the knuckles at that meeting in Mavinga, demanding why Kuito or Kwanawale had not been attacked, and why tanks were not already deployed. At least, this is according to two sources who spoke to historian Leopold Schultz. One was Major General Chris Tyrion of Military Intelligence, who remembers Butte saying it was necessary to occupy Kuito or Kwanawale for any victory. Other sources pointed out that the SADF generals had developed this expensive tank, the Ulefant, only to leave it behind at the beginning of Operation Modula, and Butte supposedly criticized them for this decision. These generals later claimed they could not release the Ulefant because the cabinet had not sanctioned this act. Reading about all this finger-pointing is interesting, but to be quite honest, a bit of a red herring. The real issue right now was not tank versus tank, it was poor information. The SADF intelligence reports were bad, atrocious in some cases, patchy, and a cacophony of guesswork. Some domains allow more precision than others, and well-known philosopher Karl Pohl, Pauper famously distinguished between precise clocks and chaotic clouds. Intelligence gathering can be a chaotic cloud. An entry in 2-0 SA Brigade's war diary for the 29th of September contains three phases for the upcoming offensive. Phase one, the enemy must be prevented from taking Mavinga. Phase two, the SADF would conduct operations north of the Lomba River. In other words, they would chase FAPLA's four main brigades, 21st, 16th, 47th, and 50th, and 59th, and third phase, the advance on Kuito Kwanabali. Whatever finger-pointing you'd care to support, there's no doubt that the SADF generals were not going to act decisively. They would continue to approach this significant moment in a rather hesitant fashion. What the South Africans didn't know is that FAPLA's 47 Brigade was running short of fuel. They could not continue their advance towards Mavinga even if they wanted to, and their food was also running low. 4-7 Brigade's commander was threatened with court martial if he withdrew. That order was rescinded on the 1st of October, and 47 Brigade was told to finish building a temporary TMM bridge over the Lomba River, then to withdraw to the north and join up with other FAPLA forces. Back at SADF Mavinga HQ, Commandant Dion Ferreira was receiving radio intercept updates. He was listening in to FAPLA's calls. It was also true that FAPLA, using their Russian, Cuban, and East German comms experts, had broken UNITA's code by now, and were doing the same. FAPLA's 47 and 59 Brigades were communicating about their next moves, and an advance party had been sent from 47, carrying the wounded to the rear, and then they brought in more ammunition and food. Ferreira knew that 47 Brigade was constructing their TMM bridge at the confluence of the Lomba and Kouzizi Rivers. This was their big mistake. At least, that's what the South Africans believed. The construction was taking place a few kilometers east of where FAPLA's strongest defensive position had been established. They were relying on their MiGs to keep the SADF away. The question facing the South Africans now was, would 47 Brigade head east, then cross the more open territory north, or would 59 Brigade cross the TMM bridge south, then both units withdraw west? There was also a serious question about whether these two brigades could actually swing back towards Mavinga instead of retreating. Questions, questions, questions. Then more pressing news arrived, by way of artillery observer Major Pierre Francken, who was sitting in a tree overlooking 47 Brigade's positions. The Angolans appeared to be moving into the open felt east of their defensive zones towards the bridge. By the afternoon of the 2nd of October, more than 100 vehicles had concentrated in a very defined area just south of the bridge. His report was backed up by an SA Air Force reconnaissance flight, which photographed 47 bunched into an area less than 1,800 by 1,800 meters. The SA Air Force buccaneers had also been busy bombing the area, but on the 1st of October, one of these returned with its bombs still attached. Armorer Sergeant Philippus van Dyck spotted that the safety arming wire had primed the delay pistol mechanism and had been pulled out. This meant the bomb could detonate at any second, mainly because the bomb was fused for an hour delay and the aircraft had been flying for at least that time. He smelled the acetone the fuse was fizzing away, but van Dyck quickly opened the tail plane of the bomb, pulled the pistol out. The firing pin then went off five minutes later. If anyone was deserving of an honoris crux, it was van Dyck, which is what he received. Back at the Lombard, the movement of 47 Brigade meant they were now a juicy target, both for the SA Air Force and ground forces. 59 Brigade tanks had also moved towards this bridge. They were either an advance force or more likely on standby to help in 47 Brigade crossing the TMM back north. All of this was followed on Friday, the 2nd of October, with a UNITA message saying that the two wooden bridges that flanked the TMM bridge had been completed. A dramatic bit of news because it meant the Angolans would be moving in hours rather than days. The SADF had been planning to strike on the 5th, but now this could be too late. Rifle Commander Kuba Smit was ready immediately. Pereira and Smit met, both agreed they needed to attack on the 3rd of October to catch Fopla in the open, squeezed together, and withdrawing, if that was what they were doing. Pereira and Smit conferred, then decided to attack. This decision was taken by them, not by the top brass back home. Meanwhile, Franken, perched in his tree, continued providing crucial coordinates and the G5 artillery pounded the Fopla vehicles starting on the evening of the 2nd. Early the next morning, Saturday, 3rd of October, Combat Group Alpha began advancing from the east to the west, following the wide Lombard floodplain. There were three lines of 61 Mechs Armoured Car Squadron leading this assault, all from Charlie with 12 Rattle 90s. Behind them was UNITA and a light infantry screen. Their task was to winkel out enemy units that would then be hit by the South African infantry following on. After these groups passed, the armoured cars of Alpha Company Mechanised Infantry supported by 81mm and 60mm motors would travel through, along with 3-2 Battalions Golf Company mopping up all of the above. They weren't alone. To the south, or the left, Combat Group Charlie would shadow Alpha as they headed westwards with a force of 61 Mechs Bravo Company, 8 Rattle 90s, which were going to focus on the tanks. They were mainly a reserve force to cover Alpha Group from a counter-attack Power 47 Brigade from where the South Africans thought they were in a defensive position a few kilometres south-east. Another company of UNITA troops was assigned to track Bravo on their left, shadowing the Shadow Group so to speak. The only problem with this plan was 47 Brigade was not where the South Africans thought they were. Everyone imagined the bulk of 47 had remained behind to the south, that they hadn't moved up to the TMM bridges in numbers. Everyone was wrong. So the plan was to overrun Fapla at the bridge, then wheeling south to the left, they would crunch through the enemy forces believed to be well away from this crossing point. Ferreira and Smit were labouring under the illusion that only a small force had sent to watch over the crossing point and advance to safeguard the position. The South Africans were reading from the handbook on mobile warfare that an initial point where the enemy had arrived would be characterized by a weaker force and that the main force would only be moved up once everything was secure. Easy enough to comment now you'll say at this stage it was still unclear if 47 were going to retreat or attack with 59 brigade in tow. Ferreira was relying on information as all commanders and the quality of his decision making depended on the quality of that information. So combat groups Alpha and Charlie were ready to go before first light on the 3rd and began their move westwards in the dark with their right wing of rattles riding close to the bank of the Lomba River. It was somewhere between 0830 and 0910 that the right wing under Corporal Duncan Taylor drove into the first enemy units and opened fire on the Lomba River. It was somewhere between 0830 and 0910 that the right wing under Corporal Duncan Taylor drove into the first enemy units and opened fire on the Lomba River. During the night of the 2nd of October, Farplay had been extremely busy. They'd shifted most of their heavy vehicles, tanks and armoured machines out of their temp base south of the river and were now in full strength at the TMM bridge. Incredible deeds were about to be performed on both sides but as you'll hear on the South African side it was almost superhuman. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage because Farplay had been extremely busy. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified both Smit and Ferreira decided to press home their slim advantage. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 and as the fighting intensified FAPLA troops immediately turned and fought with considerable courage, despite what some of the Russian sources say about their general attitude. By now it was a kill-or-be-killed moment, without any chance of immediate escape, and most men fight to the death when this is the military algebra facing them. Unfortunately for FAPLA's overall aims in southern Angola, their fighters were eventually going to break. After a couple of hours of fighting, some of the South African rattles pulled back. FAPLA could be heard on the radio claiming victory. But they were unaware that the armoured vehicles had run out of ammunition and were withdrawing to be resupplied, including the crucial gas needed to reduce their 90mm guns' recoil. It was quite a shock for the Angolans, as they sought to advance into the spaces left by the rattles, only to run straight into the SEDF and UNITA supported by artillery. Some of the messages by FAPLA to Guido Quanovali include phrases like They are running away, the victory is ours, and open fire, those bastards are running, the victory is ours, then smoke them with the bombs. 59 Brigade further north chipped in. When they come, my children are waiting and they are determined to defeat these bastards. So, lots of bastards and running. While they may have been correct about the first, they were totally wrong about the second. The radio blurted the new reality a few minutes later.
Speaker 2The SEDF are not running away, they are maintaining their position.
Speaker 1That was at 1400 hours. Soviet advisers were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. The SEDF were caught alongside the Angolan. drove this tank across the mudflats littered with burnt-out vehicles to tow away one of these SA-8 ground-to-air missile systems. He was awarded the honor as crooks for that, and now the initiative had shifted to UNITA and the South Africans once more. Then UNITA tried to seize the SA-8 from the SADF forces, but Ferreira stood firm, refusing to surrender the unit to the rebel group. It was eventually flown out aboard an overloaded C-160, transported. And yet, they were exhausted. The SADF was unable to pursue the retreating FAPLA brigades, a situation compounded by the extended South African line. Everyone then took a breath, because on their way to join Alpha Battle Group were elements of the 4th South African Infantry Battalion, along with another battery of eight G-5 guns, a troop of three fully motorized G-6 guns, and crucially, a squadron of 13 Oliphant tanks. The tanks were first for the SADF. Never before had they been deployed in this border war. Meanwhile, Cuban President Fidel Castro was horrified by the reports of the battle on the Lomba, and sent General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez as the new chief of the Cuban military in Angola, along with 3,000 more troops and an additional armored brigade. Sanchez, however, had no idea of his tragic fate at the hands of Castro later. Everyone's attention now shifted northwest of Mavinga to a place called Cuito Cuanavale. This was going to be a long and bloody fight for control of a strategic town, and that fight would last until a ceasefire was signed in 1989. Please rate the podcast on iTunes. It helps raise the visibility of the series. If you want to contact me, you can head off to abwarpodcast.com. There's a contact form on the homepage. Or if you're in a rush, you can direct message me on Twitter at Des Latham. Until next, I was Pepe. Transcription by CastingWords
PodcastTranscript AI