Speaker 1welcome back to south african border wars with me your host des latham this is episode 88 the first phase of operation modular has begun 3-2 battalion the recces and unita are facing eight fapla brigades in southern angola four of these were advancing towards movinga as you heard last episode faplas 21st and 47th brigade around 3 000 men were on their way to the lomba river northwest of movinga chief of army lieutenant general kat liebenbach had written in his report before august 1987 that a physical attack on menong by the sadf would probably solve the problem of the fapla attack but he also wrote that because of the sa army's manpower shortage this was not feasible to buttress unita then the initial group of 80 special force soldiers had been deployed along with anti-tank weapons to form tank hunting teams these failed because the angolans always deployed companies of men as screens around their precious tanks colonel jock harris officer commanding of 3-2 battalion was writing furious notes around now about what he called the foolish proposals being adopted by a defense force top brass he wanted a far stronger force to be deployed but as you know the sadf was told no equipment should fall into enemy hands and that south africans should only operate in support of unita who would do most of the fighting around moving fapla had now crossed an imaginary line that kat liebenbach had drawn 50 kilometers around moving they were now much closer right on the lomba river itself according to some there was a spate of confusing orders that followed first commanders were told in briefings it was not the end of the world if movinga fell later they were told to hold moving because unita's morale would not survive if that town was overrun by fapla then they were told that movinga should be defended even more stringently at one minute to midnight on the 19th of august the sadf began fighting back with heavier stuff firing a ripple of 96 valkyrie rockets at fapla forces who were occupying a place called the katada woods the rockets missed fapla troops by 100 meters and alerted the angolans to the fact that south africans were now definitely embedded with unita because the rebel movement had no mobile rocket launchers for the next five days the mrl fire was directed at the advancing fapla brigades and this battery along with a contingent of 3-2 battalion and the recce's were the south african front line in the battle harris at this stage was at the headwaters of the lomba and then he moved his hq to the west of movinga awaiting the arrival of more troops from buffalo 3-2 battalions anti tank squadron quebec batteries logistic vehicles and eight g5 artillery pieces which are going to be flown in on a c-130 aircraft at 1830 on the 26th of august faplas 47th and 49th brigade took up a position on the high ground near mokubola just across the lomba river it didn't take long to get a fix on their position because south africa's papa battery commander major pier franken was hiding in nearby bushes and acted as a forward observer for his mrels these were further south across the lomba river around 13 kilometers away early the next morning papa battery let fly and within minutes a tank was set alight and a number of fapla soldiers killed eventually around 100 the angolans fired back with their bm-21 rockets but missed they also stopped moving forward faplas 47th brigade began moving on the 28th of august and reached a point around three kilometers from the lomba river source this meant the mrels had to withdraw to avoid being trapped so they headed further south and had finally dropped and sadf head yanni chalnes cut libenbach and local commander dennis erp flew into rundu to discuss a worsening situation this is where 61 mech was granted permission along with two more companies of 101 battalion to join the defense of mavinga libenbach told his commanders that faplas should not just be stopped but the situation should swing in unita's favor that was a bit ambitious particularly because harris had been told that unita should realize it's their war and not their war and that's why he said that faplas should not just be stopped but that's why he said that faplas should not just be stopped but the situation should swing in unita's favor and their sadf wouldn't do more than necessary when it came to deploying the sadf's premier mechanized force 61 mech the orders were confusing the initial orders from libenbach was that 61 should be deployed but only to what he called an extent he said this should not be interpreted as permission to accept blatant risks he seemed to be hedging furthermore they would tell their own allies unita that 61 mech would not be used directly it was just a matter of time before 61 mech would not be used directly it was just a matter of time before reserve force in case the battalion was awaiting orders itching to move still based at omotia in ovampaland finally they were mobilized on 31st of august crossing the cat line over the next two days and by the 2nd of september they were heading towards mavinga the mechanized force arrived there on the 5th of september now there were over 2 600 sadf troops in guando cubango province they were facing a total of 12 000 fapla troops but in the end they were able to get to the initial 6 000 of these posed a direct threat along with the angolan air force participating in papa's advance on bavinga were the 16th 21st 47th 59th brigades although 3-2 battalion records show that 4-9 brigade was also involved fapla was moving 80 tanks towards the town directly plus artillery and mig-23s mig-21s and su-22s providing air cover the real problem for the sam 6 7 8 9 13 and 16 missile batteries these were part of the most potent force the angolans had gathered ever on the sadf side there was 61 mech a large part of 3-2 battalion two companies of 101 battalion a g5 battery a valkyrie mrl battery and a 120 millimeter mortar battery that was two and a half battalions and an artillery regiment combat group alpha led by commandant guber smith saw one mechanized company as well as a motorized infantry company an armored car squadron an 81 millimeter mortar platoon and an anti-aircraft troop bundled together commandant robbie heartsleaf took charge of combat group bravo leading three motorized infantry companies a rattle squadron ostensibly set up as an anti-tank organization and an 81 millimeter mortar platoon and combat group charlie where major david lotter took charge of a single motorized infantry company and an anti-aircraft troop bundled together commandant robbie and anti-tank platoon and an 81 mil mortar platoon behind these were two zero artillery regiments quebec battery of g5s papa's mrls and sierra with 120 millimeter mortars they were each protected by an infantry platoon and anti-aircraft sections as part of this operation the sa air force was going to be flying three canberra and four buccaneer bombers 12 mirage f1az fighter bombers and eight mirage f1cz interceptor fighters they were flown to rundu and grootfontein air bases from south africa there were six more mirage three cz interceptors back in the republic ready to be scrambled if needs be but these were already obsolete and it was wisely decided to leave them at home liebenbach's order that the sadf avoid risks was basically thrown out of the window by the lateral thinking leadership on the ground and almost immediately orders are one thing reality is another this is the drip feed logic that was going to cause so much trouble for the sadf in the near future and it was going to cause so much trouble for the sadf in the near future next few years sitting in pretoria air conditioning on sipping coffee pondering the socio-political aspects of their actions the generals appeared divorced from the realities on the ground you see the soviets had decided to move their now defeated troops out of afghanistan and to deploy some of these in trouble spots and to support their allies the cubans east europeans were in angola adding to the weight of strategic value in the southwest african country with its enclave in kabinda and its importance as a neighbor of namibia pretoria meanwhile appeared to be stuck in an early 1980s logic by releasing 61 mech on the 28th of august and granting permission to the sa air force to raid further north they had unleashed a major operation while trying to pretend it was a small incursion to give you an idea about pretoria's position more than 130 vehicles crossed over the border into angola in 61 mechs convoy alone including 73 rifles by now the soviets were deploying satellite observation although they continued to deny this and the east german comms experts had picked up sadf radio messages which obviously increased in frequency at about this time plausible deniability about being inside angola was a bit like russia calling the invasion of ukraine a special military operation when it was and is a war you have to be in the special class to believe that it was a special military operation or to believe that there was only a mine incursion taking place back in 1987 3-2 battalions harris had seen enough of this war along with jan breitenbach who is now one of those advising unita to know a full-scale mechanized assault by an enemy when he saw one and fapla were full scale there was no special military operation bogus bs this was war war conventional war the russian trained reconnaissance team has picked up the sadf movements the day they crossed the cut line. G5 guns were now facing the FAPLA brigades. Valkyrie MRLs were firing at them. The SAF was mirages and other jets began bombing them. Russians and Cubans were being killed by South African heavy weapons. 61 Mech had mobilized from Umutia in strength. Two mechanized infantry companies with Rattle 20s, an armored car squadron of Rattle 90s, an anti-tank platoon, mobile 81mm mortar sections, assault pioneers, engineers, medics, the whole bang shoot. Left behind was the crucial Echo squadron of Olifant tanks. Roland de Vries explained to me a few months ago that the tanks were added into the mix after the SAF realized they could no longer fight FAPLA with armored cars alone. When the SAF had bumped into FAPLA's heavily armored T-54-55 tanks in December 1983, that had been a rude awakening. The Rattles had low-velocity 90mm guns and some of the Rattles had a lot of power. The Rattles had a lot of power. The Rattles had a lot of power. The Rattles had a lot of power. The Rattles had a lot of power. The Rattles had a lot of power. The Rattles had a lot of power. The Rattles had a lot of power. The Rattles had a lot of power. The tanks took six shots before the rounds pierced their thick armor. It was after that South Africa decided to add 12 Olifant tanks into 61 Mech's weapon mix. They were modernized British Centurion tanks. While the tanks were based on Umutia, a lack of large operation between 1983 and 87 meant they were only used in exercises with the tank crews based near Bloemfontein at the School of Armor. It was touch and go through the years whether the SATF would actually pull these tanks out of sector 1. 0 northern Southwest Africa. But General George Mayering said the Cubans and Soviets knew they were there and they acted as a deterrent. While the frontline troops of 3-2 were fully aware that FAPLA's heavy weapons included the T-54-55s, the top brass was still not ready to deploy their own heavy weapons back in South Africa despite the fact that these tanks were at Umutia. By the time the first Olifants showed up at the fighting, it would be late October. So 61 Mech was sent into the battles along the Lomba River with weapons that did not equal the Angolan's tank power. The Ratel 90s were led by excellent mechanized officers, but it's a bit like the Germans and the Mark 2 Panzers facing Russians with the far better T-34s. The German shells bounced off the Russian tanks when they first met. But the SATF leadership believed in their doctrine that tanks could be countered by the Ratel 90s. By the end of this border war they realized that tanks could only be countered by tanks. This period is a couple of decades before the use of pinpoint accurate droner tanks and long-range missiles, so they couldn't counter the tanks with these weapons either. The days of the SATF rolling over Angolan forces in a matter of minutes were over, but the generals seemed to have continued clinging onto the false belief that it was like Ops Protea, that FAPLA would simply fold. While I pointed out that the average FAPLA soldier did not like facing the SATF and that their Russian advisors were driven to distraction. When men made a bolt for safety instead of standing and fighting, starting in 1987, the conventional-style frontal fighting meant large brigades of FAPLA couldn't retreat. Also, it's important to note that there was no real thoughts inside the SATF at this stage to do anything more about Guido Quanovali directly. However, like Stalingrad for the Germans, it was a sideshow that would grow into the main event. After the slow going of early August, FAPLA suddenly surged and lead elements reached the Lomba River in early September. During the night of the 3rd of September, Lieutenant Richard Glynn flew his Borsbock light plane on a night artillery spotting mission south of the Lomba. In the back seat was artillery officer Commandant Johann Durant, who was going to coordinate the evening's barrage. But the Angolans were waiting for them and fired a SAM-8 missile hitting the plane which crashed. Both the pilot and artillery spotter were killed. The next day, South African Air Force 3 squadron arrived at Rundu, for their air defense duties, backed up by a rodent mobile radar unit. The South Africans were picking up chatter on Angolan radio and these Angolans were speaking of a new secret weapon. The discovery that FAPLA was now using a sophisticated bit of anti-aircraft kit came as a huge shock, the SA-8. The vulnerable Canberra bombers were withdrawn and all SA Air Force bombing was suspended until they tested their bomb-toss method and found this would still work out, despite the SA-8s. Then it was decided to release the Canberras once more. The British had perfected this method during the Falklands War. Just for clarification, bombers fly at extremely low level, pull up to a point just before the target, release their bombs, then drop down low once more. The bombs travel in an arc. The plane is mostly out of missile radar sight. Operation Modular, however, was not starting well. Then most of the pilots assigned to Rundu ended up in tents at the end of the runway. Readiness tents, the Air Force called them. Little Siberia was what the pilots christened these Spartan conditions. There was supposed to be an arrestor barrier to stop planes from plowing into the tents at the end of the runway, but no one picked them up. The Rundu engineering team blamed a lack of electrical power. All the pilots then began suffering from diarrhea and operational strength within two days dropped to just four pilots. This was excruciating because air defense meant the pilots had to be strapped in the aircraft most of the day, seven days a week, sitting under the glass canopies, temperatures rocketing to over 40 degrees. They were sapping their strength. It was grueling. Morale took a battering. These pilots, the cream of South African aviation, were sitting on long drops, living in tents with no proper running water. Because the radar was so far away from the action, they could only watch the MiGs when they were at 24,000 feet, any lower, and the aircraft disappeared. This because of the curvature of the earth and the distance to Mavinga. So engineers moved the AR-3D radar to a ridge 10 nautical miles north of Rundu and used the call sign Sunset Radar. The distances involved were so vast that when they scrambled the mirages, the aircraft only arrived over the target area after the MiGs had left. The Angolan planes had radar facilities at Kuito Kwanawale and Manong and also used mobile radar, so they had coverage from the ground up. The Air Force pilots were going into this combat virtually blind. Back on the ground, the SADF tactical moves to stop Faplis' advance were clear enough. First, they needed to focus on 16 and 21 Brigade, which was traveling towards the Lomba River closer to Mavinga. The problem was, 47 Brigade had turned west, then headed all the way to the source of the Lomba, where the land was least marshy, then it suddenly turned southeast and were now below the river, heading directly east towards Mavinga itself. That was a smart move. It was either turned east or west, because the river is so wide. It may be shallow, but it's a few kilometers across in places. 16 Brigade was 30 kilometers away from 37, heading straight down from the old Portuguese road towards Mavinga. It is now that a dispute arose between 3-2 officer commanding Jock Harris and General Willie Mayer back at Sector 10HQ about what to do next. Mayer wanted Harris to wheel his squadrons around and to stop Faplis' 47 Brigade, at the source of the Lomba. Harris refused, saying his tracks with the 106mm guns would be left behind by the Rattle 90s, which were much quicker through the bush. It would weaken the force. Most of the time, the generals tended to listen when operationally experienced commandants like Harris spoke, particularly as he was one of the most knowledgeable officers in the entire SADF. When it became clear that Mayer turned this into a firm order, Harris stepped aside, saying, "I'm not going to let you get away with this. You can't get away with this. You can't get away Colonel Dion Ferreira was volunteered. By the time he arrived at the Lomba, there were four Faplis Brigades facing him. Sixteen had been joined by 21 Brigade in the east, and 59 Brigade had just arrived north of the Lomba River, with 47 on its west side. Ferreira was forced to do what no commander likes to do, split his forces. The SAF was only going to supply ground support on the 16th and would see the artillery engage from some distance. The 47 Brigade had managed to reach the source of the Lomba, and it had turned east. It was now crucial that the South Africans stop this advance, or 47 would join up with the 59 Brigade, which was much closer to Mavinga. Ferreira ordered the 120mm mortar battery to prepare. They set up their position between the main battle group and Mavinga so they could cover the approaches to the town and the upcoming battle against the 47 Brigade. Junito then sent an urgent message to Bravo, combat group's commandant Robby Hartsleep, that Faplis 21 Brigade had actually started crossing the Lomba between the South Africans and Mavinga, and had established a bridgehead on the southern bank. Right now, the MRL battery was too far away from where this bridgehead was located. They had moved even further west, where 47 Brigade had appeared the most serious threat. The rocket launchers had less than 24 hours to pull back or be cut off by the steadily advancing Angolans. Ferreira was in a pickle, but there were options. Junito had destroyed the main bridge at the point the Angolan 21 Brigade was trying to cross, and the Angolans had resorted to using their sappers to build a pontoon bridge. While they did this fairly quickly, it still left most of the Angolan Brigade on the north side of this extremely wide river. Commandant Hartsleep ordered a company from 101 Battalion and a squadron of Rattle 90s to engage the enemy. They managed to hit an enemy BTR-60, then pulled back. Ferreira then ordered them to go back and take out the intruder, but they entire force on the Southern Bank and their at dawn the following day. The G5s laid down an accurate barrage then 101 and the Rattles section charged into battle. By now there was a battalion of FAPLA fighters on the south and the South Africans moved in so fast that they were in the middle of these soldiers before the shooting really started. Then they were firing at each other from so close that the RPG-7 rockets failed to explode they needed at least 15 meters to arm themselves and many were just bouncing off the Rattles and other armored vehicles that's how close they were. The South Africans attacked so ferociously that FAPLA's relatively inexperienced recruits turned and fled across the floodplain. The SADF troops opened fire more than 100 FAPLA were cut down. Then FAPLA's artillery replied subjecting 101 and the Rattles to heavy fire from north of the Lomba. The Angolans had guessed what was going on but didn't wait for messages from their frontline troops once they recognized they retreated. 2455's began crossing the newly built FAPLA bridge with at least a company of troops in support and SADF artillery responded. They were using the terrible airburst anti-personnel rounds mainly which caused carnage amongst FAPLA soldiers. The tanks continued. Watching them approach was Rattle 90 commander Major Hannes Nortman. His first few rounds the tanks did not go well they just bounced off these solid Russian pieces of hardware. The tanks were far off and the Rattles gun lacked the power needed to penetrate inches of steel and composite materials. Nortman's Rattles were also equipped with ZT-3 anti-tank missiles but the problem is they had not been properly tested. However when one fired a ZT-3 into a BRDM it exploded then a truck was hit with the same result. In the meantime there were now five tanks heading his way. The Rattles fired all their ZT-3s and three T-54-55s were brewed up. Others turned and headed back to the north bank of the Lomba. Two SADF soldiers were wounded but dozens of FAPLA lay dead and dying across the floodplain and near the bridge. A flight of MIGs then appeared overhead and bombarded the banks of the river but missed the South Africans who took cover. At nightfall the SADF was in a strong position having driven off the first attempt at crossing the river. But the fight now shifted west towards 47 Brigade which as you know had rounded the source of the Lomba. It was moving inexorably towards Mobinga almost directly from the west. Fighting there was going to be far more intense and as you'll hear next episode far more deadly for the South Africans. Please rate the podcast on iTunes it helps raise the visibility of the series. If you want to contact me you can head off to abwarpodcast.com. There's a contact form on the home page or you can direct message me on Twitter at Des Latham. Until next, goodbye. you
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