Episode 87 –Crocodiles attack Recces and the Lomba River heavy metal clash looms

[Music] Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Desi Latham. This is episode 87, and it's early 1987, coincidentally. This idea was not facing a crisis as the Empire government in Angola was growing, increasingly determined to crush unita in the southeast. The apartheid government was also facing an internal uprising, and your organisations had been developed to deal with these. One was the Civil Cooperation Bureau of CCB. You'll hear a lot more about them in the coming few episodes. But in this episode, we'll hear about Colonel Pitmulla, who commanded sector 2-0 in South West Africa. He had considered the threat posed by a farpler, which was now attacking unita head-on at Mavinga, and the Angolan Rebel movement led by Jonas Sabimbi was wilting. Mullah had a plan involving a brigade-sized force and a three-pronged attack. First, he thought that Pablo should be hit behind the line, so to speak by ignoring the advance east of the Quito river and focus on the West, hitting the Cubans in Russian support at Manong. That would halt the supply of heavy weapons, streaming east. This implied something else. Quito Kwanabali needed to be attacked and subdued even further north-west, because it was the fulcrum, a point through which everything heading towards Unita was now moving. It was a strategic target that was also juicy. And third, it was to create some kind of direct head-on clash further east of the Quito river at some point, after the supply lines had been cut, which would give the Angolans a bloody nose, and they'd turn around. Colonel Jock Harris, who commanded 3-2 battalion, thought this an excellent idea. It conformed to SAD of tactical doctrine, using mechanized brigades, punching first, using the troops directly to take on the Cubans and fapler driving their armoured vehicles and tanks towards Unita forces. Of course, we are moving in extrably towards the battle for Quito Kwanabali, and this period has been debated particularly, hotly by military historians, so I'm going to tread very carefully, indeed. I've also some excellent source material from the Russians, so unlike some of the other battles, I'll be able to tell you what was going on day to day from the other side. One of the Russians is the Asya Slav Aleksandrovich Mityev, who was an Angola between 1986 and 1989, advising fapler reconnaissance units. He was stationed in the 6th military district at Menong, and Quito Kwanabali, and had a great deal of experience facing 3-2 battalion, the Reckys, and 61 Mech. He's an interesting character. He served with the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1979 and 1980, and arrived in Angola in March 1986. Mityev was moved into one of the most violent parts of Angola, Menong. His home was a large dugout two meters deep with concrete walls and a sloping roof. He led a recon group of these men were tough, and zipped on the floor on cardboard, like the homeless, as he says, with the AK-47s as pillows. The fapler special forces used American M-26 grenades, not Soviet F-1s. Mityev trained these men in the art of ambush, how to carry out raids, how to move in the bush, sneak out in soldiers in the dark, how to kill guards, and how to transport prisoners. They had not visioned sights for AKs and the machine guns, but one per squad. These were Russian-made and tended to break down in the humidity, the heat and the dust. However, the fact they used them at all would have been used to summon the acidity of sight. One day, 1987, Mityev formed up the men from his recon unit and ordered them, "Show me the weapon! When did you clean it?" The odds are from one fapler soldier, surprised him. "We never cleaned them! They shoot fine as they are!" came the reply. Anyone who knows AK-47s knows they're almost unbreakable. These troops didn't even oil or grease the moving parts either. Of course, militaries' sticklers would scoff at their laxed asical approach to discipline, but the truth is, these AKs hardly jam. Unlike most other weapons used in the African bush, Mityev also discovered a large quantity of the food there was supplied with, included tin to meat from humanitarian aid groups. These were supposed to be airmarked for refugees, but ended up being eaten by the soldiers. After a few months of training, the rescinds in May 1987, that something much bigger was coming up. The preparations for the operation from Kuito began with a reconnaissance battalion transferred from Manong to Kuito, Kwanabali. Mityev joined other countrymen, succonded to the area and life was idyllic at first. They were surrounded by missile systems and the SAF was left them alone. The town of Kuito Kwanabali is at the junction of the Kuito and Kwanabali rivers, and was a conglomeration of small holdings or facendas that were peri-open, not agricultural. They were all decorated by the Portuguese, and Kuito is full of small cottages. These were now run down and the sewage systems had collapsed. The center of town is on a rise near the river junction and was a colorful place before it was to be bombed into ruined. The river water, the junction is clear, described as almost like distilled water, fishing is very good. The rations caught a huge number of fish using worms for bait, including the aggressive tiger fish with teeth like a saw. They swam in this clear water when they could, keeping an eagle eye out for the crocodiles, which lurked in the murky water inside the smaller tributary. What was far more deadly was the South African artillery and air force, and that was to take base in a short while. While the rations and Cubans prepared their assault on Bavinga from this quiet little town, the S.A.D. have had plans. They were monitoring the fapler force of 8 brigades, which looked like it was going to hammer Mavinga and possibly head to Jamba, unit as HQ. Four fapler brigades were left in the river to safeguard logistic routes. The other four were going to attack unit ahead on. Each brigade conformed to Soviet design and comprised of around 1,500 men, so that the total number of fapler soldiers was around 12,000. They were backed by tanks, artillery, air support, fighter bombers, and numerous armoured vehicles. All of these had to be supplied, and that's where the first challenge rose for the Angolan's. Unita with S.A.D. for assistance were determined to stop logistic support, particularly the fuel supply. Between May and June 1987, a large column of tankers arrived in Manong with their golden fifth brigade as escorts. They were apparently 23 semi-trailer tankers, 18 filled with diesel, and 5 with petrol. But on the way south, they were hit by unita specialists armed with RPG-7s, who deployed hit and run tactics. Unita ambushed the brigade supporting the tankers on the road between Longal and Quital-Quanavali, about 100 kilometers from Manong. The routine used by a fapler was a brigade strength led the march walking on both sides of the road. The reconnaissance units supporting fapler joined the brigade about halfway between Manong and Longal. The troops were now walking slowly through open Savannah. The surrounding felt should have been combed more easily by patrols, but in this case, the Angolan officers missed the bus as Meteor writes. What Unita was doing was monitoring this brigade, and they had melted away into the Savannah waiting for the forward troops to pass before they attacked. They had also planted several landmines, which then exploded, stopping the column, and at that moment, the Unita troops armed with RPG anti-tank grenade launchers stepped out and hit the tankers. Because Unita uniforms are similar to fapler's camouflage, it created confusion, and of course they all carried AKs and RPK machine guns and RPG-7s. At least 10 fuel tankers were hit and burned out. Meteor says Unita's technique was to fire a single shot from an RPG, then escape with others laying down covering fire. Meteor was now in Manong when he heard about this attack and immediately climbed aboard a Cuban MR-8 helicopter to fly towards the ambush at low altitude, around 200 feet above ground level, and as they passed longer, they saw the columns of black smoke. It was gunfire on the ground, the convoy was halted. It was a firefight still going on with Unita. Meteor then told the Cuban pilot to climb above the smoke for better visibility. He refused, saying there'd be a target for Unita's anti-aircraft gunners. After flying around in this thick smoke, they returned to base, prostrated by what the Russian said was the Cuban lack of nerve. The Russians complained about fapler too. "The Angolans here gunfire and run," said Meteor. "There aren't really brave soldiers. The Angolans were terrified of the South Africans." This is one of the truths of the border war. In some theatres, Swapo and Fapler fought hard, but generally regarded the SEDF as a terrifying organisation, and highly effective, and the rank and file Angolans soldier often preferred to avoid a face-to-face firefight. Perhaps this drier season would be different. The MPLA Russians and Cubans launched a new offensive in 1987, they called "Operations Soludandu are Oktober, saluting Oktober, and it's set off in mid-August from Guido, Guanovae." Most fapler were on foot with BTR-60 PB armored personnel carriers and small Brazilian angessa trucks with supplies of food, ammunition, and fuel lagging behind. The force of 8 brigades included a total of 150 T-55 tanks, and apart from a list of armored vehicles such as the BMP-1s, BTR-60s, and the BRDMs, the Angolans sent in D-30 and M-46 cannon, 120 millimeter rocket launches that feared BMP-21s, as well as SAM-678 service to MSRs. It was the biggest offensive up to that point by fapler and the Russian and Cuban allies in this war. The big change I mentioned last episode was in the air. war. The Angolans finally had air superiority in the shape of Big 23s and SU-22 fighters, which were more than a match for the Mirageans. The MI-24 combat helicopters called the HIND, and known by Soviet pilots as the flying tank, were also going to be a real threat to the SAAD. At the same time, the SAAF was hamstrung by the sheer distance to Mavinga from Ashikartian and Dungwa, coupled with the limited radar coverage from Rundu. You need to begin to send messages to the SAAD of asking for more assistance, and eventually, the Defence Force agreed to send a limited force to help you need to defend against the initial Mavinga attacks. It was now that Colonel Muller's battle plan was hauled out and dusted off. Army Chief Lieutenant General Cut Levenbach was lukewarm at best about the first two options, to take Menong with a strong force or take Wito Kwanawali from the west. This is where I'm afraid some of the confused logic around strategy starts to take place, while the Menong attack would stop Fappler. It would also mean the mobilisation of a massive SAAD of force. And at this point, the South Africans were running into financial difficulties. Years of instability and sanctions were starting to have a real effect on its economy. Also, they believed that attacking these two heavily defended towns would lead to a huge butcher's bill as Jan Bratembach called. South Africa's white male population, the National Servicemen who provided their lives in this war, were growing tired of the incessant call-ups and the National Party Cabinet, was aware of what a high casualty rate would mean to their political future. Putting hundreds in line of being killed for the sake of stopping a Fappler assault on Unita is not an astute policy. So Muller's first two options were discarded in favour of the direct hit on attack against Fappler in the area east of Wito. A sudden blunt force blow they thought would do the trick. Yet, as the officers on the ground in Angola knew, this was a completely inaccurate reading of the threat preceding towards them. Back in Pretoria, the political leadership was in a complex situation. The SAAD was told in known certain terms that the battle should not escalate beyond the capacity of the South-West African territorial force or the SAAD of to deal with the situation. More importantly, PW Butter and his Cabinet made it crystal clear that the central idea was to make Fapplers offensive fail without committing the South-African totally. This is where the first strategic blender can be identified. It's easy enough to pontificate now, you say Han site is always 20/20, except at the time voices inside the SAAD were raised about this half-hearted mission. How can you fight a war while pussy-footing around? It was full frontal, they thought, "Go big or go home." The drip feed soldiers into a mechanized war makes no sense. People like Vladimir Putin are learning that lesson right now. Furthermore, should the SAAD attack Quito-Kwanabali directly, Butter's government believed the international art crowd would be significant and need more disinvestment from South Africa. Then, the obvious question arose that if the SAAD did, indeed, overcome the Russians, Cubans and Fapplers at Quito-Kwanabali, what would happen next? You need to couldn't hold the town against a sustained Fappler attack, and worse, the South Africans would then be pulled further north of the Cutline to set up their own battalions much deeper inside Angola. Holding an Angolan town would be politically disastrous, but taking it, then withdrawing would be a waste of life, and the Angolans would make propaganda capital out of the tactical retreat. It would be like grabbing a target by the tail. So it was the full frontal, but limited assault-code operation modular that one-out-the-military debate and would turn into what Leopold Skolts caused the clash of the Tartans. Heavy metal was going to clang in clash during the next few months around the Lombar River. The South Africans' main strategy was to convince the Wonders' MPLA government that they should negotiate with Unite by being defeated despite attacking in numbers. The elephant was Quito-Kwanabali. Victoria was in a real bind. Taking Quito would have escalated the war, and by now they were fighting an internal uprising back home in South Africa, and it appears the political leadership in Victoria stopped thinking straight. The only hope was Fappler's clumsy Soviet doctrine influenced tactical movement. This entails using a centralized command and control system and supplies delivered almost exclusively along the road in one direction. The only proper road in this part of Angola was the Old Portuguese road from Menonc through Longotu Quito-Kwanabali across the Quito River and towards Mavinga. All command lines, ground logistics artillery reconnaissance A pass through Quito. The SIDF was going to focus on this road and also to try and damage the chain of command. The next phase of South Africa's border war was going to be cursed by Jan Bratenbach, called it fatally flawed and incremental in nature. There were other plans. One was to send three to battalion and the rakees to destroy the bridge over the Quito River between Quito-Kwanabali and Tumpo in a night assault and without air cover. Jan Bratenbach now warned what he called the "butcher's bull" would top 300 and casualties would not be evacuated because there would be no helicopter support. So the SIDF wisely shelved the plan. But now the third number of Cubans and Angola had risen to 45,000 and there were 2,000 East Germans Iran-Fupper's signal communications and intelligence ops. This included electronic warfare systems. Cuban President Fidel Castro regarded the Angolan war as a "personal mission" and sent General Gustavo Fletas Ramirez to lead the 45,000 men he'd ordered into the Angolan bush. Then PWB ordered Operation Modular to go ahead and Phase 1 would see Unita supported by Klandistan Special Forces soldiers anti-tank teams along with a Valkyrie MRL troop and three motorized infantry companies of 3-2 battalion. But they left behind the Rathul 90 anti-tank platoon. This force was going to be a delaying tactic slowing Fapler down. 61 Mech battalion supported about 2 G5 batteries and another MRL troop were then told to await further orders. They were the reinforcements. As the SIDF planners put their heads down, they were confronted by a politically expedient order. First, no South African soldier should be sent to where there would be taken prisoner. Second, no SIDF equipment should be seized by the enemy. Third, when the SAA force flew in, they should keep further than 30 kilometres from Guido Kwanabani. Fourth, that the SIDF should try and make out that Unita was doing all this fighting. What is really interesting is reading the Russian diaries of Moscow's men fighting in southern Angoda, who are very clear that the South Africans are doing most of the fighting. How operatoria somehow thought they could convince outsiders they weren't just preposterous. Then the South African Recky and Special Forces team was dropped 70 kilometres upstream of the strategically important Quito river bridge on the night of 24th of August. They paddled down to a position close to the bridge and hid their canoes. The men swam with a current bobbing to the bridge parlons where their placed explosives. Around half a dozen then floated away, safe, but guards on the bridge spotted the Special Force in open fire. The South Africans were exposed, but used the river to float away until Sergeant Anton Bjukman was attacked by a large crocodile and dragged underwater. He pulled out his knife and stabbed the huge animal in the eye. It let him go and he got away. Another Recky had his flippers bitten, but all managed to stagger out of the water alive. But now, enemy soldiers were in hot pursuit. The commander has managed to evade capture on a fast 20 kilometre trot through the bush to the helicopter pickup point. They were carrying two wounded, so this was an epic trick. Then in a bizarre turn of events, a completely unseasonal thunderstorm burst overhead. The choppers could not deal with this. Four humans were on their way to fetch the commanders on the evening of 26th of August 1987, flying at 150 feet above ground level. Then they hit the headwinds from the thunderstorms and dropped from 120 knots ground speed to 45. They began running out of fuel, so they had to turn back to Rundu. They refueled as quickly as possible, but it was already growing light, and the humans had to operate only at night, because the MiGs were all over the place. They had to wait for dark and then the humans headed back to the pickup point, but one of the helicopters developed engine trouble and turned back to Rundu, leaving the three others to head on. The delay of almost 24 hours meant that Fuplar units were closing in on the Reckys. The Angolans had also mobilised the MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters and managed to keep an eye on where the Reckys were and provide updated info to the pursuing Angolan troops. And of course they found it difficult to provide a proper grid reference in these days before GPS. They've been running through the bush for almost 24 hours and it actually lost track of where they were. So the Puma pilots picked up the Quito river, then flew north parallel to it, and a few kilometres east of the river itself. Just as the choppers were at the turn back point, they heard the Reckys radio call, and simultaneously the commanders heard the choppers and activated what's known as an instant light. The Puma crews spotted the lights and then homed it, the Reckys then fired a pencil flare sideways through the trees to indicate the landing area. They couldn't fire this up because Fuplar pursuers would have seen it. The lead Puma loaded 16 men in one winded, but some equipment was then thrown out so that the chopper could actually take off. The second Puma also airlifted 16 and the third Puma took 21 soldiers using an extended ground roll to take off like a plane. 12 members of this up were awarded the honorisks cricks, but they'd put themselves in danger for a little reward And Angolans had already moved most of their supplies across the river bridge that blown up and then managed to fix the bridge in record time as only 40% of the structure was damaged. General Helnese now issued a formal order that Fapples' assault on Mavingo should be halted. 32 battalion and the Reckys were back in business, with 61 Mech in reserve as you heard. You need to it was going to lead the coming battles, at least that was Pretoria's order. 32 would be used defensively. Furthermore, 61 Mech was not allowed to mobilize without top brass permission. This was going to be a limited, small-scale defensive holding operation and the world would never know, at least that was the mission's statement. Their involvement should be plausibly deniable, said Pretoria. 32's commander, Jack Harris, knew this was a fool's errand and asked for relief untanks to back up his men. He knew what awaited them in southern Angola, but his cabinet said no, so Harris sent his troops to the southern banks of the Lomba River, where they arrived by mid-August. Unita placed three regular and four semi-regular battalions close by. Meanwhile Fappler had commenced an extremely slow advance southeast towards them, moving at four kilometres a day, and Unita sniping at the hills as they moved. As the order of battle appeared, they continued to be debate between senior officers about the reinforcements, particularly 61 Mech. Eventually, got liven back, flew to Rundu, and was briefed by Mule, then consented to deploying 61 Mech to the front under command of Commandant Bott Smith. But they still did not mobilize the SEDF's other heavy mechanized unit foresight. Their home base was in Middleburg in the Eastern Transval. There had been ready for action since March 1987, but would only be moved into Angola in October. So Colonel Jacques Harris had sent Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Foxtrot companies of three-tube battalion, to be led by Commandant Yan Ho-Hot, along with multiple rocket launches, and ASTFARC anti-aircraft troop. Three reiki teams from three-tube battalion, and a second ASTFARC troop and 120mm mortar battery from 61 Mech to slow Fappler's advance. A little later, another mortar section from three-two joined up, along with an anti-tank and an assault pioneer platoon, but Fappler was not stopping. By late August Fappler's formidable 47th and 21st brigades accompanied by a tactical armoured group equipped with tanks had pushed as far as 25 kilometers from Mavinger. The South Africans were determined to stop Fappler from crossing the Lomber River, and Harris initially set up his HQ close to the source of the Lomber. The rest of the battle group were arranged south east of Mavinger. The SAF was right now flying UAVs or drones, picking up the fact that Fappler's brigades were now spread over vast distances, around eight kilometers square each, which made ASTFARC an expense of enterprise. It was only as the right hook brigades appeared, and rounded the source of the Lomber River, that any real attack from the air became viable. And now Fappler's 21 Brigade positioned itself north of the Lomber River, while 47 brigades circled around its southern bank. Because the landscape here is particularly wide and flat, broad flood planes extend for miles and other side of the river, it's difficult to move vehicles without being spotted. It also meant that these two enemy brigades were separated from each other, while at the same time they began to compress into two distinct targets up against the Lomber River. The SA Air Force and artillery was going to cause carnage attacking these two brigades, using air burst and fragmentation munitions filled with thousands of ball bearings. One stick of eight bombs covered a strip of 70 meters wide, and 400 meters long. And our Russian source would explain what happened to his colleagues in one of these bombing raids. It was not a pretty picture, but that's for next episode. Please rate the podcast on iTunes. It helps raise the visibility of the series. If you want to contact me, you can head off to abwarpodcast.com, there's a contact form on the homepage, or direct message me if you're in a rush on Twitter at this level. Until next, Uzbek. [MUSIC]