Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 86. We were traveling with five recce and they're planning to attack the Swapo base that was discovered by some systematic sleuthing by Kwa Stadler and José da Costa, as you heard last episode. The base was north of Tichmutete and east of the Cobonga River and Menang. Heavily armed with a few hundred Swapo cadres, perhaps as many as 350 were training at what was their eastern front HQ, or at least it was a major forward position, if not the HQ. The troops gathered around for intelligence briefing by Dave Drew just before James Hills explained how the attack would unfold. A mortar platoon and two stopper groups, 51 and 53 Commando, were ordered to take up positions north of the base. led by Kwa Stadler. They were to approach the base using the same route that the main force would use the next day. A few kilometers from the target, they left the mortar platoon, which set up near the track that ran east to west through the base. Commando 53 then moved directly north of the base, ready to confront any Swapo attempting to escape. Stadler headed off west of the target with 51 Commando also following the track. These two groups formed a significant threat to any Swapo fleeing in their direction. Just before first light, a company from Whitehall, 101 Battalion soldiers from two recce reserves, along with a regimental HQ and 51 Commando would assault the base led by José de Costa. As this attacking force arrived at the river, the mortars would open fire. They left at dusk. The trucks dropped the troops around 20 kilometers from the target. They covered the remaining 10 kilometers on foot and eventually stopped at the east-west track. By 0200 in the morning, they were at the forming up point. The mortar platoon was hopefully ready. By first light, the stopper group was deployed west of the target, the troops lying in an extended line near the road facing north. Crucially, the man carrying the RPG had decided to hide behind a termite's heap. Something was wrong though. The mortars hadn't opened fire, and the recce's could hear the base waking up. The radio crackled into life and one of the officers was commenting on "nothing going on" when suddenly the DSHK 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun opened up from the eastern entrance of the base. It peppered the lead Casper driven by Corporal Emil Mashabavi and killed him. 53 commander now withdrew from the AA gun's line of fire. As they did so, they missed a group of swapper making a run for the perimeter. Nearby, 51 commander's stopper group found things were getting hotter. A swapper vehicle approached at high speed along the road, then blew up when it was hit by an RPG fired by the commanders. The vehicle blazed out of control and headed straight for the man who'd fired the rocket. It banged into the termite mound inches from the gunner. Then a GAZ-66 truck roared up. The second RPG round missed, but two operators jumped up in front of the vehicle and fired their SKS rifle grenades. The others sprayed it with automatic fire. The fire from the base then died out quickly. The majority of swapper's men had moved 12km west earlier. They'd only left a skeleton stock, which took off as soon as they saw the scale of the SADF assault. Live to fight another day, they say. 52 commander turned and headed off towards this 2nd training area, but were ambushed a short distance away by a swapper company, which had also hidden on the road further ahead. The armored trucks and caspers burst through this group, leaving half a dozen swapper dead, and then the cadres withdrew. It was contact after contact for the rest of the day, and by sundown, about 40 swapper were down, but the SADF was beginning to take more casualties. Besides Corporal Mashavavi, Corporal Andre Rankin was killed when two recce's casper was hit by an RPG, and a number of 5 recce's were also wounded by shrapnel and rounds. The fight was over by an outfall, but there was no rejoicing in the SADF ranks. They had lost two men, the bodies already on board a puma heading back to Oshikati. Four days later, the combatants were back in Oshivelo. The vehicles were convoyed back to Palaboa, and the commandos were packed into a C-130 and flown home. Swapper was now operating around 10km east of Kasinga, and by early January 1987, the signs were growing that the movement was planning another large-scale incursion into northern Obambaland. 3-2 battalions Bravo Company was sent to search east of Kasinga for the Kasumi base in an operation called Kakabian . The SAF was provided support, and was also attacking southern Angola in something called Operation Eitsprung around the Ogongo-Rakana area. Then, in late January, they launched Operation Orondomtali, focusing on swappers' logistics bases in central and eastern Angola. 3 weeks later, there was still no contact with the enemy, but a swapper operative captured on the 24th of January confirmed that a base did exist, but he said it was west of Kasinga, not east. After recon teams confirmed it was there but empty, Major Peter Waugh of 3-2 focused on an area further west, and then hit pay dirt. At 0600 on February 1st, Bravo Company's left flank made contact with the small swapper security patrol, but drew 82mm mortar and machine gun fire. The SAF was still active on the west of Kasinga, but there was still no contact with the enemy. The SAF's own mortar group had been out of comms range, then suddenly sprang into action and fired back. SWAPO lost half a dozen fighters out of 120 at the base, but 4 members of 3-2 battalion were killed and 11 wounded. The SAF managed to destroy a large quantity of ammunition and set the base alight, scattering SWAPO to the Mokolo, Ngonto and Kasumbi areas. Two days later, on the 3rd of February, SWAPO counter-attacked with a tank company ZU-23 mobile platoon in the south of Kasinga. 3-2's Bravo Company was so exhausted they needed reinforcing, and Charlie, Echo and Golf companies were sent to replace the Thai soldiers. The contacts then continued without casualties on both sides. They were sniping, moving, turning, chasing. Then, on the 17th of February, 3-2 battalion was ordered to move to 101 Tactical Battalions HQ at the Omana River. They were shifting south-westly. Signs of SWAPO movement had been found in the territory around Mupa, Ivali and Hansa. The tactical HQ was moved a few kilometres north-west of Dover. Eventually, on the 5th of March, a section of SWAPO was tracked down in the early afternoon, and Golf Company's recce team opened fire on them, but then they had to withdraw as they were heavily outnumbered. Meanwhile, Charlie Company was laying mines on the road between Mongua and Onjiva. Things were hot. Golf Company reported daily contacts in an area around Ivali. On the 12th of March, one of the company patrols crossed paths with a 40-man SWAPO section, and during a 15-minute fire fight, Rafahman R. Sukoti was shot dead and five other 3-2 battalion soldiers wounded. A short while later, 2nd Lieutenant D. D'Souza was killed and four members wounded when they clashed with SWAPO and FAPLA. In follow-up operations, Charlie Company managed to overcome a SWAPO platoon hiding in trenches. One was killed, but 19 others escaped. Eventually, UNITA took occupation of the town of Mupa. The SA Air Force, meanwhile, had deployed a team to Okangwate and Kaokalan, where Pumas were sent to drop reccees into western Angola. They were then sent to infiltrate Lubango airfield. The reccees were planning to infiltrate Lubango to sabotage aircraft and facilities. The idea of destroying FAPLA's MiG-21s and 23s on the ground at both Menong and Lubango was almost a holy grail for the reccees, and it had been whispered about for months. This was going to be a small team operation. They'd have to spend a few days on the ground behind enemy lines, but the destruction of such important aircraft would be a bitter pill for the Angolians to swallow. FAPLA now enjoyed air superiority over southern Angola. They could hold over the area, while the mirages were limited to a few minutes at a time, even with the tanker circling to the south. The SA Air Force had changed methodology and begun using extended range operations, employing the Boeing 707 tankers to refuel the planes in mid-air. This added impetus to 1 and 2-4 Squadron's ops, particularly as the Mirage F1AZ was such a thirsty beast. The SA Air Force practiced refueling for months using Jacob's Reef target off the western Cape Coast, with the Mirages taking off and returning to Hoodsprate Air Base. After weeks of training, refueling became second nature, although the pilots had to deal with swollen bladders. The SA Air Force also increased night sorties as the pressure grew on their daily ops in Angola. Major Nick Oosthuizen and Captain Rikas de Beer developed improved night-fighting training, and one squadron began flying four plane sorties. A typical night sortie from Hoodsprate would follow a pattern where four Mirages loaded with six bombs apiece and two spare fuel tanks would fly to Rodeval, drop their bombs, then rendezvous with the tanker, refuel, head back to base. They also conducted the first night-toss bomb, as it was called, Verhooy, starting mid-1986. Another technique developed at this stage was the get-up attack, where they had lobbed 500 kg bombs against heavily-defended targets from kilometers away. They'd pitch up in a high-G maneuver, then roll onto the target and use laser shot at the moment the target was located. The pilot pulls up, the bombs dropped automatically by the onboard computer. Still, there's no denying that they were playing second fiddle to the MiGs at this point. And because of this fact, the Reckies were tasked with trying to destroy the MiGs on the ground at Lubanko. This was an extreme mission, and only considered because of the tactical weakness and loss of air control. They had to return to the ground as soon as possible, so that they could so vital when it comes to fighting a modern mechanized war. Eventually, SADF Chief General Yanni Helnes gave permission, at least in principle, for the attack on the airbases to go ahead. However, there was a high political risk. Up to now, all ground attacks of this sort by special forces had been blamed on UNITA. Pretoria could plausibly deny some of the mining of roads that led to civilian deaths, saying it was UNITA fighting a civil war. But being caught hundreds of kilometers inside Angola trying to blow up MiGs was another story. So the first idea was to hit Menong Air Base, considered an easier target than Lubongo. Menong, as you know by now, is in the southeast of Angola, whereas Lubongo is close to the Atlantic coast and much more heavily defended. Getting in and out of there was a completely different kettle of fish than Menong. The Rikis used a specially designed camouflage uniform, blue and grey, very good for well-lit areas which they were going to operate in around the airfield. They wore grey sheepskin covers on the knees and elbows. The first idea was to sew these into the uniforms, but they were hard to walk in, so they attached elastic bands to pull over the knees and elbows when required. A three-man team was going to head into Menong, and they conducted a dress rehearsal at Hootspreet Air Base to test a night-time crawl into a well-defended and well-lit area. This led to a new invention for the Rikis, a harness for the night vision goggles. The goggles had a fairly flimsy neck strap, which was useless when leprosy. A new strap was added, which pulled the goggles against the chest, so they wouldn't swing around during the silent movement towards the enemy. A few days later, the team of KwaStadler and Didis Didriks arrived at Rundu, then they got bad news from intelligence. The MiGs they were going to target were a hard nut to crack, because FAPLA troops apparently slept beneath the planes on the apron and in their hangars. Equipment tested, they were on their way on board two Pumas and landed at his house. They landed at a UNITA base 80km southeast of Menong, then transported by truck to a point closer to the airfield. The Angolans in this area had created a civilian militia who carried firearms and were alert. They patrolled from crawl to crawl and shot at random at anything that was moving in the bush. The three-man Riki team was armed with the SA-made BXP silencers and AMD-65 specialist weapons for specialist teams. With Nevis Mateus laid up on the high ground. The other two slowly crawled towards the airfield, this was going to take quite a while. Eventually they arrived at the outer fence and a night began moving from the tree line. They then bumped into an old man who Didriks told to go home in Portuguese. By midnight they were at a river east of the field but intelligence had apparently failed them. The area was marshy and it took two hours to get through. They came across a checkpoint, guards were awake, there was a boom gate and a dug-in anti-tank gun. It took them an hour to skirt that position and by 3am they had reached the eastern end of the runway. It was now an hour past cut-off time and they hadn't even seen one MiG. It was time to turn around and head back. They had cut it too fine though and had to crawl the last two hours in broad daylight but made it out. Back at the pick-up point a doctor applied drips, they were dehydrated, they took Valium and slept. Nevis spoke to HQ and they decided to have another go in 48 hours. They took an HF radio along and their speed improved because they knew exactly what was in store along the way. By 8pm they were in position, skirting the marshy area and by midnight they had made it to the runway. Moments later a patrol dog gave them a heart attack. It sauntered past only three metres away and disappeared, its nails clicking on the tar. After another few minutes they made it to the main terminal building and using night goggles spotted nothing. No jets. There was only an Mi-17 transport aircraft and a single engine prop plane. There were no FAPLA sleeping under the MiGs because there were no MiGs. It would have been a waste of time to blow up the Mi-17 transport plane because the South Africans wanted to try this type of mission again so they withdrew. Later it was revealed that FAPLA had been evacuating their MiGs from Menang to Huambo precisely because they feared the South Africans may send in demolition teams. The cat and mouse game continued. Starting in January 1987, South African intelligence became aware of a major Soviet airlift of heavy weapons and military supplies from Tashkent in Uzbekistan and from Moscow all the way to Luanda, the Angolan capital. The Soviets were withdrawing this equipment from Afghanistan where they had been roundly defeated by the Taliban with American backing. The new equipment arriving in Angola was the latest materiel, BTR-60 APCs, BRDs. BRDM-2s, BMP-1 IFVs all heading south. Heavy transport aircraft were now flying into Menang daily carrying food ammunition troops. More than 400 trucks were counted travelling back and forth between central Angola and Menang. Back in Pretoria, these daily clashes were leading inexorably towards the decision to send another mobile mechanised unit into southern Angola. The South Africans were responding to SWAPA and FAPLA's initiative, not the other way and that's no way to fight a war. A few things had changed the minds of the military thinkers back and foot. FAPLA was now fighting directly, no longer seeking to avoid conflict with the SADF. At the same time, the South Africans were now fighting alongside UNITA in what was really a civil war in southern Angola. The limited specialist actions I've described, the small-scale movements of the SADF in southern Angola, were not leading to any strategic gains, whatever the propagandists were saying, and the soldiers fighting knew this. By now, Pretoria was one of the biggest pariah nations in the world. International pressure was growing by the day and the Apartheid government was becoming more extremist in its response both to internal and external pressure. They had to throw the dice once more when it came to a major operation, and they were focusing once more on their capacity to control the battlefield through mechanised mobile doctrine espoused by 61 mech's Roland de Vries. He was now second in command of the army battleship. I spoke to de Vries recently and he pointed out that it was only through the constant movement and contact that the SADF would succeed in overcoming vastly superior odds. This unfortunately was something that the army top brass was going to forget in the coming three years in the war as it wound its way to its conclusion, particularly in the terrible fighting around Quito, Guanabale. Speed was crucial. As soon as any attack bogged down, the SADF would be ready. As soon as any attack bogged down, the tactical superiority was gone and the South Africans would be dragged into a war against an opponent in Angola who was being supplied constantly by the Russians and the Cubans. Never mind that the Soviet Union was experiencing its own economic headwinds by now and the communist state was going to collapse within three years. No one knew this back in early 1987. As their action developed through this crucial year, the Cubans, Russians and Angolans were focusing their attention. It was also a moment when the SADF top brass had assessed the political strategy once again and come to the conclusion that negotiations had failed and they now wanted, in their terms, to create a situation in the 5th military region of Angola, Cuneney Province, similar to the situation which prevailed before the Lusaka Accord. In other words, they wanted to smash all defenses like they did in operations before the Lusaka Accord. In other words, they wanted to smash all defenses like they did in operations before the Lusaka Accord. In other words, they wanted to smash all defenses like they did in operations before the Lusaka Accord. In other words, they wanted to smash all defenses like they did in operations before the Lusaka Accord. In other words, they wanted to smash all defenses like they did in operations before the Lusaka Accord. In other words, they wanted to smash all defenses like they did in operations before the Lusaka Accord. In other words, they wanted to smash all defenses like they did in operations before the Lusaka Accord. Intelligence was warning that the regional balance would be upset by the Soviet reinforcements entering southern Angola, and alarm bells were ringing in the South African cabinet. While the thought was to send a mechanized battalion, all three, into Angola, the SADF really didn't have any proper plan about how to respond to the sudden surge of heavy weapons. Some intelligence suggested a whisper campaign where the French and Portuguese would be fed messages that Pretoria could not allow a Cuban-Russian-backed MPLA offensive to succeed against UNITA. That warning, though, would probably have backfired. After all, it was the South Africans messing around in someone else's backyard to start with. Pointing fingers at the Russians and Cubans was hardly going to lead to them changing their strategy. It may have reinforced their conviction that Pretoria must be weak. It's often better to act first and then talk later when the situation is critical. The internal uprising in South South Africa was increasing, and now, for the first time, the SADF leadership really appeared to be losing the capacity for rapid thinking in the face of a crisis. FAPLA was advancing southeast from Puerto Guanabale towards Mavinga. The airstrip there was strategically important because FAPLA could then use it to hit UNITA's HQ at Jamba. Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, also suddenly realized that the game was up unless something happened, and fast. He told South African journalists that "it is a question of life or death, on their side, it is a question of lose and start to negotiate, on our side, it is lose and disappear." As you'll hear next episode, Colonel Piet Muller, who commanded Sector 2-0, had a solution. It involved a brigade-sized force and a three-pronged attack. But his quick thinking was not going to be replicated back in Pretoria, and you'll be amazed at how an army that had made its name through tactical speed was going to muck up its planning. Please rate the podcast on iTunes. It helps raise the visibility of the series. If you want to contact me, you can head off to abwarpodcast.com There's a contact form on the homepage there. Or direct message me on Twitter, at Des Latham. Until next, Happy New Year. Thank you.
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