Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, D.S. Latham. This is episode 84. We're up to early 1986, and the SADF had learned a great deal through 1985, particularly what FAPLO were up to. In the time of the Joint Commission you've heard about, both sides were actively collecting intelligence about each other. Their operating procedure, their weaknesses, their strength. After years of strategy and diplomacy, the protagonists in this war had moved firmly from attacking the opponent's strategy and diplomacy as the first phase to a new phase, where victory apparently lay in only one outcome, destroying the enemy's army. More material, more heavy weapons, actions, reactions, more deaths. Things were becoming more bitter, and the South African government was up against the wall. They decided to take a few leaves out of the war. There were books of dictatorships like General Galtieri's Argentina, and developed death squads and torturers comprised of police and civilians. They were known as the Civil Cooperation Bureau, and some would join SADF Special Force Operations from the end of 1985. As you're going to hear, the professional soldiers in the recces and 3-2 battalion regarded these civilians and police as amateurs in the art of war. They were ideologues first, imbued with an almost manicure. They were known as the Black Hatred for the enemy, and this blinding and visceral hatred was going to lead to major abuses of power in the coming years. When you're fighting a war against terror, it's very easy to start acting like terrorists yourselves. Then of course, it's no longer a war, but an exercise in a diminishing set of strategic political returns. Particularly as the ANC's MK was now targeting white civilians for special attention. The PAC were also changing their targets. In October 1916, the ANC sent a direct message to the United States, saying: "In 1985, a chicken farm near Bushbuck Ridge in the eastern Transvaal was attacked by men armed with AK-47s. Landmines were being laid by the dozen inside South Africa. In December of that year, a Bucky carrying families was travelling on the farm Chatsworth, 45 km west of Messina when it hit a landmine. Six died, four children, two adults. Two children and three adults were injured. A farmer and his wife were shot dead in a night of attacks outside Juttenhagen, the Eastern Cape. The most devastating bomb in 1985 was the Amazemtoti Sunlum Centre blast two days before Christmas, which killed three women and two boys and wounded 61 others. MK cadre Andrew Zondor was behind this act, which the ANC said was against the operating procedure, although they defended him later, saying the bombing had been "understandable". Zondor, of course, was captured and executed. MK cadre has continued: "We're targeting civilians," whatever the ANC was saying to their international friends. In June 1986, Magoo's Bar in Durban was blown up in a car bomb, killing three, wounding 69. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in Mozambique for gun running, then arrested in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The man who laid the bomb, Robert McBride, was only saved from execution by a reprieve, and since then has had his trouble with the law, including an arrest in South Africa for drunken driving and leaving the scene of an accident, and then he was fired in 2021 from the State Security Agency after four South African shootings. The Polans realized that their air defense systems needed bolstering, but a far greater problem was their erratic supply of water to their troops. They often began their attacks during the dry season and failed to carry enough water reserves. The SA Air Force in particular tried to target water tankers at times. Far more important right now were the reports that the Sukhoi 25 fighters had been shipped into Angola and were based at the southern port of Namibia. The air base was well protected there, with SAM-3s and batteries of AAA guns of various calibers. So in June 1986, the Air Force launched Operation Shanty using two buccaneers under Commandant Labuscagni and Major Mouton in one, and Major Sibritz and Napier in a second. They were tasked with flying over the base to take photographs and hopefully identify the SU-25s. Two Pumas and a stick of paratroopers would be part of the emergency team should a buccaneer be shot down. Each plane carried a LOROP long-range oblique photography pod. The idea was to fly in at low altitude to avoid ramifications. They would use radar, around 500 feet AGL, then pop up to 21,700 feet just before the airfield, which would give them an angled view of Namibia Air Base. The standoff distance meant they'd be outside the range of the AAA guns, but they were still susceptible to the SAM-3s. They took off at 1100 hours 15 on Sunday the 29th of June 1986 and flew north, skirting the vast Angolan escarpment, and then turning west for the final approach run into the target. But a layer of cloud at 2500 feet meant the base would be out of sight when they pitched up to 27,500 feet, so Commandant Labaskakhni took a calculated risk. They flashed into the Angolan base at below 2000 feet, cameras rolling, flinching as they expected bursts of AAA fire or SAM-3s, but nothing happened. They had surprised the Angolans, and when the two returned to Bartokloof Air Force Base, the rolls of film were removed and taken to intelligence for interpretation. And there they were, SU-25s, clearly visible in their revertments alongside the runway. But not everyone was able to see them. Everyone was happy, despite the mission's success. Labaskakhne was roundly criticized by senior officers for flying so close to the airfield, thereby endangering themselves and their buccaneers. You can't make everyone happy, you know. By December 1985, FAPLA's last push to overcome UNITA at Mavinga had failed, along with their attempt at overrunning Jamba, UNITA's HQ. You heard last week how the Russians and Cubans were flooding into Angola, and a constant stream of convoys began shipping hundreds of tonnes of equipment from Menong to FAPLA's 13th Brigade at Gwito Kwanawali. The South Africans had their own plans, which would kick off in February 1986, when 3-2 battalion was deployed around Gwito Kwanawali and Mavinga, and reconnaissance teams began infiltrating further north to towns like Cajal Coutinho, 500 kilometres inside Angola. In May, 3-2 battalions supported by Western Air Command, along with Special Forces and UNITA, were ordered to capture FAPLA at Mavinga. In May, 3-2 battalions supported by Western Air Command, along with Special Forces and UNITA, were ordered to capture FAPLA at Mavinga. In May, 3-2 battalions supported by Western Air Command, along with Special Forces and UNITA, were ordered to capture FAPLA at Mavinga. The South Africans were ordered to capture Gwito Kwanawali by the third week of July. The initial plan involved a night attack including air and artillery strikes, and known as Operational Signal 947/4. But this was cancelled at the last moment in favour of an artillery bombardment using multiple rocket launchers and a battery of 155mm G5 field guns. The town was coming in for increased attention, but could not be captured by the South Africans, so they focused on bombarding it for two days. The N'Golans appeared unaffected by the strikes, so the SADF went back to the drawing board, and lying on this drawing board were previous plans for something known as Operation Southern Cross. It was imperative to drive FAPLA out of Gwito Kwanawali, or at least reduce their operational capacity to attack UNITA at Mavinga, lying to the south-east of that town. This turned into a plan that would have been the biggest conventional op of 3-2's history, after 10 years of fighting in the bush war. It was the time to face off in numbers against the MPLA's army. There would be four rifle companies from 3-2, support for mortars, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank sections, and assault pioneer platoons, as well as a 120mm mortar platoon seconded from 61 mechanised battalion, PAPA battery multiple rocket launchers, a RATL 90 anti-tank squadron, an Easterfark anti-aircraft platoon, and 1,500 UNITA soldiers. They began training in earnest. Using a scale model of Gwito Kwanawali, and by the 15th of July, supply drops had turned Mavinga into an ops forward logistic depot. By the 21st of July, G-5 artillery arrived at Buffalo from Forsyth. On the 29th, four multiple rocket launchers, two Easterfark AA systems, and a BRDM SA-9 missile system were all flown into Mavinga. Everything was ready. 3-2 battalion troops were highly motivated and expected to finally remove FAPLA from Gwito Kwanawali. Then, came a shocking order. The battalion was told to step back and allow UNITA to assault Gwito by itself, with 3-2 only providing support for their artillery. They were going to be babysitters. The troops were bitterly upset. This major conventional operation was going to cement their names. They had trained for weeks, now they cursed the politicians sitting back in Pretoria. It was with some bitterness that they blamed the bloody politicians, sitting on their fat-behinds in the safety and comfort of Pretoria, deciding that UNITA was going to commit to the most important battle of the war. They weren't far wrong about that. The half-hearted measure would be ruuued by the SADF top brass later, as the terrible battles for Gwito over the next year would reveal. Still, as professionals, 3-2 officers realized their orders were orders. By the 4th of August, Colonel Eddie Fulion's tactical HQ was set up 28 kilometers east of Gwito Kwanawali on the banks of the Hubei River. 3-2's Delta and Bravo companies were deployed with their artillery 60 kilometers east, and two platoons from Gulf were now ensconced 17 kilometers east of Gwito, while a platoon supported engineers who were trying to build a pontoon bridge across the Gwito River, seven kilometers south of the vital road bridge. Meanwhile, reccees had moved much closer and were monitoring enemy activity inside the town. The attack was postponed for seven days because Jonas Savimbi wanted to take command of this major battle himself. Colonel Kurs Bom Laubscher led the artillery units. Also Die Brennmann, Colonel Jan Breitenbach, had flown in to act as a UNITA advisor. The opening attack would be mounted by a UNITA brigade focused on FAPA's 25th brigade east of the Gwito River, which would be a kind of decoy to draw off tanks from the 13th brigade based in the town. Then they'd capture the Gwito bridge, and a day later the 2nd UNITA brigade would launch the main attack from the south and west directly on the town. So the South Africans waited in vain until mid-August the 13th when Colonel Fulun shifted his HQ to high ground four kilometers southeast of Gwito. This was a hot zone, and MiG-23 and Su-22 aircraft were spotted patrolling the skies. This was also bad news for the G-5s deployed 30 kilometers to the southeast along the Hubei River. It was even worse for the multiple rocket launchers, which had to move much closer. They were only 14 kilometers from Gwito. The artillery barrage was set for 8pm on the 14th of August, but by 2pm on the 15th they were still waiting. There was no word from UNITA. At 16:40, Fulun received the message that a Russian aircraft had been sent from Lubango to track down the South Africans artillery, forcing the artillery to shift position just in case. Eventually, the anticipated bombardment began much later that night, and UNITA's direct assault led to the town falling. There's some dispute about all of this, with Brigadier Renato, its commander, claiming they had overcome defenders, but then UNITA was forced to withdraw immediately as FAPLA counter-attacked fiercely. The 2nd UNITA brigade, which was supposed to launch from the South and West, had disappeared. But the SADF artillery laid waste to the town. It was a blaze. They also bombed the airfield, rendering it inoperative, and wreckies destroyed the Gwito road bridge. The Russian planes were buzzing around and opened fire on a UNITA brigade. UNITA based close to Fulun's HQ, but it was empty. Three of FAPLA's six radar installations were damaged, and the fuel and ammunition depot blazed for three days. UNITA was also using U.S. Stinger missiles, and claimed they hit three MiG-23s and shot them down. The Russians denied this. Nine PT-76 tanks were taken out, five by the SADF artillery, the rest by UNITA ground troops. Then it was decided to withdraw on the 17th of August. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Armed Forces decided to withdraw on the 17th of August. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Armed Forces decided to withdraw on the 17th of August. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Armed Forces decided to withdraw on the 17th of August. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Armed Forces decided to withdraw on the 17th of August. Back in Pretoria, the Top Brass were concerned about this entire exercise. UNITA had not acted quickly enough and their conventional training was weak. They were better suited to operate as a guerrilla movement. By trying to take a whole town as a conventional army, they had belied their own weaknesses. They had very little in the way of heavy weapons. They had no air force. The artillery was no match for FAPLA and the Russians and the Cubans. They needed the South Africans. UNITA's entire army was defeated. 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UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated. UNITA's entire army was defeated.
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