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Episode 82 – More Russian choppers down and 32 learns how to use SATNAV

20m 41s

Episode 82 – More Russian choppers down and 32 learns how to use SATNAV

This episode covers South African military operations during the Angolan Border War in late 1985 and early 1986. In September 1985, South African Air Force Empires shot down four Russian helicopters near the Lomba River, crippling MPLA air support. Despite this, the Soviet Union intensified its involvement, delivering modern weaponry, advisors, and troops to bolster the MPLA’s assault on Unita. In response, the SADF’s 3-2 Battalion planned Operation Order No. 1/12/85, targeting Menong and Quito Kwanavali with MRLs. The operation faced significant challenges, including outdated maps, satnav training delays, and poor weather, but eventually launched attacks in January 1986. Alpha Company bombarded Quito Kwanavali with multiple rocket ripples, killing two Russians and causing chaos, while Fulyun’s group, hindered by dense bush and tank threats, redirected to attack the FAPLA base at Baishalonga. The attack involved coordinated MRL bombardments and Unita ground forces, but daylight assault risks led to mortar strikes and withdrawal. The episode also introduces Soviet advisor Colonel Vyasha Mityev, who criticized Angolan linear tactics and advocated for more flexible maneuvers, contrasting with SADF’s innovative, decentralized command style. The narrative sets the stage for future clashes between well-drilled armies, including the battles for Quito Kwanavale, and hints at upcoming special forces operations and ANC-MK mutinies.

Transcription

3457 Words, 19888 Characters

English
Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Dersletham, this is episode 82. It's September 1985 and the SA Air Force and Ground Forces have already shut down two Russian helicopters and an Antonov transport plant. It was an attempt at slowing down an MPLA ground assault using its planned troops against Unita at Mavinger. If you remember, this was the Engolans Operations Second Congress. On the 29th of September, three Tubergenne ground team air Quito Kwanavali radio, the SA Air Force, operations of a helicopter formation that had just taken off by and for the battle zone around Mavinger. This was a mixed formation, two MR-817 transport choppers escorted by MR-25 gunships. The empires were scrambled and headed at low altitude to the targets, which were picked up along the Lomba River. The Russian choppers were flying at 3000 feet above ground level AGL and the MR-817 formation was in what's called a trailing echelon, about 1000 meters apart. Also about 1000 meters behind them, with the two MR-25s flying in support and they were also flying at 3000 feet. The first pair of empires launched their attack and then the second, with devastating consequences for the chopper pilots and the crews. All four were shot down. The third pair of empires, who were monitoring, watched as two MIG-23 fighter jets approached at 200 feet above ground level, then they swept their wings back, accelerated and climbed out of sight. They preferred to avoid dog fighting the South Africans. After the four choppers were downed, the MPLA stopped flying helicopters so openly into southern Angola. But the assault on Yonita continued unabated, led by Russian general Konstantin Karochkin by late 1985. Large quantities of modern Russian weapon systems were delivered, including aircraft, which had been taken from Russia's strategic reserve. Moscow also sent about 1000 advises to train in Golan troops and to assist with command posts, more about these folks in a moment. 2000 East Germans had boosted Fubla's intelligence and telecom's capacity as well, and there were 7,000 Supper soldiers and around 900 ANC-MK troops who joined the assault over the months. There's some dispute about these numbers, but we'll stick with them for now. The ANC's MK had been training in Angola, and these cadres were based at Luenna and Kwit or Kwanavali. The latter was gaining importance as an air support center and a strategic term. While the Russians were beefing up their top brass and bringing more men and equipment into the country, the SAD have had its own plans. On the 1st of December 1985, Operation Order No. 1/12/85 required 3-2 battalion to inflict maximum damage on Fubla personnel and equipment in the 3rd and 6th military regions by sustained bombardment, they said. This was easier said than done. The main targets were Kwit or Kwanavali and the air strip at Menong. There were also specific instructions to target the Fubla forces as soon as they began moving towards Jamba using the all-important multiple rocket launches or MRLs. 3-2 was warned not to let these fall into enemy hands. Colonel Eddie Fulyun commanded this part of the Operation Targeting Menong, both the MRL troop along with Charlie Company, while Captain Dan van de Merver led an MRL troop and Gulf Company as they attacked Kwit or Kwanavali. Ten years earlier, 3-2 had deployed around Menong during Operation Savannah. Now they were going back. On the 15th of December 4, MRLs were flown to Rundu from Batakluv Air Force Base, everything was set to roll on Christmas Eve. There was a hitch, Major Holtzazan, who commanded their MRLs told Fulyun he could not guarantee any accuracy because they had been sent maps from 1972. These were obviously hopelessly out of date and he needed specific grid references of these targets if his rockets were to strike anything. Colonel Fulyun phoned SWAT of HQ and was allowed the use of the satnav service top secret as it was, but there was another problem, no one in Rundu knew how to use the satnav. So Fulyun then called SWAT of HQ once more and was told an arms corps instructor would be flown in all good, except it wasn't. Dawn on Christmas Day and no sign of any arms corps plane. Fulyun had a fit and telephone army chief, Lieutenant General Janie Heldnays to complain, that did have an effect. At 1100 hours, a Cessna citation busjet landed at Rundu with arms corps instructors on board, and by 1500 hours, the MRL teams had been instructed on how to use the satnav. That night the gun crews and three two battalion company vehicles began crossing into Angola over, especially built pontoon bridge north of Rundu. Minita had sent Captain Venino to guide three two towards their target and they headed almost to north, and were delayed at Kosombu while Minita vacillated about granting permission to the special forces. This took four days, eventually on the 30th of December, Jonas Savimbi at Jamba passed on his message to Ponte Verde with three two were now waiting, granting their permission to go. The company wasn't going in alone. Minita then assigned a company under Major Handa to escort three two all the way up to Minong. The problem was, Major Handa was AWOL, no one could find him. Instead of waiting around doing nothing, three two decided to train its members to help load the 127mm MRL rockets and also train the leader group and how to use the satnav. Pretty much everyone knows these days how to use satnav systems, but back in 1985 this was new tech. The interface was particularly difficult to understand, it was a bit like a black box. During the training one of the troops in Broke his hand and Captain Hermann Mulder collapsed with a kidney infection. So the SE Air Force was called to fly a Casavac, but as they say it never reigns at pause and in this case literally. The Puma sent to Casavac the men arrived during a deluge and the chopper hit a tree while landing, breaking off his rear rotor blade, three two camouflaged bits of chopper and waited for spares. The next day an arm-scored team was flown in and replaced the Puma rear rotor and tailpiece. This operation was so secret that the arm-scored tippies were told that the Puma was flying in support of Unita and the three two leader group hit away in the bush while other three two black Portuguese speaking soldiers helped with the lifting and placement of the Puma parts. By 2300 hours 50, the Puma was ready and flew back with the two casualties. All this was going on Alpha Company under Captain Fred Turner and joined by Unita and Captain Funda Merva was already further north-west in approaching Guido Kuanavali. There were two multiple rocket launches hidden away at Mavinga and it was hoped that Alpha would pick them up on route to the strategic town. By the 4th of January 1986, Alpha Company under Captain Turner reached a position to the west of Mavinga and set up a temporary camp awaiting orders to advance. These two companies were going to be attacking virtually in tandem but in two completely different areas in Menong and Guido. Just before they arrived in Mavinga though, Major Handa pitched up back at Ponte Verde and announced he was ready to lead Fulyun to Menong. Fulyun then broke up his force into three groups, he named them Mexico, Luengo and Verde for the rocket attack on Menong. Mexico was comprised of Fulyun's command group Unita guys and Liaison officers, four MRLs and crews, a medical officer, four Sarmal 100 anti-mine vehicles, which carried 100 MRL rockets each and Charlie Company. This was the main force for the upcoming up. Luengo was led by Sergeant Dave Dutoy and was the logistic support team with a recovery vehicle and motor platoon while Verde Group was led by Sergeant El Lendungu and was to function as a reserve element back at Ponte Verde. On the morning of the 7th of January, Mexico and Luengo groups moved to a position 30 km southwest of Menong where they were then ordered to halt. Swatif HQ, commanding officer Major General Hyokmaiding, radio that Reckys had destroyed 9 FF support vehicles on the main road between Gjartir and Luisinga in the Menong area. A FF soldier had been captured and was being interrogated to find out more about Menong. Under the north-west, Captain Turner's Alpha Company and the MRLs had been mobilized. These teams were now ready to bombard Quittor-Kwanowali on the night of the 8th of January, 1986. The first ripple of 96 rockets were fired off at Midnight, then another 96 at 0-200 hours 35. The Angolans fired back with 13 D-30 artillery shells but missed. Two Russians were killed at the airfield and the runway and buildings were damaged in the bombardment. FF also appeared in chaos. The attack had been totally unexpected and the sheer volume of rockets that landed on the strategic turn was a shock. Captain Turner ordered Alpha Company and his support teams to lay up for the day and on the night of 9th of January, they moved 15 km south east of Quittor-Kwanowali. Just as a proper goodbye, the South Africans fired another 96 rockets at 1,900 hours 25 from this position, then a fourth ripple at Midnight. Updone, they hastened back across the cutline to Buffalo Base. Outside Minon, meanwhile, Captain Fulyun moved within 7 km of the firing position on the 7th of January, but the bush was so dense it slowed things down. It took them 8 hours to travel 12 km. in a buffal was dribbling. driven between two trees and became wedged. 3-2 wielded a few axes and pangus and after a couple of hours the trees were filled and they continued to their position. With Sergeant Major Bittner gear on foot now making sure the bifles wouldn't get stuck again. By 20 hundred hours in the 8th of January the MRL was in position and loaded but they couldn't fire. Technical problems meant they were forced to delay once more and eventually that did open fire at 2200 hours 30. Fouplah artillery inside Minong fired back but the shells landed miles away to the east. The South Africans then moved the MRL to ensure they remained invisible but as the team shifted lights were spotted two kilometres away the group was ordered to withdraw. The Mexico group with Fillion and Charge rendezvoused with the Verde group later in the dock then moved south along the Quito River. Four hours later just before dawn a heavy anti-aircraft bombardment was launched from Minong towards them. Then the spotters thought they saw four Russian attack-truppers heading their way from the rear. Sharts went out and Fillion ordered everyone to take cover but Sergeant Major North gear's driver appeared to misread the order and took off its full tilt into the open flood plane ahead. A Anita guide had the good sense to leap off the bifle which was now competing in its own parry de car rally. Moments later the vehicle plowed into the back of the command vehicle. North gear was thrown out and landed on Fillion's spare wheel. Seconds after this everyone realised that the helicopters weren't actually helicopters but traces from an anti-aircraft gun being fired by Fouplah some distance away and the troops calm down. Fortunately the buffles were not too severely damaged and North gear was fine no injuries but they still hadn't finished their attack on Minong. The combat teams laid up in the banks of the quietly flowing wheat or river for the day and the rockets were then unloaded from the MRL. But Fouplah was not idle they were scouting close by and in golden army tank patrols were spotted by three two reconnaissance members. Reckys then contacted Fillion and there was some discussion about firing of 48 rockets towards nearby Fouplah base called Odessa but Fillion was worried that there wouldn't be enough left to hit Minong off to this. So they waited out the day on the 9th and then at around noon Anita HQ sent a message that there was a powerful Fouplah force including tanks near the Bengal River about 20 kilometres away from Fillion's laid up company heading their way. It was the second time in two days that tanks were seen prowling around. Fillion made the wires the decision to stay out of their way. He wasn't armed with any weapons that could deal with a full frontal tank of salt. They withdrew to pointability. There was no way now that they could complete an attack far to the north at Minong. Still, second prize was Fouplah's battalion based at Baishalonga and Fillion radioed SWAT of HQ on the 12th of January and asked for permission to attack this target. Baishalonga is around 80 kilometres southwest of Quito Kwanawari. The base was just west of the Longa River but Fillion needed backup so you'd have to use the entire three two contingent of Charlie Company as well as the wreckies assigned to his unit and major hunters' unit assorters. They'd break into six groups for this attack named Dallas which included 40 men and 16 vehicles, the MRLs, logistics support and Charlie Company's bifles, Verde which had 20 men and 10 vehicles, Carnation made up of 180 unit troops, abrasion which were the special forces along with 60 men and 80 vehicles, and three two battalions wreckied group and the rest of the unit assorted troops. The unit or Carnation was going to kick off proceedings with special forces providing close support using the 81 mill mortars and the heavy machine guns. The Dallas group would bombard Fouplah's base with three MRL ripple rocket attacks. The plan was to start everything rolling at 1100 hours 40 on the 14th of January with the first bombardment scheduled for then. But on the 13th as they began moving to their positions it was raining heavily and unitors officers told Fillion they didn't want to go just yet. They were also not happy with the overall idea saying that the hidden bunkers were going to be a problem and that Fillion had no casabac plans. After an hour of debate, unitor agreed to go. It wasn't going to be that simple. The three two battalion wreckies had made the way a few kilometers north of Punto Verde already heading towards Baishalonga. Fifty members of unitors wrecked a group also headed off to the Bengal River. That night the MRLs were moved into their firing positions and now it was up to unitor to start the attack. After a couple of hours there was still no sign of them. Fillion was not one for giving up and at 2200 hours and five minutes he ordered six rockets to be fired on the bases of warning so that any civilians there could escape into the bush. Five minutes later the MRLs fired off a full bombardment of rockets and the wreckies reported that all hit the target. Fillion's commander at Baishalonga was picked up radio in Guitor-Quanavalia to report that the situation was pretty bad and many bombs had fallen. A second full bombardment was fired off at 0225 then the Dallas group including Charlie Company and the MRLs took off southwesterly to wait for first light and the full ground assault. But at 0500 the special forces commander whose name I don't have realized that attacking the base in daylight was going to be a real challenge. So instead he fired his mortars and other heavy weapons into the base from the high ground to the west. Dan Gordon's meanwhile had remained in the base so that night three two battalion and their unitor allies withdrew. The South Africans crossed back over the cutline in the early hours of the next morning and the next day the MRLs were back aboard a C-160 being flown to Pretoria. The assaults in your unitor did not end and the Russians were gearing up for a long war of attrition here. Hundreds more critical advisers were to arrive through 1986 sitting up the scenario for the major clash between two well drilled armies. The Russians are the late 1980s and the South African defence force. The Russians included men like Colonel Vyasha Slev, Aleksandrovich Mityev, who arrived in March 1986 to serve as an advisor to the Angolan reconnaissance units, and he was stationed in the 6th military district in Manong and Guido, Kwonavari. Colonel Mityev was to see action during the various offensives and counteroffensives until the South Africans withdrew in 1989. He had spent two years in Afghanistan in 1979 and 1980. Lieutenant General Leonard Kuzmenko, who was the former deputy command of all Russian airborne troops, the VDV, had replaced Colonel General Konstantin Yakovlevich Korochkin in 1986 and had asked the Colonel to join him in Angola. Colonel Mityev was part of the Russian 10th Department of the General Staff and advised the Angolan head of reconnaissance. His comments about the deployment make for interesting reading. He first worked with the head of Russian military intelligence who was on the Angolan General Staff from Moscow's strategic intelligence. But Mityev complained this was a useless political position and said, "Of all the selection of military advisors in Angola left a lot to be desired." Colonel Mityev was to have a major impact on this war. He realized that the Angolan army was organized into brigades comprising battalions three per brigade. But the war was being fought partially conforming to non-conventional strategy and the tactics of paratroopers he said were best suited to guerrilla war. It's what the SADF had realized long before and the use of wreckies and three two battalion had created a big headache for the Angolan's the Russians and the Cubans. The Angolan ground forces were all trained in a kind of paramilitarical cadre mentality. They would be sent from cadre divisions with their political commissars prevailing. Colonel Mityev realized these divisions were using what he called linear tactics where they had set out in one direction with one specific aim and managed by a distant commander who had no idea what was going on a minute by minute. Remember the SADF had allowed the NCOs in office to adopt a far more innovative and self-starter approach that could make most decisions on the move for themselves within a broad set of rules of engagement. When they broke these rules, the SADF and SWAT of HQ top brass just said they didn't want to know about the dirty secrets carry on. Colonel Mityev saw that the Angolans were fighting too slowly, too ponderously. He wanted maneuvers and action on separate axes using battalions and not divisions. So I will return to the Russians in Angola using their published memoirs, telegrams and other source material over the next few podcasts because what they were doing is extremely interesting. It also informs us now that the Russians are up to in the Ukraine just out of interest. Some listeners have asked why I have not featured much in the way of Angola in official military reports. One of the major challenges, apart from reading Portuguese, is that none of the combatants called themselves by their names. They used nom de gae like vietna, mochi min, mao and so on. The second problem is that the material is almost pure propaganda. There's very little valuable information about the order of battle and data and so on. Still I've managed on earth some source material, which will be useful as the series covers the final days of the border war, particularly the battles for Guito-Kwanwale. Next episode, we'll hear about a special forces operation until Ubito in early 1986 that led to the sinking of two Russian ships as well as a Cuban vessel. We'll also take a look at what the ANC's MK was up to in southern Angola. They just got over three major mutinies in their training camps and some were being drafted into fight against Unita. they were not happy about this deployment, as you will hear. Here please read the podcast on iTunes, it helps the word spread. By the way, I've got a few new pictures on the website abwarpodcast.com courtesy of Donovan. So head off there if you're interested. You can also email me from the contact list on the site or direct message me on Twitter at this lesson. Until next, frostbite. [Music]

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. In September 1985, South African Air Force Empires shot down four Russian helicopters (two Mi-8 transports and two Mi-25 gunships) near the Lomba River, disrupting MPLA operations against Unita at Mavinga.
  2. By late 1985, the Soviet Union escalated support for Angola, sending modern weapons, about 1,000 advisors, 2,000 East Germans, 7,000 Cuban soldiers, and 900 ANC-MK troops, led by General Konstantin Korochkin.
  3. SADF’s 3-2 Battalion launched Operation Order No. 1/12/85, targeting Menong and Quito Kwanavali with multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), overcoming logistical hurdles like outdated maps and satnav training delays.
  4. On January 8, 1986, Alpha Company bombarded Quito Kwanavali with multiple rocket ripples, killing two Russians and causing chaos, while Fulyun’s group faced delays and threats from tanks, ultimately attacking Baishalonga instead.
  5. The Baishalonga attack on January 14, 1986, involved coordinated MRL bombardments and Unita ground forces, but daylight assault risks led to mortar strikes and withdrawal.
  6. Colonel Vyasha Mityev, a Soviet advisor, criticized Angolan linear tactics and advocated for maneuver warfare, highlighting contrasts with SADF’s innovative NCO-led approach.

Summary:

This episode covers South African military operations during the Angolan Border War in late 1985 and early 1986. In September 1985, South African Air Force Empires shot down four Russian helicopters near the Lomba River, crippling MPLA air support. Despite this, the Soviet Union intensified its involvement, delivering modern weaponry, advisors, and troops to bolster the MPLA’s assault on Unita.

In response, the SADF’s 3-2 Battalion planned Operation Order No. 1/12/85, targeting Menong and Quito Kwanavali with MRLs. The operation faced significant challenges, including outdated maps, satnav training delays, and poor weather, but eventually launched attacks in January 1986.

Alpha Company bombarded Quito Kwanavali with multiple rocket ripples, killing two Russians and causing chaos, while Fulyun’s group, hindered by dense bush and tank threats, redirected to attack the FAPLA base at Baishalonga. The attack involved coordinated MRL bombardments and Unita ground forces, but daylight assault risks led to mortar strikes and withdrawal. The episode also introduces Soviet advisor Colonel Vyasha Mityev, who criticized Angolan linear tactics and advocated for more flexible maneuvers, contrasting with SADF’s innovative, decentralized command style.

The narrative sets the stage for future clashes between well-drilled armies, including the battles for Quito Kwanavale, and hints at upcoming special forces operations and ANC-MK mutinies.

FAQs

The attack occurred on the night of January 8, 1986, during Operation Order No. 1/12/85, targeting FAPLA forces in southern Angola. Alpha Company fired multiple rocket launcher ripples, causing damage and killing two Russians.

The attack was delayed due to outdated 1972 maps, a lack of satnav training, and the late arrival of an arms corps instructor on Christmas Day. Technical problems also forced further delays before the MRLs could fire.

A Puma sent for casualty evacuation hit a tree while landing in heavy rain, breaking its rear rotor blade. It was camouflaged and repaired by an arm-scored team, then flew back with the casualties.

They received special permission to use the top-secret satnav service, but initially no one knew how to use it. An arms corps instructor was flown in on Christmas Day to train the MRL teams, which took until 1500 hours.

The attack on January 14, 1986, involved rocket bombardments and a planned ground assault, but the special forces commander decided against a daylight attack. The South Africans withdrew after firing mortars and heavy weapons from high ground.

Colonel Mityev was a Russian military advisor who arrived in March 1986 to advise Angolan reconnaissance units. He criticized Angolan linear tactics and advocated for maneuver warfare using battalions, impacting the conflict's later stages.

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