Episode 8: The Hart-Dworkin Debate

[Music] Hi everyone, it's Scott Shapiro and this is episode eight of the jurisprudence course podcast. Today we're going to be doing the hard to work in debate and in honor of that I played walking in Memphis, Dorkin in Memphis, this was suggested to me by Jeremy Robson on Twitter. I just want to say, "Fucking hate this song! I've always hated walking in Memphis, but it is kind of funny, Dorkin in Memphis. Also, it goes like Dorkin was like such a Yankee. He would always talk like this." So the idea of him walking in Memphis is kind of funny. What I want to do today is I'd like to go through at least the first act of the hard to work in debate and that'll be come clear in later episodes. But what I'd like to do is talk about the model of rules, which was Dorkin's kind of main critique against hard. And try to explain what he was objecting to in hard theory and why it matters. I think a lot of people have the sense when they read the model of rules and think about the hard to work in debate. It's the can't quite figure out why it's even a debate. It seems like Dorkin mischaracterizes hearts position all the time and it seems like they're talking past each other. And what I want to do in this episode is try to show that there really is a debate and it's very important. And then I'll try to show how some disagreements that positive has had among themselves. So-called the disagreement between exclusive and inclusively-positivism really emerge from different ways of responding to Dorkin's challenge in the model of rules. Okay, so part one will be laying out like first part of Dorkin's critique and part two will pick up with the second half of the article, the model of rules, and then the part three will be a discussion of how positives have tried to respond to hearts at two Dorkin's critique. Okay, so let us start. The first thing I want you all to notice, I do this when I'm teaching in class, I begin by looking at the article itself, the model of rules in which I posted a link on the on the Google page which is in which is in my Twitter bio so you can look at it yourself. But the article called model of rules is or sometimes I think it was reprinted as is the law just a model of rules. The title, the subtitle, begins embarrassing questions. And what-and I always ask students, what do you think Dorkin is referring to when he talks about embarrassing questions? And what he's alluding to is the very beginning of a concept of law in chapter one of the concept of law. Heart begins persistent questions talking about the question is, why is it that jurisprudence is concerned with the question, what is law? And what Dorkin wants to argue is that heart really didn't manage to answer the question, what is law? So it should embarrass us that there are features of legal practice that legal philosophers haven't actually been able to respond to. Dorkin argues I think quite correctly that the reason why we're interested in the question, what is law is because we want to know what our legal obligations are. If something isn't law, then we may not have an obligation to listen to it. If there's something is the law and we have think there's an obligation to obey the law, then we will have an obligation. So the question, what is law has very important practical implications? Dorkin is arguing and it's embarrassing that philosophers haven't given an adequate account of it. What Dorkin does is he sets out his own view somewhat indirectly by critiquing what he takes to be Hart's view. He calls it the positive us view and he says that Hart represents the best version of the positive us view and he lays out three theses. So what I want to do is I want to go through two of the theses very carefully, but let me just summarize what the three theses are, positiveism that Dorkin takes to be constitutive of the positive us program and then he's going to attack it. Okay. So just the summary is that every legal system, first thesis is that every legal system has a master test which distinguishes legal norms by their pedigree that is by the way that they were created rather than what they are. They will this will will say over and over again in this episode that the pedigree of a norm is its its institutional source was it enacted by the by Congress or by an administrative agency or by the chief sitting under a palm tree somewhere that's its pedigree. Its content is is it good rule or not and what Dorkin is saying is that the first thesis of positiveism is that every legal system has a master test which distinguishes law from non law based on its pedigree that is its manner of creation rather than its content. Okay. The second one is that when the rules run out judges exercise discretion and the third is that there can be no legal obligations in the absence of legal rules. Okay. So those are the three theses and let me I want to go through them carefully because it's actually very important to try to see what Dorkin is attacking when he is attacking positiveism and what he calls the model of rules because he's going to take positiveism to be the model of rules and he's going to argue that the law contains more than just rules and so therefore positiveism can't be correct. So let me go through it carefully. This is a quote from the article. The there's the first thesis. The law of any community can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria by tests having to do not with their content but with their pedigree or the manner in which they were adopted or developed. Okay. Now just notice that the Dorkin is kind of alluding to the two hard stock to the rule of recognition. He doesn't use that term. He talks about a test a community's test for distinguishing law from non law but what he's referring to is the rule of recognition. Two things to note. It's really odd in Dorkin's characterization of the rule of recognition that he doesn't make reference to the one feature that Hart insisted on which was that the rule of recognition be a social rule. That is Dorkin is saying that the rule of recognition has to be a master test in the community but he doesn't specify that that master test has to be a social rule that is it has to be practiced from the internal point of view. And the second thing which is odd about Dorkin's characterization is that he says that the rule of recognition has to identify rules based on their pedigree, their manner of creation, their institutional source rather than their content. Now if you've read Hart and you've listened to the other episodes, you'll notice that I never said anything, Hart never said anything about the pedigree of rules being part of the rule of recognition or that the only thing that can be law is that it bears a property that is social in nature. The only thing he seemed to require is that the rule of recognition be a social rule but he didn't require that that social rule, I distinguish law from non-law based on its pedigree. So what is twerking talking about? On the one hand, he doesn't get the social nature of the world of recognition correctly. Then he imputes this weird pedigree criteria to the world of recognition, which heart never insisted upon. Anyway, let me-- I just want to flag that because it's very important to going forward. Let me talk about the second thesis of positivism, which was when the brewers write out judges exercise a scratch on. Let me read what work and says. He says, the set of these validly rules is exhaustive of the law so that if someone's case is not clearly covered by a rule, because there's no none that seem appropriate, or those that seem appropriate or vague, or for some other reason, then that case cannot be decided by applying the law. It must be decided by some official, like a judge, exercising his discretion. So the idea here seems to be that when the rules run out, judges exercise discretion, the rules being those rules identified by the rule of recognition. Now, I think a lot of people when they read this, they were really confused because it seems trivially true that the law just is what the legal rules are. I mean, of course, when the legal rules run out, the law runs out. I mean, what else is the law except for these legal rules? Now, it becomes clear in the article that Dworkin is using a very specific characterization of what a rule is. Namely, it's some norm that what he says has an all or nothing character to it, as opposed to what he calls a principle, which is not all or nothing, but rather has what he calls a dimension of weight. So an example that he gives for a rule is the speed limit, don't drive more than 55 miles per hour. That applies in an all or nothing manner. Or you need two witnesses to sign a two witnesses for a will to be a valid will. So that's like an all or nothing standard. But there are these other things at Dworkin claims, which he calls principles, which aren't all or nothing. They have a dimension of weight. There's something that you're supposed to weigh in the balance. So rules can't conflict because a rule is conclusive. And you can't have two conclusive standards conflicting. Whereas principles, since they have a dimension of weight, it's like, imagine you have a scale. And you're putting some principles on one side and some principles on the other. And whichever is the weightier set of principles, that will determine the case. And what Dworkin is claiming is that positivists, like heart, assume that the law consists only in all or nothing standards. It never consists in these principles, which have a dimension of weight. The example that he gives-- or he gives several examples, but the most famous is the use of principles in the law is rigs versus Palmer. Now, just a little side note-- while I tell it a little quick, sorry, let me just say what rigs versus Palmer is. So rigs versus Palmer is a case in which this guy, Elmer Palmer, hates-- well, that shouldn't say-- he's a bad ombre. He's a bad dude. And he's afraid that his grandfather is going to cut him out of the will because he's a bad guy. And so he decides that he's going to kill his grandfather before he can change the will. And he does. He kills the grandfather. And then he gets convicted and murdered. And he has the hutspa to the gall to go to the pervy court and says, well, can I at least get my money? And the court has to decide whether it's going to allow Elmer Palmer to collect under his request under the will. Now, the court-- it's a very interesting decision. That's a split decision, actually. The majority goes through the statute of wills and notes that there are no exceptions for murdering beneficiaries. You have to have two witnesses as to being writing. But we'll have never mentioned anything about murdering beneficiaries. But the court says, nonetheless, even though the rule doesn't say anything about excluding beneficiaries who murder the testator, nonetheless, the common law contains a principle which says nobody should profit from their own wrong. And because of this principle, it's a very witty principle. The court says that Elmer Palmer is not permitted to collect under the law. So this is an example of where the court doesn't recognize just a rule that is set out in the statute of wills, but also a principle which no percentage of profit from their own wrong, which when applied to the case renders Elmer Palmer ineligible to collect under the process because he murdered the beneficiary. Now, my little funny story, and then I'm going to end part one, is that I was teaching this other course a long time ago called "Elements of Law," and there's a whole series of cases called "Slayer Cases." That's where beneficiary kills in some way the somebody that he's she they are trying to collect from. So after Riggs and his problem is this is other case, involving a beneficiary who kills, I believe, his wife, to collect under the life insurance policy. So this is not a will, but a life insurance policy. And the court says that you can collect under the life insurance policy just like you can collect under the will. What's really interesting is that the person who kills his wife is named Elmer also. So in Elmer, Riggs or his polymer, it's Elmer Palmer. In this case, it was Elmer. And I say, I was a young teacher, and I made a classic mistake. I say what you learn from the slayer cases is never name your kid or marry somebody named Elmer. And then, of course, I go once up further and say, because it's such a bad name that they end up becoming murderers. And it was a stupid joke. And it was particularly stupid because as soon as I said it, as soon as I said it, I knew the mistake I had made. There's 100 people in the class. And I said to the-- I said, OK. Anybody here's father, brother, husband, named Elmer. And of course, student right in the front raises her hand. So just like-- don't make many people's names. That was the lesson I learned. OK, take a little break. We'll come right back. And we will follow up on Dworkens continuing critique of heart. Holik came from Miami, FL8. Hitchhike to way across USA. Plukter eyebrows on the way shaved her legs. And then he was a sheesh says, hey, babe. Take a walk on the wild side. Said, hey, honey. OK, part two, the wild side of jurisprudence. Yeah. Dworkens critique of heart. It does not get any more true. transgressive, dangerous than this. So I hope you're ready to have your world rocked. OK, so what have we done so far? We've said that Dworkin's characterized positivism as being committed to the idea that there's a master test which distinguishes rules that are legal from those that are not and that when the rules run out, judges have discretion to reach outside of the law and to create new law and that these rules are all or nothing standards. So that when these all or nothing standards run out, then judges have the discretion to apply non-legal rules, non-legal norms to the case. OK, now let me talk about what Dworkin means here by discretion because this is actually incredibly important distinction that Dworkin introduces. It's very important in, let's say, administrative law. It's a distinction between weak discretion and strong discretion. Week discretion is where the two kinds of weak discretion to work and says, one is where you have to exercise judgment in order to carry out a order. So let's say this sergeant says to the private round up the three best soldiers and bring them to me. So there the private is under duty to round up the three best soldiers. But he has to exercise his judgment and carrying out the orders. And that one sense is exercising his discretion in a weak sense. There's also another weak sense in which you might exercise your discretion that is you have, let's say, final, unreviewable authority. So you might say to somebody, go pick the three best people. It's in your discretion. So you're not using your discretion. It's the decisions in your discretion in the sense that your decision is final. Nobody can challenge you for your decision. Now these are weak senses of discretion because in both cases, you're under an order to do something. It's just that you either have to use your judgment and carrying out or that your judgment is non-reviewable. But there's a strong sense of discretion. And this is the sense in which positivists think that judges have discretion is that you have strong discretion when you're not under duty to do anything. So let's say when I get up in the morning, I have strong discretion, what serial, what to have for breakfast. I'm not under duty to have breakfast. I'm not under duty to have any kind of breakfast. It's within my discretion whether I even have breakfast or not. Why? Well, because I'm not under duty to have breakfast. And so in that sense, I have strong discretion. Because I'm not under duty. So the difference between weak discretion and strong discretion is whether you're under duty or not. If you're under duty, then if you have to have judgment or your judgment is unreviewable, then you're exercising weak discretion. If you're not under duty at all, then you're exercising strong discretion. So what Dwork and wants to say in his characterization of positivists is that when the rules, these only nothing standards run out, judges exercise strong discretion. The reason why he thinks that judges are exercising strong discretion is because obviously, judges exercise weak discretion. The exercise weak discretion all the time when they're applying the law. What's distinctive about the positivist position is that when the rules run out, judges are exercising strong discretion because there are no more rules anymore. And so they're not under duty to apply any of those rules because the rules have run out. So then they are, if you will, free to choose whatever rules they want or whatever standards they want, because there are no more legal rules to apply. Now, let me-- I mean, I've thrown a lot at you. So let me just kind of summarize what's going on. Dworkin is trying to characterize what the positivist holds. And he's saying that the positivist thinks that judges, in hard cases, where the all or nothing standards have run out, judges are free, are not bound anymore to apply any particular standard because they've run out. But they have to kind of reach outside the law and apply that extra legal standard to the case that'll then make that standard part of the law. But what they're doing is they're reaching outside the law. Now, what Dworkin wants to say is that this is a very bad description of legal practice. If you really focus on how judges decide cases, it's not like there are two steps. It's not like judges say, OK, where are the all or nothing standards here according to the smasser tests of the community? Oh, look, there are no such rules. So therefore I'm free to do what I want. I can be like a legislator. And I can make new law. They never do that. They never say, I can be a legislator. They always act like there is law to apply. Now, how can there be law to apply if the rules have run out? Where Dworkin says, yeah, because the law doesn't consist just in these all or nothing standards, but they also consist in these other kinds of norms called principles. So what's happening in these hard cases is that judges are not saying, OK, the rules have run out. Therefore I can do what I want. But rather, OK, the rules have run out. But the principles have not. The law has not. There are these legal principles that apply. And what I'm going to do is I'm going to figure out what those principles require in this particular case. I'm going to weigh them against each other and try to say what I'm supposed to do in a particular case. And judges in these situations are not acting like and are not, in fact, exercising strong discretion. The only kinds of discretion they're exercising is weak discretion. So they never go hooray. No more law. I get to decide what I think is best. No, they always say, I'm constrained by the law. But the law that they're constrained by are not the only nothing rules. But rather, these principles. OK. Now, a lot of people have thought that twerking really badly mischaracterized heart. Because when Hart said that the law consists of rules, he didn't mean all or nothing standards. He meant standards. And there's no reason to think that Hart would have denied what twerking is asserting, namely that in addition to all or nothing standards, there are these principles which have weight. Now, that's right. I think twerking, I think Hart would have clearly admitted that the law consists not just no or nothing standards, but also in principles and then never meant to deny it. But what I think would twerking is trying to do here is he's trying to come up with some explanation as to why Hart insisted that judge's exercise strong discretion. It's really an important part and I should do this in the next episode. Because I didn't do it. I wanted to do the hard work and debate episode now, because I thought students were taking exams. I thought they might be interested in this particular topic. But one of the things that we'll see later on-- and so I apologize, did this bit out of order-- but we'll see later on is that Hart thought that the law often runs out. That the law is not complete. That there's often what he called open texture. And that judges are often exercising discretion in hard cases. And so twerking was trying to come up with some kind of explanation as to why Hart was doing this. to why Hart insisted on the idea that sometimes the law runs out and that judges reach beyond the law and act like legislators. And his explanation for why Hart thought that was because he was captured by this idea of the model of rules that the law just is a set of all and nothing standards. Because if you included the idea that the law consists in principles as well, then you would not be tempted to say that judges off an excite strong discretion. They reach beyond the law and make new law. No, you would say, there's just lots and lots of legal norms out there for judges to decide hard cases. And that's what they are, in fact, doing. Now, this raises the possibility that Hart could simply accept Torken's claim about principles as what we call a friendly amendment. He's like, OK, you're right, Torken. The law consists not just in these all and nothing standards, but also these principles which have a dimension of weight. And so therefore, in hard cases, judges are not exercising strong discretion. They're applying principles to resolve the case. Now, there are two reasons why Hart can't do that. One is that-- and I'll talk about this in a future episode. From the next episode is that if you are a positivist, you have to insist that the law runs out because there's a limit to how complete social facts can pick out norms. And I'll talk about that. I call that the limits of the social argument that if you really are a positivist, you think the law ultimately depends on social facts alone. You're going to think that the law has to run out at some point because there's just a limit to how much you can guide people's conduct through acts of social guidance. Let me talk about that later. The argument that Dworkin makes is that the reason why Hart cannot accept principles as being part of the law why he has to insist on the model of rules is because he claims, Dworkin claims, that if you look at-- again, my mom called again. Hold on a second. Hey, mom? Mom? Mom? Mom? I'm in the middle of the podcast again. OK? OK. Love you, bye. You've got to always answer your mom's calls first. OK. So what Dworkin says is that the reason why principles are legal principles-- if you look at legal practice, you'll see that principles are legal principles. Not because of their pedigree, but because of their content. The reason why the judge and Riggs versus Palmer applied the no-personship profit from their own wrong is not because it was enacted somewhere by some legislator or by some high court, but rather because it is morally appropriate. Of course, people shouldn't profit from their own wrong. That's a morally appropriate norm, and therefore it needs to be applied in a particular case. So that shows that Dworkin claims that legal principles are legal not because of their pedigree, but because of their content. And that conflicts with the first thesis, which says that the rule of recognition must pick out norms based on their pedigree, none of their content. So the argument goes as follows. Judges in hard cases look to principles to resolve cases. Therefore, the law doesn't consist just of rules. And so therefore, judges aren't exercise extreme discretion ever, contrary to the second of these is the positivism. And the rule of recognition can identify principles as being legal principles because principles are applied in particular cases because of their content, not because of their pedigree, that is contrary to the first thesis. Now, the third thesis of positivism says that when the law runs out, your legal obligations run out. And so therefore, if judges are really under an obligation to apply legal principles and decide one way or another, then it shows that the positivist has a wrong characterization of what the law is. OK, so that's the move in the model of rules. I'll recap this in part three and then see how hard and the positivist can respond. OK, see you in a bit. [MUSIC PLAYING] OK, band on the run. Positivist on the run. We are on part three, which is always the worst part of the podcast because I get tired. And it gets later in the day. So I hope I can pull this one off. OK, so what was the critique? The critique was that what was-- Dwork is critique of heart. If you looked the way judges decide hard cases, they still think that there is law even when the rules run out. They look to principles. Those principles are legal principles because of their content, because of their moral appropriateness, not because of their pedigree. But the rule of recognition requires that all law be validated based on his pedigree. If it's content, therefore, checkmate positivist tards. OK, so what can the positivist say in response? Well, Joseph Razz, who's ridiculously smart, his response was to point out the assumption that Dworkin is making when he claims that when judges are required to apply moral principles to the law that those principles must therefore be legal principles. The assumption that Dworkin is making is that all norms that courts are under duty to apply are law. But that's false. What Razz points out is that you can be under duty to-- that a court can be under duty to apply a certain norm, but that norm not be a legal norm and not be a norm of that system. So here's the example he gives a conflict of law system, conflict of law example. So let's say a German court is resolving contract dispute involving a French litigant, this French and German litigant and the choice of law provision in the contract requires that judge look to French law. Now, when the German judge is applying French law to the case before them, the German judge isn't converting French law into German law. No, the German law is that the French law controls, but that doesn't convert French law into German law. Likewise, when the court is in hard case is looking outside the law to morality and applying more principles, Razz claims, what the judge is not doing is converting more principles into the law, any more than the German judge is converting French law into German law by applying it in a German case. Now, I wrote an article called "The Hard to Work and Debate a Shirk Out to the Perplex" and I posted it on the Google Doc. I presented this at a conference in honor of Dork and I didn't realize at that time that we were all supposed to write lot of Tory papers about Torken. I was the only one that was critical of Torken. And Torken spent the next-- he did the wrap-up session. And he just got a ragged on me in front of everyone for presenting the razz argument that one way to respond to the critique in the model rules was to say that you can be under a legal obligation to apply a moral principle. And that doesn't convert the moral principle into a legal principle. And he just thought that that was ridiculous. And he just kept on making fun of it in front of everyone. It was really quite embarrassing for me. So I went up to him afterwards. And I gave him this example. Hopefully this will help. When my daughter was young, before we went shopping, we got ice cream. And she hadn't finished her comb by the time we went to supermarket. I said, sweetie, no, no. You have to stop. You have to finish your ice cream before we go into the supermarket. And then she said, wait a second. We have a rule that you can bring ice cream into a supermarket. And I said, no, no, we don't have that rule. They have a rule that you can't bring outside food into their store. And our rule is to listen to their rule. Now, the point I was trying to make to work in was that the fact that we had a rule to respect the stores rules didn't mean that the stores rules became our rule. No, it doesn't work that way. You have to make sure not to flatten out the normative universe. Different groups have different rules. And I think it's a very significant mistake to think that every time you're under an obligation to apply some outside rule, you're converting that outside rule to an inside rule. And so one of the things, one way that the positives can respond to twerkin is to say that twerkin, all you've figured out, was that when the pedigree rules run out, judges under a legal obligation to look to morality. But that doesn't make morality part of law. In fact, and this is the exclusively gopositious perspective, moral principles can never be part of the law just because they're moral principles. In order for them to be part of the law, they do, in fact, have to have a pedigree. So the exclusively gopositious says, "Deworked and you were right in the way in your first thesis, the way you characterized positivism that the rule of recognition has to validate rules based on their pedigree, not on their content." But that doesn't show, but you just behavior in hard cases doesn't show that the rule of recognition doesn't capture all legal rules. It does capture all the legal rules. It's just that when those legal rules run out, the rule of recognition also says apply-- well, I shouldn't say the rule of recognition-- when the rule of recognition runs out and that there are no more legal norms to apply, there's a separate legal obligation on judges to look to morality, but that doesn't convert morality into law because the only way something can be law is if it has a pedigree, namely, it's part of the rule of recognition. So that's one way to respond to dworked, to say, all you've done is point out that judges can be under legal obligation to look outside the law, but that doesn't convert things that are outside the law like morality into law. OK. The second response is to deny dworkin's characterization of positivism in the rule of recognition. What the positivist could say-- and this became known as inclusively political positivism-- was that what dworkin has pointed out was that the rule of recognition doesn't just contain pedigree criteria of legality, but also non-pedigree that is contentful criteria of legality. That what the rule of recognition does is that when the pedigree standards run out, the non-pedigree standards are then the law. The only thing that's necessary to be a positivist according to the inclusively-capositiveist is that the rule of recognition be a social rule. But that social rule can tell judges to look to morality in order to resolve cases. So dworkin was able to critique card only because he assumed that the rule of recognition had to set out pedigree criteria of legality. But if the rule of recognition could set out non-pedigree criteria of legality, then it's possible for the positivist to explain how judges, in hard cases, look beyond pedigree rules to non-pedigree principles, apply them and that they're applying legal principles. This is called inclusively-capositiveism, because it accepts the idea that the rule of recognition can incorporate non-pedigree norms, that is norms that are picked out by their moral content. But they become part of law only because they're connected to a rule which is social. That is that there's a social practice accepted from the internal point of view among judges to do precisely that. So here's the difference between the exclusive and the inclusively-capositiveism when responding to dworkin. The exclusively-capositiveism says, yes, dworkin. In hard cases, judge, look to morality and apply morality to resolve the case. But just because you can be under legal obligation to apply more principles, that's a convert, more principles into legal principles. In fact, the only norms that can be legal norms are ones that are pedigree that have the right institutional background. The inclusive-capositiveism says, no dworkin. All you've pointed out is that the rule of recognition can contain, in addition to pedigree standards, non-pedigree standards. So there's no problem here. Another way to put it is that when we said that the positiveist thinks that legal facts are ultimately depend on social facts alone, the exclusive-capositiveist says, well, actually, they don't just ultimately depend on social facts alone, but they can only depend on social facts. That is, there's no way that law can ever be picked out by moral facts. The inclusively-capositiveist says, no, no, no, law can be picked out by moral facts, as long as a social fact tells you to pick out those norms based on moral facts. So the law ultimately depends on social facts alone, but the social facts tell you to look to morality, and that makes morality part of the law. So I think either, if you're an exclusive legal-positiveist or an inclusively-capositiveist, you have a way of answering dworkin's critique. The reason why I said this was act one of the hard-to-worked debate is because workin had another response, another attack on positivism, which I think is more problematic for positivism, though positivists have strangely ignored how important it is. And I will talk about that in future episodes. But when people talk about the hard-to-worked debate, they often are talking about how to explain the role that principles play in hard cases. And the debate is whether the fact that judges look to moral principles to decide cases shows that the law ultimately depends on moral facts as well, or whether positivists can still salvage the idea that the law ultimately depends on social facts alone. In future episodes, not only will I talk about this continuing debate about whether the law ultimately depends on social facts alone or moral facts as well, but also whether you should be an inclusive or an exclusive legal-positiveist. And I love the debate because it's such a philosophical debate. It's like, how would you possibly answer this question? Let me just tip my hand to say that-- inclusively opositiveism is a ridiculous doctrine and you shouldn't believe it on the pain of believing something really dumb. But I'll make that argument later. Most people, by the way, I should say virtually everyone is inclusively opositiveist. I'm being kind of a jerk here by saying that about inclusively opositiveism, but you know, we have to have some fun. Okay, I'm going to take us out with Band On The Run. I hope you guys all stay safe and thank you for listening. [Music]