Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 74. We just finished hearing about Operation Ascari and a quick note. I said the airline armored car would no longer be used for cross-border operations after Ascari, but that's incorrect. A listener who was on board one of these airlines much later in 1987 explained how he was part of Operation Firewood, where the airline was used across the cut line. Apologies for that. Thanks, Ian, for the correction. So, back to our story this episode, and it's an odd one indeed. FAPLA and the SADF were conducting patrols together as part of the Joint Monitoring Commission, or JMC, set up after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement in February 1984. It was supposed to be a precursor. The reality was neither the South Africans nor the Angolans were going to adhere to the agreement terms. Pretoria continued supporting UNITA, while FAPLA, after an initial period of seemingly trying to impose discipline on SWAPO, gave up and allowed their planned fighters to continue infiltrating of Umberland. SWAPO mortared the JMC joint patrols a number of times and firefights had developed through March, so I'm sure some of the Angolan soldiers were feeling just a tad schizophrenic. Still, the main JMC officials, both South Africans and the Angolans, gave the impression to each other that they were attempting to make this whole pre-ceasefire system work. The JMC HQ was supposed to shift south from Kuvalai from town to town through March and April 1984, where each time an area was declared free of all forces, including SWAPO, the HQ would head to a town further south. It started at Kuvalai, and now in March, the JMC was based at Mupa. The next stop was supposed to be Ivali. Before anyone was moving, however, the SCGF had to be convinced that the area around Mupa was clear. Five separate monitoring patrols were sent out between March 27th and 30th to determine what was going on. The first headed off to check the area east of Kasinga, towards Chioku, and then along the Kaunda River towards Chetekweta, where SWAPO's Alpha battalion had been lurking shortly before the Lusaka agreement signing. The second headed out from the Kalonga Bridge. The third patrol headed off from a point 64km directly east of Mupa, near Chufafra, towards Mulola, and then headed down the Kuvalai River. This joint patrol was focused on the territory between Mupa and Ivali. And then finally, the last patrol turned to the area north of the Mupa Bridge, where SWAPO's logistics bunkers had been based earlier in the year. While the FAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, SWAPO commanders told General Heldenhuis there were no SWAPO insurgents near Mupa, Geldenhuis was not convinced. Events were to confirm his fears. On the 28th of March, the monitoring patrol spotted Swapo Spur around 15 kilometers north of Dover, heading southwesterly. This was a violation of the agreement. Then, on the 31st of March, patrol near Kasinga discovered the tracks of more than 15 Swapo, about 10 kilometers southeast of the town, and these were also heading south instead of north. The JMC duly noted violation number 16 in the logbook. Things, though, were just getting started. On April 1st, April Fool's Day, a section of 20 Swapo combatants mortared the SADF's Cape Corp at Kaluk with 20 millimeter shells. It was almost impossible to stop these random acts. We must remember that southern Angola was one of the most anarchic places on planet Earth during this time. Things quietened down again, and a meeting was held between Lt. Gen. Gleason and FAPLA's Lt. Col. Montero about possibly shifting further south. Then the heaviest rains in years hammered down from the end of the first week of April, and by the 13th, roads and bridges were underwater. This meant the deployment of the joint teams was impossible. All the rivers, Guneni, Kalonga, Mwe, Kuvelai, Kaundu, as well as the Bale and the powerful Kavango, were all flooding. Mupa was now cut off after the bridge 14 kilometers north of town disappeared in the deluge. The SAA force was flying in food and material by Puma, but FAPLA was experiencing some problems. They couldn't keep up with their logistics supply demands. So the SADF then went out on patrol by itself between the 9th and the 12th of April, concentrating on the muddy land east of Mupa. Swapo's favorite infiltration route was there, along the Kasinga, Jaula, Kluma, Kufafa and Mulola track that they had developed over the years. While they marched about searching for Swapo, they found no sign of Mupa. Mupa was on the way to Kasinga, Jaula, Kluma, Kufafa and Mulola. Mupa was on the way to Kasinga, Jaula, Kluma, Kufafa and Mulola. The local population took advantage of the peaceful moment and headed back home, returning in droves to their homes around Mupa. The South Africans spotted a good opportunity for a bit of hearts and minds, and began to fly more food in for the civilians. Swapo was suddenly the odd one out in this territory, as both the Angolan army and SADF paraded around together, and the South Africans spent quite a bit of time reminding them that they had to move out of Mupa. Swapo was suddenly the odd one out in this territory, as both the Angolan army and SADF paraded around together, and the South Africans spent quite a bit of time reminding them that they had to move out of Mupa. Swapo was suddenly the odd one out in this territory, as both the Angolan army and SADF paraded around together, and the South Africans spent quite a bit of the locals that Swapu were excluded. Colonel Johan Dippenaar then sent a request to FAPLA's commander for permission to address the local population. Permission was granted and on the 11th and 13th of April he fired up a megaphone and a translator. The SADF was trying to put on its friendliest face and like Ronald McDonald with Happy Meals they handed out sweets, cold drinks and gifts for the children. The SADF also handed back church icons that they had looted from Mupa mission station, the main statue of Jesus and Mary, framed pictures and the expensive brass candlesticks. So by the 12th of April the South African government gave the go-ahead for the next move and the JMC immediately sent a patrol to Ivali to reconnoiter for a possible HQ. The best site appeared to be a spot two kilometers north of the town and on the 14th of April the locals were gathered together there by the JMC who warned that the SADF and FAPLA were coming to Ivali. The JMC HQ moved in on the 16th of April but FAPLA continued to have problems supplying their own troops and in a highly unusual move and one that was obviously wrapped in irony FAPLA asked for permission to use the airfield at Onjiva to fly in their fixed wing aircraft to resupply their troops. Onjiva was held by the South Africans but obviously it was Angolan territory so the Angolans had to ask permission to use their own base but the problem was Swapo was also known to be in the area and could mortar the Angolans when they landed. After 3-2 battalion inspected the area and a joint patrol of SADF and FAPLA headed off to check that the airfield was still usable all was well so on the 19th of April an Antonov 26 landed supplies from Kahama for FAPLA. These were then loaded onto trucks and sent north to Mupa. There was some debate now about how to move the rest of FAPLA's equipment. They were in danger of being ambushed by Swapo so the Angolans decided to send food and ammunition by road to Humbe from Kahama. They had also managed to convince their own HQ back in Luanda to send them two Mi-8 Soviet helicopters which ended up ferrying the material to Mupa from Humbe. Now FAPLA and the SADF could patrol together once more and the FAPLA company joined 3-2 battalion in the Chufafuashona 60km east of Mupa. But it wasn't long before the joint patrol ran into Swapo near Tachipa. Three insurgents were shot, one was wounded in that contact. Meanwhile things were beginning to go sour at the JMC. It was all about the understanding of what had been decided back in February during the Lusaka signing. What was also causing friction was Pretoria's continued support for UNITA. FAPLA and UNITA were fighting for control of the eastern portion of Angola and South Africa whilst supplying UNITA throughout this period. Pretoria didn't deny this but blithely told the Angolans that according to the Lusaka agreement they weren't breaking any rules. FAPLA in turn refused to allow the joint monitoring patrols west of the Kanene River and in the area between Kahama and Chikuse. Things had to be resolved at higher levels. So on the 25th of April a high-level Angolan delegation led by the Interior Minister Kito Rodriguez and a South African delegation led by Foreign Minister Puk Boerta met back in Lusaka. Dr Kenneth Kawunda greeted both sets of government officials with what was called his "well-known" courtesy before things went downhill. The Angolans were frank in their comments to the South Africans and it was all about UNITA. Angola demanded that Pretoria stop supplying UNITA and the South Africans demanded that the Angolans stop supplying the ANC. Eventually the shouting and gesturing from all parties died down. There was no resolution to this impasse so they both seemed to agree to differ and moved onto other matters. These included a prison of war swap. The SDF wanted one of their men back and this would take place in exchange for one Cuban and 31 FAPLA troops held by the South Africans. All was agreed that the JMC patrols could in fact head west of the Kanene now and north of the initial monitoring line. While the politicians were doing their thing, things had improved between the soldiers on the ground back in southern Angola. 3-2 battalion and FAPLA had spent three weeks east of Kuvelai and Mupa and had found no sign of Swapu and any of them north of Havali either. So now it was decided to move the JMC HQ south to Onjiva. The SDF intelligence however was picking up a few disquieting issues. Swarper insurgents captured during the joint patrols said they'd been told by FAPLA that once the JMC process had been wrapped up in May, they would go back to fighting as usual. That was food for thought. On the 29th of April, following another high-level meeting between Lieutenant General Chaldanez and Angolan Vice Minister of External Affairs Demore, the JMC was set to move to Anjiva. A suitable HQ for the joint operation was identified 6km south of the town, just west of the Tyrode, and FAPLA's two Mi-8 helicopters flew in as part of the support team. By the 3rd of May, the JMC shifted to this spot. However, this is where the happy camping between FAPLA and the SADF came to an end. As far as a report compiled by the South Africans later was concerned, the closer that the Angolans came to the South West African border, the less they cared about the Lusaka Agreement. The first sign of bad faith came two days after the move to Anjiva. Lieutenant General Chaldanez had invited Demore for a meal and a discussion about the prisoner swap, but the Angolan was apparently in a foul mood. He'd taken offence at a South African Broadcasting Corporation report about how the JMC were fighting Swapu, and told Chaldanez the only way to secure peace in Angola was if the South Africans left Namibia. Things simmered down eventually. And both sides agreed on the terms of the prisoner swap, which was set for the 14th of May. Before then, however, a number of incidents took place which soured relations. On the 11th of May, an SADF patrol operating solo clashed with 22 Swapu insurgents northeast of Oshikango, close to the cut line. Two Swapu guerrillas were shot. Then later that day, the SADF came across a large cache of weapons near Chile, and on the 16th of May, they found another cache. Both sides now pointing to the SADF. Both sides now pointing fingers at each other. FAPLA suggested it was amazing that the SADF had suddenly and miraculously discovered these caches, suggesting a plant, while the SADF said there'd be no move from Anjiwa to Oshikango until Swapu was sent packing. It was suggested a joint peacekeeping commission be set up after the JMC process ended. The South Africans met the Angolans once more in Lusaka on the 21st of May, headed by Pek Buta. But Luanda said they could not. Luanda promised to control Swapu. They also hinted that they didn't believe Pretoria would stop supporting Yunita either. By now, the SADF thought that the Angolans were tipping Swapu off about the JMC patrols. 3-2 battalion soldiers were also being interrogated by FAPLA officers behind the backs of the South Africans. Remember, these 3-2 fighters, many came from Angola. The SADF swapped out 3-2 battalion with 2-1 battalion of VAMBO troops instead, along with one company. By the end of June 1984, it was clear that the JMC and the honeymoon between the South Africans and the Angolans was finished. There were a number of meetings in Lusaka and in Anjiwa, and one in Rokana, but nothing was resolved. Yes, the joint patrols continued for the meantime, but the JMC was not going to move from Anjiwa until Swapu's continued operations in the region were curtailed. The nail in the negotiating coffin was hammered in. Actually, by Pretoria, offering the Angolans a clear-cut case to use against the SADF. On the 12th of August, Lt. Gen. Geldnase signed a secret order permitting the SA Air Force to fly a photo-reconnaissance mission over Zangongo, Kuvlai, Mulondo and Tecumuteti. The SADF had information that tanks could be seen in these areas, and that the Angolans had reinstalled their radar facilities and beefed up battalions here, which was counter to the Lusaka agreement. This was true. Particularly the tanks which had arrived at Tecumuteti. However, this also backfired because Swapu received reports from the Russians that the SA Air Force had flown over, which was also an infringement of the Lusaka agreement. Quite messy. By September, the agreement, which had always been impossible to manage, was dead in the water. It was ironic that political strategy had inverted. Now the South Africans were showing urgency to get this Lusaka agreement finished, but the Angolans were... The Russians were not. It was in Luanda's interest to have the SADF marking time to the south. There was no danger of another invasion. They also knew where the SA Air Force and SADF were on a day-to-day basis, so this helped Swapu bypass the patrols. As you heard last episode, Pretoria was also still being put under extreme pressure by Washington to find a peaceful solution to Namibia, and Chester Crocker actually told the National Party that the Americans now thought that South Africa was deluded. They were deliberately delaying their withdrawal from Angola. While the SADF and FAPLA were trying to find themselves, the Reckies hadn't stopped special operations. In early 1984, and despite discussing land-based ceasefires, the SADF continued to focus on seaborne ops. The spec ops continued, and special forces were instructed to investigate the destruction of the main water plants supplying the Angolan capital, Luanda. This facility was on the south bank of the Bengal River. It was also on the south bank of the Kuyfangonda River, about five kilometers away from the river mouth. By now, there were hundreds of thousands of refugees inside Luanda. The Cubans had kept the pumping station going, but it was designed for only around 500,000 people, and most civilians actually received their daily water from tankers, and they had to pay for it per liter. But if the water plant was blown up, government officials, the politically connected, and the well-off would feel the pinch. And their informal camps had no running water whatsoever. By mid-1984, the South Africans had realized that the Lusaka Agreement was unlikely to achieve its aims, and they weren't naive enough to imagine that Luanda and Swapo would abide by the rules. Time to put an end to Luanda's water, thought Pretoria. But blowing up the facility would need a huge amount of plastic explosives, and it was only accessible through thick bush, which made movement difficult. After perusing Frederickville, Luanda was able to escape. After taking photographs and receiving intel on the ground, the recce planners realized that the plant received water through two inlets on the bank of the Bengo River. They could destroy these inlets, and the water would stop flowing into the plant. Because of the shallow nature of the river and the noise made by outboards, the only way into these inlets would be by using the Klepper kayaks. Then approaching the inlet pipes and small kayaks represented their own dangers. These sucked in thousands of liters of water a minute. The inlets would just be dragged away, and so the recce boffins came up with an interesting solution. They would manufacture two miniature radio-controlled boats, weighing in at 20 kilograms each. Once in position, the kayak team would send explosive mini-boats into the pipe, and that would be that. Operation Codename Bougainvillea was born. Commandant Hannes Fenter was OC, and Major Doe Steyn was mission commander, while the sub-SAS Emily Hobhouse would insert the recces. By now, the Angolan Navy had been beefed up by the purchase of two OSA missile boats and the increased presence of the Soviet Navy. This was not going to be easy, because the South Africans had to transport four recce teams to the target area using two Navy strike craft: the SAS Hendrik Metz and SAS Gubi Kutsir. Once in place, the recce teams would be moved from the strike craft to the sub. The SAS Proteus survey vessel would lurk south of the SWA shipyard. They would then go to the South African border just offshore, in case of medical or other eventualities. Now the teams had to train hard. This was going to be a long paddle in heavily-laden kayaks. Major Steyn led the men, along with Corporal Sharkey Becker, Lance Corporal Toby Tablai, Corporal Rods Rodriguez, Sergeant Mattis Adam, and Lance Corporal Manuel. After a few arduous weeks, the teams boarded the strike craft on the 31st of May, 1984. Eventually, they rendezvoused with the sub-SAS Emily, 50 nautical miles from Luanda, on the 4th of June, 1984. The four recce teams boarded the sub and submerged, heading to Luanda from the northwest, then passed on towards the Bangor River. There were a few fishermen about on their small boats. That night, the sub headed close in to shore until the 20-meter depth line and Corporal Becker and Lance Corporal Tablai set off on their kayak to recon the river. It was dawn on the 5th of June when the recces were picked up by the sub. They had bad news. On the way to the water-purifying plant, they had been forced to stop at a bridge which had bright security lights and sentries who were wide awake. Still there was a small chance of success. At nightfall, the sub returned to the Bangor River. Two other teams were going to head back up that river, carrying the mini-boats packed with explosives, their AK-47s, the Stirling-Patchett silent sub machine gun, two pistols, a radio, and their fins and masks in case they had to ditch the kayaks. Stain led them into the river mouth. They were so close to the water-purifying plant that they thought they were safe, but they were not. They were just a few feet away from the river. They were close to the river, and they paddled towards the bridge. The sentries were wide awake. The lights were bright. They'd never make it past there once they blasted the water pipes further upriver, so they called off their attempt and paddled back to the Atlantic, this time at high speed because the river was pushing them along. A few hours later, the subs located them through their pingers and strobe lights. As they clambered on board the submarine, one of the men slipped and plunged into the sea, sinking like a stone. He could have grabbed him as he slid into the depths, but he had thrown off his firearms, which were dragging him down. The Wreckies had learnt a lot from their mission. will hear next episode. The JMC may have been limping to its inevitable conclusion but the Reckies had a much bigger mission in mind. They planned to blow up three of the Angolan's all important Oso missile boats inside Luanda harbour during the dark moon period at the end of July 1984. With that we end this episode. Please rate the podcast on iTunes, it helps increase the series visibility. If you want to contact me you can email me through the website abwarpodcast.com or direct message me on Twitter at Des Latham. Until next, goodbye.
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