Episode 73 – A 1984 cease-fire as the SADF and FAPLA conduct joint patrols

Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, D.S. Lathan. This is episode 73. Operation Ascari ended but not the recriminations. While on the surface, the S.A.D. of Gable for great deal of positive propaganda, the loss of 21 men and equipment including the rifles, and the haphazard manane, which the planning had taken place was a sign that all was not well. The morale of the citizen force units was unacceptable, said the permanent force officers, and never right. 61 make operations archives have a document which names Battle Group Delta otherwise known as Victor as the worst Battle Group in 182 mechanized brigade. The arm and squadron had performed well but in the eyes of the seasoned officers, the rest of the personnel had not. And yet we also know that the planning for Scari did not follow the comprehensive blueprints of various operations. Battle Group Victor had been sent into Kuvalai under strength, they were sent into a well-definited position without superior firepower, and without the element of surprise. Pretoria had rushed in where angels feared to tread. Furthermore, the S.A.D. of belief that Pablo would just run away had been fairly wrong. At Kahama, Melondo, Kahundo, and Kuvalai, the Angolans fought for ground, they were not intimidated, and they used the T-54 and 55 tanks to great effect. At Kuvalai, the S.A.D. of had been defeated in their first engagement, and only overcame Pablo when they had managed to concentrate forces. Despite the debriefings which were not a happy process for the S.A.D. of, there was a silver lining. The Angolans were now in a spot of bother. Swappos campaigns into Avambala and had prompted the S.A.D. of invasion, Nafopla's units needed to recover from the battering they had taken over the past two months. Kasinger had become the southern point of Swappo action, and the political commissars were negative about trying to head into Avambala and for the usual summer invasion. They had to march more than 270 kilometres to the Cutline, then they had another couple of hundred caves of a march south into the farming areas of Avambala, and this meant more danger, and less time on the ground. The political leadership of Swappo could not spend time politicising the Avambala people, and they had to speed up their insurgency and then focus on the destruction of infrastructure. Farplan and the Angolan army generally regarded Swappo with some suspicion, and they would be shooting at each other shortly, while the number of events of insurgency into Avambala and in 1984 dropped. The South Africans controlled the area south of the Bali River between the Kuvalai and Kasinger road to the west, and the Kabunga River to the east. The SADF also controlled the Kaneni province, east of the Kaneni River, all the way past Tachima Titi, south of Kasinger. Swappo combatants now needed to carry their landmines, motorboms, AK-47s ammunition, medical equipment on their backs were hundreds of kilometres extra into South West Africa. Then they had to find water and food, and the insurgents had to use the rainy season to accomplish this between November and March, when the vegetation thickened and the number of waterfalls shunners rose. While Swappo's capacity waned, and they found it more difficult to politicise the local population, Victoria had also entered a new phase. South Africa was now fighting inside Angola alongside Unita, a partnership that had firmed and solidified and at the same time drawn the SADF into a more complex arrangement. This was no longer a war concentrating on throwing Swappo out of Avambala and the SADF were now a core part of destabilising southern Angola. But there weren't alone. Cubans and Russians were also playing their part. As you're going to hear over the next few episodes, this was going to have a severe consequence for the SADF. Outside factors began to play a more prevalent part in this African war. The Russians noted with some alarm how the battles of a scurry had impacted their Cuban colleagues. The commander Major General Leopoldo Sintra Flias believed that the three Angolan brigades in the south should be withdrawn north, where the Migs could provide better air cover. On the 7th of January 1984, Angola and President José Eduardo dos Santos received a letter from Cuban leader Fidel Castro suggesting the withdrawal. This was a big moment. Imagine a vast swath of land south of the Binguela railway line which crosses the country from Nubebe, on the coast to Manong, controlled by South Africa. It's something that former three-two commanding young Braytonbach had been suggesting albeit mischievously. You wanted Pretoria to forcefully take him on to the region and to defend further north. You were saying why I have all these SADF troops die just to leave and then have to retake the territory in the future. But the Russians on the ground represented the country paying for all this equipment and the superpower did not agree. General Konstantin Korochkin refused to allow the three brigades to move north and ordered the Cubans and Fapler to remain where they were. All sorts of diplomatic-smoking mirrors were taking place. The SADF told South African media that the reason why Kuvala were so difficult to overcome during Ups Eskari was because Cuban forces had confronted them. Commandant Ep Van Lillov, 61 Mac, told author Leopold Skolz later that this was bullshit. It was said for political reasons. There were Cuban advisers, but they fled before we occupied Kuvala. Pretoria didn't want their voters to know that black Fapler troops had fought so well. It was this kind of lunatic political philosophy that was causing a lot of trouble for the SADF at this time. They were being forced to act as the blunt hammer of apartheid's technocrats. While they were sitting safely back in their white-only toilets and bistros in separated South Africa while the soldiers did the duty work. After Ups Eskari, a few realities had dawned. This was the end of the old naughty car. The obsolete island would not be used again and across border a tank. The other realization involved the T-54-55s. The SADF had been found wanting against this tank, and the Kahama assaults as well as Kuvala showed that something had to be done when it came to anti-tank planning. Within a few weeks of the end of Eskari, South Africa's latest Ulyfant Mark I tanks were delivered to 61 Mech as echo squadron to be used alongside the mechanised infantry, the rifles and artillery. Funlil mobilised his men immediately for a show of strength near Ruakana on the border of in the tanks arrived, calling him maneuvers "exercise a star face" iron fist. And that was that for the while. The next time these tanks would be used in any form of serious cross-border action was only in 1987, between 1984 and then the Ulyfans were left at 61 Mech's or Matia base, and personnel were flown in for exercises for the next three years. International pressure was also increasing on both the Angonans and the South Africans. By 1984 the American domestic backing for the concept of "constructive engagement" or "patoria" was waning. Chester Crocker had been Ronald Reagan's point man in Africa, but he was tiring of the national party seeming unending need to pulverize southern Angoda. The longer it took for Crocker's repeated promises of a breakthrough in memorandum independence negotiations that as credible the Americans appeared, particularly at home. Between June 1983 and the beginning of 1984, Washington had believed there was a real possibility that South Africa, Mozambique and Angola would come to terms with each other. The Reagan administration had shunned any negotiations or talks with Swapu directly, or the ANC in South Africa, therefore most African countries regarded constructive engagements as nothing more than a moral choice by America to support apartheid South Africa. There was also a flourishing trade between South Africa and the US with the flow of intellectual property to the SA military despite a UN arms embargo. These included modern civilian planes that could be converted to military surveillance aircraft, advanced computer systems, and the delivery of enriched uranium for the South African nuclear plant at Cuba. At the same time, the glaringly damaging apartheid policy was causing the Americans a great deal of harm. President P. W. Burtair had launched a new Tri-Cameral Parliament with Indians Whites and Colods, but this was seen as a sleight of hand and attempt at pretending to empower non-whites. And of course, Black South Africans were totally excluded from this sham democracy. They were told they belonged in Bunt-Hustons. The reason America put up with Pateria's racism during this period was they joined fight against communism. The Cold War was in full swing, and Washington was monitoring Russian attempts at resource gathering in Africa. However, using the fear of communism as the reason this water regime that doesn't allow the Black majority to vote is not exactly a long-term domestic political strategy that will win new votes in the United States. Then, in an unprecedented move, the IMF International Monetary Fund refused to grant additional funds to South Africa in late 1983 as a result of US anti-apartheid initiatives led by a Congressional Black Caucus. Although these anti-apartheid sanctions did not prevent South Africa from securing private loans, the absence of IMF approval made foreign finance more expensive. It was also making it more difficult for Pateria to access bridging loans from the Bank of International Settlements. In a double whammy, there was a financial crisis in Mexico at that time, which meant international access to debt generally became more difficult with short-term loans. becoming their preferred tool to service emerging market demand. This had a major effect on South Africa's financial liabilities and the war. It was not long before short-term debt rose to $14 billion, while longer-term outstanding loans came to $10.3 billion. Just to give you an idea what all this means, the proportion of South Africa's short-term debt of 66% grew even higher than other developing countries in Africa, which were averaging 44%. Sanctions were beginning to bite. And in a triple-wemmy, the price of gold and the value of the ran dropped causing the dollar value of these loans to soar. Up to $24.3 billion, or 46% of GDP, and this was going to get much worse within a year, rising to 50% by 1985. And anything above 30% is regarded as dangerous debt. So the South African Reserve Bank responded by using gold swaps and partially paying the mines and rants rather than dollars. It's a bit like the Russians making the accreditors pay them in rubles rather than dollars these days. And in 1984 there was a surge of violence as black citizens began to fight security forces in the metropolitan areas of South Africa. Television footage was shown on American channels and Democrats began to be arrested during sit-ins at the various South African missions in the United States. This bleak picture, compounded by the wave of political unrest by civic, student, youth and worker organizations, made foreign lending to or investing in South Africa difficult to justify. It's rather ironic then that at this precise moment the Angolan government was also pressurizing Swapo to find a solution. In December 1983, South African foreign affairs minister Puk Butter had sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Berestakware, offering to withdraw all troops from Angola for 30 days. Operation Scari was underway as you know, the SCDF was told to far through into January so Butter's letter was also ironic, but Petroër would withdraw, said Butter. If this gesture was reciprocated by the Angolan government, which would ensure that its own forces, Swapo and the Cubans would not exploit the resulting situation. Lwanda's first reaction upon being briefed about this letter was not positive. This of course was their own territory, so being called upon to remove their troops from their own southern border was a bit much. Still, they said they would do so, only if South Africa agreed to implement UN Resolution 435 within 15 days after a 30-day truce. Just to remind everyone, Resolution 435 called for a ceasefire followed by UN supervised elections in South West Africa, which ultimately would lead to the independence of Namibia. It also called for the establishment of a United Nations Transitioning Assistance Group, or Untug, to oversee both South Africa's withdrawal and the elections. Pretoria of course found us unacceptable, but the defeated Kuvalae changed the Angolan's tactics. On January 21st, 1984, they sent a note to the Americans that they were now willing to institute a ceasefire. Chester Crocker met Burt in person a week later and promised that Washington would police any ceasefire, but he also warned Burt that South Africa's support for the United movement had to end. Crocker's team then briefed Swapoli de Samnyoma, but it failed to ensure that he was elevated to the status of an official party in the upcoming signing. That was a big mistake. Some say this agreement was doomed anyway, however, by leaving Swapoli off the list meant they didn't feel equal, they didn't have to abide by the measures, and as you're going to hear, that's precisely what happened. Luanda wanted to end the infiltration of Swapoli to the South. The SEDF wanted Swapoli's bases to be removed. If Angola could reign in Swapoli, the SEDF would have achieved its objectives of keeping the movement away from South African control, and therefore the ANC away from its northwestern border. The big idea here was that there would be a joint monitoring commission or JMC set up to monitor both sides, as they disengaged from both sides of the Cutler. A conference then took place in the Xambian capital, Lusaka, on the 16th of February 1984, where the Angolans and the South Africans faced off directly. The Pretoria delegation was there by chief of the Defence Force, Yani Hellness, who explained that Pretoria wanted to make sure that both Swapoli and the Cubans would be gone from South Africa. In turn, the SEDF would head back to the bases in South West Africa, where they'd be monitored. Both the SEDF and Fapoli would conduct joint monitoring, and the JMC would be based in Kuvala, and rather symbolic location by now. Then in terms of that document, if both sides withdrew, the JMC would then jointly move to Mupa. When the JMC was sure there was no SEDF Cuban Swapoli lurking to the north and south of this town, the JMC would move progressively southwards to Ivali, Anjiva, and eventually Oshikango on the Cutler. The SEDF and Fapoli were going to conduct joint patrols, and there would be a mechanism to report transgressions. Everything was going to start in the first of March, and after 30 days, the SEDF would be out of Angoda. The SEDF was already south of the Cutler, so a few units had to be sent back just so that they could work with Fapoli. An advance party of American technical personnel arrived in Ventuk on the 22nd of February to set up the US Liaison Office as a base for four or five observers for the duration of the disengagement process. Angoda, though, had indicated that US officials would not be welcome inside Angoda itself, so they remained in South West Africa, apparently. So it all began on the 24th of February, when the SEDF component of the JMC with the Lieutenant General Keldnase in charge flew to Kuvali at 0800-30 in four punements and arrived at 10 in the morning. Fapoli arrived a few hours later in three allowets, flying red clothed streamers tied to the anti-carriage. The delegation was a significant and included opposite commanding five military region Lieutenant Colonel Sequera, chairman of the Fapoli component of the JMC Major Javier, and Major Pedro Sabastaro, political commissar in JMC member. But it also included Major Vierda Diaz, who was chief of air defense in five military region, and the chief of staff of the Angolan component Lieutenant Dos Santos, JMC member, and Stone Carlos, a civilian interpreter. The short introductory meeting was called formal but friendly, with no apparent hostility from other side. Keldnase delivered a message expressing concern over reports that at least 400 Swapo members were reportedly moving through southern Angola towards South West Africa. The Lieutenant Colonel Sequera assured the South Africans that the Angolan government strongly disapproved of these violations and would do everything in their power to prevent the movements. This meeting formally ended at 1400 hours and was followed by a cold buffet, laid on by the SA team, after which Lieutenant General Keldnase and his party returned to Oshikati. Before they left, there was the obligatory flag ceremony that was carefully choreographed. The South Africans planted their flag on the flagpole and Fapoli did the same, goose stepping in the Russian fashion to the second flagpole then raising their flags. Half the detachment had the AK-47 slung over the shoulders pointing down. The other half had the AK slung with muscles pointing up, protocol for Soviet style flag ceremonies. Then, both sets of soldiers together swept Kuvoli from mines and began sorting out communication links between the JMC and Oshikati in a Vombalet. Two South African Sam's doctors joined the JMC team in Kuvoli, along with Tiffi's from Five Maintenance Unit and 25 Field Squadron. Two SAFers Pumas were also stationed at the temporary base. The joint patrols were set in motion, but even before they began to move it became obvious that Swapo had hidden away in the South. Sector 1-0 Intelligence picked up a group of 50 Swapo moving between Shaola, Gruma and Klemma and also a large Swapo presence in the area around Kasinger. Colonel Dippinar bought the sample with the tenant Colonel Sequeta who agreed to radio Swapo, but said they had issues with their equipment and it would take about a week to sort it out. The SA team accepted this explanation, but we're wondering about the communications problem as their new Swapo units had fueled radios. Colonel Dippinar then warned the Angolians that the JMC would have to remain at Kuvoli until Swapo had moved out of the Klemma area or the JMC would not be moving from Upa on the 7th of March. These patrols were curious to say the least. Here were the two armies together, only a few weeks before they'd been pulverising each other. Now they moved in the same patrol. Meanwhile, the SEDF produced evidence that Swapo continued to operate just north of the Cutline. The three two battalion patrol clashed with the two men Swapo patrol near Caluca, killing both. The JMC was immediately notified and sent a team around, including photographers. Then these clashes continued in a 72 hour period between the 11th and 13th of March, when there were four separate incidents between the North William monitoring force and Swapo in the area, approximately 20 kilometres north east of Bambi. An SEDF and Fabla JMC joint patrol was mortared on the 11th of March, 35 kilometres south east of Tecumutiti, 4 of the Swapo combatants were killed. Then on the 12th of March, the joint patrols ambushed 50 kilometres south east of Tecumutiti, and a Swapo fighter was killed, while a 3-2 battalion soldier was also wounded. Patrol carried on moving, but it was mortared again on the 13th of March, and two Fabla soldiers were killed, two others were wounded. Later that day, a Swapua reconnaissance group stumbled into the patrol and one of the Swapua was killed and another wounded. This was a strange situation for both the SADF and Fapua, taking cover together being fired on by Swapua. Three further violations followed during the 14th to the 16th of March, bringing the total to 12 incidents by the 16th. But by now, the SADF had also broken their agreement, two embalas from Indangua had flown north of the monitor line near Kasinger on the 9th of March. A secret document at that time indicated that the SADF believed that Fapua's commander was honestly showing a great deal of frustration with Swapua and they really were trying to deal with the insurgency. At this stage, the cooperation between the two sides was still being described as very good. Sitting around a bride, however, several of the Fapua members had privately expressed that where the Fapua could actually control Swapua, although the two sides continued to try to find common ground. Eventually, things quietened down for the next move by the J.M.C. South to Moopah, where they arrived on the 22nd of March. The heavy summer rains slowed this new deployment and in the first five days, the SEDF-retested troops from three to battalion, which arrived on the 24th of March. Fapua was also resupplying their own forces and reoccupying the Tana Moopah, that all set up a civilian administration under the watchful eyes of the South Africans. While the 27th of March, Fapua had deployed one battalion at Tecumetetti and one company each at Kasinger and Kuvala, while they also stood guard over a bridge at Moopah. Reports began to circulate that Swapua's Alpha battalion had been spotted south in the Kahuna area, while they had also been seen at their logistics bunkers between Moopah and the Nunu. There was another Swapua company in the Dover Evali-Mulemba area. As you can hear, this JMC ceasefire was not working largely due to Swapua, which regarded its offers outside of both Fapua and the SEDF's control. What happened next is for next episode. Please rate the podcast on iTunes that helps make the series more visible. You can also head off to the website abwapodcast.com and send me an email through there, or direct message me on Twitter at there's lengthen. Until next, Ciao. [Music]