Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 72. The Battle of Kuvala'i II was a bloodletting of note, with Fapla's 11th Brigade now bottled up in the town and the SEDF Task Force Victor and X-Ray on their doorstep. 3-2 Battalion had pulled off a bloodless takeover of Teche Mutete during the last days of 1983, which at the same time was regarded as a momentous achievement. And it was, however, that also doomed some of the Angolans and South Africans, because one of the key aims outlined by General Grelin before the start of Operation Ascari was to try and force Fapla units to retreat to take control of the towns like Kuvala'i and Kahama and give Fapla a route out. By shutting off the escape routes, from Kuvala'i, the South Africans had actually created a situation where the Angolans were going to fight to the death. The premise back at Oshikati was that the Angolans would shatter and run when the mechanized battalions rolled up to their front door, but as you know by now, that plan backfired. The more experienced soldiers fighting Kuvala'i on the SEDF side were also extremely upset about the rather haphazard approach to intelligence gathering and tactics. This was now a conventional battle, no longer the flashy, fast-moving, mobile surprise attacks that the SEDF had honed. This was bludgeoning frontal assaults. It was on the 3rd of January 1984 that one of the hidden SA-9 Strela missiles hit the tail of an Impala jet flown by Captain Joe van der Beek, the senior pilot from Andangwa. His target had been the fire-can radar-guided 57mm AAA sight east of Kuvala'i, but during the pull-out after bomb release, he spotted a missile approaching. I've explained that the SA-9 was unusual in that it could fire on a person, but it could also fire on a plane. It was an Impala that was approaching aircraft, and this missile blew up just behind and under the tail section, completely removing the starboard tail plane and the elevator. The Impala rolled into what's known as the incipient stage of a spin directly above the target. But somehow, Captain van der Beek managed to recover before the plane hit the granite cloud and reduced his speed to below 150 knots. This controlled the induced spin, but if the speed dropped below 130 knots, the plane would spin in the opposite direction, so he was flying on a razor's edge. Then van der Beek picked up another serious issue. As the Impala limped away from Kuvala'i, it was losing altitude. His rate of descent was around 2,000 feet a minute. He would never make it to Andangwa. As it was, he would be hard-pressed to land at the Angolan town of Onjiva, held by the South Africans since Operation Protea in 1981. The airfield there had just been repaired and resurfaced just for this kind of emergency. Two Puma helicopters took off from Zanganga, as part of the search and rescue operations, and two others in Avambaland were also ordered into the air to help in case the Impala went down in enemy territory. The air defence controller then worked out an interception vector for the Zanganga Pumas to follow to intercept the Impala, when van der Beek radioed to say that his rate of descent meant he wouldn't even reach Onjiva. Everyone was preparing for the worst. But density altitude, as it's called, began to play its hand, our good friend physics. The lower the plane flew, the higher the rate of descent. The higher the density of the air, which provides more lift for wings and more power for engines. The Impala's rate of descent slowed from 2,000 feet per minute to 1,500, then 1,800 and finally 400. The shallower angle of descent meant that the glide was extended and Vandenberg snuck over the threshold at Onjiva to perform an excellent touchdown. Over Kualai, Alouette captain Carl Alberts was doing a great job early the next morning on the 4th of January, the final drive to take the town began. When we left off last episode, Task Force Victor had met fierce resistance from the Angolans, but the South Africans were determined to break through the enemy trenches around Kualai. Fapla's T-54 tanks were causing problems, while they'd also set up a 23mm anti-aircraft gun on the far side of Oshona, which had a large killing field both southeast and southwest of the main road. The Irland Armoured cars had engaged the tanks, then withdrawn. The SEDF was back to their preferred hit-and-run technique, but were still forced to assault this heavily defended position. Things were always going to be difficult. The battle turned into a full-scale conventional assault featuring two sets of highly mobile and aggressive commanders. Fapla was charging towards the SEDF with their tanks, firing a shot or two, then retreating, and the South Africans were doing the same with their rifles and Irlands. Heavily armed vehicles were exchanging fire, although on paper the armaments were not equal. The Angolans had the much more powerful and better protected tanks, including the T-54. Commandant van Lille, who was officer commanding, was behind the front, waiting for reports from the Rattles and Irlands. And the first major report was terrible. Rattle 13 Bravo from 61 Mech Battalion, under the command of Johan de Besson, had been hit by a T-54 100mm armour-piercing round, and carnage ensued. It started when the Rattle 90s and Rattle 20s were approaching the town in an integrated formation, firing and moving and taking fire from both the T-54 and the Rattle 20s. T-54s and Foplas 23 and 105mm guns. Rattle's second lieutenant, Scott, who was nearby, watched in horror as red flames blew out of the firing ports and hatches of Rattle 13 Bravo, and you could see a gaping hole in its side. Some soldiers were flinging themselves out of the vehicle, ablaze. Just then, de Besson opened the commander's hatch, stood upright, and fell over, dead. He had been peppered by shrapnel. Then soldiers inside were incinerated, and afterwards, five commanders could only be identified by their dental records or their dog tags. As the fighting raged around this blazing Rattle, 2nd Lieutenant Alexander McCaskill ordered his driver to move in front of the burning wreck to try and save the rest of the men. This, of course, meant he was now a highly visible target for the T-54s. McCaskill had ordered his men out of the Rattle, and they hit the ground, slant-decking. 20 metres away, Fopla opened fire on them from their trenches. Three of his men were wounded as they lay on their stomachs. Firing back. McCaskill managed to drag two of the men inside the burning Rattle to safety, and then returned a second time to pull a third man to an ambulance nearby. Meanwhile, Fopla were throwing everything they had at him, including RPG missiles and automatic rifle fire, but he escaped injury. Later, when the adrenaline slowed, he realised that he'd been running around inside a minefield. The Rattle continued to burn, and then it exploded, but by some miracle, a soldier stumbled from the back, his clothes blown off. Some of the wounded soldiers were now crawling towards Fopla, disorientated. They were pulled back. This was the worst incident of Kuvalev II for the SADF, for Task Force Victor, and in particular, Forsyth Infantry Battalion. Six had died. Five had been saved by McCaskill's actions, and he was awarded the Honoris Crux for his courage. The South Africans continued to press home the attack, and it emerged that the T-54s had pulled back towards the centre of town. The infantry clambered back aboard the Rattles, but in the confusion, they just jumped on the nearest vehicle. Some became overcrowded. Experienced commanders and the SADF were not happy about this tactic. They pointed out that the Rattle was not designed to carry soldiers through a battle, only into a battle. The troops should jump out, spread across the ground while the Rattles fired their enemy with their machine guns and cannons offering close fire support. Sitting inside a Rattle close to the enemy could be a death sentence. All it takes is one RPG-7 shoulder fired missile, and they're all dead. But once they cleared the minefield, they should have been on the move, on their feet. Soon after Rattle 13 Bravo had been hit, Rattle 71 Charlie detonated a land mine. Then Rattle 71 also hit a mine, the soldiers inside suffering damaged eardrums from the explosion. The enemy brigade continued shelling and firing and hitting the South Africans with RPG-7 missiles. Still, they refused to retreat. By now, 11th Brigade was aware that the much feared Terrible Ones 3-2 Battalion were waiting for them north at Tecumateti on the main road. A large force of almost 600 3-2 Battalion soldiers had headed towards the Swapo Tactical HQ north east of Kuvelai earlier in the operation, with the premise that more bases could be located near Tecumateti. They found out that the Swapo HQ was actually much further north at Lumbambula across the Benguela railway line, and were way out of reach for both 3-2 and the SA Air Force. So 3-2 moved towards Tecumateti instead, and had overrun the town, capturing a large group of Fafla at the same time. The SA DF top brass were stunned, and Ascari Commander Joep Joubert was in total disbelief. The enemy had abandoned their equipment, and 3-2 captured four 23mm anti-aircraft guns, six Soviet gas trucks, an assortment of logistics, as well as half a dozen T-54 tanks. This was particularly satisfactory for 3-2, because they had no anti-tank capability. They then used the seized equipment, turning them around and concentrating on Fafla forces trying to filter north from the battle of Kuvelai. The battalion then blew up a bridge 8km south-west of Kasinga, and were given orders to hold Tecumateti now that they had done the impossible to seize it. Meanwhile, the loss of the Rathal and the 11 casualties, six dead, five injured, was a blow to the task force. Fierce fighting continued through the day the 4th, with the Alouette gunships providing vital information to the task force, crunching its way through the thick bush. Captain Karl Alberts piloted one of these alouettes and his gunner Eddie Buelink was alongside, blasting away at the poplar sections around Kublai. Alberts was able to help the task force artillery to range onto enemy targets. Then Captain Chris de Toey, a squadron commander, received a report from Alberts that enemy tanks were on the move again. These two worked in tandem, with Alberts flying below the tree line then climbing and attracting a barrage of anti-aircraft fire and RPGs, while a second gunship would spot the enemy artillery and AA gun and rocket launchers and report their position to South Africa's 127mm artillery. During this part of the battle, Alberts spotted seven T-54s approaching the rattles, backed up by at least the company of infantry. Then another Rattle 20 detonated a landmine and caught fire. Meanwhile, the South African artillery opened up with a barrage and quickly withdrew to avoid return fire from fire. The pilots and the alouettes continued to draw fire. Alberts had to refuel at least twice he spent so much time being the bait. The pilot with nerves of steel ended up also being awarded the honor as crooks for his courage under fire. Van Lille, who commanded Task Force Victor, had also ordered Alberts to remain in the air and his eyes in the sky were possibly the difference on this day between the successful overrunning of Kublai and failure. By midday, Van Lille ordered Lotta to advance and join Chris Dutoy, who was running out of ammunition after three hours of continuous fighting. Dutoy needed to withdraw and resupply, but didn't want to lose the initiative. Lotta advanced past the burning rattle and the remains of the T-54 close by, using rolls of toilet paper to mark his advance through the minefield. By now, enemy fire was desultory. It suddenly became apparent to Van Lille that the battle was won, although it had taken 36 hours of fighting. All the SADF soldiers were like, zombies by this stage, beyond exhaustion. As they moved into the town, they came across the craters left by the SA Air Force bombardment and saw that very few enemy had been killed despite the massive blasts. Far-plus soldiers had survived by taking shelter in deep bunkers and trenches, and they had crept below ground once again. Some were intent on fighting on. This could turn very nasty very quickly because there were civilians around, adding to the general confusion. As the SADF maneuvered past the burning rattle, the SADF soldiers were able to see the SADF soldiers coming out of the minefield. Lotta ordered them out of their armored vehicles. They were terrified of ending up like their colleagues, blown up and burned to death, even though they were aware of anti-personnel mines littering the area. Lotta remained on board as his men marched alongside his rattle, and enemy resistance was encountered again, albeit slight compared to the previous two days. At 1400 hours, Van Lille followed this group through the minefield, tracking the toilet paper trail. Then he saw an infantryman who was in the middle of the minefield, and he saw an infantryman who was in the middle of the minefield, and he saw an infantryman who was in the middle of the minefield. Then he saw an infantryman who was in the middle of the minefield, and he saw an infantryman who was in the middle of the minefield, and he saw an infantryman who was in the middle of the minefield. Then he saw an infantryman who appeared dazed, and he told him he was not prepared to continue fighting. Van Lille grabbed the man and slapped him, then ordered his troops to hand him a firearm so that Van Lille himself could advance with the infantry. A soldier thrust an abandoned AK-47 into his hand, and Van Lille reboarded his rattle. After his rather unfortunate general pattern moment, Van Lille advanced and caught up with Lotta. Things were not going as well for McCaskill and Tuttori's sections, despite the SAF being able to advance. They now faced a far more concentrated FAPLA element who were hiding in a thick forest area, and where the leaves had been blown off by the SAF was bombing, and the ordnances fired across the space for two days. It was a scene soldiers described as reminiscent of the images of the First World War, apocalyptic as smoke swirled, vehicles burned, firearms crackled, and soldiers scurried about through this forest of broken trees, empty branches, strewn with bodies. Then Tuttori's rattle was hit by a mortar round, but he ordered the driver to continue. The South Africans were clearing the trenches, and Lotta was following the south-north road as his soldiers began to move from building to building in the town. He was heading towards a strategic target, a bridge across the Kuvilai River. The enemy had left this position and fled by the time the SAF approached late in the afternoon of the 4th of January, and Lotta set up his command post at a filling station near the bridge. The infantry dug in facing a tree line on the opposite river bank, and all had been firing speculatively for some time. Tuttori then ordered a ceasefire. They needed to conserve ammunition. By 1700 hours, enemy resistance was fading, and some of the 11th Brigade FAPTA soldiers could be seen fleeing north out of the town. Waiting for them was 3-2 battalion. Task Force Victor had finally taken Kuvilai, and it was time to form a large army. lager for the night. Van Lille decided to remain in town itself while Lothar and his reserve force were sent to the south. Some of the other officers grew concerned that Van Lille's lager was irregular and a juicy target for Angolan megs or artillery or both. He was convinced they were in no condition to counter-attack and took the chance. And his men were falling over, they were so tired, so he ordered them to prepare for a night lager. At 1830, rattles commanded by Steyn accelerated through the town suddenly passing one of the T-54s that had been taken out during earlier action. They saw another tank moving across the river to the north but couldn't open fire. The light was too bad, it escaped. By now, Lothar's Alpha and Delta companies had pulled together into a closed lager about five kilometers south of Cuvillai in dense bush alongside the road. McCaskill's rattles and Eerlands were in the middle of the night. Van Lille and Van Lille were in the middle of the night. In a temporary base in town and during the night of the 4th they heard enemy voices and vehicles moving. These were FOPLA hidden in underground bunkers. This had the feeling of Stalingrad about it. In the early hours of the 5th, some of the FOPLA troops tried to start the T-54 tanks and escape across the river but the rattles opened fire with their 90 millimeter guns and FOPLA dispersed. So the next day, the 5th of January 1984, the SADF began clearing the remaining enemy targets. Coming under fire here and there. The citizen force soldiers were now brought up from the rear to sweep the area of landmines and to help with mopping up. It was during this phase that the SADF came across a large bunker which had housed a Cuban advisor. Inside they found pamphlets and reels of 12 millimeter film as well as an SADF issued R4. While the team scoured the town, rattles crossed the Cuvillai river bridge and headed a few kilometers north, all the while trying to avoid land mines that they believed FOPLA had laid as they retreated. It wasn't long before the South Africans triggered one of these. At about 0900 hours, a soldier was wounded when he stepped on an anti-personnel mine laid in grass near the river. When an ambulance rushed to his assistance, it triggered another mine. The soldier eventually was cazevaced and the damaged ambulance towed to safety. The body counting began. Eventually it was announced that 324 FOPLA troops had died at Cuvillai. But 21 South Africans had died during Operation Ascari and at least 30 had been wounded, while the town had been almost totally destroyed. The number of civilian casualties has never been released, but it's believed to run into the hundreds. Because they'd pushed so far north, it was decided to secure as much of this region as possible, despite the growing cacophony of pressure. Pretoria was facing even greater sanctions and boycotts, and as photographs and stories emerged, from places like Cuvillai, the number of civilian dead and wounded turned into a PR nightmare. The SADF sent word to Van Liel and the other commanders that all aggressive action should halt on the 10th of January. It wasn't so simple. The SADF were pushing on. Rattles were sent on to search for more equipment, particularly missing T-54s. One was discovered, but by now the rattles were bogging down constantly in the mud, although the alouettes overhead were trying to direct them through the worst of the morass. The crews had been required to recover their armoured vehicles at least a dozen times, and finally the rattles became so bogged down that they couldn't be moved, and eventually everyone laggard where they were. Back in South West Africa, Brigadier Joep Joubert demanded that Chris Dutoy continue moving north and help 3-2 Battalion in Tichamutiti. Dutoy argued that his men were at width's end and his vehicles needed repairs, but they marched on. Van Liel's forces joined Dutoy, and the Tiffies arrived to fix the vehicles, and Colonel Eddie Fuljun, officer commanding of 3-2 Battalion, also joined the task force. The 140mm guns moved up, and by now FAPLA began to shift south from Kasinga. They were going to make life difficult by firing constantly on the SADF units manoeuvring north of Tichamutiti. Operation Ascari was almost at its end. But not before a momentous discovery. Back in Kuvulai, as the South Africans cleared an immense space of over 7km, they came across a complete Soviet SA-9 surface-to-air missile system. There were 8 vehicles part of this kit, and it had 9 rockets packed into the trucks. This was a real coup for the South Africans. They knew that the Americans had purchased SA-9 rockets for millions of dollars, and were looking forward to selling an entire SA-9 system for a whole lot more. The mopping-up also revealed an AGS-17 grenade launcher, the first found by non-Soviet forces. This 30mm air-cooled automatic grenade launcher was a bit of a shock. It looked like a machine gun with a drum magazine holding 29 grenades which could fire rounds up to 1,700 metres. This created some interest amongst SED of intelligence. The next day, 13th of January, mail was sent to troops inside Angola. Eventually, on the 16th of January, they crossed the cut line back into southwest Africa, and so ended the Battle of Kuvlai II and Operation Ascari. Next episode, we'll assess what it all meant, but for one extremely experienced commander, the strategy deployed was stupid. And that was Jan Breitenbach, former 3-2 officer commanding. He blamed political leadership for meddling in the plans, and pointed out that Pretoria didn't seem to have any clear idea why South Africans were dying in large numbers in Angola. The National Party just seemed to say they needed to buy time, which was running out anyway. Both sides had fought tooth and nail. Operation Ascari had succeeded in one main objective. It had convinced the Angolans, that it was time for a cease-fire of some sort, which we'll hear about next episode. Please rate the podcast on iTunes, it helps make the series more visible. Or you can head off to abwarpodcast.com and email me from there, or direct message me on Twitter @derslatham. Until next, goodbye. Subtitles by the Amara.org community
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