Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 71. It's the first days of January, 1984, and Operation Ascari has hit a few hiccups. Task Force Victor failed to take Kupilai in the first battle for the town at the end of December, as you heard last episode, and Combat Team 1 in particular had been mauled. Both Combat Teams 1 and 2 retreated two kilometers northwest of the town, then turned and headed southwest, where they bivouacked around 17 kilometers away from Kupilai, deciding what to do next. Some members of the Task Force began to talk about heading back to the border, and if their vehicles ran out of fuel, they openly spoke about abandoning them and walking to the cut line. At least one captain involved in this discussion decided to, ignore his NCO's comments, according to veterans of the battle. The muddled manner in which the first attack in Kupilai had been carried out was plain for all to see. Some later suggested the thick vegetation had created navigational challenges, which was true. But no officer in his right mind at this point would have accepted a renewed attack along the same route. FAPLA was ready and waiting, and this would have been a silly tactic. Unfortunately, this muddling was going to continue through into the battle for Kupilai. After regrouping, SADF headquarters then radioed Task Force victor commander Piet Grijling and told him to turn his men around and renew the assault. He had other ideas. Many of the troops had been mentally battered, and some point-blank refused. The SADF was an organization that in some ways reflected the style of warfare conducted by the Boers during the Anglo-Boer War. When ordered to press home a full frontal attack against the heavily armed enemy in an entrenched and well-defended position, they refused. "It's better to live to fight another day," they said, "like their ancestors." Just because the politicians were in a rush to show some kind of advantage over the Angolans didn't mean having to throw your life away. Grijling was in an invidious position. The intelligence he'd received concerning the first attack was substantially below par, to put it mildly. Reckies had not realized how many T-54/55 tanks had been sent to the border, and the South Africans had miscalculated when it came to attacking positions protected by the feared anti-aircraft guns. The enemy artillery also outranged the SADF, and the T-54/55s were a real eye-opener for troops fighting them for the first time. The analysis of the images captured by the SAF's photo reconnaissance missions had also missed some important facilities. The drone had picked up that SAM-8 missiles were present, but totally missed something else, the SA-9 Mobile Unit or Strela-1, known by NATO as the "Gaskin". These could be deployed against ground attack aircraft, and the Strela-1's seeker system was unusual in that it used something called "photo contrast". This was an advantage when it came to homing methods over the traditional heat-seeking missiles. The Strela-1 could engage an enemy plane approaching at low level, whereas the heat-seeking missiles could really only be successfully used chasing the afterburners or when fired from behind an attacking jet. The Strela-1 was a new weapon deployed by the Soviets in Angola, even though it had been around since the late 1960s. But it did have a few drawbacks. It could only engage targets against background conditions of either clear sky or solid overcast, at least 20 degrees away from the sun and at least 2 degrees above the horizon. So, attacking impalas and mirages that approached targets out of the sun had real protection. If they knew where the SA-9s were, of course. The first SADF assault in Kuvlai had also created some head-scratching when it came to systems. RATL commanders said afterwards that their 20mm cannons had jammed and the specialised tools needed to unjam these weapons were not readily available. This is what is known as a "span ratchet" or "cocking ratchet" and they say there was only one for every four RATLs. So, by January 1, 1984, Task Force Victor was languishing south-west of Kuvlai when Kraling received new orders to renew the assault on the 2nd of January. That did not go down well with the O-Mana. But the TAC was duly prepped anyway. Early in the morning of the 2nd, some of the Citizen Force O-Mana refused to get out of their sleeping bags in protest. They were not cannon fodder, they said. Permanent Force soldiers and the National Servicemen, the youngsters, just called up: "We're ready to go!" But the part-timers, or the campers, were not. The source of this information comes from a manuscript of Combat Team 2 leader David Lotter from his book "War Journal" and also quoted by former 3-2 comms officer Mariusz Schipas. Refusing to fight is regarded as treasonous behaviour and can lead to court-martialing and possible execution. Kraling, though, listened to his men, which the top brass regarded as a mistake. However, he had also made his own mistakes, including moving on Kuvlai during the first battle despite losing touch with the armoured cars, then not realising that his mortar section had overshot the rest of the mechanised units. But this wasn't his fault alone – there were lots of gaps in the SATF information about Kuvlai. All of this, worsened by Pretoria's insistence on some kind of success, come what may. But the SATF needed a scapegoat, so General George Mayering relieved Kraling of his command and sent him home. Commandant F. van Lille was sent to replace Kraling and Sector 1-0 Commander and Operation Ascari OC Brigadier Joep Jobe and General Mayering, who was Chief of South West African Territorial Forces then, both briefed van Lille before he flew in to join Task Force. He was told how crucial it was to overrun Kuvlai and chase out the FAPLA Brigade, or at least cut off the town's water and light, so that they would be forced to retreat. The new attack date was set for the next day, the 3rd of January. That meant the new commander of this task force had the grand total of one day to arrive, inspect the mechanised battalions, look at the plan, then issue orders. Even for the best officers in the world, this would have been an extremely tall order, but he did have some good news: Combat Team Delta was going to detach from 61 mechanised battalion and join Task Force Victor. He would then have more firepower at his disposal than Kraling, who was heading home. Still, he had a challenge re-motivating the men of Task Force Victor. Earlier, Brigadier van Skalkveg had been asked to take over from Kraling, but he refused, and in what you could call a "hospital pass" suggested van Lille be given the leadership role instead. Van Lille was eventually choppered into Task Force Victor, which had moved again to 30km south of Kuvela, beyond the range of all Fafla's artillery, and he arrived late in the afternoon on the 1st of January. Meanwhile, 61 Mechs Combat Group Delta was bundabashing towards them and showed up the next day, on the 2nd of January. It was decided to break up the new formations into three. Combat Team 1 was comprised of Alpha Company, mainly Citizen Force troops. Combat Team 2 was Bravo Company of Force Sai under the command of David Lutter. We had 20 Ratel 20's and 4 Ratels armed with 81mm mortars at his disposal. And then Combat Team 3, which was a squadron of Irland Armoured Cars from Moi River Regiment under Major Henny Kalmeier, along with a Medium Artillery Battery from Maloppa Regiment and Regiments Delaray and Groot Karoo. They could all call on 8 sections of 81mm mortars, who are now back to the usual position in the rear. Plus, they could also use 71 battery of 140mm guns under Captain Ben Kutz. On the other side facing them, besides FAPLA's artillery, there were a dozen T-54/55 tanks. Intelligence and proper information about Kuvalei still was sorely lacking. Later, some of the senior officers would duck and dive questions about Askari, but let's start with specifics. Instead of months of careful preparation, Task Force Victor was going to be thrown into a full frontal attack on entrenched positions without any real strategic advantage. At least 5 to 1 advantage, and they were definitely not going to be surprised. The SADF top brass were using what can only be called a racist presumption that because FAPLA was black and the SADF was predominantly white, the Angolans would run away. But they didn't. Secondly, the intelligence information that was shown for Lil was a single blurred photograph from an RPV, the drone, which was about the size of a notepad, and a rough estimate that there was a brigade strength awaiting him in Kuvalei. That means at least 3,000, possibly 5,000. Thirdly, some of the mechanized commanders had no experience in specific vehicles. Lieutenant J.G. Scott told Marius Skippers later that he'd been surprised to find that he was now going to assume command of at least four of these rattles because he was trained only to lead Irland 90s. The rattles were armed with 90mm guns firing armor-piercing rounds with a range of 1,200 meters and a 7.62mm machine gun. Facing them were T-54/55s with its 100mm gun with a range of 2 kilometers and far thicker armor. However, the rattles were highly maneuverable in the bush, and in the coming clash, known as Kuvalei II, they would move quickly to set up secondary shots at the oncoming T-54/55s. The Russian tanks had another advantage besides armor and their gun, and that was they could shoot on the move. They could not fire their 90mm while moving with any degree of accuracy, so most stopped unless in a catastrophic situation. Then Rattle commanders would watch their 90mm rounds bounce off the Russian tank up to six times before it was knocked out. Van Liel pondered all of this and the upcoming battle. He was going for a mix-and-match approach, with soldiers from the two different task forces, 61 Mech and 82 Mech, as well as the citizen force Omaner, with Forsyte infantry to make up for the previous poor morale. As he stared at the tiny photograph, all he could glean was that there was a lot of vegetation around the town and a road. It was paramount, thought Van Liel, to create a diversion in this situation. He was relying once more on the SADF's capacity to move fast and react quicker, so his initial plan was for 61 Mech to move towards Kuvlai from the southeast, close to or along the main road. This would then draw fire and 82 Mech would attack from further east. But the citizen force contingent, 82 Mech units, which had been under Commandant Gdeling, balked. They didn't want to be the main force. And Tolstoy said, While Van Liel, they were not happy about the idea. Some mentioned the phrase, cannon fodder again, and others used phrases like certain death. Van Liel basically was forced to swap the two forces. 82 would now be the diversion, and 61 would bear the brunt of the assault. The citizen force soldiers agreed, finally, to Van Liel's altered plan, and things were set to roll. It was before dawn on the 3rd of January 1984 that the Battle of Kuvlai II began. The air force had been busy through the last days of December, bombing the town. Canberras had dropped 60 120 kg and 18 250 kg bombs, two 450 kg and 600 alpha bombs. Impalas had followed that up with 32 250 kg bombs, and all, they said, had hit their targets. By now, Kuvlai was not your average Angolan town. The bunkers and trenches were far deeper, and by all accounts, the bombing failed to damage any infrastructure, in and around the town. The SA air force declared later it was the most successful raid they'd conducted through the border war, but the detail of exactly what they hit was rather porous. So, before first light on the 3rd, the combat teams formed up and began moving in the direction of Kuvlai. Then, to add to the confusion, torrential rain began to fall, and the thick cloud cover meant there'd be no air support for most of the initial phase of the attack. Delay after delay set in. Vehicles failed to make their assigned jump-off points, and the time for the final assault was pushed back to 1,400 hours. Then the mud and poor visibility meant more delays, and as the tension rose, communication between two of the commanders broke down. Van Liel was arguing with the Major Chris Dutoy, who was leading the armoured vehicles, and who began to warn that there was not enough daylight for an attack. Van Liel told him curtly that he was no longer prepared to reason with the Major, and the strike force continued to advance, with Van Liel hoping he could come across the main road north into the town, which was so blurred on his photo recon map he couldn't see it properly. The assault, though, was going to be carried out by the infantry on foot, with anti-tank squadrons in support when they got close enough. 61 Mech or X-Ray was on the right. Van Liel was travelling blindly, and it was almost impossible to maintain the momentum in the muddy and thick bush. Waiting for the South Africans was a FAPLA brigade arraigned across an area at least seven kilometres in diameter around the town, so it was going to be sooner rather than later that his men hit the first defences. While they groped their way along, Van Liel was staring at his compass, and then things began to unravel. Part of the plan was for the diversionary O-Munner force to begin taking fire from a distance, which would then help the main force locate the enemy. And yet, here they were, close to the town, no sign of this diversionary shooting. Instead, it was the main force that suddenly, came under fire from shoulder-launched RPG-7s and AK-47s. The time was now 1600 hours, the summer sun starting to slant into the west. Dutoy, who was travelling alongside Van Liel, radioed to suggest once more that they should rethink the attack. They were not in control of the situation. By now, the South Africans had arrived at the first line of anti-tank positions, which was an open area cleared of all vegetation, except for the stumps of large trees. Remember that FAPLA had used this conversation as a kind of "rattle trap" previously. Van Liel now grew wary. He knew these stumps could rip out the hydraulic pipes from under the rattles. This was a dangerously late moment to try and force home an attack. Dutoy was right, after all. And as Van Liel vacillated, FAPLA was going to make up his mind for him. There was a second combat team under Lotte, which was on the move 500 meters behind Van Liel's main force. And by now, both teams were taking hits from FAPLA. An Irland 90 had reportedly triggered a mine and had come to a grinding halt. Radio Engville Technical Service Corps ordered Tiffies to move in to help. After many minutes driving back and forth in the thick bush, the Tiffies finally found the Irland and towed it to safety. The gunner continued to fire at the enemy positions as he was towed away. The enemy continued firing back at him, which angered the Tiffies. They said the Irland's gunner had drawn fire and they would be hard-pressed to go in to save another Irland, should this happen again. Then Rattles 71 returned. The Irland Bravo detonated a landmine and ended up marooned in the middle of a minefield. The driver tried to drive out but then hit a second mine and the armored vehicle shuddered to a halt. The ammunition aboard began exploding as the five soldiers leapt out, saving themselves at the last minute. FAPLA continued firing into the damaged rifle and by 1700 hours Van Liel finally realized that continuing this attack was futile. He had also discovered his so-called diversionary force, a mixed group including the Omaner, had not followed his orders. Instead of heading into the town alongside the main group, Task Force Victor had hung back and now they were actually behind Van Liel. No wonder they had failed in their mission to draw enemy fire. Angrily, he ordered Victor to leave the area immediately and form a lager for the night. It was still rainy and overcast, and with dusk approaching, the light was bad. Brigadier Joubert back at HQ agreed and told Van Liel to complete his withdrawal and the South Africans drove 5 km south-east of Kouvelay and formed a lager for the night. "Tomorrow was another day," said Joubert. Meanwhile, the remnants of Ratel 71 Bravo were left behind in the minefield and the South Africans were worried that FAPLA would seize it. They needn't have worried. FAPLA's T-54/55 tanks hit it repeatedly until it was a twisted hulk. Ironically, the South Africans were firing on the Ratel at the same time with the aim of leaving it completely destroyed, unusable and looted. Both sets of gunners from both sides were, for once, trying to achieve the same outcome and both succeeded. The only thing left the next day was parts of the undercarriage. The SADF troops in both combat teams were exhausted and yet most only managed an hour or two of sleep that night before they were woken up at 0400 on the morning of the 4th of January. This was day two of the battle and during the night, Van Liel and de Toij fortunately had patched up their differences. De Toij would lead the Ratel engaging the T-54/55s while Delta Company, headed by Johan Du Besson, would hit enemy infantry targets. Once Delta had crossed the minefield, the idea was for Alpha Company under Van Liel along with Combat Team 2, led by Lotte, to follow. The remains of the Ratel in the minefield was causing some problems with Brigadier Hubert back at Oshikati fixating on recovering what was left of the thing which was rather silly considering the number of hits it had taken. So, by 0430, they were moving and at 0600, as the light improved, they approached the flattened Ratel. By now, four Ratels 71 Charlie, Alpha, 71 and 71 Bravo were strung out in an extended line. Behind them was the second line of 13 Ratels commanded by Lieutenant Alex McCaskill. Waiting ahead was FOPLA's 11th Brigade and as the SAGF units moved forward, the enemy opened fire with anti-aircraft weapons. It was now 0800. The SAGF artillery had begun an extremely heavy bombardment while the SAF also managed to fly in a few sorties. The rain was lifting just in time. The South African 120mm mortar teams provided harassing or quell fuze on the west side of the Kuvlai River. This was going to be some day. The artillery was going to fire off 60 tonnes of ordnance in a couple of hours. The recoil driving the wheels so deep into the muddy ground that they had to be dug out after the battle. At 0845, the bulk of the task force under Dutoy reached the clearing where the Ratel had been left burnt out and destroyed. There wasn't enough to move it, said Dutoy, despite Joubert's orders. It was then that FOPLA resistance stiffened and the task force began to try and negotiate the minefield and tree stumps. A few of FOPLA's 23mm anti-aircraft guns had been set up in a killing zone aimed at one of the Schoeners and the tanks were also firing across open ground. Then, as with earlier battle calls, the Angolans counter-attacked as the South Africans' attack slowed. This was the second time in a matter of days that the South Africans had faced this unexpected action and the main target was Task Force Victor, not X-Ray. Combat Team 3 had just emerged from the south into one of these open Schoeners when a T-54/55 opened fire. The airline 90s of the Regiment Moy River faced off against these significant opponents about 1km west of the task force. For some reason, For some reason, Comet Team 3 actually drifted off course by over 900 meters, but the Alouette gunships were operating and helped redirect the Moray River airlines. One of the armored cars was then hit a glancing blow by a T-54-55 round, shaving its open hatch, and the airlines withdrew once more. Better safe than sorry. The T-54 was out of range of the airline guns. FAPLA was fighting tooth and nail for this town, but the South Africans were refusing to back down. To the northwest, another group of 12 SADF Rattles came under heavy fire. Two men inside the command Rattle were wounded by shrapnel, including its O.C. Berger. In the intense gun battle, the Rattles then managed to take out one of the T-54-55s. But the manner in which FAPLA was fighting had surprised the South Africans. They were moving their tanks around the battlefield using conventional tactics, and the entire exercise resembled Second World War fighting. Tank against armored car, with the troops seeking shelter alongside. This non-conventional war had turned very conventional. The fight was just starting, and would last until the following day with FAPLA bottled up in Kuvlai. As I'll explain next episode, 3-2 battalion had pulled off a bloodless takeover of Tetumuteti, which meant FAPLA's 11th Brigade was now trapped in Kuvlai, and hundreds were going to die in their trenches. But they were going to leave two dozen South Africans dead. Before this battle was over. Please rate the podcast on iTunes, it makes this series more visible. Or you can head off to abwarpodcast.com and email me from there, or direct message me on Twitter, at Des Latham. Until next, I'll spade. Thanks for watching!
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