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Episode 69 – Operation Askari begins with a reconnaissance drone

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Episode 69 – Operation Askari begins with a reconnaissance drone

Operation Ascari, launched by the SADF in December 1983, was a multi-phase offensive designed to disrupt SWAPO and FAPLA operations in southern Angola. The plan involved special forces reconnaissance, air strikes, and mechanized infantry to cut off enemy supply lines and force a retreat. However, the operation faced significant setbacks from the start. Political negotiations delayed the start, and intelligence failed to recognize that SWAPO and FAPLA morale was high, bolstered by new Soviet weaponry, including T-54/55 tanks and advanced missile systems. The SADF deployed three task forces—X-ray, Victor, and Eco Victor—each with substantial firepower, but the rainy season turned the terrain into mud, slowing artillery and armored vehicles. The G4 artillery piece proved particularly problematic, bogging down in the mud and delaying attacks. Initial successes, like the capture of Kutevi on December 16, were overshadowed by fierce resistance at Kuvula, where defenders used heavy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons to hold their ground. The SADF underestimated the enemy’s determination, and the assault on Kuvula became a grinding, costly affair. The episode highlights the complexities of modern warfare, where logistical challenges, intelligence failures, and determined adversaries can derail even the most well-planned operations.

Transcription

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English
Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me your host, Deathletham. This is episode 69. By November 1983 the SADF was prepping for the significant operation called Ascari, and the Air Force was going to play its part. The original plan was for the opt to start on the 9th of November, but political negotiations had led to a postponement to the 9th of December. Meanwhile, the SAF was set up their remotely piloted vehicle on RPV in Zangonga and a major Jinx Buddhist. The aim was to monitor the Kahama area initially as part of a sub-Ascari operation called FUX. The RPV was codenamed Gata and was trying to detect the location of SA-8 missile systems sent to the South by the Angonans courtesy of the Russians. They proved or are they hidden in this process, these were early days in the use of what we now know as drones. Time to take a closer look at Operation Ascari, which was broken into four phases. Phase 1, the special forces would wreck you deep into Angola, then the Air Force would bomb Tafrune and volcano bases near Lubangol. Phase 2 would see offensive reconnaissance around Kahama, Mwolanda and Guvallai, and the SADF estimated this could take as long as two months, starting at least a week after Phase 1 had begun. The main aim was to cut off Swapo and Fubba's communication and logistics lines and to demoralize the Swapo sections, leading to there with a drawl north. However, the SADF missed a crucial bit of information when assessing the options in Phase 2. They presumed both Fubba and Swapo Moral was low, but that was not the case. It was higher than it's been for years. Swapo's plan armed wing had been withdrawn into Angola for retraining, and these fighters reprieved about new heavy weapons sent by the Russian sponsors, including T-54/55 tanks, as well as new missile systems, demoralizing them this time was not going to be as easy as in 1981. Phase 3, which was to begin after the invasion, was to reinforce the gaps supposedly created by a scurry west of the Kineni River through to Kateri, Mupa, Vinteset and then to Iondi. The loss phase was supposedly to reinforce these empty bases once Swapo and Fubba had left, and thus stopped the years incursions into South West Africa. The SADF top-rise was hoping that a brute force invasion would do the trick, that they'd see the Mirage's, Pumas and Pilots, Eloid gunships and the mechanized battalions full of parabats, three two soldiers and mobile infantry, and then Swapo would retreat. This was not exactly how it turned out. Saks Force X-ray was to head west of the Kineni River to strangle the garrisons of Kritevian Karma, and hopefully cause Swapo and Fubba there to withdraw without too much of a fight. X-ray was comprised of 61 mech battalion, and its firepower was substantial. There were two infantry companies from Forsyth, one company from 8-cyth, and Arman Karsquadron from one special services battalion, two troops of multiple rocket launchers from 10 artillery brigade, one artillery battery, two anti-aircraft batteries, a wrecky section and sappers from 25 field regiment. Task Force Victor also known as Compact Group Delta, included 82 mechanized brigade HQ. A company of citizen-for-soldiers cobbled together from Krut-Kuru regiment along with President C. R. Sartre and Delaray regiment troops. A company from one side, an Arman Karsquadron from Moirova regiment and Malopo, as well as an artillery battery, two anti-aircraft batteries, one multi-rocket launcher troop from Forsyth, a troop of sappers from 13 field regiment, a signal troop support platoon, one medical platoon from five medical battalion, a light workshop unit, and a provost section. Their target was east of the Koneni River, and they were tasked with assaulting Kuvula. Task Force Eco Victor was the cutoff force north of Kuvula, waiting to ambush the supposedly fleeing fapler, and also to take aim at the Swapov bases east of the Kavanga River. The team tango was comprised of one company from Forsyth, one Arman Karsquadron, one artillery troop, a multi-section from five-syth, two sections of sappers, one rake platoon or element, as they call it, one maintenance section and a workshop troop. They would operate as a kind of reserve, but more details about combat team tango later. There were a few obvious challenges facing the SADF, first the weather. It was rainy season, and the mud and cloud cover was going to cause havoc. The second was the conglomeration of vehicles, they had different cross-country ability, which was going to throw a spanner in the works. For example, the Israeli-designed G4 artillery piece had major mobility problems dragging this gun through the mud, was going to become the bane of many soldiers' life, and slow down a critical attack on Kuvula. After a scurry, their 155mm G4 would not be used again in a conventional opt for the rest of the border war, like the Irant Armored Car, both were no longer effective. The G4 replacement, the G5, was another matter entirely, and probably one of the most feared artillery pieces anywhere in the world when it eventually arrived on the border in 1986. During the Battle of Kuvula, artillery had a travel off-road, which meant the G4s had to be dragged through the bushfold, and this was slow going. Facing these main SADF units was a sniper force of 79 artillery reconnaissance soldiers, 81 B-10 troops, 140 strong mortar sections with 82mm mortars, almost 100 RPG operators, and just over 600 Swapo Special Unit soldiers. Around 320 of these had been retrained, were deployed as shield battalion around Kassinger. This meant they could rush south, requested. There were also 22 Sam 7 missile operators around here, that arrived as part of maneuvers planned to support MIG fighter jets early in 1984. The 10th Swapo Salute Battalion was stationed at Armeni, and its Alpha Shield Battalion was moved through 40 km east of Lubanko. In addition, Swapo's western area headquarters was at Kahama, and the Umbhulambashi centers, as they were called, included hundreds of troops, arraigned in the territory north of the cutline at bases called Leningrad, logistics, Marxist Youth Center, and the Greenwell-Matombo training center. There were also Swapo units near Kauunda, and a large complex around Kuvuli. Complex 1 to the north of Kuvuli housed the HQ of 53 Brigade, one platoon of Cuban advises, 120mm mortar sections and 2 BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, and also two amphibious BRDM-2 armoured cars with around 100 Swapo soldiers. Complex 2 had a battalion of 53 Brigade troops, and Complex 3 included a barracks of 400 soldiers, along with a section of 120mm mortars, 682mm mortars, 3 BTR-152s, 2 BTR-DM-2s, and an M-TU bridge layer. They could also call on at least half a dozen 14.5mm and 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns. And the Angolan's had 8 MIG-21s or 17s, along with 4 Pilates PC-7 reconnaissance aircraft based at Manong. Combining Swapo special units was Michael Ashiphala, if you remember his better known as Danger, Ashiphala. While his commander Duma Harmamba was in Kasinka. Lurking nearby was the 6th Fumpla Brigade with 1,200 men and an entire Cuban regiment of 1,500. They were based at Matala, and heavily armed with Sam 9 missiles, SA-3's 39-T-3485 tanks, at least 4 MIGs, 4 MR-8 helicopters, and advanced radar. It was another Cuban-10 company of 150 at Dongo, and 1,500 Cubans were based at Jamba, near one of Swapo's logistic spaces. Further north along the road from Kuvillade took a single-attention Matetti, a company of 11th Fumpla Brigade troops were waiting, with 4 23-mall anti-aircraft guns. While Swapo's 8th battalion was set up 30 km east of Titch Matetti, along with 250 men and women from its Bravo battalion. The 11th Fumpla Brigade was heavily armed. They had 14 brand-new T-54-55 tanks, 4 PT-76 amphibious tanks, at least 6 BRDMs, a section of 57-mall anti-aircraft guns, BM-21 multiple rocket launches, 122 mm and 76 mm artillery, 82 mm and 120 mm mortar sections. And they also had SA-8 and 9 missiles, just a cap of a significant arsenal. Hanging around Kounda were at least 80 Soviet personnel, with a large number of mortar sections of all sizes, SA-7 missiles and nearly 6,000 civilians. So you can see how Operation Eskari could get very messy indeed. The SA-D have started the ball rolling with the usual point men, five teams of wreckies were deployed in November 1983. They operated west of Kahama and east of the town near Malondo, around Kuvali, and even as far as Le Bunga. This created a problem for the SA Air Force, which was responsible for moving the five teams around Angoda. Each of these teams operated as a separate entity, and established their own tactical HQs at Sangonga, while the SA Air Force also had an HQ in the town, these were separate. The wreckies were used to doing their own thing, but Air Force Commander Dick Lord Grumble debunked coordinating evacuations, he pointed out that all the wrecky teams got into trouble, which were the Air Force support first, so eventually a single HQ was set up. There was another real effect of so many special force groups operating in southern Angoda. Swapo and Fapler picked up fairly quickly, that something really big was going on when one of these operator teams ended up in a firefight with Fapler near Kahama in November. When the Angolans realized it was the famed wreckies, all planned fighters immediately sought shelter inside Fopla Basis. The perception that something big was going on increased when 61 Mech rolled into southern Angola on the 8th of December, arriving in Zangonga, and such a large mechanized brigade on the move can't easily hide its presence. The Angolans realized straight away that their nemesis 61 Mech was in town, and they put two and two together. When the wreckies start moving in teams and numbers, then 61 Mech rumbles into town, expect fireworks. It's time to haul out a Google map of Angola, if you can, because as I explain what happened next, you're going to need to give an eye out where things are going down. There's a main road from Zangonga, which crosses the Kaneni River and heads off northwest towards Humber, and bends further west to Kahama, but 100 clicks further north. There's another smaller road out of Zangonga, heading north, northeast, which follows the Kaneni and up to Kalonga, then to Matala, which is on the main route east, west across Angola, and close to the Benguela road. The other main road out of Zangonga is almost directly east, and then Ben Sato and Jiva, which was the second major town held by the SEDF at this time. Head north from Angiva for 25 kilometres, and you arrive at Anghanka, turn left on the E N 120 highway and head north for another 25 kilometres, and you're in Ivali, and then about 80 kilometres further up the road is Kuvalai, another 50th Tetsumateti, and Tetsumateti is just south of Kasinka. All of these towns are going to feature in some way or another in Operation Eskari. If you look at the map, it's quite clear if you're defending this region from SEDF incursions launched from the border that the South Africans will refine any engagement to a fairly narrow band in the central area. They wouldn't head west, that's where the semi desert lies, and there's no one there, and also where the migs love to operate, nor are they going to head east because that's where you need to. So if there's going to be any attacking, it's almost directly north east, and north west, from both Zangonga and on Jiva, it's just a matter of deciding when the SEDF would be coming. Once the reiki activity was picked up, Swapu's defenses were triggered, the fact that the South Africans were going to launch an invasion in the middle of the rainy season was a novelty but not a surprise. When 61 mech rolled into Zangonga, alarm bells went off because Luwanda knew exactly what that meant. Brigadier Yuppia Bay, who commanded the operation, said the overall plan was for the SEDF to continue attacks for two months. This would hopefully isolate the various towns and bases, block ammunition and supplies, when the garrisons as he said, would wither on the vine, and they would have to abandon the towns. If a scurry had taken place inside a political vacuum, it may have worked, but as we all know, politics was very much on the commander's minds as the men prepared to go into attack. Yuppia briefed the officers. This was not a quick fix operation, but he had the political leadership on his back. Once a 61 mechs X-ray task force appeared in Zangonga, the unit moved off Duneurth and arrive near Kutevi on the 11th of December 1983. That's a hamlet alongside the Kineni River, and a faplum mortar team opened fire on them straight away. It was speculative shooting at best, and two impiler strike aircraft circling above then spotted something a little more serious. Two of the newly arrived T-54-55 tanks were moving towards the task force along with the company of infantry. This faplie company also saw the ground attack and parlors and took evasive action, but a mirage was overheard and dive bomb the tanks hitting one. Yuppia and his commanders were aware that there was an even stronger faplie force 50 kilometers north of Kutevi on the same road at Melondo, so it was imperative to act quickly. Combat group 2 immediately rolled up to Kutevi from the north, while combat team 1 remained behind to cut off any retreating faplie or swap her. When HQ was set up, an S-battery opened fire while the colleagues in our battery repositioned north east to prevent swap from escaping in that direction. The company of swap then ran into a wooded area just outside the town and began firing RPG-7s at the task force performing melting away. Kutevi fell shortly afterwards, taken with that much resistance and no casualties, and that was on the 16th of December. The next stop for X-ray was supposed to be Kahama, where faplies the 11th brigade awaited. That town was some distance away to the west, about 90 kilometers as the crow flies, and X-ray headed along the 20th northern parallel line as it was known to get there, it was going to be another 10 days before an assault took place. Meanwhile, 55 kilometers north east, task force Victor had begun an offensive against various faplie targets around Kuvali. They began bombarding the town on the 16th of December, hoping that the Angolan's wood would withdraw without a fight. The SAD of planners were going to be disappointed. The defenders were motivated and well protected by heavy weapons, artillery and missiles, and they weren't going anywhere. After an initial half hour bombardment from the west side of town, faplie gunners opened up in response. The 11th brigade used the battery of 57 and 23mm anti-aircraft weapons and two batteries of 122mm guns. A kind of Angolan standoff developed, and the wreckies then moved in together more intelligence. But on the 18th of December, they bumped into enemy units 20km south east of Kassinger, and pumors were called into airlift operators up. Commodan Farn Krayling of task force Victor decided to shift his units to the south, while their artillery continued bombarding faplie and trenched in Kuvali. Krayling was having problems with his artillery. They barely covered 20km in 6 hours because the guns were bogged down in the mud. Private group had driven along this route far quicker back in 1975 during operations of Anna, but things were not going as swimmingly now. This was a grinding approach, not the usual speed and flash that the SAD was known for, and it was only on the 22nd of December that Krayling's forces were in any position due directly assault Kuvali. The approach to the town is dominated by a flat expanse, or trees had been cut down, and the stumps were left a few feet above ground. That was a kind of anti-tank trap, because these could damage the bottom of the rifles, islands and buffles. And the defenders also kept up their tit-for-tat bombardments. No sooner had the South Africans finished their artillery assault on the 22nd, then faplie opened up in response. Krayling's task force Victor Vanguard was only 7km south west of the town, well within the range of faplie's artillery and things got very hairy, very quickly. Well, right now we have to halt and secure the perimeter, as you'll hear next episode the coming full assault on Kuvali was going to be extremely costly for both sides. Please rate the podcast on iTunes that helps make the series more visible. We can head off to abwarpodcross.com, and you can also message me on Twitter @destafem. Until next, goodbye.

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. Operation Ascari (December 1983) was a major SADF offensive in Angola, split into four phases, aimed at cutting off SWAPO/FAPLA logistics and forcing their withdrawal.
  2. The RPV (drone) "Gata" was used to locate SA-8 missiles, marking early drone warfare, but political delays postponed the operation from November 9 to December
  3. SADF intelligence underestimated SWAPO/FAPLA morale, which was boosted by new Soviet weapons (T-54/55 tanks, missile systems), making demoralization harder than in 198
  4. Three main task forces were deployed
  5. Rainy season mud and poor mobility of G4 artillery and Ratel vehicles slowed operations, leading to G4’s eventual retirement from conventional use.
  6. SWAPO/FAPLA forces were substantial, including 600+ special unit soldiers, Cuban advisors, tanks, SAM missiles, and MIG jets, posing a serious threat.
  7. The operation began with reconnaissance teams, but their presence and 61 Mech’s arrival alerted the enemy, triggering an early firefight near Kahama.
  8. Kutevi was taken on December 16 with minimal resistance, but Kuvula’s assault faced stiff defense, with artillery duels and mud hindering progress.

Summary:

Operation Ascari, launched by the SADF in December 1983, was a multi-phase offensive designed to disrupt SWAPO and FAPLA operations in southern Angola. The plan involved special forces reconnaissance, air strikes, and mechanized infantry to cut off enemy supply lines and force a retreat. However, the operation faced significant setbacks from the start.

Political negotiations delayed the start, and intelligence failed to recognize that SWAPO and FAPLA morale was high, bolstered by new Soviet weaponry, including T-54/55 tanks and advanced missile systems. The SADF deployed three task forces—X-ray, Victor, and Eco Victor—each with substantial firepower, but the rainy season turned the terrain into mud, slowing artillery and armored vehicles. The G4 artillery piece proved particularly problematic, bogging down in the mud and delaying attacks.

Initial successes, like the capture of Kutevi on December 16, were overshadowed by fierce resistance at Kuvula, where defenders used heavy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons to hold their ground. The SADF underestimated the enemy’s determination, and the assault on Kuvula became a grinding, costly affair. The episode highlights the complexities of modern warfare, where logistical challenges, intelligence failures, and determined adversaries can derail even the most well-planned operations.

FAQs

Operation Ascari was a significant SADF military operation in Angola starting in December 1983, aimed at cutting off SWAPO and FAPLA communication and logistics lines and forcing their withdrawal north.

The operation was originally planned for November 9, 1983, but political negotiations led to a postponement until December 9, 1983.

The RPV, an early drone, was used to monitor the Kahama area and detect the location of SA-8 missile systems sent by the Russians to the Angolans.

Phase 1 involved special forces reconnaissance and Air Force bombing of bases near Lubango; Phase 2 was offensive reconnaissance around key towns; Phase 3 aimed to reinforce gaps after the invasion; Phase 4 was to secure empty bases once SWAPO and FAPLA left.

The main challenges were the rainy season causing mud and cloud cover, and the poor mobility of vehicles like the G4 artillery piece, which slowed down critical attacks.

They were well-prepared with heavy weapons, including T-54/55 tanks, missile systems, and motivated troops, and they resisted strongly, as seen in the Battle of Kuvula where they did not withdraw easily.

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