Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 67. It's almost 1983, a year that would end with Operation Ascari. Last episode, we heard about the arrival of new Russian VIPs in Luanda in 1982 and how the SA Air Force had shot down the 2nd MiG in southern Angola. By now, 3-2 Battalion had set up their HQ at Atonjiva Airport, a few kilometers outside the town and 40km north of the cut line. But the battalion was going to move their mobile task force HQ further into Angola to Ayonde, as you're going to hear, and the signs were all there for what would become a pivotal year in the border war. It was during this period that Swapu would be driven out of much of the area north of the cut line and would be sent to the border with the SSS. Which would have political ramifications, both for Swapu and the South Africans. This area stretching from the Kalukia Dam and Zangongo in the west to just south of Kuvalai and Piticente in the north, then to Ayonde in the east, was eventually secured by the SADF. 3-2 Battalion was going to concentrate its operations mainly in the north around Mupa and Kuvalai. By now, one parachute battalion was also established at Zangongo, about 130km north of the cut line. If you recall, there was a friendly fire incident in 1982, where members of 3-2 Battalion and one parachute clashed. So from now on, these two specialist units were assigned to specific areas that never overlapped. Despite the SADF controlling Onjiva, Swapu continued to raid around the town. On December 4th, 1982, a Swapu stick attacked a small village south of Zangongo and then killed one civilian wounding four. Another civilian was shot in Onjiva in a raid. By Swapu, then on the 11th and 12th of December, two more contacts were reported nearby. Further to the east, Unita had taken control of most of southern Angola. By January 1983, Swapu had increased pressure further south by passing 3-2 Battalion and one parachute and then swinging around into southwest Africa. 14 separate Swapu planned platoons of around 50 men each entered Vomboland and Kabongo by February of 1983. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up operations chased most out of southwest Africa, but at least 100 had penetrated further south into the areas around Tsumeb, Otavi and Huitventain. Swapu's Bush Telegraph was in business once more, and the sections had made it into southwest Africa, avoiding contacts as the South Africans and SWATF troops swept the region. Once again, the Air Force was going to be vital, as well as Kufu's Zulu team, which had increased its actions across Vomboland. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF follow-up to the SADF was a success. The SADF wanted to force Swapu back into Angola from the south, and during February, forces were deployed north of the cut-line in an attempt at squeezing Swapu into a narrow zone. Planning shifted to Operation Bantam, which was a more direct assault on Swapu bases inside Angola. By now, UNITA and the SADF were working together in these attacks, and UNITA's Brigade HQ was in the Namaika and Naema area. Two companies of UNITA were based north of Angola, and one and a half companies at Chitando. And despite South Africa's constant propaganda that these men were soldiers fighting a war against the MPLA, they acted more like local bandits, at least according to 3-2 battalion vets who've written about this. They claim 3-2 was far more instrumental in attacking FAPLA targets than would allow UNITA to take credit. There's a lot of debate about this, but it's fair to say that both UNITA and 3-2 were actively pushing FAPLA and Swapu, out of southern Angola. But incidents in early 1983 proved that both Swapu and FAPLA had managed to infiltrate the region around Onjiba. On the 10th of January 1983, for example, a 3-2 battalion armoured personnel carrier hit a landmine, injuring eight soldiers. Then on the 12th, a buffal carrying Platoon 4 of 1 Parachute Battalion triggered another landmine around Zangongo, injuring a soldier there. Alpha, Delta and Echo companies of 3-2 battalion were inside Angola. Alpha, Delta and Echo companies of 3-2 battalion were inside Angola, along with three platoons of 1 Parachute Battalion. Onjiba had turned into a vital tactical headquarters and was protected by 3 SA Infantry Battalion 81mm Motor Group, a 3-2 battalion 81mm team, 61 Mech Battalion armoured vehicles, along with maintenance troops, sappers, signalers and other support personnel. Then on the 4th of February, a larger battle took place between Platoon 3 Alpha Company and 40 Swapu guerrillas. At least six enemy were killed, four were captured, but 3-2 sustained four casualties themselves, including a bizarre incident, where Lance Corporal Mario Oliveira turned into a living bomb. He was hit in the shoulder by an M60 rifle grenade that buried itself in his chest. This projectile is around 15 inches long and around 2 inches wide with plastic fins at the back for stability. His men called for a CASAVAC and the critically injured Lance Corporal was evacuated in a puma. The grenade could have exploded at any second, but the medic said, that the M60 was still deep in his body. The antibiotics who treated him had no idea that the M60 was still lodged inside him. A drain was inserted to allow some of the blood building up around his lungs to drain. He was also placed on a drip and then shot up with antibiotics. His condition seemed to stabilise. The unfortunate Oliveira was flown all the way to Oshikati where doctors prepped him for surgery. As they carefully probed around his wound, plastic fins emerged, and for the first time they realised that the M60 was still deep in his body. Surgery was halted, as an explosives expert was called in and identified the fins as those of the M60 grenade. X-rays then confirmed this and the surgery was evacuated, while the anaesthetist, Captain Kurs Reiniker, and the chief surgeon, Captain Paul Eilof, stayed behind to treat the Lance Corporal. Oliveira was conscious throughout this experience. Then sandbags and armoured plates from a buffal were set up around Oliveira to protect the operating team, who were joined by Major de Villiers, and Staff Sergeant Lübe. Meanwhile, the rest of the medical staff were sent a safe distance away. It takes a great deal of courage to begin saving the life of a man who technically should have blown up a human bomb as a patient. Oliveira didn't think he was going to make it. First a hole was burned into the plastic fins and a cable was inserted and placed through a pulley in the roof of the theatre. You can see where this is going. So spare thought for Oliveira, who was still conscious. As the operating team took cover behind the buffal's steel plates, they slowly pulled the M60 grenade out of Lance Corporal Oliveira's chest. Amazingly, this projectile had penetrated his left shoulder and both lungs, but it missed his heart and his ribs, and was resting inside his body against his right ribcage. Had the grenade hit his ribs, it would have exploded, but the soft tissue meant that the firing pin was not pressed deeply enough to set it free. If you didn't believe in God before this, perhaps you did afterwards. Shrapnel from an M60, for example, can kill up to 50 meters, let alone buried deep inside the target. Major de Villiers received the honoris crux for his actions. Ilhoff and Reinecke were citizen force troops, and they both received the Southern Cross Medal for devotion to duty. As Maria Schieper notes in her book Striking Inside Angola with 3-2 Battalion, there's a tragic end to the situation. Here's a story. Twenty-one years after the surgery, in 2004, Captain Paul Ilhoff, the chief surgeon who saved Oliveira, was at home in Poloquani having retired from the S.A.N.D.F. when an oxygen cylinder that was near him exploded and he died in that incident. All those years later, it took a civilian action to kill this highly experienced medic. Throughout the first quarter of 1983, there were constant contacts between 3-2 and 1 Para, and Swapo and Fapo. This continued through March and into April. Then in late April, the South Africans launched Operation Dolphine, determined to reduce the number of enemy around Onjiva. They wanted to hit Swapo in particular, and the Rikis had discovered a Swapo base 80 kilometers north of Mupa. This op began in earnest on the 30th of April, when three companies, one 81 millimeter mortar team and three Riki teams were choppered into a helicopter administration area south of the Colonga River. This HAA was shifted northward. This was done on the 2nd of May, while one Riki team checked out the high ground and a river weir nearby. Eventually, the entire force joined them on the 2nd of May. In the next contacts, 3-2's Platoon 3 Charlie Company was operating alongside Foxtrot, and around 60 Swapo soldiers were spotted, and a battle ensued. One enemy soldier was wounded, the rest melted away. Through May, scattered incidents took place in Ovamberland, and by now a large number of S.A.D.F. were inside the base. After the battle, a large number of other S.A.D.F. were deployed to the base, and a large number of other S.A.D.F. were deployed to the base. The S.A.D.F. battalions of the 2nd World War became a symbol of South Africa's ability to take control of a foreign country's territory. At the same time, 3-2 battalions' core officer component were concerned that they were not as effective now that there was such a large volume of S.A.D.F. around the southern Angolan town. 3-2's strength lay in mobility, where the specialist troops would be hidden, operating unseen. Instead, they were being visited on a weekly basis by S.A.D.F. top brass who had been and all the activity was being duly noted by FAPLA and SWAPA local spies. Captain Willem Ratter, who commanded 3-2's recce wing, eventually had enough and wrote a report about this. He had begun to eye IONDE as a possible new base for the Specialist Battalion, and said so in a report he titled, Viability Study for the Mobile Task Force at 3-2 Battalion HQ IONDE. This hamlet was ideal, he said, because it would mean smaller units could be deployed, and they could reduce the number of machines around the place, thereby also reducing noise and tracks. He was concerned that the large number of 61 Mech and other vehicles were giving the game away when it came to quietly moving around the bush. Ratter said he needed only three buffals with mounted machine guns to lead this expansion northeast, backed up by the SAF was flying Pumas and Aleut gunships where required. At first, the SOD of Topras thought this was a bad idea. Remember, they were constantly fretting about the geopolitical effect of the action of the soldiers. However, in spite of their misgivings, Ratter's wish was granted. 3-2 Battalion's tactical HQ was shifted to IONDE, which is 120 kilometers north of the cut line and northeast of Anjiba, midway between Ivali, which lay west, and Canavete, to the east. That put it in a significant 170 kilometers away from 3-2's main base at Oumauni in southwest. IONDE had been seized by the South Africans during Operation Protea on the 25th of August, 1981, and it's smaller than a one-horse town. There were only three buildings near a gravel airstrip, and that was about it. One building was turned into a radio room, the second served as a store, and the third became a kitchen. The SADF then built a series of underground bunkers, and everything was heavily camouflaged. The most of the equipment was light enough to be moved rapidly just in case, they came under attack. Ratter's original plan had called for this base to be used as a moving platform, then to be shifted quite rapidly, but it turned out that 3-2 was going to be operating there for more than a year. The main challenge was logistics. Men at this forward base could not expect chopper flights into the area too regularly, so they ended up storing around 10,000 rat packs and a 10,000 liter water bladder, amongst other items. The base was duly set up and ready for business, by mid-June 1983, and it was on the 17th of June of the same year, a day after the official inauguration of this new forward tactical HQ, that an incident would highlight the complexities of fighting a war so far inside enemy territory. Everything was going well, thought the men of Ayonde. A dozen or so supply vehicles were on their way, including Queerfuel and Sarmel 100 transport trucks that were delivering supplies, fuel, ammunition and spare parts. That was supposed to be a one-off. From then on, they'd be on their own for weeks without being resupplied. So a few trucks rolled in and entered the base, when one by one they began to detonate enemy anti-tank mines. 3-2's Ayonde base was actually in the middle of an enemy minefield, which the sappers had missed because of the depth the mines were buried. The boots of the troops hadn't set them off, but the fully laden trucks did. The sappers duly swept the area once more, and declared it safe. But less than a week later, more vehicles triggered mines, and in one incident, communications troop Mario Skippers was walking in front of a Sarmel close to the airstrip when the Sarmel detonated an anti-tank mine. Skippers was thrown off his feet, and when the dust cleared he found he was lying near the truck, covered with sand and debris, bits of rubber in his hair and face. For a comms man, this was a big problem. His hearing in one eardrum had been damaged. It was a four-day trip by truck back to the base at Buffalo, close to the Caprivi airstrip, around 500km east of Ayonde, should he need to seek medical assistance. So every six weeks new troops would travel to Ayonde, having survived a four-day epic journey bundo-bashing, their style duck helmets causing intense neck pain as the trucks bounced through the bush. On the 4th of July, the folks at this base were in for a surprise. During the night, they spotted lights, and these appeared to be a FAPLA brigade on the move. Nights can do strange things to soldiers' eyes, and this night was no different. A large FAPLA contingent was based at Caoundo, about 100km northeast, and the base commander believed this motorized brigade was heading their way. Two Impalas scrambled and flew over, firing air-to-ground missiles at the lights. It turned out the lights were actually a bushfire, twinkling in the distance, like a mischievous mirage. Eventually, the battalion commander requested air force try and supply the base. These four-day treks, one way, were becoming more and more difficult. So in October 1983, the SA air force began shuttling troops. Four Pumas were deployed between Onjiva and Ayonde, while two Dakotas headed to Ayonde from Ondangwa. The aircraft dropped off three new companies at the forward base and picked up the men being cycled back to Ondangwa. It took up to 16 hours to complete this logistic journey, and again battalion approached SA-DF command suggesting C-160s should be used, which would slash the number of shuttle flights. But this meant these highly valuable planes would be exposed at Onjiva, so the SA air force said it was a no-go, only Pumas and Dakotas allowed. There was always something happening at Ayonde. One day, a Dakota, who was in the area, arrived, and as usual a smoke grenade was fired to show the pilot the direction of the wind. A windsock was not used, because this would of course give the game away, having a permanent sock flapping about. As the Dakota approached upwind, which is how planes land, the wind reversed to a strong tailwind. The plane suddenly seemed to accelerate straight towards the commanding officer, Captain Hohart. Behind him were the bladder tanks containing Avgas. Hohart leapt out of the plane, but the pilot managed to spin the Dakota 180 degrees at the last minute, using what's known as a ground loop, and just missed the fuel bladder. A short while later, there was a 60mm mortar practice session, and the bomb landed spot on target. The problem was, it was the wrong target. It hit the water bladder, and left the troops without drinking water for days. While all of this was going on, the SA air force was planning a new weapons platform. While all of this was going on, the SA air force was planning a new weapons platform. A 20mm cannon was installed on a Dakota DC-3. Up to now, the Alouette gunships had provided top cover for troops on the ground for years, but they had a major drawback. Because the cannon and its ammo were so heavy, the Alouettes had to take off with a light fuel load, and could only stay airborne for around 90 minutes in total. That's why the Ayonde Tactical Base was stocked with thousands of litres of aviation fuel, and while the police Khufut and Army Romeo Mark teams carried drums of aviation turbine fuel with them. It was often at the most critical moments in a battle that the Alouettes were forced to refuel, and that led to SWAPO and FAPLO making good their escape. A new Dakota conversion project was overseen by Commandant Boy Duprier, officer commanding a 44 squadron at SWATCOP. He was to install the cannon mounted in the cargo and passenger door on the left-hand side of the aircraft. Then they had to figure out how best to fly this weapons platform. Major Tinus Dutoi, who had spent 14 years in operational duty as a chopper gunship pilot, was the go-to when it came to figuring out how best to use the new air-to-ground attack system. To be effective, the plane had to orbit left, providing both the pilots in the left seat and the gunner with the best options, as they viewed a target on the ground. Then they had to figure out limitations in vertical and horizontal deployment. If the pilot banked too much, the gunner would lose sight of the target. Too little, same problem. However, if the pilot pivoted on a fixed angle, they'd be an easier target for an RPG or a missile, so a practical solution had to be found. The captains switched seats to the co-pilot's position on the right, then varied the angle of bank and managed to keep a target visual through a small window on the left side of the flight deck. By doing so, they could still turn tightly and deploy evasive maneuvers and have the target in sight. The Dakota pilots were not trained to be attack aviators. They'd been flying support missions as logistics. Now they were thrown into the mix as full-blooded air-to-ground support attack staff. As Dick Lord, the SA Air Force commander, said later, "That involved a significant change of culture." These pilots were not shot at that often. Now they had to think about ground fire from AK-47s, RPG-7s, anti-tank rockets, and SAM-7 heat-seeking missiles, as well as anti-aircraft batteries. The Dakota now had a 20mm cannon stuck in its door, and some maths was used to figure out how enemy fire would affect the Dakota. It was eventually calculated that Swarper and Feibler would have to aim around seven or eight aircraft lengths ahead of the new slow-flying gun ship if it was at a thousand feet in order to hit the plane, while SAM-7 threats were reduced by adding the anti-strella modifications to the DC-3 exhaust system. The first "blooding" of the plane that became known as the Dragon exceeded expectations. On the 4th of August took her from Ndangwa at 12 hours 1945, joined by a member of Khufud who was on board as what was known as Sky Shout in radio contact with his men on the ground. Khufud Zulu was on the ground in Kaspers, and the official call sign of the Alouettes were gunship. So what to call the Dakota? The crew aboard immediately said they were Dragon, taken from the well-known Puff the Magic Dragon American aircraft used in Vietnam. The Dragon went into its orbit at a thousand feet just across the cut line. Below was Khufud. There were also two Alouette gunships operating from 50 feet up to 500 feet. A SWAPO platoon was hidden in nearby vegetation, and on board the Dragon, the gunner prepped the 20mm cannon. He had thousands of rounds available and was unlikely to run out of ammo. First, the Dragon used its huge PA system to broadcast the demand that the SWAPO platoon surrender, but they ignored the invitation. Flight Sergeant Mardovec swung the 20mm into position and peppered the thick bush below. Next moment, men began running from the bush, trying to escape its high rate of fire. With the enemy now in full view, the Dragon, along with the two Alouette gunships, took full toll, and the bloody encounter was short and conclusive. I can't find a complete description of just how many casualties were reported after this incident. And yet, SWAPO was remarkably able to penetrate all these buffer zones, and worse, they had begun to blow up infrastructure around places like Grootfontein and Undangwa. Once again, major plans were afoot to try and drive them from Ovambelad. Operation Ascari moved into planning phase, and what happened next is for episode 68. Please rate the podcast on iTunes, it makes the series more visible, or you can head off to abwarpodcast.com or direct message me on Twitter at Des Latham. Until next, goodbye. Thanks for watching!
PodcastTranscript AI