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Episode 65 – Ops Meebos where SWAPO AA fire downs a Puma

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Episode 65 – Ops Meebos where SWAPO AA fire downs a Puma

In mid-1982, South African forces launched Operation Meaboss to counter Fuplar and Swapo forces in southern Angola, targeting key command centers and supply routes around Zangongo and Anjiba. The operation involved complex phases, including reconnaissance, airborne drops, and ground assaults, with a focus on disrupting enemy logistics and command structures. A deadly friendly fire incident early in the operation revealed coordination failures, while enemy forces remained well-hidden in dense bush, protected by minefields and anti-aircraft guns. On 2 August, a catastrophic incident occurred when a Puma helicopter was struck by anti-aircraft fire during a return flight, killing 15 South African troops—among the deadliest single events in the Border War. This attack, which took place near the Mueh River, revealed a critical intelligence failure and left the South African Air Force exposed. The operation culminated in a successful ambush of a Fuplar logistics convoy, destroying multiple trucks and killing 35 soldiers, though it triggered international criticism when the MPLA accused South Africa of invading Angola. The political fallout intensified pressure on Pretoria, and the tragic Puma loss underscored the high human cost and tactical risks of deep operations in hostile terrain. The episode ends with a somber reflection on the lives lost—many of the fallen paratroopers were just 19 or 20 years old—highlighting the brutal realities of the conflict and the enduring legacy of its human toll.

Transcription

3296 Words, 19143 Characters

English
Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Tess Latham. This is episode 65. We're back in 1982 after Ann Hiatus covering the seaborne operations and an update from the SA Air Force, which had had a rather busy May as you heard in episode 64. Things on the ground in South West Africa showed that Swapar was almost fully recovered from the hammering they had taken during Operation Protier. The own operation had killed three farmers and eight security force personnel around the bombardland in the Triangle of Death. Three two battalion continued to carry out a number of projects, and in particular the long-term operations Spiderweb Hearts and Mines Initiative in the Kavanga, which I spoke about last episode. A number of other ops were planned to take place back-to-back and code-named Operation Meaboss, which had actually started in March aimed at the area around Zangongo Humbai and Anjiba. The aim of Operation Meaboss was to keep Fuplar out of the two main southern Angolan towns Zangongo and Anjiba, which had been seized during Operation Protier in an area of Angolans called the 50 Military Region. The secondary aim was to pinpoint and destroy enemy headquarters and caches and to disrupt logistics, while there was a considered attempt at turning the southern Angolans against their own government. Meaboss was actually conducted in two main parts. Meaboss I was broken into five stages, first reconnaissance and the setup of a helicopter administration area, second an airborne operation by a paratroopers north of the cutline, then a full assault followed by a mopping up and finally, over the drool south of Boopa. The closest enemy brigades of the Fortsas Amaras, Papialara Stalevuk, Zakao, Angola, or Fuplar were entrenched at Kahama and Kettevi across the Canani River to the west, and Kuvalai Techa Mateti Kasinga to the north Menong to the northeast and Kaundur to the east of Kaubangar River. Joining there in Angolans were some Cubans and it was the combined Fuplar Cuban conventional power at Kuvalai and Techa Mateti and Kasinga, which could really interfere with Operation Meaboss. It's ironic though that the biggest loss in the upcoming upwards actually caused by a Swapo team armed with anti-aircraft guns as you're going to hear. Operation Meaboss launched in full on the 13th of July and was planned to run for more than a month until 25 August 1982. The fury of a combined counterinsurgency task force was directed at Swapo's command and control systems, Rund, Mupa, Kuvalai and Techa Mateti. If you look at the map, the target area was demarcated by following the line of the Kuvalai River, north eastwards towards Indungu, to the densely covered terrain north west of the Kaundur River and Techa Mateti. This was going to be a difficult project because Swapo and Fuplar were hidden together in Thickbush and they were well entrenched and camouflaged from the ground and the air. Furthermore, their positions were protected all round by defensive fire layouts and minefields. By June and a fortnight before Meaboss kicked off the contacts and firefights were registering on a weekly basis. It was on the 25th of June that Alpha 1 platoon of 3-2 battalion was involved in a friendly fire incident while operating in central Angoda. That's because it was where Falcon Group 3 from Alpha Company of 1 parachute battalion were also patrolling. A firefight broke out between these two sets of soldiers with Corporal James Conroy of 3-2 battalion and AP Manual of Alpha 1 were killed in the shootout. 4-3-2 was deploying in a wide ranging area. It was a terrible but understandable incident. Both sets of highly trained troops would not have been in radio contact at that time, but the deaths were a warning to the planners to ensure operations were more effectively managed. In preparation for Operation Meaboss, two companies from 3-2 battalion and a company from 1-1 parachute battalion were destined to operate as the main strike force and the command of Colonel Jan Biterser. The main tactic was to use sequential, pure, born assaults and each would be supported by allied gunships. By July 1982, Swapar's central area headquarters was on the move and known to be in the area summary around Ivali, Mooper or Kuvala. Orders from their main HQ at La Bunga were quite clear they had to keep moving daily to avoid the SDF and the SAF and the wreckies. Several Swapar activities were also reported in that vast area north west of Kuvala towards the Kalonga River. And the man responsible for discovering the first base was Captain Wilmerata, head of 3-2's recon team and the SADF named the objective "Smelling Rat". This enemy target lay on the southern bank of the fast-flowing Kalonga River, the same river that flows past Kasinger. The enemy base was found by Rat on the 30th of July. It was 30 km southwest of Tecumuteti and about 20 km off the main road, Kuvala. The indefatigable Rat has been dropped above the cutline and walked 30 km eventually finding the Swapar base near Mooper. He was wearing captured enemy boots with the souls that had been glued on back to front. Employing this sort of trick was not unusual for Rat, it cut his special forces teeth fighting for the salue scouts in the redision bushel. Rata lurked close to the enemy base taking notes and dispatching radio calls and short bursts via an impala relay aircraft that was flying above 30,000 feet. The other bush telegraph, however, that kicked into gear at this point belonged to Swapu and they were going to react shortly. Swapu's base, the one that had just been codenamed "Smelling Rat", was going to be attacked by air using 85 parent troopers from alpha company of one parrot battalion. A C-160 transport plane was prepped, the parrot troopers climbed aboard and then the plane took off. But it flew back a short while later because a suitable drop zone had not been found. The wreckies eventually managed to set up a helicopter administrative area, or HAA, 20 km north east of Evali and about the same distance away from the Swapu base, which was spotted in extremely dense bush on the banks of the Jamba River. The helicopter administrative area was 280 km from the airfield at Undungwa in South West Africa, so the flying time was close to 55 minutes. One parrot alpha company was going in for the attack after an aerial bombardment by Mirajas and Canberra's. The parabets were chopped in by Puma helicopters led by Captain Eric Rabi, while six aloet gunships would keep an eye out for the fleeing enemy soldiers. But Swapu had spotted the South African setting up the helicopter administrative area and on the morning of the 31st of July they alerted Fubla, who began shelling the South Africans from west of Kubele. The first bombardment fell around 700 metres away and aloet gunship pilot Captain Neil Ellis suggested moving the HAA a few kilometers east, which they did immediately. Mupa base was being watched by Rutta in the meantime and the final date for the assault was set for 2nd August 1982. Just before midday on that date, Brigadier Wittgop modernist joined Captain Neil Ellis in the command aloet and they took off. Immediately as the air attack went in, the Mirajas and the gunships started drawing fire from enemy 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns and RPG7 rockets. Puma's managed to drop the first company under the command of Captain Rabi and a fierce firefight developed. The Puma's flew back to the HAA area and returned with a stick of parent troopers from the company of Major Jab Swarth, but they were engaged as they hit the ground. A massive bushfire had started caused by the bombing in the Tracer rounds, making it more difficult to advance and then both sets of parabets were in danger from the blaze. Eventually the SCDF managed to prevail and overcome the Mupa base and 61 Mech Commander Ruralant de Fris says a 3-2 battalion soldier was killed and 2 were wounded, but SCDF records shirt was a parabet who was shot. Depends of Swapar had died and a large booty of weapons and ammunition were captured. The M3-2 and the Rikis declared the area south of Kuvalae free from Fuplar and Swapar after a few more days of skirmishes. On the afternoon of the 2nd of August, intelligence was received that Fuplar's 11th brigade at Kuvalae was calling for reinforcements. Fuplar was going to dispatch a large logistics convoy from Tetumatetti that same night to replenish 11 Brigade under the cover of darkness and 61 Mech was tasked with ambushing the convoy. But its commander realized there was no way to move his entire battalion into position quickly enough. Although they and goons were going to travel at the 60 km from Tetumatetti to Kuvalae. That was taking a big gamble. It was decided to drop onto the 61 Mech platoons in a possible ambush position on the Tetumatetti Kuvalae gravel road and commanded de Fris as for the Pumas to fly a one more sortie over the target area. And then for the Mirages to support his men just before first light the next day. Alpha Company commander Captain Jan Malan was ordered to rush to the ambush location, which was around 13 km north of Kuvalae, you arrive there dusk. Malan set up his platoon in close order and a huge trees alongside the road inside dense cover. There were only 25 metres from the road. Two infantry sections with RPG-7s were awaiting the convoy. Along with three light machine guns, laid out an extended formation parallel to the road. The 60-millimeter mortar section had placed their tubes close to Malan's HQ under control of the platoon sergeant. The third infantry section was deployed in a half-moon formation behind the front force to to keep an eye on. eye art for Fouplish, should the enemy try a flanking maneuver during the ambush. The South Africans didn't have time to dig foxholes. They hurriedly filled sandbags with loose sand and placed these in front of them for cover against possible enemy fire. As you can see here, it's fortunate they did this. Then the sappers laid tripped flares in the tree line alongside the road, and they laid up, waiting for the follow-up convoy. They all had a fitful night expecting the Angolins at any moment. It was only at 0530 the next day that they heard the engines of the enemy convoy approaching from the north. As Captain Milan wrote in his report later, "All in the ambushing party were wide awake by now. Nerves on end. Excitements were stirding amongst us at adrenaline surging." Milan quickly redeployed his third infantry section to the north flank to protect the main ambush force against any counterattack. All the troops by now had packed their kit, and were carrying a rucksacks on their backs. Once the contact was over, the platoon was going to head off at speed in the southeastly direction through the bush. At about 0545, the first two enemy vehicles entered the killing zone directly in front of the South Africans, who could hear the drivers changing gears and the trucks further back, as the front engines slowed, heading up a small rise. It was still dark, pre-dorn, and the trucks had their lights off when Milan gave the order to fire. Two Russian-made Ural trucks were hit with machine guns and RPG 7s, while the two Claimal mines laid earlier, also detonated. The remains of the exploding enemy vehicles were clearly silhouetted by the blazing tripflares and the trees. Massive explosions rippled as the trucks were loaded with mortar rounds and artillery shells, throwing a huge volume of shrapnel into the bush. Miraculously, none of the South Africans were hit by this cloud of steel. The 60-mull patrol mortar started firing speculatively on the enemy convoy further to the north and chaos ensued. Tracks turned around, some colliding, as far plus soldiers tried to get out of the killing field. The survivors turned in an attempt to escape north back towards Tetch Matetti away from the Pandemonium in front. Milan then gave the order to cease fire and the killing group withdrew in an orderly fashion along the south-eastern route. The flanking section continued firing for a few minutes then followed. After a 3-kilometre hike, the South Africans turned, doubling back on their tracks. That's an old trick. Just in case Foupler was following. They weren't. Meanwhile, two mirages had taken off from a dungway heading towards the gravel road, along with a command allowette of Neil Ellis, flying along with Komodantorola and Tafris. They caught some of the Foupler soldiers on the ground, and Tafris said later, "I momentarily felt a pang of sorrow for the hapless. It was a turkey shoot. Who was stupid enough to have given the ill-fated command to travel the road of death through the night?" Two-year-old trucks were left behind intact, and the SADF found tons of Norwegian tuna fish and spaghetti from Spain, amongst the bits and pieces of Foupler uniform. Seven other Russian Urals were found by the platoon in the surrounding bushes, and a few that were too badly damaged to drive were destroyed by RPG7s. Ellis and his new part-time crew member, Roland Tafris, flew north on the Kovalai road and spotted about 11 more trucks which had turned around, and were heading back to the town. Allerid gunships armed with 20-millimeter cannons sprayed these. 35 men from 61 Mech, along with help from the SA Air Force, had destroyed an entire convoy. The officers were congratulating each other and when they received some bad news. Lwanda's MPLA government had complained to the United Nations that the SADF had invaded their country, and the political leadership in Pretoria was now under pressure. Foreign Minister Pick-Butter was actually in Washington at that time, and the slight reprimand was sent to the SADF, which of course caused some anger and more confusion. I mentioned this before, but the fighting inside Angola was confusing for the South African troop. They were highly trained and successfully dealing with battle, only to be told by the political leadership they were fighting too hard. They had to avoid hitting Foupler, although Swapo had taken to merging with the Angolans when the fighting started. And Swapo knew that the SADF had been ordered to avoid attacking Foupler, and yet something far more desperate awaited. On the 9th of August, the SADF was still searching for the mobile Swapo headquarters inside Angola, and 61 Mech was still east of the Kuvalai Determatetti Road, somewhere close to the Mueh River. Captain Villemurata and the Scouts of Three Jubitalian were hunting the infamous Bravo battalion of Swapo, the main enemy 61 Mech had sought and had had a few skirmishes with during Operation Daisy in November 1981. Both sides were aware of the other, it was an intense dislike, you could say. They were in the bush somewhere, but had escaped so far. Ratana shifted his search area to the north west of Kuvalai, and found tracks only two hours from 61 Mech's layup position. The South Africans launched an operation into the area using Puma Helicopters in an attempt to flush Swapo out of their hiding place. The Aloeid gunships operated as close air support once more. Eight Puma's began to fire soldiers of both Three Jubitalian and one parachute battalion into a target zone north of the Mueh River, 15 kilometres west of the Kuvalai Determatetti Road. What these pilots didn't know was that their route not only took them over the dry riverbed of the Mueh River, it also took them over a heavily armed Swapo anti-aircraft position. The enemy was lurking in bush near the riverbed, a few kilometres from where 61 had stopped, and neither side was aware of the other at this point. The Puma's dropped the first sections and flew back to the Helicopter Administrative area, then returned, but made the fatal decision to follow the same route back along the Mueh Riverbed. But this time Swapo was ready. The enemy anti-aircraft fire suddenly erupted from below and slammed into the second Puma piloted by Captain John Twuddle. The Puma broken too, pitched up then plummeted to the ground where it exploded and burst into flames. Three SAF was crewmembers, and twelve paratroopers were killed. Fifteen South Africans died in that Puma, the biggest single incident death of the entire border war this far. The response from the SADF was immediate, out of it gunships were on the scene in minutes, and a large group of Swapo were seen dancing around the Puma. Swapo's anti-aircraft guns continued to blaze away. Sixty-one Mac mobilized. They were 23 kilometres east of the crashed Puma, but they arrived in time to see the Aloyte's circling. The gunships, though, were running short of fuel as 61 Mac arrived, about an hour after the Puma went down. Meanwhile, Swapo's anti-aircraft guns had been withdrawn, and the first SADF soldiers on the scene found an area strewn with empty 14.5mm shell cases. The whole area was covered with a chevron brute print of Swapo, of the enemy themselves. There was no other sign. As Roland de Vies, the commander of 61 Mac, pondered the conage, a rattle-90 commander by second lieutenant devolved vitamin approached. He was one of the troop commanders of Captain Chris Dutoy of Charlie Squadron. Vitamin just mounted and began walking in Dutoy's direction, as Captain Dutoy shouted at Vitamin to stop. The second lieutenant stepped on a landmine, which blew his foot and bottom of his torso away. He lived for a few seconds, but the wounds were too extreme, and then he died. This Puma incident had not cost the SADF 16 men. A few meters away, drag marks could be seen. One of the paratroopers had apparently survived and been dragged to a tree where he had been shot through the forest. So 61 Mac began to clear away the remains of the 16 men, but they didn't have enough body-backed. The Puma was called in, and eventually the bodies were flown back to South West Africa. A roll call later would show that Puma crew men, Captain John Twidal, Lieutenant Chris Peterson and Flat Engineer Sergeant Krobe's Krobalah had perished along with one pair of battalion's corporal S. Suas Lombard, Lance Krobele Stephen Haw, and Raffelman Andrei Walmarrans, Grant Krill, Craig Moody, Andrei Sumayas Fanique, Antoine Krier, Martin Leroux, James Marshall, Alan DeClack, Shane Patrick Melon, and Raffel Hilton Barrett. The parabets were all from one parachute battalion, and on Tuesday, the north of August 2022, it will be 40 years to the day since they died. Most were aged 19 to 21 years old, so the oldest parabet would now be 61. In this series I couldn't name all those, obviously, on other side who died, the deaths all those in the many thousands. And this one moment, however, in the Border War series, must surely symbolise the carnage. They did not go quietly into the night, but we do hope they rest in peace. We'll wrap up Operation Mewborson Episode 66, and then step back to take a broader view of what was going on around South Africa in late 1982. Please rate the podcast on iTunes and make the series more visible. We can head off to abwarpodcast.com and email me there. Oh, if you're in a rush, direct message me on Twitter @dezled. Until next, must pay. (upbeat music)

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. Operation Meaboss, launched in July 1982, aimed to eliminate Fuplar and Swapo forces in southern Angola, particularly around Zangongo and Anjiba, while disrupting enemy logistics and attempting to create internal dissent.
  2. A major friendly fire incident on 25 June involving Alpha 1 platoon and a parachute unit highlighted poor coordination, resulting in casualties and prompting operational reforms.
  3. The operation faced significant challenges due to well-camouflaged and entrenched enemy positions, extensive anti-aircraft defenses, and a tragic Puma helicopter crash on 2 August when a Swapo anti-aircraft unit ambushed returning aircraft, killing 15 South African troops and leading to deep operational and political repercussions.

Summary:

In mid-1982, South African forces launched Operation Meaboss to counter Fuplar and Swapo forces in southern Angola, targeting key command centers and supply routes around Zangongo and Anjiba. The operation involved complex phases, including reconnaissance, airborne drops, and ground assaults, with a focus on disrupting enemy logistics and command structures. A deadly friendly fire incident early in the operation revealed coordination failures, while enemy forces remained well-hidden in dense bush, protected by minefields and anti-aircraft guns.

On 2 August, a catastrophic incident occurred when a Puma helicopter was struck by anti-aircraft fire during a return flight, killing 15 South African troops—among the deadliest single events in the Border War. This attack, which took place near the Mueh River, revealed a critical intelligence failure and left the South African Air Force exposed. The operation culminated in a successful ambush of a Fuplar logistics convoy, destroying multiple trucks and killing 35 soldiers, though it triggered international criticism when the MPLA accused South Africa of invading Angola.

The political fallout intensified pressure on Pretoria, and the tragic Puma loss underscored the high human cost and tactical risks of deep operations in hostile terrain. The episode ends with a somber reflection on the lives lost—many of the fallen paratroopers were just 19 or 20 years old—highlighting the brutal realities of the conflict and the enduring legacy of its human toll.

FAQs

The main objective was to keep Fuplar out of the southern Angolan towns of Zangongo and Anjiba, which had been seized during Operation Protier, and to destroy enemy headquarters, caches, and logistics networks.

Key challenges included heavily fortified and camouflaged enemy positions, dense bush terrain, defensive fire layouts, minefields, and friendly fire incidents that highlighted poor coordination.

On 25 June 1982, a firefight broke out between Alpha 1 platoon of 3-2 battalion and Falcon Group 3 of the parachute battalion, resulting in the deaths of Corporal James Conroy and AP Manual, which led to operational changes in coordination.

Captain Wilmerata, leading a reconnaissance team, located the base on 30 July near Mooper, 30 km southwest of Tecumuteti. It was significant as the first confirmed enemy command base targeted in Operation Meaboss.

The SADF successfully captured the Mupa base on 2 August 1982, killing a Swapar commander, wounding two soldiers, and capturing large amounts of weapons and ammunition, declaring the area south of Kuvalae free of Fuplar and Swapar.

On 3 August 1982, 61 Mech ambushed a Fuplar convoy near Kuvalae using concealed infantry and mortars, destroying 11 trucks and killing 35 enemy soldiers, though it triggered political controversy due to UN complaints.

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