Episode 58 – SWAPOs “Danger” Ashipala switches tactics as he dispatches 150 men to the Triangle of Death

Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me your host, Deaths Latham. This is episode 58. As you heard last episode, Swiper Insurgents were about to head south from various points north of the Toshapan, aiming at the farming area in the Triangle of Death. As Napoleon Bonaparte said, "You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war." By now Swiper and the SDF had pulled each other since 1966, and both sides had learned from each other. Because of this, April of 1982 would turn into a bloodbath in the Triangle of Death. The impetus started far away in Lubungo in Sidingola. That's the town with a statue of Christ that replicates the famous Rio statue, just a little smaller. It rises 30 meters into the air, arms wide, welcoming visitors. It was under the shadow of this statue, more than 700 kilometers from Tsumib and the Triangle of Death, that plans were afoot. 12 kilometers outside Lubungo is a town called Humpata, and further south of this, lay the Swiper base called Volcano. Just a little background, Humpata is where the Dorslan trekkers of 1881 had arrived, after they had left the Transvall in 1873, searching for a new, booed, promised land, tired of being chased through Africa by the British. Humpata and Lubungo lie in the humid, subtropical parts of Angola north of the desert lands. The trekkers had headed to this area, as you heard in one of my earlier podcasts, because the Portuguese colonial authorities, at the time, had invited them. By 1885, most of these trekkers would be leaving the area for a number of reasons. One was the climate, the other was that the colonial authorities wanted their children to be taught in Portuguese and not Dutch, and they'd just left a region where the English were trying to enforce language rules already. So some of these Angolan trekkers headed south, through a small settlement they named Upingtonia, etched out of land, given to them by a Cambondi Kaimpengana, king of the Andongos of Ovambaland. This area was south of Ovambaland proper, with Otavi in the west, Hruthontane in the east. It included the copper-rich area of the Otavi mountains, where Tsumib would later be located. It was a great deal of trekking going on between this area and the area in Angola around Lubungo, and many of the old trekker graves can be found in the area around Humpata Lubungo and the Old Upingtonia. By the early 1980s, Swapur had set up a major training base, 30 km south of Lubungo, and named it Volcano. It was here in 1982 that a specialised unit was being trained, and that unit was called Typhoon. Like the trekkers, they'd be heading south soon, and the name Typhoon was apt, as you're going to hear. Swapur's aim was to infiltrate south of Ovambaland, and to attack farms around Tsumib and Otavi, and Hruthontane, the Triangle. Leading this group was a man who'd been fighting against the SAD of Constantly since the late 1970s, his name was Rubin Danger Ashipala. He was apparently a flamboyant character, and those who fought against him called him tactically brilliant. Of all the commanders facing the SAD of over the years, Russian, Cuban, Angolan, East European, he was probably one of the most accomplished at the art of war. His motivation was not simple hatred. His decision to kill civilians, black and white, was based on a military strategy. Destroy the farmers' morale, and you'll weaken the SADF by reducing the effectiveness of their local support. He was planning a rather long march from the volcano base, all the way to Tsumib farming area. That was more than 700 kilometers away. Part would be accomplished by vehicle, but more than half the distance was going to be on foot. Danger Ashipala was highly aware of the effect of negative propaganda, and his obsession was going to cost many lives. Every single civilian who was blown up by landmands or shot or intimidated came with an unequal number of Swapo dead, but their officers were trading these lives against increasing paranoia inside the farming area in the triangle of death. It was a political equation, one in which his own fighters' lives were traded in exchange for an increase in white farmer paranoia. By now Swapo had killed hundreds of civilians, both black and white, but over the years thousands of Swapo and plan fighters had died in that awful exchange. And yet these actions seemed to be working, at least when it came to fear. No one in this triangle could travel on the roads normally, they had to use mine protected vehicles, or travel in convoys. They could be ambushed at every turn, their children could die. That's no way to live year after year, however stiff your upper lip is. That's their old story, civilians caught between two heavily armed and motivated forces suffer the most, they have literally nowhere to turn. They doomed if they support the status quo, and they doomed if they don't. Many of the civilians inside the triangle were actively trained as soldiers to fight against Swapo, so they weren't seen as non-competent, they were part-time reservists, they were armed, and Swapo believed because of this they were valid military targets. Ishe Paola understood this probably better than most of his enemy, the SEDF leadership in Pretoria, who were trying to reduce Swapo's effectiveness in the short term. Ishe Paola also knew something else, and he was implacably glued to this view. Eventually he said the SEDF would leave Namibia, and then his organisation would be in charge. He preached this message constantly as a morale booster for his troops. This meant his strategy was like that of a chess player, playing a series of tournaments, not just a game. He could sit back for ages and just watch, he didn't have to rush around the felt chasing ghosts like the South African mechanised units. He had history on his side, and anyone who fights a war and understands this is a very dangerous opponent, because they usually do not deploy an emotional response to tactical defeats, they have a much bigger picture in mind. After Operation Prater in 1981, Swapo leader Sam Niyoma met Ishe Paola and they shifted their bases northwards, because the SEDF had made it too dangerous to remain close to the Cutline. So who was Ruben Danger Ishe Paola? Well one of his earliest successes had taken place in February 1978, when he and a group of Swapo had crossed the border on foot and hit a South African military base at Elundu, ten kilometres inside South West Africa. The SEDF were killed, six were wounded, and he dragged Skitter or Raffleman, Jan, Fundameshd, back to Angola as a prisoner of war. Most radical our soldiers just killed everyone, but Ishe Paola understood the value of propaganda and wanted Skitter, Fundameshd, very much alive, so he could be paraded in front of cameras. That was much more demoralising than a body in a bag. The families of prisoners of war suffer mental torture as they imagine the horrors they loved one is going through, a POW is a gift that keeps on giving a body as a one-off present. Ishe Paola's advanced strategic thinking confounded some of the South African narrative that Swapo were just a bunch of savage murderers arbitrarily killing everything that moved, and by 1982 South African intelligence knew exactly who Danger Ishe Paola was, and they also knew how effective the volcano base was at churning out planned soldiers. In a few weeks, the SEDF were going to get their hands on one of the maps which contained details of volcano's staffing, its daily routine, its weapons, its axis routes, but first, a series of vicious firefights were going to develop. The centre of the volcano base featured a large parade ground surrounded by a simple pole fence, and one corner was a planned map laid out with rocks of Namibia, and on the east side there was a stage with a roof where officers would sit during parades. There was also an ammunition bunker that was two metres deep covered with large wooden poles and earth. Inside were AK-47s, ammunition, hand grenades, land mines, raffle grenades, RPG-7s, and strilla missiles. There were motor bombs and plastic explosives. Nearby was a trench with a desk, and that's where Ishe Paola and others planned the mission. The next mission was going to shake up the Tumibia area, as I mentioned. The nine units were going to take various routes down south and three would break through the SEDF and SWATOS defenses. Importantly, SWATO officers at volcano had no radio, nor did they have telephones. This protected them from SEDF intelligence intercepts. They received and sent messages the old-fashioned way by road, with freight tracks carrying food, along with the latest orders or military updates. Danger Ishe Paola had a 4x4 land cruiser, but that was the only vehicle on the base, and he used it sparingly. He didn't want to attract attention. volcano was also three kilometers away from the main road to the Bungo behind thick bush, and no one was allowed to visit, this kept it safer. There was always shooting going on around the Bungo, so villages kept the distance. By August 1981 there were 400 soldiers training at volcano, about 50% of these were new recruits. Plan had suffered large losses over the last two years of war, but dozens of new recruits arrived every few months, as they responded to SWATOS propaganda inside of Humberland. Danger Ishe Paola made all recruits learn English and offer cons, they needed to understand the enemy, he said. Each company was comprised of 10 platoons of 40, and each commander given a war name. This was usual for post-colonial wars, names like Amin Kilimanjaro Castro Kownda. These commanders were trained in China, not in Russia. They adopted the Vietcong style of operation, living off the land, using foot-based paths, not roads. Every company had a political commissar in the man of the Russians and the Chinese, ensuring that they towed the single-party line. Daily training included laying landmines, using plastic explosives or sabotage, setting up ambushes, tactical movement, how to confuse trackers and basic first aid. These men were briefed during the training about what would happen once they infiltrated a Vumberland and, unlike the South Africans, there would be no extraction if they were wounded. They were handed medical kits with bomb bandages, syringes with penicillin and morphine and told that if they were walking-ruined, then walk, they wouldn't be any chopper casepacks, no medical facility. They were on their own. One day in March 1982, danger Ashapala dropped the men for a parade and announced startling news. They were going to be part of a major offensive into South West Africa. Nine platoons totaling 200 men were selected. Seven of these platoons, 150 strong were heading to the farming areas of Sumib, Hutfantane, Fatawi, Kombat, Uchiul and Gamansha, and they were called the Eastern Group, the rest, which were remained north of the Karlin. The 150 would be led into the Triangle of Death by commanders called Nangorbi, Castro, Kayofa, Calulu and Shikongo. The timelines were drawn up and the orders were simple. Fight for a month until they ran out of ammunition, then go underground afterwards, or if possible, head back north, but that was only to be attempted if there was a clear route or they'd been spotted early. This was going to be a classic guerrilla campaign. Sam Nuyomah visited the base again just before Operation Tafoum began and stood alongside danger Ashapala on the parade ground stage under the roof. Alongside them was planned a senior staff officer, Martin Shali. 1982 was the year of Swapu, Nuyomah said in his fiery way, "You're going to fight until the area you're in is free, kill the booze." On the 1st of April, 1982, a convoy of Russian-Ural trucks rolled into the base and the men of Eastern Group were loaded up. First, they headed north-east, not south, passed the outspread arms of the Lombangul crossed on the hill towards Tecumuteti. When the trucks reached Tecumuteti, the infiltration teams clamoured off. The easy part of their truck south was complete, and they were given a day to take a breath and receive durations. Then the platoons began the long walk southwards. The cut line was still 370 kilometres away. They could not approach any closer by vehicle because the SADF was too active in southern Angola. 32 battalion and 61 MEC had been sweeping that part of the country clean, and Swapu also had to deal with unitar. It took these 150 men almost a week to walk the 370 kilometres, carrying landmines, hundreds of rounds of 5.56 ammo, AK-47s, RPG-7s, hand grenades, and the strailer anti-aircraft missiles. That by itself is some hike by any soldier's standards, and they did it at speed. The groups reached the border on the night of 8th of April then broke up into their platoons before crossing the cut line. Each platoon had its own target. Remarkably, they still had 240 kilometres of marching to go, not to mention they were heading into 3 heavily patrolled regions which the SADF called Charlie, Alpha, and Bravo. 2 of these platoons were airmarked for something special. Those under the command of Kayoffa and Kululu carried extra RPG-7s, SKS-Rafel grenades, and strailer anti-aircraft missiles. While the other platoons were ordered to avoid any direct confrontation with the SADF and Swapu, Kayoffa and Kululu's men were told to attack the security forces head on. This was going to be a mission that carried out with deadly efficiency, and it was going to send truck waves through the triangle of death. They were going to dangle themselves as bait, and their trap was going to work. By now 61 mechanized battalion was well in sconce than the area around Sumip, and the special relationship had developed with the community, particularly the farmers. Hundreds of specially trained troops and rattle infantry were based less than 100 kilometres from Sumip alongside the main tar road. 61 Mech officers and their families lived in the tree-line streets of Sumip. They were welcomed, and lifelong friendships had developed, particularly the townsfolk and the SADF. The town's economy had been boosted by 61 Mech, food, clothing and schooling was all required to keep the officers' families going. The oldest house in Sumip was now 61 Mech's HQ, and many Sumip women were hired to carry out troop payments and other admin duties. However, most of the mechanized units' junior officers, NCOs and troops remained in the bush, based in Umatia, and were hardly ever seen in the town. It was utter bounds, except in special circumstances. The citizen-force and national servicemen retracted into town now and again to purchase toiletries and writing materials, but the hotel bar, liquor, off-sales and every other part of the town, except for the main street were banned. These organised eight stuppies, as they were called, saw troops heading into the retail stores. Some stopped at the Veyant Brothers' copy shop halfway between the mineshaft and the Dutch colonial church, where hamburgers and chips. So over time, a sense of unity had built up between the south-westers and the south-Africans. Both spoke off regards, went to the same churches, came from the same people who'd checked to the Transvall and Freestate, and became Dorst Trekkers. 61 Mech and I's commander Rola Interfris was going to face a severe test shortly. He had studied the revolutionary principles of warfare and was expert at thinking like a revolutionary. At Ometeer, he'd become famous for listening to a lower-ranking officers thought about tactics. He'd also shun during his training, particularly when it came to acting as a guerrilla leader during war games. He was acutely aware by April 1982 that Swapah was on its way. He had just no idea that Tafoon was blowing some. He's told the story many times, and he was worried right then, and he was concerned about three things in particular. First, sitting below the cutline waiting for an attack means, "Yes, you don't have the initiative." Secondly, he wanted to escalate his patrols because it was rainy season. His enemy was on the move, but he had to wait for orders. Thirdly, he fell under the command of Sector 3-0, and the HQ was in Achiboronga, 200 km south of Ometeer, where 61 was based. Sector 3-0 commanders were far away from the action, and some at 61 Mech believed their commanders had adopted an out of sight, out of mind, kind of logic. Local farm-based commanders had also begun to sound the alarm at this point. You see, in 1981, the year before counter-insurgency ups had been under defreases command, but then there was shifted to SWATIF, and he chafed under the new rule. The local farms had small units of SEDF and SWATIF troops scattered about, but these men had no vehicles except for a handful of buffles and land-rovers. What were useful is local security guards, if you liked, but not tactically. Then came the news on April 10th from Inkongo. The tracks of 150 infiltrators had been found in the vicinity of the cutline, north of Brava section, and they appeared to be on their way to Tsumir. The SEDF launched a follow-up operation, but lost the spur. The Fris asked Achiboronga, 30 HQ, if he could launch something called Operation Awake, the counter-insurgency plan he deployed the previous year, 3-0 hesitated. Then the next day, on April 11th, a buffal set of a land-mine at the Charlie sector border about 30 kilometres north of Tsinsabas, closer to Brava. The Fris and his plan is new then, that the infiltrators were hitting their way, but where were they? Was it a repeat of the previous year, or had SWATIF learned its lesson about how it ran ambushes and attacks, and changed tactics, wondered the Fris. Of course, it appeared that everyone in the SEDF at that point was oblivious to just how much SWATIF had actually altered its tactics. I mentioned Napoleon's famous dictum at the start of this episode for a reason. You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war. And danger, Achiboronga was a quick learner. He knew what the SEDF would do in a firefight, how they'd respond to his spoo. He was banking on more of the same, and he wasn't going to be disappointed. Achiboronga had planned a trap, and the security forces were going to drive straight into it. Among his victims would be members of the family of Tanti Bumpi. Remember, she was at the heart of radio comms in the Triangle of Death. Her husband Danki and his son Hendrik were going to pay the ultimate price, as they tracked Swapur's spoo across a dry salt pan called a fence at China. What happened next, this was the next episode. Please rate the podcasts and art tunes that helps escalate the visibility of the story. If you have any comments, head over to my website, abwaportcost.com, there's a link you can send an email there, or you can direct message me on Twitter @Daisleyton. Until next, don't since. [BLANK_AUDIO]