Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 56. December 1981 brought the usual debriefings and analysis about how the border war was progressing, particularly after a year that saw such highs and lows for the SADF. However, before the end of the year, the SADF ordered another small operation called Flinder to hit the area near Ivali, over the Catalan. In one of the final acts of the year, troops were in contact with SWAP who armed with SA-7 missiles and RPGs near the town. One of the troops was hit by shrapnel from an 82mm mortar and was in a serious condition. He needed to be cazevacked. Lieutenant Arthur Walker led a two-ship Alouette formation to the scene and provided top cover for Lieutenant Serge Bovy. He was to carry out the pickup. Ground troops marked the LZ with a white phosphorus grenade, which tends to burn anything and produces a great deal of smoke. Lieutenant Bovy approached to land when Walker's Alouette lurched sideways to avoid enemy ground fire. Heavy AA weapons were targeting the two choppers, and Bovy watched the tracers rip past his helicopter. Then he flared to land, and on touchdown, two troops loaded the cazevac into the helicopter while the rest of the platoon formed a defensive circle. The chopper was now heavy, so it took many seconds to lift off, and even longer to transition from vertical to forward speed. As Bovy banged away from the enemy positions, his blood froze. There were two 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns firing straight at him from virtually point-blank, 100m away. The Alouette was hit by rounds passing through the door, another removed the top of the instrument panel, and a third ripped through his flight suit but missed his leg by a centimetre. The Alouette was hit by rounds passing through the door, another removed the top of the instrument panel, and a third ripped through his flight suit but missed his leg by a centimetre. The damaged Alouette continued turning away from the AA guns, flying with the cockpit just below the level of the treetops, but leaving the rotors above the branches. But the Alouette was on fire, and electrical sparks were jumping along the damaged instrument panel. The anti-aircraft fire continued, hitting the port side door and the co-pilot's seat. Bovy's armoured seat was also hit from behind, bouncing him briskly back and forth in a kind of crazy rodeo of 14.5mm power. The Alouette was hit by rounds passing through the door, another removed the top of the instrument coughing, the rotor blades slowed, the controls were stiffening, and Bovey was about to crash. He flared to dig the tail into the ground, but then spotted a large tree and deflected the cyclic and rudder to the right at the last moment. After impact, the Alouette came to rest on its side. Flight engineer Dolphin Rensburg was lying in a small space between the door and Bovey's chair, bleeding from his mouth, but he was alert and said he was okay. Bovey unstrapped and felt a sharp pain in his back. It was injured. Still, he managed to punch out a window and jumped from the chopper, joined moments later by von Rensburg. The Kazovac was now trapped in the wreckage, and he was dead. They had to leave him because Swarper were heading their way. Mortars began dropping around the Alouette as Bovey and von Rensburg legged it into thicker bush nearby. Suddenly, they spotted a Swarper soldier with an AK-47 a short distance away. He was firing into the air at the other Alouette, his attention fixated on Walker's chopper. He didn't see the two South Africans hiding in the bush, a mere 50 meters away. Von Rensburg wanted to shoot him, but Bovey refused, saying they should remain silent because it was their only hope of escape. That didn't last long. AK-47 and machine gun rounds began to bounce off the trees and the ground nearby. The enemy was following their spur. Meanwhile, overhead, Lieutenant Walker had watched his number two crash and burn, but then Sergeant Burtis, his gunner, spotted the two men on the ground. Despite the heavy damage, Bovey was still alive. Bovey was still alive, but the heavy AA fire, Walker landed his Alouette nearby in a tight LZ opening, and both Bovey and von Rensburg were pulled on board. Walker then somehow managed to take off with an overloaded Alouette and made it safely back to base. And for his courage, he was awarded the honoris crux gold, becoming the only person with a double award of the coveted honor. And so, 1981 ended with mixed results. The year had ushered in several developments which caused the war to escalate. Before Operation Protea, and Daisy, the fighting had been ostensibly between the SADF and SWAPU. After Operation Protea and then Daisy, the strategy changed on both sides. Pretoria was supporting UNITA directly, and the MPLA government realized that while it did not want to declare war on South Africa, it had to respond to the impact of Pretoria's interference in their backyard. Before Protea, only 3-2 battalion had consistently clashed with FAPLA, even though the standing orders were to avoid conflict with the Angolans. After Operation Protea, only 3-2 battalion had consistently clashed with FAPLA, even though the standing orders were to avoid conflict with the Angolans. Until 1981, the sporadic fighting between FAPLA and the SADF was replaced by a period of direct conflict. SWAPU had used FAPLA's protection by retreating rapidly in the face of the South African invasions, and then taking up positions alongside FAPLA. By the time the SADF raided Zangongo and Onjiva, the mixing of FAPLA and SWAPU meant there was no way for the South Africans to attack SWAPU without attacking FAPLA. This had an effect on how the war was going to be planned by Pretoria. The unconventional operations the patrols being walked south of the cut-line were aimed at SWAPU. From now on, all operations north of the border were directed at both the MPLA and SWAPU. The SADF had also now moved systematically into southern Angola, particularly Kineni province, where they were to have a permanent presence until the end of the war. After Protea, the main conventional mechanized groups were pulled out, but counter-insurgency forces stayed behind to fight alongside UNITA. By 1981, 3-2 battalion had controlled the eastern Kineni and western Kuando areas, but now this was extended to the western Kineni as well. And global diplomacy and realpolitik was growing more important right now. The United States had just vetoed a UN resolution condemning Pretoria for Operation Protea, and curiously Cuba's response was also somewhat muted despite their soldiers being affected by the operation. SWAPU had been dealt a series of blows, particularly by OPCAR Nation and Protea, and they had plans to counter-strike. The armed-ring PLAN had lost Tsangongo, Humbe and Onjiva. 3-2 battalion was now ensconced in the Kineni area, and a semi-permanent presence of light mobile search and destroy teams were maintained almost 100 kilometers into Angola. The airfield at Onjiva was repaired and resurfaced for use by South African Air Force aircraft. PLAN was forced to take a long detour if they wanted to strike areas south of this region. Then they'd also be running a gauntlet of 3-2 and other specialist forces trying to detect their movement. By December the death toll amounted to around 2,500 FAPLA and SWAPU, as well as 56 SADF members. But civilians in Ovambaland and the Triangle of Death had suffered enormously. 92 had died at the hands of SWAPU directly, 62 others were killed in land mine explosions, and over 100 were abducted to Angola, or had left voluntarily. The SADF wasn't sure either way. Politically, South Africa was trying to extricate itself from South West Africa without handing over the territory to SWAPU. That was because it was likely to bring the ANC to its northern borders, both in Zimbabwe and South West Africa. Prime Minister P.W. Boto felt bound by the commitment made by his predecessor, B.J. Forster, to support an autonomous South West Africa, or Namibia, as it was likely to be called. Boto had been working on creating a viable, moderate political alternative to SWAPU. Boto also wanted to establish a joint military-security alliance with South Africa. While this was the overarching goal, Pretoria became expert at forestalling discussions on an internal settlement the longer the war in Angola continued. Boto's government demanded the withdrawal of the Cubans and Russians as a precondition of Namibian independence. Pretoria said the Cuban presence in Angola constituted a legitimate security concern for SW Africa. Most Western countries at the time supported this assertion, particularly the United States and its Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, who accused the Soviets and Cubans of military adventurism. SWAPU's position was that Pretoria should stop tying their own independence to another country's civil war. France, however, was pressurizing both Pretoria and Washington to drop the demand about Cuba, saying that the Namibians were being held hostage by U.S. foreign policy goals. Havana, for its part, interpreted Pretoria's comments as proof that South Africa was merely an American pawn and part of Washington's obsession with Cuban interests around the world. P.W. Boto and his foreign minister, Pic Boto, had been trying to convince other African countries that having the Russians and Cubans lurking around Africa was tantamount to signing up for colonialism 2.1. Boto called on Africa to, "Say to the Cubans to go home, and say to the Russians, 'Go home!' And the minute this happens, I will be prepared to settle all our military forces in South Africa." However, the apartheid state was not exactly the best messenger for this message, as you can well imagine. There was an all-white government which denied the vote to its majority black population, preaching to Africa about colonialism. Whatever your political beliefs, folks, you can see the significant problem with this communication methodology. It is somewhat illogical, to put it mildly. As you'll hear in a forthcoming podcast, Crocker would eventually meet Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonard Ilyichov, who talks about what to do about the Cubans and Namibia. So, the new year 1982 began with the enemy an aggressive intent and some bad news for the SAF which was going to get worse before the month was out. Politically this was also the year that the country was supposed to march towards independence and its name be changed to Southwest Africa Namibia or SWA Namibia. A number of incidents shook the SADF early in 1982. On the 5th of January an SAF was Puma was shot down over the cut line and Captain Robinson, Lieutenant Earp and Sergeant Dalglish were all killed. All signs indicated that the yearly incursion into Southwest Africa was about to begin and the bloodshed would continue. A few days later two Natal based national servicemen died in a contact. Two weeks later two more were killed in a landmine explosion. The next day three SADF soldiers died in another landmine blast. Two of them were twin brothers. The SADF for some reason had a these two to serve together very much against military doctrine and the shock for their family must have been immeasurable but apparently they refused to be separated. The SADF never allowed twins to serve together in a combat zone again. A few days later two more soldiers were shot dead by SWAPO in another contact. PLAN was also changing its tactics and looking for quiet zones to shake up the South Africans. They hit the Olukula area 11 kilometers south of Beacon 36 in January 1982. This area had experienced no SWAPO action for two years thanks to Project Spider Web where the SADF had bolstered intelligence and other systems in the area. But a platoon from 8th Sai that was patrolling was in for a rude awakening on the 27th of January when a SWAPO attack left three more South Africans dead. They had been taken completely by surprise. Intelligence officers were convinced that the attack was the work of SWAPO's Far East Detachment which had now penetrated from the north of Beacon 36. Air reconnaissance and intel from UNITA indicated a plentiful supply of water existed at Chana Dengue that's 30 kilometers north of the beacon. UNITA had also reported a possible SWAPO base close to the China and a second which lay 45 kilometers south of Yonde. On the 17th of February 3-2 battalion's entire reconnaissance wing was divided into eight teams and they settled from Omauni in a convoy. They were to conduct a small operation code named Oliphote, Olive Wood. They were carrying spare diesel and aviation fuel in case they'd be stuck north of the border for any length of time. The recon wings were looking for these SWAPO bases if indeed they existed. Five days later a 3-2 foot patrol made contact one morning with a small group of SWAPO near Yonde killing one and wounding a second. And yet 10 days later the recon wings had found no other SWAPO and on the 27th of February they stopped at Chana Mokapa for resupply. Operating procedure entailed that the vehicles be drawn into a lager and camouflaged with Captain Willem Rutte's command vehicle in the center. Sergeant Phil Smit, who was leader of team eight, flew out on one of the resupply choppers to head home. His wife was about to have a baby. Considering what happened next he was one very lucky soldier. The rest of the group remained in position waiting for nightfall but at dusk around 1800 two SA Air Force Impala ground support planes passed overhead and the ground troops noted they appeared to be in attack mode. A terrible series of events was about to take place. The flight leader in one of the Impalas opened fire on the lager with his 30mm cannon. Shocked, Sergeant Mark Craig was struggling to comprehend what was going on. My first thought was that this isn't happening but the screams of the injured and the roaring jets as they pulled up told me I was in serious trouble. A half dozen vehicles were already burning. There was smoke everywhere and Captain Rutte's command truck had taken the brunt of the attack. All around fuel drums were exploding. Some were thrown high into the air adding to the chaos. There had been no radio contact between the ground force and the air force. Things could have been far worse had the number two Impala not realized that they were attacking friends. So the Impalas broke off and flew away. The second Impala was attacked. The first Impala was attacked. The and yet the damage was done. Rifleman S. Hafeni was dead. A 30mm round passed through his chest. 17 other men were wounded. A driver, a national serviceman, had been seriously burned. A sand or bushman tracker from 3-1 was seriously injured by shrapnel. Captain Rata had been hit in the face. His glasses were shattered. He was bloody, but he refused medical treatment until all his men were attended to. The fuel drums continued exploding for more than an hour afterwards, throwing burning diesel and showering aviation fuel on the men. A column of black smoke reached high into the sky. Then two puma choppers arrived to bring supplies, and they became part of a major casualty evacuation process. Willem Rata refused to climb aboard the pumas until one of the pilots, who outranked him, ordered him to get in. Lieutenants Jim Savory and Charlie Loxton remained behind to direct the medical evacuation, and the cleanup, along with Sergeant Craig. The vehicles continued smoldering for the next day, a dead giveaway to Swapo and Fapa. With their numbers depleted, the officers asked for permission to withdraw, but 3-2 command refused the request, telling the men to wait until recovery vehicles arrived. This put the small group in significant danger. A patrol later found Swapo tracks nearby, and they requested permission to withdraw once more, and again it was refused. Sergeant Craig, then asked for explosives to blow up what was left of their burned vehicles, but this request was also denied. No SAGF equipment, whether gutted or not, was to be left behind in Angola, so they had to wait for the recovery task team. It was a tense 10 days later that this group of hardy 3-2 recon members eventually withdrew from Angola, and it was touch and go whether they would make it, particularly after Foxtrot Company, which had been dispatched to help protect the recon group, ran into Swapo landmines, placed on the routes. Several of the Foxtrot vehicles were badly damaged, but eventually they located the shot-up recon teams and dragged the burned-out vehicles back across the cut line. An official inquiry later showed that while the recce team's position had been plotted on a map in the Air Force Operations Room, the two Impala pilots had not been told about their deployment, and then naturally assumed the vehicles belonged to the enemy. As all veterans know, sometimes, in the Army, the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing, and this was the case, leading to friendly fire losses. Offsetting these aggravations were moments where the officers and NCOs and rank-and-file troopers were forced into situations of mutual support and humor. One of these started at Hutspreit Air Force Base back in the Republic and ended at Undangwa. The armorers of Hutspreit were regarded as the A-team of engineering, and pilots were told if they wanted to know anything about their morale, they had to go to the Air Force Base. The first time they were told to go to the Air Force Base, they were told to go to the Air Force Base. 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The first time they were told to go to the Air Force Base, they were told to go to the Air Force Base. The first time they were told to go to the Air Force Base, they were told to go to the Air Force Base. sympathy because SWAPO was presumed, rightly or wrongly, to be dominated by Ovambos, and Kaukalandas and Ovambolandas did not always see eye to eye. All of this was setting up one of the most remarkable battles between SWAPO and the SADF, which was going to be called Operation Super. More than 200 PLAN fighters were going to be confronted by a single SADF platoon, but unfortunately for PLAN, the platoon was comprised of three two-battalion soldiers. What happened next is for next episode. Please head over to my website abwarpodcast.com, there's a link to send emails if you want to chat, or you can direct message me on Twitter, at Des Laffey. Until next, fast paced. Thanks for watching.
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