Episode 55 – Operation Daisy where a Mirage shoots down a MiG in a first for the SAAF since the Korean War

[Music] Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, Your Host. Here's Lathan. This is Episode 55. The sound of gunfire from Operation Proteer is dying down. And yet the SEDF was already planning its next invasion of Angola. The intelligence gathered during Protoche was going to lead to the second Major 1981 operation, which was launched in November targeting Ionder initially, which is 120 kilometres inside Angola. And then onwards to Bambeer and Chatequeta, much deeper inside Angola. But first the Air Force was going to get busy. The aircraft used were extensive. 15 impolars, 9 pumors, 2 supervillons, and 10 allowets for Army support. Then 4 DC-3 decoters, 6 C-130s and C-160s, and 1 DC-4 as air transport and supply, and 9 boss box for navigation and reconnaissance support. Two Mirage-3s had also been deployed for photo reconnaissance missions, 20 Mirage-F1s for air superiority, and 3 Buccaneers as backup of enemy airfields needed to be bombed. The Mirages were going to face MIGs for the first time in direct air-to-air combat. And as you're going to hear, things didn't end well for one MIG in particular. Colonel Oli Holmes was commanding the Office of the Air Force contingent at Oshikati, and their idea was to set up a forward HQ position at Iond airfield, once it had been secured. Three two battalion were sent in to protect the tactical headquarters and to patrol the supply routes for the main mechanized force, while reiki teams led by Captain Villamurata were sent to keep an eye on Swapo positions. The assault force would be headed up by 61 mechanized battalion and include elements from 201 and one parachute battalion and five reconnaissance regiment. First, three two had to reconnoiter Iond and establish what kind of enemy presence was in the town. On the 2nd of November, one of the reiki teams made contact with a small Swapo section about four kilometres north west of Embundu, killing one in a short sharp firefight. Two hours later, another reiki team ran into a group of Swapo, killing eight and capturing four, who confirmed that a large concentration of their fighters were based around Bambi. They also revealed the exact location of Swapo's base between Kasinger and Tecumutiti. There were seven targets in total, believed to contain two thousand planned fighters that were Swapo's armed wing, with Fuplar in the vicinity. For example, reconnaissance showed that there was a brigade with heavy weapons including tanks at Kaundu, two battalions at Kasinger, a battalion each at Kuvango and Tecumutiti, and a Cuban regiment of five hundred men backed up our armored cars at Donga. While Fuplar and the Cubans were thought to be fairly static and unlikely to be a threat during Operation Daisy, it was likely that Swapo would retreat towards their golden forces to seek refuge. And what should have been a tactical warning, S.A.D. of military intelligence, knew that 61 Mech's movements were being telegraphed to Swapo, as soon as the mobile battalion began to roll. The Bush telegraph was working well for Swapo. Commandant Rolando Friis led the two mechanized infantry companies of 61 Mech, as well as an armored car squadron, an anti-tank platoon, an 81 millimeter mortar platoon, and a 120 millimeter mortar battery, and he was highly aware of the Bush telegraph. 201 battalion, which was a motorized infantry unit, would join this mechanized attack, plus two companies, some national servicemen, part of one parachute battalion, and three companies of three parachute battalion, who were the part-time citizen forcemen. On D-3, all forces moved into Angola to position themselves for the big push north. A helicopter administration area was established by three two battalion, and two pumers and two allied gunships were deployed. They then laid down strobe lines, marking the position for use later, and these were switched on at 2200 hours as a position marker for a C-130 Hercules that dropped eight members of a reconnaissance team by parachute. These men landed close to a suspected enemy HQ, and the wreckies had the base visual and monitored what was coming and going. They also identified a suitable drop zone for a large-scale parodrop on the morning of D-day, said 4th of November. Another three two battalion reconnaissance team was sent to the helicopter administration ground, and they headed towards Ionder Airfield to keep an eye on things around that area. By last lights on the 2nd of November, eight elevates, and the same number of pumers were positioned at the helicopter admin area inside Angola. But Swapu and Fapler were aware of these deployments. D-1, the 3rd of November, and Rattas' recon team reported that Ionder was unoccupied. Six pumers flew in after sunrise at O-615, along with an alloyed gunship for protection as top cover and found the airfield indeed was deserted. The idea was to focus on the enemy-based nearby, once they determined Ionder had been evacuated, and so they turned their attention to Embundo, six kilometers to the southwest. By ten hundred hours forty-five, the mobile air operations team had set up their centre in one of Ionder Airfield's abandoned buildings. The runway was in good shape, even the Dakota DC-3s could land. 201 battalion who were close by ran into a contact with Swapu at fourteen hundred hours twenty, and two elevated gunships were sent to land fire support. 201 would take a few casualties, and that skirmish more about this in a moment. But an hour later, the first of many Dakota flats arrived at Ionder, bringing in Brigadier Krunovalt and his communications operations commops team. A few minutes later, another Dakota landed carrying a tactical HQ medical team in the equipment. It was fortunate for the SRDF that they had this airfield to themselves at this point, because the centre of operations could shift into southern Angola instead of being based for the south. This obviously saved time and money. The first of three pairs of Bossbord light planes landed just before sixteen hundred hours, and they were going to remain at the airfield for the duration of Operation Daisy. It was all hustle and bustle right now, and Farple and Swapu were aware that something big was a foot. At sixteen hundred hours, two pumors were sent to pick up four wounded members of 201 hit during the fire part with Swapu, along with a prisoner of war who was slightly wounded and was going to provide more information about the composition of enemy forces. With 61 mech ready to roll into Angola, heading deep into the countryside, there was a need for spares, and just before dark, another Dakota landed at Ionder, carrying spare buffal tires. The last flight of the day into the airfield was one more DAC, the fourth, which was carrying paratroopers, who were going to act as a tactical HQ mobile reserve. The logistics part of this op was going well, but as you're going to hear, the op itself did not. While the focus was on Ionder, Bambi and Tetumatetti, to the west, the airfields was dealing with a significant threat to the upcoming operation. If you remember our previous podcasts before Operation Prater in August, Farple's vital radar station at Kahama had been bombed and was unusable. The Angolans had not been idle since then and had reactivated Kahama's facility. This was then confirmed by former Rajas, which headed over southern Angola, and triggered a radar signal. This had to be dealt with. A strike was planned on Kahama, but would only take place on the 5th of November, D-Day+1. So far so good, you would say, preparations unfolding neatly. Except you wouldn't, if you were Colonel Jan Breitenbach, Commander of 44 Parachute Battalion, and Commander Rola and the Fris of 61 Mac, both were unhappy. There were two main reasons. First, the plan was to shake up Swapper and attack them deep in Angola, but there were not enough SADF troops deployed to deal with a vast area of operations. Breitenbach put it best when he likened the operation to stopping a flood of water with a wire mesh. Swapper would just fan out, and how could the paratroopers deal with this on such a broad front. There were being used as stopper groups, but should really be used as a fire force. 61 Mac's De Fris was unhappy, and he'd brought up the issue of Swapper's intelligence units being proactive. His large, mobile column would trigger the intelligence bush telegraph. Both Breitenbach and De Fris had enough experience to know by now, but they were talking about. Unfortunately, the top brass appeared convinced of their own brilliance and ignored these warnings. The main attack was going to be carried out by 61 Mac, and then all forces would be busy for 17 days inside Angola as counter insurgency ops were conducted. Afterwards, 201 battalion, along with three two, would cover the paratroopers in 61 Mac's withdrawal. Breitenbach wanted a small group of attackers to undertake his favorite form of warfare, which he called to find them, fix them and finish them, rather than the noisy, large mechanised army that was going to roar into Angola. While the recon teams had collected fairly accurate information, they were effective only around specific areas assigned for reconnaissance. The rest of the intelligence about this ops was based on assumptions about where the enemy were, which is a fallible approach. Sector 10 headquarters and army chief Yani Keldinhez were both confident to spot the holes in SADF knowledge things would go well, but he was uneasy. Keldinhez's public-facing attitude was that it was worth taking a chance, although they didn't have all the facts. And so by the first of November 61 Mac and the paratroopers began mobilising, and immediately Swapu's bush telegraph went into top gear. The SADF plan was to rush north once across the Cutland, but as anyone knows by now, no one rushes through southern Angola unless you airborne. It was rainy season, so where the Rattles could usually handle thickish sand, neither was snorled by the Undergrowth. It was so thick that the front wheels of these 18.5 tonn biehmoth would lift off the ground while traversing the off-road routes. The frees plowed onwards literally, despite these odds. One of the first incidents that almost led to a death involved a three-meter-long member had dropped into the Rattle of Major Kurs Libinbach. He ended up yelling and shouting in the reptile found its way out of a Rattle door to disappear into the Angolan bush. Above the mobile forces, the air support and drop was beginning. After the floods into Ionder, the main air activity started on O-300 hours under then before, when 6 C-130s and C-160s took off from Krutfantane with three companies of barren troopers. Their DZ or Drop Zone was on map reference X-ray Papa 4709-5, and that was where the strobe lights had been set up as you heard earlier. Things can go wrong very quickly, and in this case they did. Later, the pilot said the DZ strobes were not switched on when the C-130s and C-160s arrived overhead, and the barren troopers were dropped kilometres away from their position, but the wreckies say they did their job. After looking at the various versions of this event, it appears that the fires burning at the enemy base caused confusion, and that the wreckies were alright, their strobes were on, but the reality was a few hundred parabets were now far west of their target. Brettenbach was seething not for the first time he regarded the Air Force as a bunch of carboys, as his poor parabets had to waste their energies slogging through the bush instead of fighting. I've spoken to a few recently, we said that the effects of a route march on strike force operations was debilitating to the extreme in that environment. Meanwhile, 61 Mech was Bundo bashing heading for Bambi and Chatequera. Everything was going smoothly after the initial difficulties. By early morning of the Fourth of November, the fleet said managed to make up time and they storm these two bases. 61 Mech overran them almost immediately because they were empty. The wreckies said afterwards that they could hear 61 Mech coming through the bush for three hours. There was so much noise in the quiet African early morning. Even if Swapo's bush telegraph had failed, they'd still have had more than enough time to scamper to save you with such a cacophony going on. Swapo also heard the C-130s and C-160s fly past carrying the parabets, and figured out that this was not a normal morning, and breakfast could wait, despite the fires already burning for the purge. In fact, the wreckies and their hard-out spotted Swapo leave these bases and sent an urgent message to come up, but the operation was too far gone, and the freeze didn't get the news. 32 battalion had also learned something that morning. They'd captured a plan officer's clerk who was talkative. He explained that Swapo's standard operating procedure had been updated. When they picked up mechanized SAD of units on the move at the border, their teams were informed almost immediately. Plan commanders had guessed correctly where 61 Mech were going, and ordered the evacuation of Bambi and Chatequilla. So, the air attack was going to drop thousands of dollars of ordinances on an empty base. While the bosswalks took off Red Dawn as navigational guides and artillery spotters for 61 Mech, 201 and 32 battalions, the next wave of aircraft dropped their bombs very accurately by all accounts, except Swapo was no longer at the positions. At 0815, three Buccaneers launched their first bombing run on Swapo HQ with a low-level attack, each dropping a stick of 8 460 kilogram bombs flying north to south. A temperature inversion had trapped the smoke from the fires, as Swapo prepared their breakfast a little earlier before they'd left in the hurry, and these fires were still crackling. A minute after the Buccaneers formed Mirage, F1AZ's dived onto the target for the north, letting loose with four sticks of bombs, there's still no anti-aircraft fire. That was going to change. The last Mirage out of the bombing run spotted an SA-7 missile trail. You warn the crews of three incoming Mirage F1CZs who were beginning their dive onto the target. Swapo positions around the bases were active, and these AA crews began to fire back. The Air Force then targeted these anti-aircraft positions, changing their runs, with another former rajas heading for what they thought were 23mm guns peppering the sky at 10,000 feet. These Swapo gunners had not left the building. They were also aiming at the boss books, so eventually the Air Force resorted to the slower and pilot ground attack aircraft, and despite four hours of attacks, Swapo's anti-aircraft fire persisted. On the ground, 61 Mech eventually rolled through the entire base area, but Swapo was long gone. They'd headed north, leaving the mechanized column to report no resistance whatsoever. When expensive and powerful operation, this was frustrating. The aim was to weaken Swapo, but repeatedly targeting their training logistics and operations bases and killing them. All this South African firepower, trundling around the bush, was costing the taxpayer a fortune and failing in its main objective. 61 Mech swept the area range at the greater, then turned south towards Bami. The anger was building up amongst the commanding officers. They'd travelled for two days to deal Swapo a severe blow, but all that had happened was that they'd been clearing booby traps and empty positions. Around Bami there were a significant number of trenches and old Swapo bases, and the enemy had left this area some time before, perhaps weeks. Swapo also left a few surprises for the SEDF. Three rottles were damaged in mineblasts, and spare axles had to be flown in with super-frillons. That night, a small group of Swapo walked into 61 Mech's vehicle logger from the direction of Determity to the northwest. The South Africans opened fire using what they called their fire belt action, where all vehicles fired their guns in one direction at the same time. Three Swapo were killed. Over night, Bradenbach and DeFris were conducting what you could call a "told you so briefing." Both parachute and mechanized force had been misused, and the two commanders were blunt in their assessment. Both also realised that the forces had been deployed back to front. It should have been the parachutists attacking the isolated bases far inland, and the mechanized force should have been deployed as the stopper group. As Swapo retreated, the parachutists on foot were somehow supposed to tighten and net around them pretty much an impossible feat in the vast and golden flatlands. The mobile force would have been better placed to cut off Swapo's retreat, and the helicopter gunships and medium artillery would have been more effective instead of the 120-millimeter mortars. For the next two weeks, the South Africans swept the area in search of Swapo without success. There were small firefights, but the big battles they had hoped for were not to be. By the 18th of November, 1981, they were back at base in South West Africa, and Janie Heldner has formally announced that Operation Daisy was one of the least successful operations conducted thus far in the border war. It was demotivating. After all the success of protier, this was a failure and staff officer Moral was flat. But there was one incident that rippled across the region which took place on November 6th, and this involved a mirage and a mech. After years of warfare, finally the Angolan Air Force decided it was going to become aggressive. Increased mech activity had been reported between the 4th and 5th of November. This led to a stiff air defense program being initiated by the South Africans at Undungwa. Mirage F1CZ armed with missiles and 30-millimeter cannon were on cockpit standby from 1st light. At 0700 on the 6th, radar flat controllers at Dayton, as it was called, detected two fast-moving tracks heading towards the South West African border from Lubango in the direction of Quittevi. The radar flat controller scrambled two mirages to intercept what were obviously mechs. Previously the mechs had retired when the mirages scrambled across the border, but the South Africans had a trick up their sleeve this time. They used extreme low-level penetration up the Koneni River, staying below Angolan radar, then pitched up from 50 feet to 25,000 feet in 30 seconds. Enemy radar still appeared to miss their move. Leading the flat was major Johanna Rankin, with Lieutenant Johan Duplici as his wingman. The two Johans were graduates of 85 advanced fighter school at Petersburg, and they were highly trained in interception techniques, and what was known as ACM air combat maneuvering, or what Johanna I would call an old-fashioned dogfight. Duplici spotted two mechs 21s about four nautical miles away on the port beam. They appeared to be at the same altitude. It was now or never. The South Africans jettisoned their drop tanks and turned hard, left bringing the mirages into line behind the unsuspecting mechs 21s. The two enemy aircraft were flying about 1,000 meters apart, with the number two mechs around 30 degrees behind the leader. They were also flying directly into the sun, which meant the mirages could not fire their Metro 550 heat-seeking missiles. Rankin closed in on the trailing mechs and fired a burst from his 30-millimeter cannon from around 300 meters behind the enemy aircraft. A puff of smoke burst out of the plane and fuel appeared to begin leaking from its fuselage. Both mechs suddenly entered a descending left hand turn and jettisoned their own drop tanks. Despite the move, both were now in a good position for a missile shot because they'd defected away from the Sun. Rankin and the lead mechs began a dance of death in the sky, with the mech managing to turn onto his tail, but it didn't fire its Let's miss out, perhaps, and experience a malfunction. Rankin continued turning types and then headed towards the second meag, telling Duplici to go after the leader. At that moment, the second meag committed what is regarded as a cardinal sin of aerial combat, and reversed his turn, and Rankin's mirage closed quickly on the slowing Russian plan. Rankin opened fire with his 30mm cannon once more, and the meag exploded, shiring the mirage with debris and breaking into two pieces behind the cockpit. As the bits of meag spiraled towards the Angolan felt, the pilot ejected. The lead meag now executed an extreme maneuver that pushed the capabilities of both sets of pilots and planes. It's called a high-speed spiral dive that loaded over nine Gs, and Duplici could not get his missiles to fire because the forces on the planes were just too high. The Metro 550 missile had reached its limits again. This bit of expert flying saved the meag pilots laugh and he got away while the mirages were forced to turn back to the southwest African border. By the time the two Johans manned back to Undungwa, Duplici and Rankin were being faded as heroes. The meag 21 was the first aircraft shot down by the South African Air Force since the Korean War. The pilots had a few drinks to celebrate that night, but the boffins were concerned. The Metro 550 missiles had malfunctioned and the South Africans were forced to shoot down an advanced enemy fighter plane with cannon like it was 1952 all over again. That had to be sorted out and quickly, or the next dogfight may see mirages the victims of the meag. Still, this was an historic moment in the annals of this border war. Next episode will assist the overall situation by the end of 1981. Please head over to my website abwarpontcoast.com. There's a link to send emails if you want to chat. And also please rate the podcast on iTunes. It helps increase the visibility of the series. And you can direct message me on Twitter and my handle is @dezlegan. Until next, goodbye. [MUSIC]