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Episode 5 – The South African Defence Force re-arms as the Angolan war of independence overflows into South West

15m 14s

Episode 5 – The South African Defence Force re-arms as the Angolan war of independence overflows into South West

This episode of South African Border Wars examines how the SADF began rearming in the early 1960s as decolonisation swept Africa and the National Party feared a Soviet-inspired insurgency reaching South West Africa. The Caprivi Strip was seen as the key vulnerability, bordered by Angola, Botswana, Zambia, and Rhodesia. By 1966, Portugal had been fighting MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA in Angola for five years, and SWAPO was expected to mobilise southward. Pretoria initially downplayed the threat, and the SA Police rather than the army led early operations, with political leaders wary of escalation while military hawks demanded a firmer response. Defence Minister Frans Erasmus pursued affirmative action for Afrikaners, weakening the army and pushing out English-speaking officers. The SADF in 1966 was poorly equipped, still using World War II rifles, tanks, and artillery, though new R1 rifles, 7.62mm machine guns, and Panhard AML armoured cars were arriving. A new professional officer corps, including Jannie Geldenhuis, blended British Army organisation with Boer Commando traditions and stressed scientific discipline over magic. The air force and navy were equally unprepared, with limited Mirages, Buccaneers, Canberras, Alouette and Puma helicopters, and ageing ships. The episode ends by noting the SADF was hardly ready when the border war formally began with the attack on Ongulumbashe.

Transcription

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English
Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Deas Latham. This is episode 5 and we'll hear a bit more about Angola, but most of the episode is going to focus on our main story, how the SA Defence Force began rearming itself in the early 1960s. As nations across Africa were decolonising, it appeared to the National Party in Pretoria that black majority rule would find its way to South West Africa. Last episode, we heard how the South African government had begun to impose the strict rules of apartheid across both territories. National Party politicians knew that it would only be a matter of time before they were faced with a Soviet-inspired insurgency on their doorstep. The major weak point in South West Africa was the Caprivi Strip, which was bordered by Angola, South West Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and at its eastern point, Rhodesia. South Africa's National Party was trying to cope with reports of increased insurgency in South West, as Angola to the north became more unstable. By 1966, the Portuguese and Angola had been fighting against various independence movements, including the MPLA, UNITA, and the newly renamed FNLA, for at least five years. It was inevitable that the South West African People's Organisation, or SWAPO, would begin to mobilise south of the border. Pretoria's response? According to war researcher Leopold Schultz, was based on their unwillingness to acknowledge that SWAPO formed a real danger to South West domination at first. The early years of the battle against SWAPO were going to be led by the SA police and not the army. Much has been said and written about this approach, with the military hawks in the National Party pressing for a more determined response, and the political leadership preferring to avoid escalation. They were watching what the Americans were up to in Vietnam at that time. The South African army at this stage was pretty much in the middle of the war. It suffered from the after-effects of the Second World War. It also suffered from an ideological shift, where many of the top officers had been pushed out of the SADF by the nationalist-led Afrikaans-speaking political order of the day. The English were not wanted by these nationalists, whose narrative was one of extremism, particularly when it came to that terrible war of 1899-1902, the Anglo-Boer War. The Minister of Defence, Frans Arad, expressed his disdain for the South West African people, and said that it would be better for them to return to their native countries, and that it would be better for them to return to their native countries, rather than for them to return to their native countries. Leopold Schultz, the Nationalist of the South West, said that he would like to see them re-established and re-established. The Minister of Defence, Frans Erasmus, had instituted affirmative action to promote Afrikaners at all costs, had instituted affirmative action to promote Afrikaners at all costs, and if that meant weakening the army in the short term, and if that meant weakening the army in the short term, he didn't care. As long as the people who looked and sounded right were promoted, Erasmus was a happy man. So too were his fellow nationalists. This has a curious ring to it in the 21st century, This has a curious ring to it in the 21st century, with the African nationalists basically doing the same thing to Afrikaans and English-speaking whites in the military. to Afrikaans and English-speaking whites in the military. The African National Congress is also disembarked The African National Congress is also disembarked on a general basis by instituting race-based affirmative action, on a general basis by instituting race-based affirmative action, which means change at all costs. That only works in a stable situation when you have a strong currency and growing economy. The weakness in this philosophy only shows up when there's a crisis. Of course, another irony about the ANC's action in South Africa Of course, another irony about the ANC's action in South Africa is that the government today cannot really lay claim to any memory of the border war because they were largely absent from the fighting. It is a fact that the Angolans remind the South Africans about It is a fact that the Angolans remind the South Africans about all the problems and something that irks those in power in modern South Africa. So the SA-DF in 1966 was not the powerhouse that it grew into by the early 1980s when it was considered the most powerful and feared army in Africa. There had been some changes with the old-fashioned Lee-Enfield rifle of the First World War being replaced by the Belgian FN or a version of it called the R1. This was an automatic rifle that used 7.62 ammunition and it was to remain in use until the R4 and R5 appeared much later. The Belgian light machine gun with the 303 calibre was replaced by a version that fired 7.62mm rounds and used the same magazine as the R1. The infantry also deployed the Saracen armoured personnel carriers dating back from the 1950s. The South Africans anti-tank gun they used remained the Second World War 6-pounder and the 3.5-inch rocket launcher. By 1966 these had been replaced by the NTAC anti-tank weapon while the defunct 3-inch mortar was on its way out in favour of the 81mm. The SA-DF still used this World War Vickers machine gun and that would remain in use for another 10 years. By 1966 the army had Sherman and Comet tanks which were also dated from 1945. The Irland armoured car or what we called the Noddy car was in use. It's basically a French Panhard known as the AML but called the Noddy car partly because it had rocked back and forth over the uneven felt and the fact that the first versions in South Africa actually resembled Noddy's car in some ways. However it had two major drawbacks. It was petrol powered so it could burst into flame if it and also slightly underpowered. But it was preferred to the Daimler ferret that the SA Defence Force had used since the Second World War and that was armed only with a general purpose machine gun. In July 1961 a South African military delegation headed by Minister of Defence Jim Fouchy and SA-DF Commandant General Peter Krobala travelled to France to negotiate a licensing agreement with Panhard for those vehicles. The AML was favoured because the SA-DF's priorities at the time were fighting a possible counter insurgency campaign or an unconventional bush war and the basic requirements of which were light armoured vehicles with the greatest mobility and most simplified maintenance. Elans were to form the mainstay of the SA Defence Force Armoured Corps for nearly 30 years. But by the mid-1980s it was presumed to be underpowered as South Africa believed it would fight more tank warfare which was true by the time of Guido Carnavali in 1987. The artillery was also equipped with light 25 pounder or 88mm guns and medium 5.5 inch both dating from before 1945. So not exactly the most up to date army in the world at this stage. That of course was going to change radically within two decades as the war in South West began to dominate National Party cabinet meetings back in Pretoria and the Treasury. The infantry had been negatively affected at first by the Nationalists seeking to remove English speaking officers who were thought of almost as the enemy by the new ruling class. By 1962 the voluntary military service system was replaced with a ballot system which meant some white men were called up to serve for nine months. It was quickly realised that nine months is not enough to train and deploy men properly and this was the change in 1968 where military service was converted to a full year. By the time I was trained, it was 1981 and military service was two years. Each period of the border war caused an escalation. In the same way as the American experience in Vietnam and more recently in Afghanistan. The training in the early 1960s was not very good by all accounts with much of what was going on really rooted in a kind of second world war mentality and conventional warfare. As Coles points out there were only two units that were respected, the Army Gymnasium itself and one Parachute Battalion. The Special Forces or RECIs were only created in 1969 so the first years of this war were to be characterised by the new Officer Corps coming to grips with a new form of warfare. By 1966, the SA Defence Force was in no position to fight either a conventional nor an unconventional war. However, it had the advantage of being grounded in two intrinsically opposed disciplines. One, the British Army Organisation and the other was the Boer Commando innovations of the 19th century. These two cultures which had at first clashed inside the SADF were co-opted by a fresh Officer Corps including leaders like Jannie Geldenhuis who had quickly emerged as one of the new brand of South African professional military. It was Jannie Geldenhuis who led the Guard of Honour on the 27th of January 1960 at Janssmuts Airport for British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. I mentioned him last episode and his Winds of Change speech that he was to make in South Africa's Parliament in Cape Town in February. Geldenhuis was trained partly at British Army Intelligence School at Mayorsfield where one of the courses he received was delivered by Winston Churchill's former Head of Security. The Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 meant the SADF Officer Corps was highly aware of the nationalist movement back home and began to understand the ramifications for Southern Africa as a whole. Geldenhuis mentions in his book called "At the Front" that he and other South Africans being trained by the British were acutely aware of what was going on around the time of Sharpeville. The culture of professionalism grew year by year even as the political pressure inside South Africa and South West Africa increased. By combining the best elements of the British system which included banning officers from making any income through any business related dealing and understanding that it was a disgrace to become insolvent with some of the Boer Honor Code it made for an interesting looking army. It is difficult for some now to appreciate what this means but it is one of the main reasons why the army did not agree to a coup as demanded by P.W. Boerter and his hardliners many years later. Apart from these codes the other main change experienced in the army was the development and realization of what science meant. The Boer commander system had espoused innovation but it was also riddled with poor discipline in fact anarchy at times and a reliance on magic. The power of the Bible was supposed to be at the heart of the military struggle by the Afrikaner and in the mid 1960s this shifted to an ideological understanding of the power of science over magic. Modern concepts like this caused a clash of cultures in the changing SA Defence Force. Gellner himself was stressed by that clash but knew it was an imperative in any future conflict. To know something rather than wish for something is a fundamental principle of an effective army the basis of intelligence and heldness refers to this as it is the discipline whereby the assumptions underlying principles methods and boundaries of scientific knowledge are explored and scientific laws are formulated the new officer corps also developed techniques to convert opaque concepts into easy to understand orders and then to quickly transfer these to ncos and individual troops i set out to be rational said heldness and i practiced it to the extreme he would argue with fellow officers about whether petoria was actually hot when messina was hotter he would argue in a factual and logical manner rather than indulge in small talk this in some ways would be at the heart of the successful sa defense force later ignore the party political propaganda concentrate on the real threats and opportunities that's strategic by 1964 south african officers were being sent as military observers to angola which by now was well into its war of independence heldness was transferred to luanda the capital in 1965 as ian smith made his unilateral declaration of independence speech this was only a year before the south africans would be fighting in northern southwest africa as officers made their way to angola they began to learn two things one was a basic understanding of portuguese and the other was an appreciation for how to conduct war inside angola meanwhile the sa air force was equally unprepared for any war it had taken possession of a great aircraft the dassault mirage 3 17 with the hj1ez ground attack variant and 16 others with the hrcz interceptor on face value this was a good sign but in reality the mirage would suffer later from its endurance limit of only 40 minutes that's all good and well in europe but in the vast spaces of africa it's a problem the sa air force would need a significant upgrade in both training and equipment which would be used to fight against the sa air force eventually took place after operation savannah only in 1975 more about that in later podcasts the sa air force bought 16 buccaneers and eight canberras these were to prove most useful throughout the border war as you're going to hear however they suffered from one major problem the cavalier attitude to maintenance and flying the buccaneer in particular by 1978 nine of the buccaneers had been lost in flight accidents when the climax of the border war perished in 1970 the sa air force in 1988 this kind of lackadaisical approach to flying meant there were only five left like the americans in vietnam the south africans quickly realized the value of the much vaunted aircraft the helicopter without these the army would have been unable to fight 128 sud aviation eluit three light helicopters were bought in various batches by the sa air force throughout the 1960s i saw these being used as helicopter gunships in angola later they of course were not designed for this role but it was one innovation that really worked in the felt of africa as they swooped low and fast armed with machine guns and other weapons it's a small helicopter unsuited to carry loads and by 1970 south africa had purchased 20 puma by the late 1970s the sa air force had 68 pumas and another 16 superfuelons you can see that these numbers are paltry by world air force standards the troop carriers for example were 40 world war ii douglas c-130 hercules there was no way later in this war that there were enough aircraft to conduct deep operations into angola other than by using the road this would have a major impact on what was going to happen in the water wall the navy's tactical role was limited as well but it was useful operationally the navy had two second world war destroyers three type 12 president frigates and three french built daphne class submarines over the next two and a half decades the subs would be used to deploy special aircrafts to angola and the navy would be used to deploy special aircrafts and to track russian and cuban vessels by the 1970s israeli built strike craft would be in use along with ad hoc fishing boats for recce operations by 1966 when the war formally started when the sa police and some military attacked a swapo base at ungulambash the south africans were hardly prepared when it came to equipment let alone infantry numbers this would change rapidly over the course of the 23 years of south africa's border war so that's enough for this week next episode we'll take a look at the event that triggered those 23 years that attack on ungulambash at the same time we'll hear about what was going on in angola please rate the podcast on itunes if you have the inclination you can also send me an email through my ab war podcast.com website or direct message me on twitter at des latin until then be safe goodbye you

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. The episode focuses on how the South African Defence Force began rearming in the early 1960s amid decolonisation and fears of a Soviet-inspired insurgency.
  2. The Caprivi Strip was identified as the major weak point in South West Africa, bordered by Angola, Botswana, Zambia, and Rhodesia.
  3. By 1966, Portugal had been fighting MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA in Angola for at least five years, and SWAPO was expected to mobilise south of the border.
  4. The early counter-insurgency effort was led by the SA Police rather than the army, as political leaders preferred to avoid escalation while military hawks pressed for a stronger response.
  5. Defence Minister Frans Erasmus promoted Afrikaners at all costs, weakening the army in the short term and alienating English-speaking officers.
  6. The SADF in 1966 was poorly equipped with dated World War II weapons and tanks, though new equipment such as the R1 rifle and Panhard AML armoured cars were being introduced.
  7. A new professional officer corps, including figures like Jannie Geldenhuis, combined British Army organisation with Boer Commando traditions and emphasised science over magic.
  8. The SA Air Force and Navy were also unprepared, with limited aircraft, helicopters, and ships that would only be upgraded much later.

Summary:

This episode of South African Border Wars examines how the SADF began rearming in the early 1960s as decolonisation swept Africa and the National Party feared a Soviet-inspired insurgency reaching South West Africa. The Caprivi Strip was seen as the key vulnerability, bordered by Angola, Botswana, Zambia, and Rhodesia. By 1966, Portugal had been fighting MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA in Angola for five years, and SWAPO was expected to mobilise southward.

Pretoria initially downplayed the threat, and the SA Police rather than the army led early operations, with political leaders wary of escalation while military hawks demanded a firmer response. Defence Minister Frans Erasmus pursued affirmative action for Afrikaners, weakening the army and pushing out English-speaking officers. 62mm machine guns, and Panhard AML armoured cars were arriving.

A new professional officer corps, including Jannie Geldenhuis, blended British Army organisation with Boer Commando traditions and stressed scientific discipline over magic. The air force and navy were equally unprepared, with limited Mirages, Buccaneers, Canberras, Alouette and Puma helicopters, and ageing ships. The episode ends by noting the SADF was hardly ready when the border war formally began with the attack on Ongulumbashe.

FAQs

The episode focuses on Angola and how the South African Defence Force began rearming itself in the early 1960s.

It bordered Angola, South West Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and Rhodesia, making it vulnerable to insurgency.

The South African police led the early fight against SWAPO, not the army.

It was not a powerhouse and was unprepared for either conventional or unconventional war.

The Belgian FN rifle, or a version called the R1, replaced the Lee-Enfield.

It was favored for counter-insurgency because it was light, mobile, and easy to maintain.

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