Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars, with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 49. It's the first half of 1981, and more hit-and-run raids were being carried out by Swapu, particularly around Okolonga and Mahanene. Some of the frustrations concerning the quality of intel were proving difficult to explain away by the SADF. For example, early on the morning of the 21st of January, six 14-man teams from 3-2 battalion were airlifted into Angola, to within one and a half kilometers of the suspected Swapu base at Dongrena. The intelligence info was wrong. The base was two kilometers south of that position, and by the time they hit it, there was no one at home. And worse, the base wasn't Swapu's, it was Fapla's, the Angolan army, which 3-2 was told to leave alone. The troops found paraphernalia in the trenches, proving they were in the wrong. Just then, a young boy was spotted wandering around, and he told the troops that there was a Swapu base nearby, but it was further southwest. That information was accurate. It took a child wandering around the sandy southern Angolan plains to provide intel to 3-2 battalion, a rather embarrassing fact. When 3-2 arrived at the base, it was empty, but showed signs of being hastily evacuated with plates of food still on the table. Colonel Ferreira was scratching his head. After redeploying his forces once more, and then moving his tactical HQ back to Ombalunto, he handed over Operation Fastrap, as it was known, to Commandant James Hills. The Swapu base in the vicinity of Kaluka Dam was still a mystery when Operation Fastrap was called off eventually in March. The early months of 1981 were characterized by a series of operations inside Angola of various sizes. 3-2 battalion and 1 parachute battalion were busy most of the time. It was apparent that FAPLA was growing increasingly aggressive. The Angolan Air Force as well was showing signs of life. Their training appeared to be improving. Pretoria's policy remained one of avoidance when it came to FAPLA, unless the SADF was under direct attack. This, as I've said, created challenges for commanders in the field. It was difficult to identify the one from the other at times, as the comments earlier in this episode reveal. The situation prevailing along the South West African-Angolan border was intolerable. It was difficult to identify the one from the other at times, as the comments earlier in this episode reveal. The situation prevailing along the South West African-Angolan border was intolerable. The situation prevailing along the South West African-Angolan border was intolerable. The escalation expanded into areas where there'd been previously no SWAPA activity and the intensity of the attacks increased. The escalation expanded into areas where there'd been previously no SWAPA activity and the intensity of the attacks increased. The escalation expanded into areas where there'd been previously no SWAPA activity and the intensity of the attacks increased. Former SAF Force Commander Brigadier General Dick Lord points out in his book "From Fledgling to Eagle" that Defence Force capabilities and resources were being stretched unnecessarily and SWAPA was using the logistics and protection of FAPLA in order to approach the border with relative impunity. But the SAF had limited resources in equipment and manpower. So it was not going to be possible to sweep this area clean. There was a 1.2 metre-high four-strand wire fence which basically stretched the distance from Brussels to Milan. As Lord points out, had NATO deployed all their forces in Europe along this fence between these two cities, they would not have been able to stop people crossing from one side to the other. So what chance did the SAF have? The problem in South West Africa was also the dense bush and visibility which dropped to 30 metres or less when you were on the ground. After each wave of SWAPA attacks, the security forces would apply a different tactic, deploying more ground troops often by using more vehicles or helicopters and then improving armaments. But by early 1981, SADF top brass had decided that the thinly spread security forces were no longer cost-effective. Too much time and money was being expended in non-stop patrols with too little to show for it. SWAPA was also gaining the advantage and in military terms, when that happens, the enemy's confidence surges and it's hard to believe that this is the end of the world. But the SAF was also gaining the advantage and in military terms, when that happens, the enemy's confidence surges and it's hard to believe that this is the end of the world. SWAPA was also gaining the advantage and in military terms, when that happens, the enemy's confidence surges and it's hard to believe that this is the end of the world. SWAPA was also gaining the advantage and in military terms, when that happens, the enemy's confidence surges and it's hard to believe that this is the end of the world. A defensive tactic by the SADF had to change to offensive. They couldn't just patrol waiting to bump into a landmine or booby trap or SWAPA stick. They also couldn't just rely on a few hundred members of 3-2 battalion and the reccees to do this either. General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement General Janne Heldenhuis and his replacement, Major General Charles Lloyd, were trying to deny the guerrillas freedom of movement prohibits host countries from allowing incursions from their territories into those of international neighbors. But of course Pretoria was also allowing 3-2 battalion to launch incursions into Angola but these were plausibly deniable. So they convinced themselves that international law was on their side and began planning the massive Operation Pretoria, one of the biggest invasions of Angola carried out by the SATF in the entire 23-year war. But first Operation Carnation which involved 3-2 battalion was launched in June 1981 and continued all the way until Obs Protia in August with the aim of pushing SWAPO out of the southern areas across the cut line. I did cover some of the incidents related to Operation Carnation in previous podcasts and remember this took place in the first few months of 1981. So there was a cat and mouse game going on by this stage. On the 10th of July 1981 3-2's Foxtrot company operating along what SWAPO called the Central Front headquarters uncovered a cache containing 4,000 kilograms of canned food. On the 11th of July 3-2's Alpha company attacked the northern front logistics base two kilometers northeast of Onjiva killing four enemy and capturing a large pile of equipment. SWAPO though had the SATF movements under close scrutiny and avoided being caught. Each time 3-2 began to move SWAPO was informed. They kept one step ahead of the patrols and avoided ambushes while moving steadily towards FAPLA at Mongua and Onjiva. The situation changed radically on the 7th of August when FAPLA columns emerged from the shadows to face the South Africans head on. The first confrontation was with members of 5 reconnaissance regiment which was deployed around 20 kilometers west of Onjiva on the main road to Kwamato. Two enemy vehicles were hit by an ambush then the South Africans dug in for a possible counter-attack which took place later that night. FAPLA returned to recover their dead and were attacked in the dark. The Reckies took out three BTR-60 armored cars but a 5 Reckie member was killed. Then the South Africans learned that FAPLA had ordered all ops trained troops to report to Namakunde with their automatic weapons. The Reckies were told by the local population that FAPLA was also at Dover which is northeast of Onjiva on the main road to Kahundo. They appear to be gearing up for something quite big. In mid-August more contacts took place near Chiedi but each firefight led to SWAPO beating a hasty retreat in the direction of the nearest FAPLA base and thus the move to Operation Pretier which would turn into the largest ground assault by South Africans of the entire border war. The co-operation between SWAPO and FAPLA had to be broken. Both used the same logistics routes so the SATF needed to destroy the communication lines across the Kaneni River. To do that Major General Lloyd approached Constant Paludan and suggested a large force be sent into Angola to destroy the combined FAPLA-SWAPO strongpoints at Sangongo, Mongua and Onjiva. Not all South African officers were entirely happy about this. For example 3-2 battalions Commandant Dion Ferreira had a cordial relationship with FAPLA's commander at Onjiva Major Alfonso Maria. He sent a letter to Major Maria previously thanking him for his cooperation and warning him to stay out of 3-2's way. Now he was going to be part of a massive attack on Onjiva itself. Meanwhile Sangongo's FAPLA commander was much more aggressive and was harassing SATF patrols constantly. SWAPO and FAPLA's logistics system was fully integrated at Sangongo along with their defensive positions. Lloyd wanted direct attacks on these positions but it wasn't going to be easy. More than 4,000 SATF troops took part in OPS Pretier which was a very complex undertaking involving many moving parts of the SATF equation. It was a mechanized operation and as we spend time over the next few episodes looking into the OPS in great detail I will try and simplify these strands. The man who was going to lead the South Africans into this major undertaking was Brigadier Rudolf Witko Parnost. He was officer commanding Sector 1-0 in northern South West Africa with his HQ at Oshakati. There were three main task forces: Alpha, Bravo and Charlie and each was about a brigade in strength. Charlie was a support brigade and it wasn't involved in the fighting per se but focused on counter-insurgency in the north of South West Africa. Bravo was under the command of Colonel Fos Banade and was going to spend most of the coming weeks focusing on what was called Area Tango Eastern Kunene Province. So it was that Task Force Alpha was the main assault brigade comprised of a mixed mechanized and motorized infantry force under the command of Colonel Joep Jobert. His fellow officers admired his detail-driven approach to planning and even Jan Breitenbach who was notoriously direct and did not suffer fools thought that Jobert was a good leader. Alpha was broken down into four battle groups. Up to now in major OPS the SATF had used the phrase "combat group" but they switched I guess that was because this was such a large undertaking. Battle Group 10, 20, 30, 40, and a fifth called the Pathfinder Group. Commandant Roland de Vries, who you've heard from already in this series, led Battle Group 10, which was basically 61 Mech Battalion, comprised of an infantry company in Rattles, a parachute company on board Biffles, an armoured car squadron, a mortar platoon, a troop of 140mm artillery, and a combat engineer troop. De Vries also had a reserve of one Rattle 20 company and a Rattle 90 troop from the anti-tank division. Battle Group 2-0, of which I was part, was led by Commandant Johan Udipis-Dippenau. He had led 61 Mech during Operation Skeptic, and it was one of the more powerful organisations to mobilise, featuring two motorised infantry companies in Biffles, a mechanised infantry company in Rattle 20s, two extra motorised infantry platoons, two armoured car squadrons featuring Rattle 90s, and Rattle 90s as well as Rattle 60s, a 140mm artillery battery, and a combat engineer troop. So Battle Group 2-0 was specifically created for Pretier and disbanded straight after that. Battle Group 3-0 was led by Commandant Chris Serpentine and included three motorised infantry companies in Biffles, an armoured car squadron of Rattle 90s, a 120mm mortar battery, and 81mm mortar platoon, and a combat engineer platoon. Dion Ferreira led Battle Group 4-0, basically a 3-2 battalion group. It included three motorised infantry companies on board Biffles, an armoured car squadron of Eland 90s, a battery of 120mm mortars, a combat engineer troop, and four anti-tank teams. They were going to be very busy. The final group was the Pathfinder Company, which was going to operate independently, led by Captain Andreas Ruys-Feltheisen, and made up of mostly 44 Parachute Brigade, lurking nearby alongside them was Jan Breitenbach, who ended up joining this Pathfinder Company for the ride, he said later. I must also tell you that a few other unlisted people were involved. One was a highly experienced small elite unit I met at Onjiva Airport a few weeks later. They were mainly Vietnam veterans, former Green Berets, who were acting as what we called operators, and they were not officially involved with the SADF. They didn't officially exist, but they were there being paid by someone, and I'm sure one of the listeners will have more information about these folks. I drank a few beers with these Vietnam vets. One had a PhD in philosophy from a prestigious American university, and I tried to connect his daily life of soldiering with his previous life as an American academic. That was difficult. So the South Africans had a few other surprises for the Angolans. For the first time, an artillery troop was equipped with one hundred and twenty six units, twenty seven millimeter Valkyrie multiple rocket launchers or MRLs. When I drove past this weapon for the first time inside Angola, I thought they were captured Stalin's organs from the Second World War being used by FAPLA until they began to fire towards FAPLA lines. Then the penny dropped. As soldiers know, I guess the Russians are finding this out the hard way in Ukraine. You're always the last to know when it comes to all sorts of things. The MRL manufactured in South Africa was very successful, although, there were only a few available by the time of ops protea. Everything about this assault was going to involve power, not least when it came to aviation. It was the largest concentration of planes and other aerial vehicles gathered together by South Africa since the Second World War. There were thirty three mirages of various types. F1AZs, F1CZs, 3CZs, 3D2Zs, 16 Impalas, 5 Buccaneers and 5 Canberras. They have also deployed an unmanned aerial vehicle UAV for the very first time. Photo reconnaissance would be carried out by 1 Canberra, 3 Mirages and 2 Impalas. And then for fire support, troop movements as well as backup, they'd use 19 Alouette gunships and troopers, 17 Pumas and 2 Super Freelance. Eight Kudu aircraft would fly in communication links and relays. And then seven Dakotas along with three C160s and 130 Hercules were available for paratroopers, transport, resupply and propaganda pamphlet dropping, as well as 11 light boss books deployed as spotters. The light aircraft would be very useful in navigation recon and for telecoms backup. Now all of this was going to cost a packet. The SA Air Force launched Operation Knife at the same time as Protea with the aim of providing electronic warfare support to its forces. It'd be a Ground Comms Intelligence or Command Team at RAKANA working with the ECM to build up an assessment of enemy radar and air defences. The Air Force had their own objectives which included the disruption of Angola's Air Force and SWAPO air defence systems in the South Central Theatre. They were particularly interested in the installations at Chebemba and Kahama and would carry out these attacks independently of Protea's ground forces. The high level objectives were to neutralise SWAPO's military force in Southern Angola between the Kunene and Kavanga rivers in order to make their movement inside South West Africa more difficult. Three main bases were targeted at Humbe, Zangongo and Onjiva. As you've heard, PLAN's operational HQ was at Zangongo while their logistics centre was at Onjiva. Still, the orders continued to emphasise avoiding fighting FAPLA. The SADF order said: "Not to attack any FAPLA positions or troops unless they interfered and the safety of our own forces were thus threatened." How the Top Brass thought this was possible is beyond me. By the time we ended up inside Angola, I didn't see many SWAPO soldiers during OPS Protea. It was all about FAPLA. All the POWs retreated were FAPLA. The dead lying about the streets were all Angolan Army. We would also meet Cubans and Russians, but SWAPO? They were thin on the ground. Before unleashing this mighty force, the SADF needed to soften things up a bit and on the 21st of August 1981, launched Operation Koinin, or RABBIT. This was basically a mobilisation op getting all the battle groups to Oshikongo. Some of us had been conducting manoeuvres for weeks around Oshivelo, close to Etosha Pan. I was living inside one of the ammunition dumps, which we always thought was a curious place to make the OPS medics camp. One RPG later and we'd be vaporised, but I suppose that meant no medics required. Waiting for us inside Angola, where FAPLA's second division in Kunene province, with its headquarters, which is in Lubangu. SWAPO's HQ was also there. The division had six brigades at least, that was what the SADF intelligence highlighted. Three were stationed close enough to pose a major threat to the South Africans. 21 Brigade was at Kahama and was thought to be a mobile reserve and the Requis would keep a close eye on their movements. 19 Brigade was stationed inside Zangongo and Piu Piu, and 11 Brigade at Onjiva. It was the Zangongo force that had the most power. FAPLA had the most teeth. FAPLA had two infantry battalions, a tank company with T-34s, an armoured car squadron using BGR-23s, an artillery battery, three 122mm rocket launchers, seven anti-aircraft guns, which we know by now were potent weapons against ground forces, and a planned infantry force. Many of the defenders were inside reinforced concrete bunkers and the bulk of the defences were facing south. This was PLAN and SWAPO's biggest mistake in upcoming battles. They were being attacked from their rear, particularly at Onjiva, and no concrete bunker can save you when the enemy is inside your defensive position. The SADF units were arranged south of the border, and at first there was an attempt to convince anyone stumbling across our large camps of Battlegroup 2-0 that we were conducting training or manoeuvres. But a number of our units were injured and some were killed. The SADF soldiers were trying to help us out, but we had no idea what they were doing, so we decided to leave them to the SADF. The SADF soldiers were trying to help us out, but we had no idea what they were doing, so we decided to leave them to the SADF. The SADF soldiers were trying to help us out, but we had no idea what they were doing, so we decided to leave them to the SADF. The SADF soldiers were trying to help us out, but we had no idea what they were doing, so we decided to leave them to the SADF. Word began to circulate that this massive build-up must be linked to an inevitable invasion. Word began to circulate that this massive build-up must be linked to an inevitable invasion. It's hard to hide live fire going on alongside a main road, even in an area where trouble was tightly controlled. It's hard to hide live fire going on alongside a main road, even in an area where trouble was tightly controlled. So, in the light of the massive SADF force living along the south of the border, the planners of Operation Pretier were hoping for tactical surprise. So, in the light of the massive SADF force living along the south of the border, the planners of Operation Pretier were hoping for tactical surprise. Both FAPLA and SWAPO knew there was an attack coming. Both FAPLA and SWAPO knew there was an attack coming. They knew it was probably going to target Zangongo and Onjiva amongst other towns, but from which direction? They knew it was probably going to target Zangongo and Onjiva amongst other towns, but from which direction? They knew it was probably going to target Zangongo and Onjiva amongst other towns, but from which direction? Zangonga and Onjiva amongst other towns but from which direction? And that was the big surprise. First it was decided that 3-2 battalion would strike at Zangonga from the north where the defenders were thinnest and the defenses weakest. Two days later at 1100 on the 23rd of August the airstrikes began. First Kahama was hit by two Canberras armed with four 450 kilogram and 18 250 kilogram bombs. Eight Mirages joined the attack armed with 30 missiles and so did two Buccaneers which were also armed with missiles. A few minutes later two more Canberras, two Buccaneers and 16 Mirage F1s armed with Mark 82 bombs attacked the radar installations at Chibimba although they faced heavy flak from SA-7s. At 1600 hours five Canberras hit Kahama again then a few hours later they bombed the transport depot northeastern. the town. Meanwhile Rekis were already in place across the border monitoring enemy movement on the ground between Kahama and Zangongo. At 0300 hours on the 24th of August battle group 1-0 led the way moving from Ruakana towards Kaluki then northwards following the west bank of the Kunene river. That made navigation a little easier. Things were more difficult for 2-0 my battle group as you're going to hear. At 3 hours 30 battle groups 2-3 and 4-0 crossed the border at beacon 16 and headed directly north. But this snaking column came to a sudden halt 12 kilometers northeast of Kumato when one of the 10-ton trucks detonated a mine. It was thick bush and a dark night. The dust making things even more difficult. The biffles were moving slowly far slower than the rattles and the schedule was recalibrated. By 10 hours 30 the force was 10. kilometers east of Zangongo awaiting the air attack. At 11 hours 05 eight impalas hit Piu Piu and Humbe knocking out the anti-aircraft guns. Minutes later the artillery opened up and fired a 20-minute barrage with the 140 millimeter G2 guns and the 127 millimeter MRLs. Then at 12 hours 39 ground troops moved on the targets. 1-0 was aiming at Humbe. 4-0 was focused on the center of Zangongo and 2-0 targeted the southern suburbs so to speak. Meanwhile battle group 3-0 headed off to Piu Piu. What happened next is for next episode. Right now we need to stop and check for anti-personnel mines. Just a quick shout out to Michael Buster who lives in Phoenix Arizona who hosts the Forgotten Wars podcast and has asked me to promote his series on wars like the Boa Bagananwa war. So search for Forgotten Wars podcast on iTunes, Spotify and all the other platforms. Almost anywhere podcasts are provided. Please head over to my website abwarpodcast.com. There's a link to send emails if you want to chat or you can direct message me on Twitter at Des Latham. Until next. Thanks for watching. I'll see you next time. Bye.
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