Episode 48 – Russian specialists set up anti-aircraft missiles and Special Forces ops accelerate across the cutline

Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me or host, DS Leyton. This is episode 48, it's the start of 1981 and a momentous year this would be. The rations were increasing their support for the MPLA in Lewander and one of those who arrived was Vladimir Vasilievich Kostolakchenkov. He helped establish the Petroa Anti-Aircraft System between 1979 and 1981. In the South of Engola and published some of his thoughts in a book called Bush War, the road to Guito Granabali. While most of this book is about the major battles that took place a later around Guito Kostolakchenkov's explanation of what happened in the South in the very early 80s is important for us at this juncture. It was his second tour of GTI of Engola, his first was as a translator in 1976 and he witnessed the civil war that broke out between the FNLA, the MPLA and Unita. He was based in Karmona, northern Engola and was translating for a team of Russian advisors. He survived numerous FNLA attacks and explains how all attempts at sealing the border with the Congo failed. The FNLA fighters used dug out canoes and small lightboats to move and complete silence along the many tributaries of the Congo River and infiltrated up to 300 kilometers inside Engola. They were supported by what he calls "their fellow tribesmen" who were scattered all over the region and he knew then that the struggle inside Engola was going to be a long drawn-out affair. Now he was back three years later after completing a course at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow. When he arrived, Engola had begun secret negotiations with the Zaire trying to get them to close down all FNLA's bases to stop attacks. If Zaire agreed, then Engola would stop supporting the breakaway Katanga province. What's fascinating about Kostra Chenko's experience is his description of how dilapidated the Engolan Air Force was before the early 1980s. He was involved in training MIG-21s and MIG-17 pilots but the Russians decided to stop supplying the letters they were unsuitable even for training purposes but the MIG-21s were a different story and could take the battering dish out in Africa. And really changed things at least from his point of view was the arrival of the MIG-23s and Sukhoi-22 fighter bombers. The SAF was began to pick up that by the end of 1981, the Engolan Air Force was becoming far more aggressive as they took advantage of the newer fighter jets. It was in November of 1981 that South African Air Force pilots would shoot down their first MIG since the Korean War, more about that saga in a later broadcast. The Russians realized that the Engolan Army couldn't conduct military activities without normal air support and anti-aircraft defenses. Some subunits had been put together in the preceding year after completing their courses at Soviet military colleges but the SAF was flew over southern Engola doing basically whatever they pleased. At least as long as they avoided swapper and farpler anti-aircraft defenses which were deploying their Z-U-23-2 twin-barrelled auto cannon as well as the 14.5mm ZPU-4 machine gun. These were very effective weapons against both aircraft and ground troops as you've heard already. They barked fire with deadly force as the Russians would say. They also rockets the Striller-2 and Striller-2M which were a shoulder fired armaments. The SAF learned to fear these but there was a major weakness. They only had a range of up to 2,500 meters and a minimum of 150. The SAF was flew at an altitude of more than 3,500 meters because of the mountainous landscape in Lubongo and the capital Lwanda. Mirages also conducted lightning raids they would hit and run. Vladimir Kostrachenko witnessed many attacks by Buccaneers and maintains in his book that he saw them hit ANC camps, swapper and farpler but it also saw air raids which bombed purely civilian targets from time to time. Pitoria denied this and as Kostrachenkov notes, " either they were incorrectly informed my military intelligence or they did this to teach the Angolans a lesson." We've already heard how poor intelligence had stymied a number of SADF attacks so it's highly likely that civilians were bombed whatever SADF commanders have said. It's the nature of war inside civilian areas and to expect this not to happen or to try and trot out a narrative that it never did is really foolish. President Dossanto apparently confronted the Russian head of mission, General Shakhnovich and his head of staff general Inyuzof asking how come it was so easy for the SAF to bomb southern Angola at will and embarrassing question deposed to representatives of a supposed superpower. It was decided to send Russian and Cuban anti-Ekrot sections to conduct these defenses themselves and Kostrachenkov was part of this rollout in 1981. Of course Moscow denied this at the time but even at the time the evidence was indisputable. The Russians viewed the Angolan fifth military district around southern Angola as weakly defended and decided it needed an upgrade. So a group of specialists from the Soviet Union arrived in 1980 to select suitable positions for ground to air missiles. Kostrachenkov set off with the specialist Tula Bungo. The plan was to protect the important time which was home of Tobias Aneko, that Swapo's training base. The South Africans had targeted the space a number of times particularly the preceding year in the warm up to operations as sceptic as you heard. It wasn't going to be easy constructing defenses there. Three anti-Ekrot divisions were needed and one would protect the other as well as the base itself. They formed a triangle so that two divisions could attack any aircraft flying in from any direction. Each division would cover the other two and if one came under attack two others would alter their aim to deal with the incoming aircraft. However if you take a close look at the Bungo district on strategic maps or Google Earth using the 3D app you'll see that the summit of the triangle was limited by the range of fire caused by the mountains and distances between each. The mountains also hindered the launching of their rockets. It's not advisable to aim your missile too low in a civilian area. The divisions set on a mountain commands excellent view of the ground if the enemy attacks along roads but the Russians had to set up on high ground while the Mirages would attack horizontally or sometimes from below. You cannot fire a missile at a negative angle. Kostradchenko saw this first hand, the Petroda S-125 missile system would be armed and this can reach altitudes of around 15 kilometers. They were effective, for example in the 7th of June 1980 while attacking swappers to Bios and Echo training camp during Operation Sceptic, Akaev Smokshell, Major of Frans Petorius and Captain Rc Dupassi who were both flying Mirage if ones were hit by S-125. Petorius' aircraft was hit on a fuel line and he had to perform a dead stick landing it if was based on Dungwa. Dupassi's aircraft sustained heavier damage and he had to dive it to Rokona forward to Astrop where he landed with only the main undercarriage extended. Both aircraft were repaired though and returned to service. But the Mirages and Impalas would fly at 50 meters above ground meaning the rockets could not aim. The Russians specialist with Kostradchenko spend some time in Lubangu trying to find the best angles and then attempted stopping these low level attacks but he says the South Africans always seem to find a new depression or hollow to pass through. Kostradchenko spent almost two weeks in Lubangu with the specialist measuring sites for the defences using the other lights. There were half a dozen points that could allow anti-aircraft divisions to cover each other and the target area. But there were two places in particular where low flying planes had to be attacked using sträller, shoulder-fired rockets or anti-aircraft guns since the Pejora complex couldn't cover these gullies. The Russians had installed the Pejora at a suitable spot on the high ground and set up the command center and division positions suiting the topography. One night a Russian ship secretly entered the port of Mokhamidis or it is known as Namibu today and offloaded the rockets. These were hauled along at night through the mountain pass to Lubangu and set up ready for the next South African attack. Once everything was installed, control of the area was handed over to Cubans and the SADF intelligence apparently had no idea that the Pejora were around when they attacked during operation. By April 1981, along the cut line, daily contacts were being reported by 3-2 battalion and by mid-year, the level of insurgency was off the charts. 3-2 was trying to stem that tsunami, for example, in the 14th of April, Colonel Ferreira was ordered to attack Swappers northwest in front headquarters as we heard last week. Remember, he had been hauled over the coals in January after targeting Angolan Army units along with Swappers and was ordered to avoid any further conflict with the Angodans. His target in April was to be Cuormato once more, the scene of his previous assaults on Fappler. I guess he shook his head after receiving the orders. One minute he was scolded for attacking Fappler, the next he was sent back into Fappler's backyard and then told to avoid the Angodans. The SADF by now had picked up that Swappers' western front HQ was near China and Mundajibala, about 6 kilometres northeast of Cuormato. Radio Intercepts pinpointed the location and it was decided that a joint operation was required to put a data back. Operation Hoatpal, or Woodenpal, combined 3-2 battalion and the Parabats once more. Colonel Young Bradenbach was back in the hot seat. He'd lead a Saber team from the Parabats 44 parachute brigade and the Air Force as well as engineers from 25 fields. squadron would operate as support. As Ferreira surveyed his maps, he was struck by the vastness of the target area. It was spread over an estimated 880,000 square meters and housed the Swapo Force believed to be up to 200 strong. Operational Order 12 Stroke 81, Artland that proper and physical reconnaissance was to be carried out before any attack after the somewhat shambolic intelligence you heard about previously. Lieutenant Villain Marrata was placed in charge of a wrecky team which entered Angola and reported back after some days. They confirmed a large number foxholes east of the base, as well as three anti-aircraft guns on the western side facing the China. Remember China is like a depression that sometimes is full of water, but during dry season many would turn into dusty, salty flats. In this case, the China did have some water. On the 15th of April, three twos echo a company crossed the border on foot just west of Beacon 13 and began moving north. It wasn't long before contact was made with 40 Swapo soldiers who were at a waterhole. One Swapo was killed, the rest retreated north. It was now likely they'd raise an alarm, but the SID have decided to go ahead with the assault on Swapo's base. Bradenbach's saber team entered Angola at first light on the 16th of April, but he was mechanised and all vehicles had anti-aircraft guns mounted to deal with Swapo's heavy weapons. It was hoped that if the SAA force didn't finish off these AA guns, then the heavy machine guns on the back of the bifles would do the job. As happened previously, Bradenbach's team got lost in the flat features terrain and couldn't link up with echo company. Eventually he decided to fire flares to allow echo to locate him, but he was now within 10 kilometres of Swapo's base, and that gave his position away. Still they waited until 1st light on April 17th to launch their strike on Swapo. Before they could move in, Swapo opened fire on where they thought the South Africans were, east of China Mundi Jawala complex. At 0620 they let rip with 120 mm and 82 mm, the barrage lasting 10 minutes. This puzzled both three to battalion's echo company and Bradenbach's saber group, as they were no SAAD of units at that position. Swapo apparently was firing at random. The SAA force sent an Impala at 0745, but they missed the anti-aircraft guns, which were then assaulted by aloe wet gunships. One chopper was hit and managed to limp back to the assembly's safe area. The failure of the Impala airtack didn't stop the ground assault. First, four puma's dropped a string of parabats into three stopper groups about a kilometre north of the base, and by 0813 echo company's troops had made it all the way into the center of Swapo's base. Given the noise and flares and whatnot over the past three days, it was virtually deserted. There were a few Swapo soldiers who surrendered. Verrera knew immediately what had happened. The Swapo barrage early in the morning was merely a cover to delay any attack as Swapo completed their tactical withdrawal. Three two set about destroying the base are rather hollow victory, it must be said. Colonel Verrera then made one of those radio calls you make when you're pretty sure the answer will be no, and requested permission to pursue the enemy to Cuamato, the nearest large town. That was where Fapo waited, and Petoria was still adamant that the Angolan army should be left alone. Verrera then formally complained about the SAA force inability to hit the target. Only one 250 kilogram bomb dropped by one of the six impilers had actually hit the base, and worse, the Helicopter gunships started their final run so far east of the base that they had missed all signs of Swapo withdrawal. The MPLA, meanwhile, appears to have guessed that the SDF was not allowed to pursue their Fapo soldiers and pressed home a tactical advantage. First on the morning of the 20th of April, three two's jolly company temporary base south of Cuamato was bombarded by Fapo using 122 millimeter rockets. Colonel Verrera made another full-on radio request for permission to follow up and was denied. At 1600 hours on the same day, a patrol from Charlie company and Fapo began a five-fire south-west of Cuamato. Fapo withdrew after an exchange of fire and the patrol shifted position eastwards. There were only ten members of the small platoon and they immediately came under fire from 82 millimeter mortars. After allowit gunships were called in, the new MPLA and Swapo tactics were deployed. As the allowit swung around the five-fire position Fapo opened fire in them with two SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles. Swapo's new tactic appeared to be working. They'd lure the South Africans into Angola, then hand over the fight to Fapo and the Cuban and Russian advisors. Fapo in turn had increased the size of their patrols to 50 men at least, which began to harass the South Africans more aggressively. Verrera once again was about to blow a fuse, but he was forced to withdraw his men south of the Cutline on the 21st of April, having achieved very little beyond forcing Swapo out of its HQ for short while. The western area of this war was intensifying. Regular ambushes and the destruction of roadlings between specific towns was the order of the day. Places like Cuamato, Angiva, Chidi Namakunda, and Angke, Dover and Chitano were death traps for Swapo and plan. South African special forces were concentrating north of Mongolia as well along the road to Yavali and Moopa towards the major crossroads at Kuvongo. On the night of 26th May, a combined operation was launched involving three two battalion, 44 parachute brigade, and special forces specifically aimed at ambushing vehicles on the road between Zangonga and Lubonga. The idea was to destroy stormwater drains, thus would cause problems for Swapo and Fapla in the rainy season. The roads would be submerged in places and would hamper logistics. First Lieutenant Raja, of course, led an 18-man reconnaissance team, and they would be responsible for the main ambushes. They would lay three TM-46 mines on the road surface, connecting each with cordics. The team leader would then trigger the mines when he received the signal. It wasn't long before vehicles began to roll past. The first was a star strike, which was blown up, flying through the air and landing in the trees at the roadside. The reconnaissance team destroyed the wreckage by lobbing a phosphorus grenade into the twisted remains, and it burned into the morning. At 0-445, another truck rumbled southwards from Lubonga to Zangonga, and the driver hit the brakes when he spotted the still smoldering wreck, but it was too late, and the wrecky team opened fire with small arms and an RPG-7 rocket launcher. The truck was carrying fuel drums and exploded, killing all three swabs on board. 10 km north of Chiemba, the special forces team blew up another vehicle with an RPG at around 1,900 hours that night. At the same time, one of the two Sabre teams, from 44 parachute regiment and a Colonel Bradenbach, rigged a culvert 30 km north east of Injibo with plastic explosives. They triggered these, blowing a 4-meter wide gap on the road, and it was now impassable. Meanwhile, a second Sabre team was patrolling near Guamante. When they surprised, the group of six swappered an observation post around 12 km south east of that town. They killed three, the others got away. The Sabre team wasn't done. They turned west and blew up a culvert on the main road between Zangonga and Mongua. All the wreckies and 44 battalion parabets then made it back to base, unscathed. However, there was a much bigger operation being planned. In fact, there were two that were to take place back to back. Code named Operation Karnation, the first was launched on the 20th of June, and was said to continue until Operation Prater in August. As with other preparatory ops, Karnation was going to offer some success, but also some failure. The SID of special forces were becoming better and better at the job of silent killing, stalking the enemy inside their own territory. But the political leadership back in Pretoria wanted a big bang. Karnation was originally planned to destroy all swappers logistic routes and bases in the immediate area north of the cutline from Beacon's 12 to 19. The plan was to drive swapper north of Kuvalae, which lies June-Earth of Anjiva. After some time, the attacks were extended east, covering the area all the way to Beacon 28. If you have a map, draw a line from the Namibian Angolan border directly north towards Ionde, that pretty much gives you an idea of the extent of a coming action. The brunt of the fighting would be born by three two battalion at first, of course, along with 44 parachute brigade. Other units drafted and included 6 and 3 psi, or SA infantry, 101, 201 and 701 battalions, as well as one SA coloured corps and five reconnaissance regiment. Operating across the border, these units found the first swapper base, but it had been evacuated. A second base was located, and only one swapper guerrilla was killed. Locals then tipped off the South Africans, that there was a base of a few kilometres east of Omopunda. The special forces duly headed there in the morning of 22nd June, and attacked killing two swappers. Then they ambushed a truck that night on the Manguan Anjiva road, believing it was being driven by a swapper. And at the same time, it was now clear that swapper was using a different tactic. They would move rapidly from one base to another every three to five days, this made it more difficult for the Allied gunships to spot them. Arms and food caches were left throughout this area, and although many were found by the SCD have destroyed many more and not. The game of Captain Mouse continued through June 1981 and into July. On the 1st of July, Colonel Ferrera sent Gulf Company to Chana Pali, which was directly over over the cut line from year 9. a where they struck it lucky. In a violent firefight, 17 Swapas were killed in three capture. On the 5th of July, the Swapas patrols ambushed East of Enhaka, and three more were killed, and yet the main priors, which was the location of the Northern Front Headquarters, remained elusive. Each time the SID had mobilized against what was reported to be the location, it was found abandoned. Sometimes just a few hours before the South Africans arrived. Clearly, Swapas was receiving some kind of information, but how? The SID of special forces prided themselves intoception, but it seemed it wasn't enough. On the 7th of July, three twos Foxtrot Company killed the 7 Swapas South East of Dover, and the gunship spotted a large base. This was a base on the main road north-east from Anjiva to Kaundu, and big enough it was thought to house 200 men. Foxtrot attacked immediately, but once again Swapas had left, and only two soldiers were found, to their credit they fought back, but both were killed. This was becoming irkson. Foxtrot Company moved swiftly to Mooper to the north of Injiva, and occupied the town killing one Swapas soldier, again the main group of guerrillas had left. Perhaps the most frustrating moment was at 1400 hours 15 on the 8th of July, when the allowets located another base 8 kilometres north-east of China Unbi. Three twos Alpha Company was airlifted there immediately, and there was a skirmish, during the contact two more Swapas were killed. They were not alone. The Pumas drew 14.5mm and SA-7 missile fire, and had to withdraw themselves, and airstrike was duty-coulding, and the impolars struck. Alpha attacked a short while later, but Swapa had somehow managed to withdraw in the teeth of these assaults. It was a tactical withdrawal, and they had taken the all-important anti-encroft guns with them, except for one SA-7 system. They, by day, the stings, the contacts, and the firefights went on, drawing the SA-DF across southern Angola, all the while around Injiva and Zangonga. It was these two towns that were going to be the target for a much bigger offensive, called Operation Protier, which was going to involve more than 4,000 SA-DF troops. Next episode, we'll deal with the preamble to the major battles fought during this offensive. Speaking of offensive, to my friends fighting in the Ukraine, sorry about the poor pronunciation, but put in Buddha Paramashni. May Zitoboyu. And for those seeking insight into wars, my friend Michael Buster, and Phoenix USA, has a series on the Anglo-Bore War as part of his forgotten wars podcast. It's an international view of an African conflict, so take a listen. If you'd like to contact me, send an email through my website, abwarpodcast.com, or direct message me on Twitter @daislaithen. Until next, bye. [Music]