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Episode 47 – 32 Battalion’s Colonel Ferreira hauled over the coals for attacking FAPLA and Impala’s drop napalm

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Episode 47 – 32 Battalion’s Colonel Ferreira hauled over the coals for attacking FAPLA and Impala’s drop napalm

In 1980, South African military operations in Angola, particularly Operation Skeptic, intensified as part of a broader conflict over Namibian independence. The SADF launched targeted attacks on Swapo bases, claiming to level the playing field after Swapo’s insurgency into South West Africa. However, the UN and African states criticized Pretoria’s actions, with Secretary-General Kurt Voltaim accusing South Africa of aggression and highlighting the failure of international bodies to maintain peace in volatile regions. Diplomatic negotiations in Geneva faltered due to accusations of UN bias toward Swapo. Meanwhile, the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) was established to manage local insurgencies, comprising locally recruited units under SADF command. Early clashes in September and October revealed intense guerrilla tactics, including ambushes and ambushes in the Guamato area. A major operation in January 1981, led by Colonel Dion Ferreira, targeted a suspected Swapo base near Guamato, resulting in significant casualties among FAPLA forces and limited South African losses. However, political directives from Pretoria abruptly halted further hostilities, instructing the SADF to avoid engagement with FAPLA, despite evidence of a large FAPLA base. This interference created strategic confusion and frustrated military leadership, undermining operational effectiveness and morale. The episode underscores the complex interplay between military action, political interference, and the enduring struggle for Namibian sovereignty amid regional instability.

Transcription

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English
Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, T.S. Latham. This is episode 47 and we're between major operations as it were. Last week, I published episodes 45 and 46 after being out of action for a few days. Nothing serious, just the real world, you know. We heard about upsmoke shell over the past few episodes. The next major incursion into Angola will be Operation Protier. There's quite a bit to cover before then. Upsceptic in particularly the battle for the Swapo Complex codename "Smoke Shell" had been a valuable learning curve for the SADF. At the same time, a new round of political negotiations were underway in June 1980. And General Magnus Milen had been appointed Minister of Defence in October. General Fulyun was now Chief of the Defence Force and Lieutenant General Yani Heldenheist took over as Chief of the Army in November. He was set to head back to Pretoria from his HQ in Oshikati. Taking a closer look at the attempted restarting negotiations, when it came to Namibian settlement talks firing of his Minister Puk Boethead often to reduce operational bases in the proposed demilitarized zone from 40 to 20, but on certain conditions. Pretoria also wanted an undertaking from Swapo that it would abandon its claim to bases inside South Africa but could retain those in Angola. Boethead also demanded that UN Secretary General Kurt Voltaim stop referring to Swapo as the only authentic representative of the Namibian people, which the UN leader had been doing on trips particularly to other African countries. Voltaim initially agreed to Pretoria's demands, then told the South Africans that the African frontline states and Swapo had begrudgingly accepted that while they still believed that the SADF didn't need the 20 bases after elections at all, that the UN force would be able to cope with tensions and they would accept the terms, but the sticking point was Swapo was refusing to disarm their combatants before the South Africans disarmed and vise versa. Angola and Zambia in particular went to this war to end, it was destabilizing their countries and they went it out. The one day Lusaka had told the South Africans that they supported Pretoria's position concerning the DMZ and the reduction of bases from 20 to 40, fine words, and yet it was not so simple as it never is in politics. Resolution 435 was at the core of the South African Namibian dispute. Remember, it had been passed by the UN Security Council way back in 1978 and consisted of proposals for a cease fire which had to be declared before any independent elections would take place. This was shortly after the disaster in Angola where the UN pushed for elections while the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA continued to fight for dominance. The UN-appearative learnt its lesson from that disaster and the idea was for all parties to stop the shooting war in South West, then a UN force would be installed called the United Nations Transition Assistance Group or Untaug. The big question was who was going to enforce and monitor the implementation of 435 and who was going to blink first, Swapo or Pretoria and the other problem was the timing. And of course, Operation Skeptic began at the time of initial negotiations which appeared to scoop a good faith between the parties. If you stand back and observe these goings on, you can see why the South Africans naturally felt hard done by. Here was Swapo conducting an insurgency into South West Africa, killing civilians and laying mines and when the SDF and turn invaded Angola to take out the bases from where these attacks were taking place, de-rin, stepped in and declared these operations illegal. "Our unfair," said Pretoria, "level the playing field." "Okay," said Swapo, "give us our independence and go home and hold free and fair elections there for your people." "That'll level the playing field." Voltaum launched a strong attack on Pretoria after Operation Skeptic and in response, Puttas said he was surprised by the Secretary-General's remarks. "Dr. Voltaum's attack on South Africa is nothing new," said Pretoria. "He does it regularly when he visits Africa to, among other things, hide the incapability of the United Nations to do something positive about the development of Africa." "Pointing out the constant warring and disastrous states of places like Chad, Marley, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the Congo, Syria, and Cordovoire, etc., was a fairly good boy if you debating from a position of strength." The unfairness debate was really just a smokescreen used by elements of the National Party to grandstand for their electorate at home. The eternal underdog logic was a profoundly important narrative. It had been used by Ian Smith's Rhodesia, and now it was used by P.W. Puttas South Africa, but for how long would it be useful? A government enforcing a party negotiating with the UN, loyal by post-colonial global politics, was never going to be refereed with anything approaching objectivity now, was it? The diplomatic shunting match had barely died down before the S.A.D. have launched another invasion into Angola called "Operation Club Club". This began at dawn on the 30th of July 1980, when S.A.D. have forced us to launch an attack on a Swapo logistics base near Chitaru, which was only five kilometres from the Catalan, and around 35 kilometres east of Rokana. Swapo had proved quite effective at lobbing mortars at the Rokana hydroelectric scheme as you've heard, and now the S.A.D. have wasn't intent on dealing the attackers a blow, pushing them further north. 80 men were dropped by helicopters close to the town of Chitaru, after 20,000 leaflets were dropped warning civilians of the impending attack. Aluret gunships supported the company as they deployed and 27 planned troops were killed, then the S.A.D. have destroyed an MPLA base in the town for good measure before withdrawing. Back in Ventuk two days later, the South West African territorial force or SWATF was officially launched as part of the S.A.D.F., eventually it would take over the lion's share of the fighting that was still going to take place along the South West Africa's northern border. Using a local force was an advantage for the S.A.D.F, because they were more worried about a direct threat inside South Africa itself. The ANC and PSC armed wings MK and APLA were increasing their insurgency and the bombing campaigns in South Africa were also escalating. The National Service death toll had been accelerating too, so creating a SWATF meant the great work inside SWA in the future could be largely dealt with by locals, not South Africans, parachute in every year as part of the National Service. But the SWATF commander remained an S.A.D.F. general who was also the Secretary of Defense and the administration's military adviser. So SWATF was comprised of three combat groups. The Corps was a full-time component. The second were the locally recruited light infantry battalions, which were mainly based on tribal lines and the third group were the area forces, which were commanders and territorial units. There was also an air wing, which was a cobbled together affair of mainly light plane owners. The big exception, of course, was three two battalions. It was so valuable as a military resource to Petoria that it was retained under control of the S.A.D.F. directly. Thus SWATF had around 1,000 members by the end of 1980, but it would number over 20,000 by the end of the border war, the Namibian War of Independence. And it would include engineers, parachute regiments, artillery and signals amongst others. So the insurgency into a Vumberland recorded a massive spark in September 1980, when a large 150-member plan group led by a seasoned campaign called Kallulla entered northern South Africa as a single large unit. But they were tracked down and ambushed after a typhoon from local avombos. An intense firefight over four days left 81 SWATF dead, including the commander, the S.A.D.F. reported no casualties. Eight S.A.D.F. soldiers had died in August and yet in September, despite the obvious increased activity of SWATF and the massive firefight just mentioned no S.A.D.F. wounded or killed seems unlikely. And of course, it was. At least one three two battalion member had died in September, according to laser reports. In the 5th of September, Lance Corporal E. Sophia was shot by friendly fire. A platoon commander had dropped his pistol while leading his men in a contact, then when some of his troops went back to pick it up, they walked straight into the own stopper group, which didn't recognize them in open fire. As an ops medic, I've treated soldiers hit by friendly fire, including antipersonal shells, and it's excruciating in the extreme it's frustrating and it's demotivating. By now, three two battalion was engaged in a battle of reconnaissance operations through the month, searching for SWATF's elusive north-west sector HQ. On the 15th of September, Reki teams that were operating independently of Delta and Charlie Company tracked a SWATF guerrilla as he moved through the bush from a deserted village, 20 km southeast of Guamato, inside Angola. The insurgent had grabbed food from a cache and the Reki's tracked him back to a small base, where at least 10 other SWATF guerrillas were hiding out. Unships were called in, and the seven-man Reki team attacked on the ground, killing two SWATF guerrillas. Villagers then told the Reki's that another large group of SWATF were drinking beer at a village SWATF west of Guamato, so the special force members shot it off to investigate. Indeed, intelligence was spot on. Three SWATF were spotted changing clothes at the village and were shot, then another larger group opened fire on the Reki's from behind a bayowab tree. The gunships were called in once more and during a fierce 40-minute encounter, 20 more SWATF died. But the South African still hadn't found SWATF's main base. frustration built up for the Reki's N32, particularly Delta Company, which had been tasked with finding this mysterious base around Guamato. In October 1980, Delta Company was relieved off to weeks of searching, and SADF intelligence now believed that the main base was more than likely inside Guamato itself, and being protected by Fappla directly. This posed a strategic challenge for 3-2 and the South Africans. They were supposed to avoid conflict with Fappla and the MPLA, generally, focusing on Swapu. But if planned fighters were in Skonstantans behind in Golan army fortifications, then attacking could put civilians in jeopardy as well. There were other moves of foot. In September, something took place which was to lead eventually to the historic battles at Guitua Guanavali much later. Unito arrested control of the strategic village of Mavinga from Fappla, and it had one major facility that worried the MPLA. An airfield. Jonas Savimi was going to use this airfield to fly in supplies, and as part of his public relations campaign, it was his window on the world as William Stienkebrat. That one small village became a focal point for MPLA action over the next eight years of the war. As Luwander assaulted Mavinga, the South Africans would be inexorably drawn into the eastern sector repeatedly because Savimi would need the SID of support in fighting off these heavily armed Angolan forces. It was not like Pretoria really had a choice. Savimi had been buffering the eastern zone against Swapu. And so there was a short lull in November of 1980, but December was different. It took an announcement by Swapu's Secretary of Administration Moses Garoub to lift the lid on the action of that month. He claimed that a number of raids had just been made into Angola and had been repulsed by Swapu and Fappla. New South African commander General Lloyd had first rejected that report, but then admitted at a media conference that they had been bases targeted and said there were no South African casualties. Swapu claimed that killed a large number of SID of troops, but as usual it was almost impossible for Pretoria to hide dozens of body bags from its prime media back home, and this was a case of blatant exaggeration. But you can see the cat and mouse game going on both militarily and politically. By Christmas the usual number crunching went on. The SEDF and Swapu had lost 100 men through 1980, the highest casualty figure ever. The insurgents, as you heard last episode, lost more 1,447, which by the way was a staggering figure that would only be surpassed once more in the next 8 years of this war. And yet the insurgency hardly wobbled as you heard. So New Year 1981 dawned and it didn't take long before the dying resumed. But first politics. In January the South Africans, Swapu and other members of the South West African internal political parties attended another set of pre-negotiations meetings in Geneva which ended badly. Beijing generated into a shouting match over the UN's pro-Swapu bias. At about the same time back in November 3, 2 battalion was planning a special event. By mid-January 1981, Colonel Dion Ferreira was ordered to take personal command of further deployment inside Angola to find this missing Swapu HQ. But he wanted a lot more than one company to do that because everyone now suspected Cuomato was the base, and Cuomato had Fapler units armed to the teeth, including heavy weapons, anti-aircraft guns and even possibly tanks. So Ferreira sharpened his pencil and built a powerful force consisting of three two battalions alpha and bravo companies, an 81mm motor group, one company each from one parachute battalion and two or one battalion, and two wrecky teams from each of special forces, two or one, and 44 parachute brigade. Crucially, as you are going to hear, Ferreira wanted full-blooded air support. That first army HQ offered two gunships, which went down like a cup of cold sick, as they say. And then after more sharpening of pencil sounds, that was increased to six puma helicopters, six gunships, a command and control silhouette, two boss book reconnaissance planes, and four impala strike aircraft. All were now waiting on his command at Undungwa, but the pressure was obvious. Okay Colonel, here is your personal Air Force. Now you better head off and find this elusive swap-a-base or dot dot dot. So it was then, net by 1400 hours on the 15th of January 1981, Ferreira's ground troops were in position and their target was the turn of Guamato. This had to be where swap-a was launching insurgency into a bombardment, as three two and the wreckies had scoured pretty much everywhere else. Just then were the parabets of one parachute battalion, who were driven in buffles to the edge of Guamato. As they swept the town, it was deserted. Then new information emerged that the nearest fapler contingent was actually 16 kilometers northwest on the road to Zangongo. Then the local Angolan militia made the fatal mistake of not withdrawing and the parabets located them killing one and capturing a second. He was going to provide more information about what was going on. At 1700 hours 30, the parachute company was moving north of Guamato to set up an ambush when they walked into a swap of platoon around 15 strong. The gunships were called in again to assist and on the way pilots actually spotted another enemy base from the air. The platoon from 32nd alpha company was airlifted in and attacked the base. They were stopped dead in their tracks by the heavy fire and so three more platoons of parabets and four gunships flew into help. Ex-pumers carrying troops arrived and lieutenant alpha walker and his flight engineer Sajun Boats-Burtus led a two-ship formation into the thick of the battle. Anti-aircraft fire was directed at these pumers, some took hits and one was walkers, but he ignored the traces and continued to land and take off over the next three days of fighting around this town. Yes, the alert gunships provided accurate fire support so none of the pumers were shut down but it was going to be a close call. The impalars were scrambled at undung ran, flew over the base five times, knocking out some of the anti-aircraft guns and destroying three vehicles. That night the gunships withdrew onto running low and fuel and at 2100 hours the parabets returned to tactical headquarters. One platoon from alpha company was led behind his night watch and they managed to capture two more enemy in the darkness. As with previous captured POWs these two were more than happy to spill the beans and explained how they were 150 farpler troops in the base. Now at least the attack force had a better idea by what they were facing if the two POWs were telling the truth. When the fight resumed the next morning the 16th of January, more anti-aircraft fire was directed at the alert gunships. The impalars attacked again at 0820 firing rockets in the 30 millimeter cannon but missed the targets. At 0847 a second air strike was called in and this time the SAF was went for range rather than accuracy. That's because they dropped napalm as the alert gunships circled the base looking out for movement. Then at 0855 three two battalions brother company was airlifted in by pumors for another attempt at the ground assault and eventually at 1100 hours 30 resistance crumbled. More than 70 farpler troops had been killed and two three two riflemen were wounded. Given the ordinances used remarkable really that more on both sides had not died. By the way a Puma pilot lieutenant Walker was awarded the honorous crooks gold for his carriage under fire and no doubt the troops who were on the ground applauded this as they watched the choppers ducking and weaving through the floods of traces. Things were far from over around Cuomato however. On the 17th of January gunship spotted another base nine kilometers south of the town and drew anti-aircraft fire. They escaped damage heading back to tactical headquarters but had stored the coordinates for this southern base. That was good news for the impalors which flew in shortly afterwards and destroyed the bases 23 millimeter anti-aircraft guns. Colonel Ferrera then prepped his men for another ground assault and by noon three twos alpha and brother companies along with two or one battalion's Charlie company were in position. They were well on the way to controlling this part of southern Angola. The impalors whistled in for a second strike but just before Ferrera advanced, he received a message to end the engagement and withdraw immediately to Umbalanto avoiding any further contact with Frontler on the way. By 1800 his units pulled back south of the Cutler. The political fallout I mentioned a moment ago had interrupted military matters. Those who have been involved in these sorts of cross-border missions into foreign territories know the frustration that Ferrera experienced at this point. The next morning, the 18th of January, Colonel Ferrera was part of a detailed planning session at 10HQ at Oshukati. What were you thinking shooting up Fappler, he was asked. The fact that Swapu was hiding behind Fappler and that the SEDF had no option but to fight both was not considered completely out of bounds. Ferrera was ordered in no uncertain terms to refrain from any further confrontation with Fappler and to confine his operations to locating and dealing with Swapu only. It was just this kind of muddled-headed political interference that was creating contradictions for three two and other SEDF units. The frustration amongst leadership was growing as the political leadership snugging their Pretoria beds tried to play the good guy when basically it wasn't possible. It was also not good for morale either. As you'll hear in the next episode, Colonel Ferrera had hardly any time to take a breath after what must have been a shocking debriefing. By 1200 hours 30 on the same day his men were back in Angola, but now avoiding Fappler like a plague. And his wreckies were about to meet an extraordinary Portuguese farming family who were living near Beaconfall north of the Canadian river, near Caluca, who were in grave danger. Somehow they had managed to survive the revolution. in the 1960s, then the Civil War marooned in a sea of death like an Angolan Swiss family Robinson, but it was not time for them to leave. What happened is for next episode, right now we must halt and secure the perimeter. Thanks to the folks who donating towards the upkeep of this podcast, Ray in particular who lives in the United States, his substantial donation means I can fund the podcast and website hosting fees for another year. I'm in your debt, Ray, and my other funders, thank you so much. If you'd like to contact me, head off to the website abwarpondcast.com and email from there, or send me a direct message on Twitter, my handlers, and there's later. Until next, goodbye. (upbeat music)

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. Operation Skeptic, a South African incursion into Angola targeting Swapo bases, intensified political and military tensions, with Pretoria accusing Swapo of unfairness and the UN facing criticism for perceived bias.
  2. Despite diplomatic efforts and UN Resolution 435 calling for a ceasefire and elections, Swapo and South Africa remained locked in a stalemate over disarmament, base reductions, and the legitimacy of political representation.
  3. The launch of the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) enabled localized resistance against insurgent activities, but political interference from Pretoria—especially banning operations against FAPLA—created strategic confusion and undermined military effectiveness.

Summary:

In 1980, South African military operations in Angola, particularly Operation Skeptic, intensified as part of a broader conflict over Namibian independence. The SADF launched targeted attacks on Swapo bases, claiming to level the playing field after Swapo’s insurgency into South West Africa. However, the UN and African states criticized Pretoria’s actions, with Secretary-General Kurt Voltaim accusing South Africa of aggression and highlighting the failure of international bodies to maintain peace in volatile regions.

Diplomatic negotiations in Geneva faltered due to accusations of UN bias toward Swapo. Meanwhile, the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) was established to manage local insurgencies, comprising locally recruited units under SADF command. Early clashes in September and October revealed intense guerrilla tactics, including ambushes and ambushes in the Guamato area.

A major operation in January 1981, led by Colonel Dion Ferreira, targeted a suspected Swapo base near Guamato, resulting in significant casualties among FAPLA forces and limited South African losses. However, political directives from Pretoria abruptly halted further hostilities, instructing the SADF to avoid engagement with FAPLA, despite evidence of a large FAPLA base. This interference created strategic confusion and frustrated military leadership, undermining operational effectiveness and morale.

The episode underscores the complex interplay between military action, political interference, and the enduring struggle for Namibian sovereignty amid regional instability.

FAQs

Operation Skeptic was a South African military operation in 1980 targeting Swapo logistics bases in Angola. It was significant because it demonstrated the SADF's efforts to disrupt insurgent activities, though it was later criticized as illegal by the UN, leading to diplomatic tensions and accusations of unfairness.

Pretoria wanted to reduce the number of bases from 40 to 20 in the DMZ to lessen the military presence in the region, arguing it would improve security and ease tensions. However, this required Swapo to abandon claims to bases inside South Africa and to disarm before South African forces disarmed.

Resolution 435, passed by the UN Security Council in 1978, called for a ceasefire before independent elections in Namibia. It aimed to prevent further violence by establishing a UN monitoring force, but its implementation faced challenges due to conflicting interests between Pretoria, Swapo, and Angolan factions.

SWATF was a locally recruited force established in 1980 to handle insurgent activities along South West Africa's northern border. It reduced the need for South African paratroopers and allowed for more localized, sustainable operations, though it remained under the command of SADF generals.

In January 1981, a combined SADF force attacked a suspected Swapo base near Guamato. While they captured two prisoners who revealed the presence of 150 FAPLA troops, the operation was halted abruptly due to political orders forbidding further clashes with FAPLA forces.

Friendly fire incidents, such as the death of Lance Corporal E. Sophia in September 1980, highlighted serious coordination issues and contributed to declining morale. These incidents were both tragic and damaging to operational effectiveness and unit cohesion.

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