Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me your host, Dez Latham, this is episode
45 and it's 1980. Everything will accelerate from now on as wars generally do and other
side has complete control over the battlefield. And one of the biggest events of the border
war was about to take place, Operation Sceptic or Smoke Shell as most called it. A swamp
over by now had pulled back from the shallow areas, those parts of southern Angola closest
to the cutline, the border with South West Africa. They moved deeper into Angola northwards,
which meant that any future operation would have further to go.
The pattern of rainy season cross-border incursions was now underway as swampers armed wing plan
used the thicker vegetation and numerous water holes, not to mention the increased problems
for the SA Air Force with thunderstorms and more weather around making air support problematic.
It was also more difficult to locate bases inside Angola. The SA DF began focusing
its powerful conventional cross-border operations during winter when it was dry. Remember southern
Africa is a summer rainfall area for a global audience. The dry winter is meant it easier
for heavy vehicles to travel about and during the winter plan would gather in the main
bases to debrief and retrain for the following summer. The South Africans were making new
plans with a strategic purpose to attack Swapar and destroy its image as a war-winning movement.
That of course was supposed to show South West Africans, they shouldn't depend on Swapar
when the country became an independent Namibia.
The SA Air Force continued operations throughout this period strafing and bombing enemy positions
inside Angola and in Avambalan. As a countermeasure in summer, a Swapar moved quickly through
Angola towards the border, the SA Air Force launched a program of low-level armed reconnaissance
flights by impilot fighter jets in the shallow area just north of the cutline. Angola
and army vehicles learnt very quickly to avoid travelling during the day and switch to transporting
war material at night. This meant the SA Air Force needed to innovate. The SAF at that stage
was almost impotent at night, at least according to its commander Brigadier General Dick Lord.
On the 1st of February 1980, the last straw was a report by Lieutenant Franco Mark who saw
a mass gathering of Swapar insurgents just north of the cutline south east of Injiva. They
had lit huge fires and looked like there was a feast going on prior to their mission
into South West Africa. Although highly trained, the impilot pilots avoided night fighting
and the practice had been banned, remember, since 1976 after a series of accidents.
But so angry with the South Africans about this big Swapar bribe that they sent an urgent
request to be allowed to launch a night strike on the target immediately.
His idea of HQ passed on the request to the Cabinet for Permission and it was granted.
So at 2,300 hours 45 in the 1st of February, Lieutenant Pete Hollis and Captain Quibbus
Turin took off from in Dungware to attack under a bright full moon. But of course by then
the party was over and the fires were out so the two fired the weapons at where they thought
Swapar was and headed home. They purposefully avoided looking back at the explosions. This
was believed to have caused the 1976 accident where the pilots lost their night vision and
the brilliance of bomb explosions. Night vision and night vision equipment are two
very different things. And early in 1980 the SWF boffins including Force Preparation Director
Brigadier Bossi Haise, SSO attack Colonel Fred Dutoy, SSO Morarajas, Colonel William Hechter,
and SSO impilers Major Stain Fenter decided to try out night fighting training once more.
Late squadron based at Blum spread were given the task of carrying the south because they
were close to Debruch weapons training range, west of Blum. Pilots with a minimum of 1,000
hours in the Impala were signed on and ex-Buccaneer squadron commander Simon Fengardin was drafted
in as an advisor. The Buccaneers had developed an excellent night attack capability, now it was
the Farters turn. Atlas aircraft corporation fitted five Impaulas with a simple yet quite
ingenious attitude indicator called the Minescane aircraft Moonlight. The attitude indicator had
to be isolated from the rest of cockpit illumination allowing all the others to be dimmed
because it was vital as the main instrument required by the pilot to recover from an unusual
position or extreme altitude. All other instrument lights were dimmed to allow the pilot to see
the ground at night then he could glance at the attitude indicator as the primary reference
without blinding himself with a full panel of bright lights. They also fitted an audio bomb release
of us. The pilot could dial in the release altitude for the weapons carried as he entered the
dive attack alone warning in his earphone started at 800 above ground level then changed to a higher
pitch at 500 AGL and then cut out completely at the release altitude this helped pilots concentrate
on the target without staring at the altimeter. They began to fly at nights and pairs and all
white lights in the briefing room were now converted to red. It takes about an hour to fully adapt
your vision to the gloom of the night. Minescane ops took place between five days before full Moon
to five days after. Cloud cover couldn't exceed three eighths and sorties flown after the full Moon
could only take place after midnight because the Moon rises an hour earlier each night. Translucents
or the brightness of the Moon is greatest before full Moon and after. By the 22nd of every this
new group of flying night sorties over Debruch an extremely quick turnaround. These days the
sort of change would probably take more than a year but they say in war everyone thinks quicker.
By the 28th of February SWF was briefed about progress which was good. The next Moon was two days
away so the pilots were told to fly to Andungwa and try out their new skills. That was breath
taking me swift by any standards. Swapo's bri was on the 2nd of February. The SWF trained some of
its pilots to fly night missions by 27th February. Good grief. Still the pre-state weather played its
part and the empires couldn't fly to Andungwa so they headed to AFB Lungabine in the Cape first
carrying out night practice sorties on the 2th rock range. Then they were configured with four
rocket pods and external drop tanks and headed to Vintuk via Ketman's Whip to refuel. Finally they
arrived in Andungwa and after a day of familiarisation flying headed out over southern Angola on the
3rd of March. They used the famous Kulsai in Skunk. It was a curious choice of Kulsai because in
American and NATO codes Skunk is a radar or visual maritime surface contact whose identity is unknown.
Their night patrols were determined by the Angolan deployment of 23mm, 37mm and 57mm anti-aircraft
batteries. The South Africans would cruise at a slow-ish 200 knots indicated ASB then activate
their weapons as they crossed the Ketman. If they spotted vehicles they had a just position to
a roll-in point, pull the throttle to idle, silence the undercarriage warning alarm and then roll
into a dive. The speed would build up silently to 300 knots then the dive break would be extended
while the pilot kept tracking the target through the gun sight, listening for the audio cues from
the bomb release altimeter, then fire and climb. The big trick was to attack the vehicle from behind
if they could by keeping an eye on its headlights. Missiles gunned the pilot fixated on the attitude
indicator, pulled the nose through the horizon, selected dive break in and full throttle then climbed
away from the small arms fire, circled at cruising altitude looking out for Sam missiles,
and if any were spotted he'd dive to low level and then zoom back to Angola, of course looking
at his fuel. During the rest of May good results were achieved but then swappers switched their
lights off. Even though they're used parking lights, the Impala still managed to spot the
outtrack even from a distance. By the time of Operation Sceptic, the SAF was a begun to use less
experienced pilots, the system was working so well. So on the 30th of May it was finally time to set
Operation Sceptic in motion. The aim was for Sector 10 in South East Africa to destroy Swappers,
command control and logistics structures by capturing what was called the QFL complex at Chufufa,
as well as bases at Mollola and Chautombo. That was supposed to take place on the first day of
the invasion after this the force would remain inside Angola for 10 days to conduct follow-up operations.
This would entail an overland attack 180 kilometers inside Angola. Of course the SAF would be
travelling more like 260 kilometers because they would be maneuvering inside the country.
No MPLA or FAPLA targets were to be included in what would be the biggest mechanized infantry
assault by South African forces since World War II. Battle Group 6-1 would be led by 61 Mech,
along with one parachute battalion, one mechanized company from one SA infantry and two sections
of engineers from 25 field squadron all under the command of Commandant Dippie Stippenheim.
They would attack the QFL complex directly and then a second Swapper base at the Ande.
QFL complex was codenamed "smoke shell" and when you hear what happened it's why veterans
took of being an operation "smoke shell" rather than skeptic. Battle Group 1-0 comprised of two
companies of one parachute battalion, one Irland 90 armored car squadron from 61 Mech,
one section of engineers from 25 field squadron and 181 millimeter motor group from Army HQ.
Commandant Christopher Tain was to lead Battle Group 1-0 and their target was Melola, South of
Smoke Shell. Battle Group 5-3 was comprised of three two battalions Bravo company, two armored car
troops, one 81 millimeter motor group from Army HQ and two sections of engineers also from
25 squadron, commandant by Yorah Yoddhan. Chitumbu was their target and also that was South of
Smoke Shell. Then 5-4 battalion was also unleashed and were the appointment of this operation,
three two battalions Delta and Echo companies joined by one company of parabets from one parachute
battalion, one 81 millimeter motor platoon from 3-2 and two sections of engineers from 25 squadron
all headed up our commandant Antón van Chran.
They would start the ball rolling north of Beacon 24 to Malenba and turn towards Akatali
Kongwer to secure the main area of attack for the other three battle groups.
If you have a map of Angola, it will take a direct line north from Yenhana inside Namibia
and imagine the attack taking place up this line all the way to Chufufa, all the presumed
major swamp or logistics area.
Kasinga, by the way, was further north west of this position.
Just in there 4 was fire 4 battalion with 3 2's delts and echo companies doing the
grand work of sweeping the area around Malenba.
They would then set up a temporary base where troops would sleep overnight on the 9th and
10th of June, then the main attack on Smokshell will follow on the 10th.
But intelligence was deficient, even the South West Africa command of Tenant General Yeni
Heldenheist was not happy while 61 mechanized battalion commander Dipponarch called the
information gathered rather vague.
Once again the troops on the ground were going to pay for this deficient intelligence.
The S.A.D. have believed that Smokshell was a large base but it turned out to be a complex
of 13 completely different positions spread over an area of 3 by 15 kilometres or 45 square
kilometres all inside Danzbush.
And they were going to defeat this in one day, perhaps not.
Each position was a strong point in covered between 300 and 600 metres.
Swapo had also dug in, no more living in buildings these men were in foxholes, trenches
and covered bunkers.
Every single one was camouflaged and would be difficult to spot both from the air and
the ground.
The complex was also well defended with at least seven anti-aircraft positions, some with
a feared 23mm gun and man by around 800 Swapo soldiers.
A big difference from Kasinger was that there were no civilians above.
No children nor women who were not combatants.
So far 4 battalion kicked off the attack by securing Mulemba District, just over 40 kilometres
north of the Katwan, combat group 6-1 led the way across the border towards Chufufer
with combat group 1-0 in its wake.
For a week before the attack, far 4 battalion swept the area around Mulemba, destroying
a large cache of equipment at China and Anjuri.
There were some heavy firefights, including one on June 4th when Delta Company's corporal
infant bake was killed and Rathlemen Jose Juao was wounded in the stomach.
At least they believed he was wounded because private Juao disappeared.
Delta searched for him through the night and all the way to 2 o'clock the next day on
the 5th of June.
It was thought that plan had snatched him during the skirmish so the decision was taken
to continue the assault and he was listed MIA.
On June 6th Delta Company found another large ammunition cache 15 kilometres south of Mulemba,
including mortars and RPG 7 rockets.
The South Africans were relying on the air cover and on the 7th of June the SA Air Force
Julia Blige, 16 Mirage's hammered Tobias Hanyaka training centre with THTC as it was
known.
It was a bit of a scientists as that was far away to the northwest but made a point.
This was Swapar's main training base near Lubunga, way to the northwest of the Ataxan.
If you remember Lubunga was one of the towns in the Highlands of Angola that the South
Africans used on their way to the capital of the Wander.
It was a symbolic and strategic target.
After hitting the training camp 12 of the Mirages and 4 Buccaneers bombed the QFL or smoke
shell on their return home.
But 2 Mirages were damaged in that attack for the loss of 2 Swapar killed and 1 wounded.
By June 9th far 4 Battalion had secured the route from Beacon 25 by the Jaffirma Mulemba
route to Akatari Kongui, which was the staging area for 61's crossing.
The other battle groups left Ianhana for Mulemba at 0200 hours on the 10th of June with
combat group 6-1 supposed to be in place by noon across the border.
After an aerial bombardment by the SAF was then an artillery bombardment by 61's guns,
the South Africans were then moving from the south, the east and hit smoke shell.
It was expected that the enemy would probably wilt in the face of such power and flee westwards.
That wasn't exactly what happened.
2 parachute companies from combat group 61 were also supposed to be chopped into the west
of the smoke shell complex to operate their stopper groups, then the attack would focus
on the under-complex with 4 positions believed to house around 700 Swapar grills.
While all of this was supposed to be going on, in the South combat group 1-0, which had
followed 61 into Angola, would remain around Mulela.
There was to be another moment of eye-rolling, as usual, General Constantine Fulyun insisted
on being part of the operation to spot the obvious strategic danger.
So he joined Komodon Dipinar in his command rattle.
As with other major operations before and after, the SAF threw up many smoke screens to keep
plan away from learning about Opskiptik.
For almost two weeks before the invasion, the units involved were going to take part in
highly visible exercises and counterinsurgency operations around of Umberland.
Stepping back for a moment we have to ask a few Syrian questions.
If the SAF knew that plan was strongest on the ground in summer, then surely plan knew
that the SAF was strongest on the ground in winter, or late autumn.
So Swapar was planning for an invasion they believed was likely.
Secondly, the SAF was flexing its air muscles and the attack on the Bunga was excellent
elixir for pilots, bar stories, but actually tipped off the Angolans and Swapar that a
major attack must be imminent.
By focusing on Swapar's most important training centre with Amarajas, this superb sight
if you enter your aviation, they also alerted everyone that something big was a foot.
Bombing the Tobias and Yakov training centre and then Smokshell itself, straight afterwards,
was not the cleverest trick in the SAF was a strategic ambush.
That didn't exactly keep Swapar in the dark about Smokshell's or QFL, as it's known.
Important.
Yes, it's easy enough to sit here with 2020 Vision and Hansa, but if you were sitting
in a foxhole in Smokshell and 12 Mirajas blew in out of the blue sky one day, how would
you react?
You'd be expecting ground forces shortly.
The SAF was trying to obfuscate the significance by flying Mirajas in stages from vitality
of airbase to upington to confused Swapar and Russian intelligence.
Then all of that Smokan mirrors was for nothing when they bombed Smokshell hours before the
actual ground attack.
The other reality check here is that Swapar's positions were so well dug in that the aerate
had virtually no effect whatsoever.
The main force, led by 6-1 Mechanized Battalion, began moving from their bases early on
the 8th of June.
The convoy was an impressive sight, 144 kilometres long at times.
As the first vehicles arrived in Enhiner for a fuel refill, the last were just about to
leave Almutia.
That distance is a two-hour drive by a car, whether you take the B1 route, or the D3630
and 3631.
Mechanized warfare is the trickiest to coordinate, to plan, to get right.
It features heavy vehicles, aircraft, artillery troops, logistics, fuel, food, medical supplies,
and things began to go wrong early.
The bush was dense and the roads were comprised of thick, dusty sand.
The Irland Armoured cars, the noddy cars, led the way, followed by rattles in the G2
Magurus-Doyte gun tractors.
By the time the final heavy vehicles hit the sandy trails, these had been plowed up like
the Russian steppin' winter.
The Magurus-Doyte engines overheated, guns broke loose as metal fatigue caused failures,
and delays tested tempers.
But, and eventually, the battle group rolled into Malimba in southern Angola on the evening
of 9th June, joining find Kran's combat group 5-4.
There were still 130 kilometres to go to Smokshell, and the force moved out before dawn
on the 10th, led by combat group 61, in a huge convoy of just over 150 vehicles.
There were a few hitches that most troops were oblivious about.
For example, at Malimba, the choppers were supposed to pick up the paratrooper groups
to drop west of Smokshell, but there was no fuel for the pumors, an extra ordinary oversight,
so Dippinar was forced to continue without his important stoppers in place.
By 1315 that day the massive invasion force was ready east of Smokshell, although the
first exploratory assaults had already started at 12th.
The Air Force was also overhead and their second raid on Smokshell was full strength meant
to stun the defenders, but there'd been bombing since 0800, long before the ground forces
arrived.
These second bombing runs had very little effect on Smokshell, and as Dippinar gave the order
for the full assault at 1315 with a call of "Lot Vi!" let it rip.
The artillery was supposed to open up, instead there was silence, but not for long, major
debars for Mark hurriedly moved the battery into position and began the bombardment late.
But the Smokshell base was so atomised as I explained that the artillery had very little
effect as well.
Stopper guerrillas had already moved away from their northern foxholes and taken up alternative
defensive positions closer to the centre of this complex and the south.
Moreover their well-built bunkers needed a direct hit to be destroyed, that was like
threading a needle in the dense bush or to use a pool term, calling all pockets.
Artillery spiders found it very difficult to identify the targets.
Dippinar had decided to break up his force into six combined combat teams with mechanised
and motorised infantry and 19mm gun artillery support.
Team 1 and 2 had a company each supported by Rathall 90s and mortars.
Team 3 saw Elon 90s supported by an infantry platoon.
Team 4 and 5 were parabbat companies with three stopper groups and team 6 was the reserve.
As you're going to hear next episode, the assault would go like clockwork for teams 1 and
3 aiming at the now largely empty swap in northern positions.
But team 2, Captain Louis Hodams' B company was going to run straight into heavy anti-aircraft
guns in the southern section.
It was not going to be pretty.
With that, it's time to secure the perimeter, just a quick thank you to Richard and Robert
to your both donated towards the spot.
podcast. Thanks. That helps pay the podcast and website hosting fees. If you want to chat,
you can send me an email to
[email protected] or direct message me on Twitter at dislatham.
You can also contact me through the website abwarpodcast.com. Until next, goodbye.
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