Episode 41: Europe Under Trump: Strategic Challenges and Opportunities with Rosa Balfour

I think the situation for Europe has never been quite so grim, and actually, paradoxically, enlargement can offer a glimmer of hope. If it's done properly, in the sense that, you know, we were talking about how, you know, 2004 enlargement was a huge opportunity for the youth economic growth for the scale, but it can be against. Coming to you from the banks of the River Danube, you're listening to the Vienna Coffee House Conversations podcast with me, Ivan Vavola, and a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences here in Vienna, where I lead the Europe's Futures Program. So welcome to our digital salon. In each of the Vienna Coffee House Conversations episodes, I'll be joined by Europe's Futures Fellows and leading thinkers from around the world. We'll be probing their current research through discussion, challenge and exploration. So long as we explore the ideas, debates and encounters that will shape the future of democracy in Europe and beyond. And it gives me great pleasure today to introduce and welcome Rosa Balfour, who was a fellow in the first group in 2019. Rosa is the director of Carnegie Europe, which is one of the offices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, one of the oldest think tanks in the world. She is an expert on European politics in Europe's global role. She was a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund and a director of Europe in the world program at the European Policy Center in Brussels. She has worked as a researcher in Rome and London, is the author of books and appears frequently with opinion pieces in the international press. Very warm welcome to you Rosa. Hello Ivan, nice to talk to you today. Wonderful. Well, let's dive into the deep end of the pool immediately. We're speaking obviously after the United States presidential election and the victory of Donald Trump. And you have just written a piece for us at the IWM on Europe under Trump. What is and what will be Europe under Trump Rosa? Well, even where to start. I mean, I think, you know, looking globally, I think Europe really is in the front line of Trump's policies and what he promises to do. Perhaps just after Mexico, all right, because I mean, you know, one of the big plans is to deport millions of irregular migrants from the United States to Central Latin America. So after Mexico, I think Europe really is in the front line. I think other parts of the world might be hedging or might find ways to gain some advantage from Trump's selection, but I think the Europe is going to be really difficult because it goes to the heart of Europe's security, of Europe's economy, and Europe's global relations. So I would say if one were to sort of make a hierarchy of how Trump will be negatively impactful on Europe, the first is obviously Ukraine, NATO, and European security. The second is Europe's economy with the promise of tariffs. Pretty much across the board, and of course, Europe's economy is crucially interdependent with the US, but Europe's economy is much more dependent on trade than the US. So, you know, the Transatlantic space is the most deeply integrated space in the world, but there is a little bit of an asymmetry in that Europe's economy is more dependent on trade than the US. It's less self-sufficient from that point of view. And thirdly, China. China poses a whole range of challenges from regulation of the digital space to screening foreign directs investments, and if the US and the EU are not firmly aligned, and if the US demands a certain kind of subsidence from Europeans with respect to its China policy, that's going to be very problematic for Europeans. For the EU, but also for European men and states. So, has Europe learned from the first Trump presidency and falling upon that, is Europe thus more prepared for the shocks, I would say, that you have aligned there? So, I think there's one area where Europe claims to be prepared, and that's on trade. And I'm just going to come back to this afterwards, because let's be honest, in 2016, Trump won the elections and said, "Europeans are free riding on US security guarantees, they need to get their act together." And he wasn't the first US president to say that, and it wasn't because of Trump that Europeans started to, you know, start spending more on defense, but still, they're far from having any degree of autonomy from the US, both in terms of security, but also in terms of defence. And then in 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. What did that mean, that there was a need to accelerate that very slow process of trying to spend more on defence and taking care of one's security a little bit more? And in order to do that, Europeans actually turned to defence contracts with the United States. So, actually, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Europeans have become more dependent on accessing defence contracts with the United States. Secondly, in order to win Europe off Russian gas, they turn to the United States. So, actually, in the past couple of years, we've seen an increase in the dependence of the EU and European states on US security. So, you know, on the one hand, Trump accelerated the debate on what is branded under the label of strategic autonomy, which is something the French have been pushing for a long time, but then Russia's war in Ukraine accelerated, you know, additional dependence on the United States. This debate on strategic autonomy or transatlanticism hasn't really made much progress. Europeans have been very divided on this matter, and the unity they found in 2022 over supporting Ukraine kind of glossed over those deep divisions. We have countries that still privilege the relationship with the United States and NATO as the source of security, and we have countries that distrust the ability of Europeans alone to take care of their security and territorial defence. And that debate did not really take place in any meaningful way at the political level in the eight years since Trump was first elected. So, there hasn't been enough progress, which means that today we find ourselves between a rock and a hard place, basically. Indeed, and there has been an effort to strengthen relationships that put a very simply between the European Union and NATO, and of course, let's not forget the important role of the United Kingdom, even after Brexit in the European defence and security structure. And we've seen both bilateral and multilateral efforts in that regard. Obviously, you've just said that the movement has been extremely slow in capturing and seizing that opportunity. The United States, if it decides under Trump to pull back from supporting Ukraine, do you think that Europe is ready to take over that full burden as we hopefully approach some sort of ceasefire to begin with, and then a resolution that would be somewhat in Ukraine's favour? There's big debates going on, and I think some member states of NATO and the EU are trying to step up. And as you said, they have been a series of meetings, but I'm very doubtful that Europeans alone can actually do enough to support Ukraine. We're seeing this on the battlefield now. The military situation on the ground is not a Ukraine's favour, and that is, to a large extent, caused by the delay of Western support in delivering what Ukraine was asking for. It was also caused by a strong degree of caution, especially in Washington, with respect to the risk of escalation with Russia. So throughout 2023, I think many would argue that Ukraine did not get enough Western support in military terms. That might have helped Ukraine change the situation on the ground. We've seen a deterioration of the battlefront in favour of Russia. At the moment, Ukraine is not in a strong position. What would be desirable is that in the next few months, Western support allowed Ukraine to be in a better situation on the battlefield, so that when Trump comes into office and announces some big peace plans or whatever it is he has in mind, Ukraine is in a better negotiating position. There's one thing I do need to say, and that is that there is no clarity as to what the Trump untaraged is actually thinking in concrete terms in so far as Ukraine is concerned. It is not clear what kind of deal Trump might have in mind, and I think whether that deal is successful or not and which European states are going to go behind it and support it and which are not, that is, I think, very much an open question. So it depends very much, any by the situation on the ground and be by what kind of deal Trump has in mind. you crayons? of course already have plenty of ideas. They've been creative, we've seen a lot of Ukrainian creativity over the past couple of years and they are adapting fast to what Trump might have in mind and they try to maximise their leverage and their influence in the Trump entourage. It would be I think important that European states that the forefront of supporting Ukraine could actually discuss with Zelensky what it is they have in mind. Also because you know the longer term prospects could become even more complicated than they are now. So as an interview before going on to the next question what has been the atmosphere in Brussels you work and live in Brussels obviously the election even though it was very close in the United States did tip very strongly in Trump's favour. Yeah I mean I think the sort of policy-making community oscillates between those say no we are prepared we have the tools we can offer a deal. Ursula Fondelian has already said well maybe we can buy more LNG from the United States you know they've already put things on the table I have to say that over the past few years the Commission in particular has developed a set of tools which at that moment was thought of with respect to China admittedly they were actually they started to think about them during the first Trump administration that is you know economic security tools anti-co- version instruments so so that the toolbox on the trade front has improved so that you know can be mobilized but the problem is the strategy who is going to agree on what kind of strategy Europeans should unfold in order to address whatever Trump decides to do. So what extent should it be reactive should it be responding to tariffs or should it be preventing the possibility of all the likelihoods of tariffs. Which member states are going to align behind you know potential Commission-led trade policy response and how can one make the linkages between trade and security because in security it's mostly member states it's mostly NATO it's a political conversation on trade it's mostly the Commission because the Commission has the powers to lead on commercial policy but even on commercial policy will the member states hide behind the Commission or will they not and I think in the short term there is a big risk that because of the diverse perception of national interest shall we put it that way you know some member states will go in in one direction and others will go in another so what could we see we will see the countries on the eastern flank they will prioritize security they will prioritize Russia's invasion of Ukraine and they'll do whatever they can to keep the US involved in security. Trade will be a second order of priority. Then you'll have you know a bunch of countries that actually are led by leaders who have a very good relationship with Trump who would want to align Trump and welcome the arrival of Trump on the scene because it undermines EU unity because it undermines the ability of the EU to carry out foreign policy and because these countries may be guessing an opportunity to hedge and to maximize their own leverage within the European Union within NATO or even on the global scene so I'm thinking about Hungary in particular and Victor Orban has been very openly supporting Trump and has managed to be very influential in his circle but also what's going to happen what is it to be going to do? Minorne is very closely connected with Elon Musk she will be probably part of Trump's magic circle is she going to whisper Trump's here in the favor of Italy or is it going to be in the favor of the European Union? I think that is a big question and we don't know so if member states start going each in their own direction who's going to fall behind the the commission to carry out what it can do on the trade front which as I said is limited to trade and does not does not address the security issue it's going to be a big challenge from the point of view of the European leadership and how much do the travails of domestic politics in German and France complicate what you have just been talking about? massively I mean Germany the day the US election results they announced that the government was it was going to be a little timing exactly quite extraordinary Germany has been consumed by domestic politics for a long time its europe policy seems to have fizzled out disappeared in many instances it's actually been more of a problem than a problem solver at the European level blocking certain decisions just being difficult it has collapsed over the obsession with the debt break you know if the EU is going to stay up to Trump it needs to double down on its own investments it needs its sources of finance and Germany has not allowed this to happen the elections are called now for the 23rd of February so we have lame duck governments until then and then coalition talks can take even six months so we have nine months of the absence of German leadership in Europe France as you know my corn-calls snap elections they didn't go well for for centrist policies so if pop France now is really struggling to pass through any legislation in the national assembly because it has this two ways split between the hard left and the hard right and it's virtually impossible to do anything now I wouldn't rule out my corn because he does have powers on the foreign policy front he met with Kirstama that was quite interesting on amnesty stay he gets it I mean you know of all the leaders I think he's the one who has the greatest outlook on global affairs whether one agrees with him or not so I wouldn't rule him out but the possibility of new elections in France are very likely so in my view the next year is going to be a year of domestic infighting a lack of a strategic vision of member states splitting among themselves and all this is going to take is going to unfold when when Donald Trump is going to be at his strongest because let's not forget that the US election results give Donald Trump the executive the legislative and the judiciary the Supreme Court so until we have the midterm elections Trump is going to be super empowered it so it's going to you know Trump power on steroids and he's going to be wanting to do as much as possible in the first couple of years of his presidency while the EU is going to be you know wondering about what to do and fighting among members so I think it's going to take some time before the EU is able to get its act together I wouldn't rule out the possibility of it doing so but I just don't see that happening in the short term yeah Trump has what the political jargon calls the trifecta the three branches of power you recently wrote a piece for the French or Times if I'm correct on Europe being trapped between technocracy and democracy can you explain what you mean by that yeah so I mean I actually think that one of Europe's long-standing problems is the fact that it lost public appeal at some point it says if European integration reached its peak periods in the 1990s and then moving forwards and carrying out further treaty reform was really difficult further treaty reform to better empower EU institutions and processes including democratic accountability to move forward so in your will recall I'm sorry I'm taking a little bit of a sort of historical no no it's important to remind ourselves of how things went and what they were going so there was you know just before the big enlargement of 2004 that you convened a big conference that included member states but also representatives of national parliament to draft a new constitutional treaty and then in 2004 the EU enlarged and you know also to accommodate the new reality of a EU with many more member states this constitutional treaty was supposed to empower the EU to move forward and in 2005 it was voted down in two referendum in the Netherlands and France and therefore that you okay it's managed to salvage bits of this and agreed on the Lisbon treaty but since then treaty reform has become taboo and what did we see we saw that throughout the the decades of the eurozone crisis Europe was very much led by member states and very much led by one member states in particular Germany which was a very strong and powerful by comparison to the other countries and and really pushed forward that you but very much in crisis management mode EU solutions were managed by a small group of decision makers public trust in European Union really started to plummet there have been plenty of grounds to rethink the grand bargain between European citizens their national representatives and their EU representatives and this hasn't been addressed this has been brushed under the carpet first we saw the rise of populism over the past few years we are seeing the rise of radical right parties that have come into positions of leadership of government and they are deeply Euro-Skeptic but having learned the lesson of Brexit which of course was one of the consequences of this sort of question this dilemma between technocratic politics and democratic politics politics, you know, having learnt the lesson of Brexit, they decided, okay, maybe leaving the use not a good idea, but we can change it from within. And we can really put a break on the ambitions for working together in a more sort of synergetic way. And we just, you know, this is nation's first and we use the European Union in so far as it furthers our national interest and we block it when it doesn't. That's where we are now. So this is a long process. And then what is happening at the moment in Brussels, we had the European Parliament elections in 2024, we saw the further rise of the radical right, but not enough to take over. So, you know, the centrist parties managed to form some kind of coalition where the European peoples party as the largest group in Parliament, and this is also the party of the President of the European Commission. The President of the European Commission has been very successful in handling all sorts of crises recently and I would put COVID in the first instance and then the response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine where it really did coordinate the energy shifts away from Russia, the sanctions packages. So it's done a really, you know, very good job. It works very well with the Biden administration, but in doing this, it has had a tendency to centralise powers in the hands of the President of the European Commission at the expense, for instance. So the other commission isn't, college reality there. And this is really what she's trying to do now. We have a very long list of challenges. There were three reports published in 2024, the Letdown Report, the Draghi Report and the New Minister Report, all of which are saying Europe needs to do more. The incoming Commission wants to do this, but it doesn't have the support of the member states. So then you have a dilemma, how do we go about it? Do we try to centralise powers and power forward alone at the risk of losing the people behind? That is where the leadership conundrum is at the moment in the EU. Without Germany, you can't do it. If France cannot play a leading role, you cannot do it. Other countries are also important. Lots of people have said, "Are the centre of gravity moving towards these?" Well, maybe on security issues, but not so much on other issues. Fusker is now leading Poland and he is a pro-European political actor, but he is absorbed by undoing what the previous government did in terms of capturing the political position. So it's going to be really difficult to find the right constellation of countries that are willing to back and support and implement a plan for radical reform in the European Union in order to stand up not just to Trump, but also to the inherited problems that Europe has been avoiding to address over the past 15 years also. You mentioned the various reports of Leighta Draghi, the different ways in which the United States and China have unleashed innovative potentials in China. Obviously, it's a huge state funding. We will probably see under Trump a loosening of all rules and various ways in which the companies that in particular work for the military industry will be freed from contracts from the defence department. You mentioned the dead break in Germany. We have seen a variety of meetings of entrepreneurs saying that there's simply too much red tape and we've been listening to this for years now. Is there a way in which Europe needs to understand without breaking some fundamental rules that there needs to be more freedom of entrepreneurship without this European propensity to try and use the colloquial expression to define the size of a banana? No, thank you for raising this. We're actually coming up with a big report next week, just looking at geopolitics and economic state crafts because so far the EU has really pursued economic policy in a very technocratic way going back to technological and geopolitics has been more the domain of member states with the EU struggling to get an enmity over the big decisions. Now we have a fractured international environment with elements of globalization being challenged by Covid but also by trade wars. Then we have a Trump administration that is promising to make connections between policy fields that have been unprecedented. I mean JD Vance has said if you want the US to pay attention to Europe's security issues then you have to let Elon Musk do whatever he wants with his business in Europe. These are big challenges and the EU is certainly not prepared for this. On the economic side there's a lot of consensus around the analysis of the drag report and if you look at any of the graphs in that report you can see how big the gap is between the EU and the US and China on productivity, on competitiveness etc. It's really quite shocking. Many still think it could be a third poll between the US and China and the economic conditions for that are simply not there. The EU has thrived through rules based economic integration and this has been a large work. If you look at the way in which the countries that joins the European Union in 2004 their economic growth after joining the EU has been extraordinary and has been to the benefit of Europe of the EU as a whole. So that has happened however EU member states have been deeply reluctant to pursue further reforms such as banking union, capital smart, fit union. These have all been on the cards for 10 years, 12 years, for a long time but they haven't been implementing them. The reason being often smaller member states worried that they will fall behind the larger member states and also all countries wanting to protect their national champions in their own national industries and that's where the EU started to fall behind on innovation, on research and development, on infrastructure investment coupled with decade of austerity, so insufficient public investment in these areas. It means that basically the single market, a good idea back in the 1980s and 1990s, its progress has been interrupted. So there will be some tough questions to be looked at in terms of how to encourage upgrading and upscaling the European market to make it more competitive, tough questions with respect to which industrial sectors to invest upon, given that in many areas we're far too behind the US and China. I think politically these decisions haven't been made at 27. There's one idea that came from Spain is to go about it with just a few countries and then likelihood is that others would follow if you get a good enough critical mass. So that might be a future trajectory of European integration, it sort of moves ahead with a few pioneer countries and do you see that working in other fields as well, these kind of coalitions of the willing so to say? I actually think that probably at this point in time it's the only way forward. I don't particularly like it but I think the risk is paralysis and I don't think Europe can afford that. So I'd like to pass on to one of our favorite topics and that is enlargement of the European Union which is one of the focal points among many of the Europe's futures fellowship as well and everyone else but in these times of geopolitical imperative to enlarge and then many of the political realities slash obstacles to this and we know that member states have varying views but you know the threat of Russia to put it very simply is there and we don't have yet an ended site to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We've seen the massive interference hybrid interference of Russia and the Georgian and Moldovan elections. Russia has its big foot in the territories of all three countries occupying significant parts of the territories of the three formerly known Eastern partnership countries. Where do you see, I mean if I caught you rightly you say Europe should enlarge even out of despair. Yeah well I didn't write the title but the idea I think is important. I get it it's important to put things starkly so that people can wait. No, I mean I actually think that's you know I think the situation for Europe has never been quite so grim and actually paradoxically enlargement can offer a glimmer of hope. If it's done properly in the sense that you know we were talking about how you know 2004 enlargement was a huge opportunity for the euphoric economic growth for for scale well it can be again. Yeah and you know you'll have with Ukraine whatever deal is reached there's going to be a big reconstruction process this is already on the cards if it's fine tuned and you know made it so synergy with EU accession process, it could be a huge opportunity economically. So there is an opportunity to access a new market to elevate Europe as a whole from the point of view of the economy, again, thinking about green economy, green tech, the technological contributions that Ukraine can make to Europe's economy, it quite extraordinary. So let's think in positive terms about enlargement, it's not just about ensuring that Russia cannot continue its pursuit of destroying the Ukrainian state and therefore enlargement as offering Ukraine a security guarantee, which obviously ought to be coupled with NATO accession, which at the moment hasn't actually been properly promised to Ukraine. It's not just about security, it's also about thinking how Europe's economy and single market can be enlarged, enhanced, elevated, enriched. So there's a big opportunity there, I think. But what we're seeing in the candidate countries is partly because of Russian interference, Russian presence, partly also because of domestic politics in individual countries where there are leaders that have undermined dismantled democratic institutions and leaders that will hedge in favour of Trump and not in favour of the European Union. We have a bit of a checkered landscape in the candidate countries. So perhaps even in among those countries we'll see a coalition of pioneers wanting to join the European Union and those conversely will say, well, actually, we want to stay out, we're going to hedge our bets, we want to get whatever we cannot of the EU in terms of economic investments because let's not forget that in most of these countries the EU is that still the most important economic actor, but we also want to talk to the Russians, the Chinese, the Saudis and now the Americans, right? It's going to be space for a loss of competition, geopolitical competition, but I think there still are countries and citizens in particular that really want to join the European Union, that really treasure not just what the EU has to offer economically but also in terms of democratic stability, accountability and freedom and that's where you know that's where you're it really needs to double down on its assets and its strengths and its power of attraction. It's diminished by comparison to 10, 15 years ago. The EU lost the ball I think in the Balkans for about a decade and it lost lots of grounds and lots of influence, but there's still our countries that are interested. At some point they will have to make choices and you know, Moldova and Georgia, that moment arrived just recently in this roller coaster election year they voted, you know, October and yeah in October I think all the maybe November the second round of the parliament presidential elections in Moldova, Russian interference was heavy-handed in both countries, in Moldova the incumbents, the pro-European incumbents made it. In Georgia the pro-Russian incumbents made it despite the fact that Georgians as a citizenry are overwhelmingly anti-Russian but they're also afraid of Russian so they were worried that if they voted for the opposition, Russia would invade again, right? The geopolitics has really been a negative influence on the outcome of these elections but Moldova is still there, you know, the government will need to think about what it can do to bring a greater plurality of Moldova's in favor of joining the European Union and that you will need to double down with its offer. And one must remind that in Georgia there was a lot of witnessing of massive vote rigging as well and the international observers noted that as well. I completely agree with you that this is a moment of opportunity for both the EU and the candidate countries that should be seized. There are clearly positive dependencies on Europe to put it again colloquially. The bread of the Western Balkans is buttered by the European Union and I would say even the political survival of these leaders who have slid into authoritarian practices also depends on the European Union and the West more broadly writ. We've seen Serbia massively helping Ukraine's defense effort, for example, just to note that. The fact of the matter is that as you rightly said, I think a moment was lost in the 2000s to move more quickly and then of course we have this whole package with the Ukraine Moldova's in Georgia's with the Western Balkans now. We need to remind everyone in ourselves that Ukraine is three times as bigger in terms of territory and population than the Western Balkans. That it is more challenging to put it mildly for to be integrated but you rightly pointed out the opportunity there in every regard. At the same time Europe has to prove its credibility or rather the credibility of the peace project slash of bringing in new countries. And there I would say and I don't know if you agree with me that we need a win and probably we can achieve that with bringing in with full respect to them the smaller countries such as Montenegro, North Macedonia, footnote, we know all the problems it has with the Bulgaria or Albania and that needs an effort on the part of the EU but primarily of the countries themselves to move speedily ahead. Do you think that is feasible? There certainly are I mean among the policymakers the EU policymakers there is commitment towards I would say Montenegro and Albania because I think with North Macedonia the ball is partly in North Macedonia's camp but largely because the EU member states let Bulgaria set some bilateral conditions that actually were beyond the accession process. And we need to keep reminding everyone of that. The EU officials are much more confident on Montenegro and Albania. I think on this front there's something that needs to be said because the debate and this is the debate in European circles has now centered around the idea that the EU needs to reform before it can enlarge and to be honest it's actually a false idea. In the past the EU has reformed after enlarging and yes reform is necessary be it institutional reform which to be honest wouldn't be necessary if it's just Montenegro and Albania but also be it policy reform again if it's just two countries it's manageable right. But obviously if you're looking at you know more countries with a larger population and with the challenges that you create poses of course we need to talk about common agricultural policy of course we need to talk about all this but historically this has never happened as a precondition to enlargement it's begun to quite the other way around right. So the fact that this debate in European circles has focused so much on the need to reform the European Union I find that quite worrying I mean to me it seems a signal of not being really committed. So I think we've got two you know two camps here and I think what the candidate countries need to do is really disable the camp of those who say we need to reform before we enlarge they need to say no look we are so prepared and you can take a scene and actually we're small enough not to cause any trouble to the institutional mechanics and to the policies the demonstration effects on the rest of the region will be important if not you know these are countries where people from the Balkans actually go on holiday so they'll see what it means to have this type of economic growth that you have when you're when you join the European Union so it'll be very visible tangible demonstration effects on the other countries I think that would be the path forward and then those who support EU enlargement need to lobby hard on those that are more skeptical I think I do think France has been one of the countries that has actually been more of a hindrance than an enabler of enlargement and obviously depending on domestic politics that problem could get worse but I do think that Macron with his speech in Bretus Lava in 2023 where he said these countries should join the European Union and he also said you create your joint NATO right he said he made these two points very important yeah they both are important and I think that the sort of there is a circle a thinking circle in Paris that agrees with that so you know that's quite big change a Germany has supposedly been you know an enabler of EU enlargement Italy has actually been historically enabler you do have a group of people of countries that could push this dossier further so I think I think there is scope to do things I am worried about the impacts of Trump here because Trump might well undercut EU policies then that's what he did in his first term and you would ask why is it that Trump with his manga you know manifesto why would be interested in the Balkans well the years he has been I don't know whether it's because of his wives or whether it is because of his former ambassador to Berlin Rick Grinnell who also self-styled himself as a mediator between to be in cost alone during the previous Trump administration. It's gonna be challenging. But, you know, the EU has been involved in Balkans for a long time. I think it can, it really ought to focus on that and, you know, display its economic power and its diplomatic knowledge 'cause it has a lot of diplomatic knowledge in the region to navigate through all the challenges. I think, I think it's something that actually can be done. It seems to me easier than, for instance, how to position the EU in the context of US China rivalry. - Yes. - This is gonna be great. - And I fully agree with what you've said. And I think that the EU should go into the fast lane and start doing work on the integration. One needs to mention in terms of Trump, there's also the Sun and Law, Jared Kushner, who wants to build big hotels, both in Serbia and Albania. So there's a variety of private interests, I would say that there are. As we come to a close, Rose, that we, of course, didn't mention that it's important you alluded to it. I mean, there's the whole demographic issue and the weakening of populations in the Balkans and most young people do not have the patience to wait this out and are joining the European Union individually. And there is, I would say, with great certainty, there's no one, for example, in the Western Balkans who doesn't have or know someone who lives in the European Union. And they full well know that life is somewhat better there than here. And I think that kind of joint approach where we need champions of enlargement. Both in the EU, a group of countries who could maybe more forcefully, again, coalition of the willing. And in the region itself, which we haven't seen where some bilateral tensions, not only Serbia, Kosovo have existed, they need to understand that they need to show European behavior, i.e. the will to join the project. So the final and possible question, you've mentioned, as you mentioned, Draghi and the possible slow agony or the danger of dissenting to irrelevance. I think your answer on enlargement was on the hopeful side and on that side as well. But we are between a rock and a hard place. And do you think that will meet the quote-unquote Monet test here of actually going through with what I agree, what you said, one of the probably the biggest challenges that the EU has faced to time yet? Yeah. So as I said, my short term perspective is really quite grim in the sense that at the moment I'm not seeing the-- The cliques of the length. Exactly. But I do think there is enough creativity and political energy in Europe as a whole. And I do think that we will be-- that some creative ideas will come out of it. And I do think that eventually, this splintering that we're going to see in 2025, eventually, member states will realize that actually, it's in their national interest to overcome their differences and to pursue a more joined up strategy. So I think eventually, that will happen. Because otherwise, the risk is that basically Europe becomes a single market without any leverage, without any weight globally. And that is when it won't collapse, but it will become irrelevant. I do think-- and I think this is really important, because we've talked a lot about foreign policy and the domestic challenges to foreign policy as we have known it so far. And I do think this means that people working in think tanks, in the media, in academia, in NGO sector, and civil society really need to think hard about how they can contribute to this difficult moment. This is a moment in which democratic ecosystems that have enabled us to work are severely under threat by the simple fact that Trump has been elected and his agenda. By the fact that his agenda will be deeply influenced by Elon Musk, who has bought up one space for debates, which is Twitter, and turned it into an instrument for political propaganda. And we need to think hard about what it is that we can do in order to preserve this ecosystem and preserve our future, but also to contribute to the debate on what the big choices are. So I think, in that sense, politicians and politics and member states will have to go through their stages of enthusiasm for Trump or adjusting to Trump, failure, denial, et cetera. And then maybe they'll get to the point that, actually, if they realize that if they work together, they can do better. But we can also be working hard to finding ideas that can have a different impact to the inevitable conflict rule scenario that Trump is promising for the world. I mean, he's saying he wants to be-- he's saying during my tenure, there was peace. But actually, I would argue that Trump's impacts was to enable semi-authoritarians, would be authoritarians, or authoritarians, such as Putin, to take a shot at changing international order. And so I would say that he might manage to bring some kind of deal in Ukraine or the Middle East, which would be to the favor of some and not of others, namely Ukrainians, Palestinians, et cetera. But that's not going to be stable. So we are looking at an international system that is dangerous. So we need to work hard on how we can contribute to thinking about a different world. Indeed, we'll be watching all of this with both this trepidation and hope. Rosa, thank you so much for joining the Vienna Coffee House conversation. Thank you, Ivan. That was great. I started very pessimistic. But-- No, no. I think we managed to cover a lot of ground. And I think we did open some avenues for a better future. That concludes this episode of Vienna Coffee House Conversations, the podcast brought to you by the Europe's futures program at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. Europe's futures is a program of impact, ideas, and action for a Europe that rises to the challenges of the 21st century and is undertaken in collaboration with the Esther Foundation. To find out more about our work and research, visit Europe's futures.eu. [BLANK_AUDIO]