This episode introduces the foundational structure and powers of the Australian Commonwealth Parliament, establishing a clear framework for understanding constitutional law. The legislature is bicameral, with the Senate representing all states equally to balance larger states’ influence, while the House of Representatives allocates seats based on population, resulting in significant disparities in electorate size that the High Court has deemed constitutionally acceptable. The legislative powers are outlined in Section 51, covering key areas such as foreign affairs, trade, and marriage, though state governments can legislate unless overridden by inconsistent federal laws. A central feature of the system is the close integration between the executive and legislature, where the Governor-General acts on the Prime Minister’s advice, and the monarch’s formal veto remains largely unused. The episode contrasts Australia’s parliamentary model with the U.S. system, where separation of powers includes executive veto and legislative override, creating a more balanced but gridlocked process. Historical examples, such as the 1975 constitutional crisis, illustrate the political risks of legislative deadlock. The episode also highlights the legacy of British parliamentary privileges, including the controversial power to punish contempt, which was later reformed in 1987 to protect free expression. While the structure appears streamlined and efficient, it centralizes power in the hands of the elected government, raising questions about checks and balances. This foundational overview sets the stage for deeper exploration of specific legislative powers in future episodes, such as the Trade and Commerce Power.
[Music]
Hello and welcome to another episode of Surviving Constitutional Law
I'm your host Cameron Shamsabad. In today's episode we're going to be kicking off our series on
Commonwealth legislative power today under the Australian Constitution.
So in today's podcast we're going to be setting up a very basic framework
discussing the structure of the Australian Parliament
and then the basic framework for the various legislative powers that the Australian Parliament has.
Which we will build on in successive episodes of this podcast
in a more in-depth fashion to discover and discuss the more nuanced aspects of each particular legislative power.
So if today we don't go too deep on any particular power that you might be having trouble with
don't worry too much about it. I will be coming to all the important ones
for your undergraduate studies and the ones that are really relied upon by the government quite regularly in due course.
So today we're going to be going over very briefly again the separation of powers
doctrine in Australia and that's going to lead us into a discussion of
bicameralism in our legislature specifically the division between the Senate and the House of Representatives.
From that point I'm going to discuss some of the powers of the Parliament generally
and I'm going to be also making some comparative points to both the UK, Canadian and American systems of government
just to provide you with some full context on the issue.
So sit back, relax and let's dive into the episode.
So first up why are we starting with the Australian legislature?
Well in order to really contextualize and put our constitutional law journey on the right track
we're starting with the legislature rather than the executive of the judiciary for a couple of very important reasons.
The first is that chapter one of the Commonwealth Constitution creates and empowers the legislature
which means that it's really the first thing that the Constitution sets out.
With the executive and the judiciary following in chronology as chapter two and chapter three respectively.
So that means we're really starting where our frame is intended the Constitution to start.
We're starting our journey from the beginning of the Constitution.
The second really important reason why we're starting with the legislatures
because our system functions in a Westminster fashion largely.
And that means that the legislature holds a great deal of influence and predominance
over both the executive branch of government due to its history
and really a collusive sort of relationship with that branch of government
in terms of institutional structuring.
The third reason which is very practically speaking
is that each federal law enforced by the executive
or heard in dispute by the judiciary must first be created by the legislature.
As such it is really a more practical thing to start with this limb of government
rather than any of the other organs of government to consider what the legislature really can
and cannot do, what can be made into law and what cannot.
And if we can set up that basis we can then discuss the powers of the executive
and the role of the judiciary as well as their powers in a far greater sense.
So that's really why we're going to be starting with the legislature today.
So I just touched on it very briefly in relationship between the legislature and the executive
how there's that little collusive relationship that's been going on between the two
and how it sort of structured that way within our system.
So that really does bring us to the first point that I said we would discuss in our episode today
very briefly which is the separation of powers in Australia.
The structure of the constitution separates the various institutions of government
into their respective roles and it's intended to produce a sort of quasi-independence
to really varying degrees of each in relation to the other.
This is expressed in the constitution with the establishment of the legislature in chapter 1,
the executive in chapter 2 and the judiciary in chapter 3.
It's really trying to push the image that these things are separate powers
even if they are exercised by a similar group of people in terms of the legislature and the executive.
A simple way to remember the various roles I find in terms of the separation powers
is to think of them in a sort of biological manner.
So if you just put it like this maybe it would make a little bit more sense to you
coming to this point of your constitutional law journey.
The legislature really takes on the role of the brain within the governmental structure.
It comes up with the ideas and through making laws it creates orders
that are then sent off to be implemented.
The executive is the hand or the arms which having been empowered by the legislative brain
implements its ideals into the real world and pushes the ideas into the society and makes them work.
The judiciary has a very unique role in the sense that it plays largely the role of a conscience.
Its role is to resolve the internal disputes that arise within the government
and with people that are interacting with the government and it is almost giving a reflection
upon the actions of both the legislature and the executive in its decision making.
It determines which actions that are taken by the legislature and the executive were right
and which ones were wrong and also to what degree in a lot of cases these days.
Obviously these things are more nuanced than that and the judiciary has a more expensive role
in terms of state powers and things like that but ultimately as a framework
you could think about the separation of powers in that very natural way
just to keep a good understanding of things in mind.
Now this analogy I found does assist students in grasping the basic roles of the various institutions of government.
However it really is imperfect for a number of reasons if you apply it in a very in-depth fashion
and I would really caution you simultaneously while giving that to you
in taking the analogy any further than it needs to be taken.
I would stress that it should really be looked up for a basic purpose
and that is for two principle reasons.
The first is that the analogy as I have alluded to isn't exactly right in all cases.
There are a number of precedents which have proven that the distinctions between the institutions
and their powers are somewhat blurred.
In the case of the legislature and the executive in Australia the relationship has really no meaningful separation.
The collusion here creates a hand that thinks for itself situation
as opposed to a brain hand separation which the analogy really is meant to give you.
The second reason why this is an imperfect explanation
is that the government as created by its constitutional documents
is not ultimately something of physical existence.
It is a legal fiction which is maintained generationally without much question.
It does not in itself really possess any intrinsic qualities except those which we ascribe to it.
So I would really be cautious with the analogy in that sense.
However, if you are going to just think about it as what the separation of powers doctrine is meant to be
and what the specific roles of each arm of government is meant to be or what organ is meant to be
really that does work for that purpose.
But with that firmly clarified and set out I would like to really move on to our constitution
and discuss the Senate and the House of Representatives in their structure respectively.
So let's start with the Australian Senate.
Section one of the Constitution states, quote,
"The legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a federal parliament
which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives."
The Senate in this legislative organization was created as the legislative body
intended to represent the state governments as a whole within the Commonwealth.
As such, its structure really does reflect the intention of the framers to protect smaller states
from those who are larger in population size.
As such, each state does have an equal number of senators regardless of population differences.
So for example, both New South Wales and Tasmania both currently have 12 senators.
Territories are allocated to senators, though this is on a different basis,
and as such there are a total of 76 senators currently.
The election of Senators is to be by
whole states voting as one electorate according to section seven. However, the parliament has the
power to prescribe the method of election to the Senate and has done so several times since
federation. Currently, the voting system is by single transferable vote or STV, which is a form
of preferential proportional representation. This is quite different from the House of Representatives
in some ways, in which each member represents a certain number of constituents within a jurisdictional
boundary, which means naturally states that have larger populations will have more representatives
in the House of Representatives. Just like the House of Representatives, the Senate is presided
over by a member, the member who presides over the Senate is referred to as the President,
and they must be selected before any other business can be heard by the Senate. The President of
the Senate must at all times be a senator. So now we have our Senate and we've discussed some of
the basic structures and some of the basic roles. How do we actually get the Senate in its place?
Well, according to the Constitution, anyone who may vote for an election of the House of Representatives
is also under Section 8, automatically eligible to vote for senators. And this means the
enfranchisement of people cannot be distinguished between the two legislative bodies.
The method of electing senators, as determined by the Commonwealth Parliament,
must also be uniform across each state. It cannot be inconsistent from state to state.
Now, the powers that the senators once they're elected can utilize are considered also co-equal
or coordinate with those of the House of Representatives. It theoretically can initiate laws
of any kind for later approval by the House, in the same way that laws can be proposed by the House
of Representatives to be approved by the Senate. The only exceptions really come in the form of
Section 53, which concern the appropriation of monies for the running of government and the levying
of taxes. In each case, the Senate is not capable of proposing law or bill, which would actually
do either of those things. Those things must be done by the House of Representatives.
It does, however, have the capacity as a Senate to reject all bills, which includes the budget
and appropriation bills initiated by the government in the House of Representatives.
In relation to the budget, this is called blocking supply. When the Senate fails to approve the
budget and blocks supply to the executive government led by the Prime Minister, this causes
a tedious political crisis within the country. If the Prime Minister cannot secure the essential
finances to fund the government, under the Westminster tradition, the stalemate is resolved by
an election, usually a double dissolution election. As such, in 1975, the Whitlam government was
dismissed for this reason by the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, who exercised his reserve powers
of the Queen. This event, when the Labor Government was dismissed and a double dissolution
election was called, is generally considered to be one of the most significant, if not the most
significant, constitutional crises that Australia has actually faced in its history.
So, once we've elected our Senators, there is another very important feature of the upper
House, which should be noted, and that is that its members, once they're elected, have a much
longer term than their counterparts in the House of Representatives. According to Section 7
of the Constitution, Senators are to be elected for six-year terms. However, Section 13 does
require that every three years half of the Senate is subject to an election. This is always scheduled
to coincide with the general election of the House of Representatives. So, for example, absent
any double dissolutions, the 40 Senators that were elected in 2019 will not face another election
until 2025. However, those Senators who were not up for election in 2019 will face the next
election in 2022. Now, Section 15 of the Constitution provides that a casual vacancy of a state
Senator shall be filled by an appointment of the State Parliament. If the previous Senator
who has left his position or her position was a member of a particular political party,
the replacement must come from that same party. However, the State Parliament may also choose not
to fill the vacancy, in which case Section 11 requires the Senate to proceed regardless
of the vacancy existing. Should the State Parliament be in recess when the vacancy occurs,
the Constitution also does provide that the State Governor can appoint someone to fill the place
until 14 days after the State Parliament resumes sitting, at which time it's assumed that
the State Parliament will make an appointment to the vacant position. So, with that overview of
the Senate in mind, and having discussed its structure, its powers and aspects of how it's
elected, it's important for me to provide you with some context for the Australian Senate and why
things are the way they are, looking at the bigger picture. So, to figure out why the Australian
Senate is really the way that it is, we're going to be looking at two primary examples that our
framers would have been considering when they were structuring and debating what the Senate would
look like. One of those is the UK House of Lords and the other is the United States Senate.
Now, in the United Kingdom, the Parliament is comprised of two houses. One is the House of Commons,
which is the Lower House and the other is the House of Lords, which is the Upper House.
These two houses, however, are not equally empowered as with the Australian Senate and House
of Representatives. All legislation in the UK by convention should be proposed by the House of
Commons and is then subsequently sent to the Lords for either approval or amendment advice.
However, since 1949, the Commons is capable of bypassing the House of Lords, should they reject
a law? By simply reparsing the exact same law a second time, meaning that the House of Lords
can merely delay passage of a law, it cannot completely block the passage of a law. As such,
within the UK, it can be stated that the Parliament holds supremacy in the government. However,
the House of Commons holds supremacy over the Parliament. In this sense, you can really imagine that
the separation of powers there is fundamentally quite different and is comparably extremely
disproportionate. Now, another aspect in which the House of Lords is extremely different from
the Australian Senate is that unlike our relatively small number of senators, the House of Lords
has 785 members. The vast majority of the Lords are appointed by the Queen and are given life
purge, meaning they must never face an election. Of the Lords' temporal, as they are called,
the majority are life peers who are appointed by the monarch on the advice of the Prime Minister
or on the advice of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. However, they also include some
hereditary peers. Prior to 1999, over 100 seats in the House of Lords were hereditary
and passed down based upon noble bloodline. Since that time, however, out of about 750 hereditary
nobles, only 92 may sit in the House of Lords. These 92 peers must be drawn from the British
ability. Ninety of these hereditary seats are subject to a special election wherein a person
of noble birth may be a candidate and the House of Lords itself, through various and quite unusual
mechanisms, may then vote on their purge. Hereditary peers are elected to hold their seats
until their death, resignation or exclusion for non-attendance. In addition to this,
there are also 26 seats in the House of Lords reserved specifically for bishops of the Church of
England. The Lords spiritual, as they are referred, hold purge so long as they are in possession of
a diocese within the Church structure. Now, to encourage gender equality, female bishops are
currently being preferred to males for all new vacancies that may arise until May of the year
2025, and it's likely that this was in response to the disproportionate number of men who have
been in the role for such a long time, and given the life tenure, they hold their positions
for quite some time, and there's now a policy objective or agenda to bring more women into those
roles for the next few years, so that they will also have life tenure in their positions.
Now, for us Australians, this probably sounds a bit archaic, and
very silly. It's very very different from what we would observe within our own
country and in most countries around the world. It should be noted that the UK
Parliament is really the product of a great deal of historical evolution as I've
mentioned in previous episodes. So it's really a remnant from a time gone by and
it's not built in a modern sense in any way. And really this has been the
perception of people, not just now, this isn't a modern interpretation of
things, this is also the interpretation which was being given by a lot of the
people who were involved in our federation drafting during the 1890s. Some of
them at the federation conventions were seeking to closely replicate the
British system as much as possible, probably looking to mimic the Canadian
model more than anything else. Though thankfully the majority preferred to
follow the American example structurally much closer rather than either the
Canadian or the UK House of Lords. Now in the United States the legislature is
divided into two almost equally empowered bodies. These being the House of
Representatives and the Senate. This of course is the origin of our own
institutions names and the separation of powers really that we do have in
Australia. Now the US Senate requires each state to have an equal number of
representatives regardless of size. This should really be a bell for what I've
already said is the Australian model and you can see the similarities from where
we have derived these ideas. As such both Hawaii and California in the United
States have only two senators each along with all the other 50 states. They all
only have two senators. Now originally these senators were selected by the state
legislatures. However since the passage of the 17th amendment in 1913 the
appointment of senators by the state legislatures has been replaced and
senators are now elected on rotation by their respective states acting as one
electorate. Senators are also elected for six year terms in the United States and
the terms are staggered slightly differently from Australia so that
approximately one-third of the seats in the Senate are up for election every
two years and this is timed of course to coincide with the House of Representatives
elections which are held every two years in the US unlike in Australia where we
have a tradition of holding hours every three years. Now the Senate is sorry
the Senate in the US may also introduce a bill on any subject except those
concerning appropriations of money or the living of taxes which must
originate in the House of Representatives. This should all sound familiar of
course. However in the US the Senate also holds a special power to approve
the appointment of executive cabinet members and federal judges who are
nominated by the president. This is particularly important in relation to the
Supreme Court nomination process where the Senate Judiciary Committee will
often spend days questioning nominees as to their constitutional opinions.
This should be extremely relevant for you right now given that we recently
have the passing of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the US Supreme Court
meaning there is now vacancy on their Supreme Court which will be filled by
either President Donald Trump if he's re-elected or potentially vice
president Joe Biden if he's elected to the office. The Senate over there will
have the final say on whether or not the candidate selected by that person who
holds the presidency will actually be successful in making it to the Supreme
Court. Now aside from that the Senate also has the extraordinary power in cases
where the president is impeached by the House of Representatives of conducting a
final trial of the impeachment. Whether Senate to convict the president of either
treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors they would be removed
from office and later face criminal proceedings against them in a normal court of
law. On this basis the US Constitution actually provides a mechanism for the
removal of the head of the executive, the chief executive, in quite unusual
fashion especially compared to say Australia or the UK where ultimately the
chief executive being the monarch cannot really be indicted by the crown as
the crown in all realistic senses is represented by them. They really wear the
crown so they can't be prosecuted whereas in the US there is a process of
impeachment whereby the president can actually be prosecuted. Now aside from the
power of nominee approval and impeachment the Australian Senate has
closely mirrored its American counterpart in a number of ways. It is one
example where the Constitution of Australia is almost completely devoid of
British influence when we look at the Senate of course. Our framers particularly
Andrew Inglis Clarke and Sir Samuel Griffith favoured the American model over
even the Canadian Senate. In Canada of course the senators are appointed by the
Governor-General on the Prime Minister's advice and they hold their seats not
for life but until the age of 75. Now the primary reason for us supporting the
American style Senate was to entrench the importance of federalism in Australia.
The Senate was where popularity of majorities from large states like New
South Wales and Victoria could be tempered by the voice of smaller states like
Tasmania and South Australia who could by coalitions prevent the
passage of laws privileging the largest states at the cost of those smaller
sister states. So with that stated we now come to the House of Representatives
within the Parliament. The lower house of the Australian legislature as previously
mentored is the House of Representatives. It is set out in chapter one part three
of the Constitution. According to section 24 it must be "composed of members
directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth and the number of such
members shall be as nearly as practicable twice the number of senators."
Electorates for the House of Representatives are formed on the basis of
population quotas and as such states like New South Wales and Victoria will
naturally have more members in the House than smaller states like Tasmania or
WA. Currently there are 151 seats in the lower house. While there have been
attempts to ensure each member represents an almost equal number of people this
has been almost impossible to actually affect. As such in some electorates and
divisions such as for example Calpa on the New South Wales North Coast the
number of constituents is almost double the number of voters for example in
Solomon which is in the Northern Territory. To give you some contrast in Calpa
there's something like 120,000 constituents within that electorate whereas in
Solomon there's something like 62,000. So you can really see in different parts
of the country it's just too difficult almost to get it exact. However this is
really raised some eyebrows in the past specifically because if you have one
representative in part of the country for only 62,000 people and in another part
of the country it's almost double that or potentially more than double that.
It obviously creates an inequality as to the representation because rather
than the larger electorate being divided and having two representatives the
smaller electorate in the Northern Territory for example gets to keep one
representative for a smaller number which means that its people are naturally a
little bit more empowered for their more minority status in that sense. This
actually spurred a high court of Australia case called the Attorney General of
the Commonwealth X-Rell McKinley and the Commonwealth in 1975. Now in this
case the high court was asked to determine whether the disparity that arose
within these different electoral boundaries was actually constitutional given
that it does result in inequality between electors. In this case the court
determined that the presence of some disproportionality population per
boundary or electorate is not inconsistent with the Constitution. Chief Justice
Barwick actually went further than this stating that the Constitution should
should be read as an Imperial Act and that American notions of equality were
inappropriate within an Australian context. Justice Mason did however state that
there are conceivable circumstances where there will be such a large
disproportionality that it may
produce a question of maldistribution, violating the basic equality of Australian electors.
However, within this judgment, Justice Mason didn't really set out what the degree would
be to trigger that disproportionality.
Would it be, for example, 60,000 to 120,000 electors in terms of disparity?
Could be, one representative per 100 electors, while in another electorate it is, say, 120,000.
The degree of disproportionality isn't really discussed there, but Justice Mason does leave
a door opening case the day does actually come when the disproportionality is just too
large to ignore.
So, now we'll move on to the next part of chapter 1 of the Constitution of Australia,
which concerns both houses of Parliament together.
So, members of both houses are required to swear an oath of office according to section 42
of the Constitution, which affirms their allegiance to Australia and also to its monarch.
Should be noted that according to section 43, a senator or a member of the House of Representatives
cannot simultaneously serve as an MP in the respective opposite house.
So, for example, a senator cannot simultaneously be an MP in the House of Representatives and
vice versa.
Now, section 44 sets out several main grounds for disqualification of parliamentarians.
These are broadly speaking, firstly, being a foreign citizen or dual citizen and therefore
holding allegiance to another nation.
Secondly, being attained for treason or subject to legal prosecution for either a Commonwealth
or State of Fence, carrying a penalty of at least one year imprisonment.
Thirdly, being an undercharge bankrupt, fourthly, holding an office of profit or pension payable
by the Commonwealth, and finally, having a pecuniary interest in any agreement with the public
service of the Commonwealth.
So, recently there has been a lot of talk about section 44 due to the large number of politicians
that were disqualified from parliament in 2017.
This section, its cases and the wider constitutional debate around it is best really dealt with
in a separate episode because there are quite a lot of nuances to this discussion.
For now, however, it's enough that we just simply note its existence, but I would say
that if you are interested in this topic and the disqualification of politicians and the
history of section 44, you really should look into it a little bit deeper at the moment
and you will find quite a lot of material has been published recently about it.
There are some conservative scholars that argue it's working the way it should.
There are also some conservative scholars that are arguing that it's the application
by the court is the incorrect part that the interpretation is incorrect, otherwise the
provision would be functioning slightly differently, but you also have some more progressive scholars
within the legal sphere who have argued that section 44 in part or its entirety should
be repealed on the basis that it has an archaic sort of effect, specifically looking at
the idea of dual nationality and dual citizenship which is quite common for a lot of people these
days to have both.
If you're interested, this is a very good topic to write an essay on or do a short thesis
on if you have a project upcoming and there's been a lot of theoretical work done on it as
well.
Go and have a look at that, but for right now, I won't dive into things too much.
I have already digressed quite a bit.
Following through with part four of the constitution, we do find an interesting provision in section
49, concerning the privileges of parliament.
This section basically states that it is for the parliament itself to determine its own
powers, privileges and immunities.
However, until they do so, their privileges shall be the same as those of the UK parliament.
As such, until the Parliamentary Privileges Act of 1987 was passed, the Australian parliament
relied upon the UK Bill of Rights from 1689.
I'm going to provide you with a little bit of history now about that UK Bill of Rights,
which will canvas the interesting aspect of section 49.
Following the English Civil War and subsequent restoration of Charles II to the throne of
England, the parliament had lost its predominance to the executive arm of government in the UK.
As such, during the reign of his brother, King James II, who is the last Catholic monarch
of England, the parliament invited the supporter of a Protestant noble from the Netherlands
to invade with an army of Dutchmen to overthrow King James and place his system marry on the
throne instead.
The Dutch forces were being led by a man named William of Orange, who would co-rain after
his successful invasion as King William III of England, with his wife Queen Mary II.
James, in turn, had fled to France, where after a failed attempt to reclaim the throne,
he lived in exile for the rest of his life.
With William's arrival in 1688, however, the English parliament agreed that in order to
justify the removal of King James II for his tyranny, the parliament must set out the
fundamental rights and privileges that he had abused.
This they believed would also create a clear line for their new monarchs, which could
not be crossed, and if they were crossed, obviously would have some sort of repercussion.
This period of time is referred to as the glorious revolution in the UK, and it culminated
in the creation of the English Bill of Rights, which set out basic civil rights for Englishmen,
such as, for example, that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted upon those imprisoned.
Also, that fines in four fixtures before conviction are illegal and void, as well as that
subjects have a right to petition government without fear of punishment.
Of more concern at the time, and also to the point that he's being made now, was that
the rights of parliament were established, and these included, in particular, the right
of free speech and debate in parliament for its members, that only parliament can levy
taxes, that the monarch cannot suspend the laws of parliament without its consent, and
that there cannot be a standing army in times of peace without parliament's consent.
Now, this statute, along with the act of settlement, from 1701, among other things, forms
the basis of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK, and as such, establish the basis of
parliamentary privileges.
Interference with the exercise of privilege was considered to be a crime, specifically
the crime of being in contempt of parliament.
So given until the 1980s that the Australian government hadn't adopted its own parliamentary
privileges laws, until that time, the UK precedence and laws were really still in place,
and as such, not only did the Australian parliament inherit the privileges of the UK parliament,
but also inherited the crime of being in contempt of parliament.
Now the interesting part of this story is that two journalists were actually charged with
being in contempt of parliament.
In the case of Regina and Richards, ex parte Fitzpatrick and Brown, in the year 1955, which
can be found at the 92nd Commonwealth Law Report at page 157, two journalists were arrested
for publishing an article in the Bankstown Observer about Labour MP Charles Morgan, who informed
the House of Representatives that the article had impugned his honour and questioned his
fitness to be in parliament, specifically the article alleged that he had engaged in corrupt
legal practice as a lawyer prior to his election.
The men who had published this article smearing the MP were brought before the House of Representatives
to their dispatch box to answer the charges that they were in contempt of parliament.
Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies, the much respected founder of the Liberal Party, moved
a motion that the men being present for 90 days as punishment.
It was carried, and they spent three months in prison for the article that they published.
The parliament had found the two men guilty before they even entered the chamber.
The only matter to be determined was their sentence.
The high court on appeal also refused to overturn their punishment and held that the Australian
parliament retained the privileges and powers of the UK House of Commons, and as such,
was capable of punishing a person for contempt of parliament.
the passage of the book.
1987 Privileges Act, all charges of contempt are subject to judicial review in a federal court.
Section 4 of that Act does provide that certain conduct will be subject punishment if it
properly or improperly interferes with the free exercise of the House, its functions
or performance of its members.
This is punishable under Section 7 with up to 6 months imprisonment.
However, contempt by defamation which is really what occurred in the Fitzpatrick case was
abolished in the 1987 Privileges Act, unless of course it is said in the presence of a House
or committee.
So the moral of the story really is, if you plan on defaming a politician just make sure
it isn't done in Parliament.
Now while the Fitzpatrick case is often overlooked, it is interesting to note not only that speech
was punished in that case and the press censored, but also that the House of Representatives
has an ancient power to punish citizens who violate its privileges, exercising and almost
quasi-judicial power simultaneously in describing both guilt and sentence to the person.
The case is also interesting as it was a Labour MP who was allegedly defamed, yet it was perhaps
the most famous Liberal Prime Minister of our history who led the House in punishing
the perpetrators for their mean words.
I shall leave judgment to you as to whether this is a good example of bipartisanship or
not.
However, it certainly does reveal, not only that the Australian Parliament has quite archaic
roots in some circumstances, but also that's the concept of free speech expression and protection
of the free press is quite different here than it has been in many other free countries.
So you should always keep that in mind, that our institutions have been quite abrasive
towards the freedom of the citizen.
Now with that quite dark story in mind about our history, it's probably now a good time
to move into our overview of the legislature's powers.
So part five of chapter one sets out the powers of the Parliament in making laws.
The main body of these are set out in section 51, which contains 39 heads of power under
which the federal parliament may legislate.
This including quite notably for example foreign affairs and interstate trade and commerce
matters, external affairs matters, issues of naturalisation and also foreign aliens, corporations
and of course, particularly in the last couple of years quite famously, the federal government
under section 51 has the power to regulate marriage.
The section also contains lesser known heads of power though, such as the power of parliament
to legislate in relation to, say, lighthouses or interstate railway construction and also
the standardisation of weights and measures. So if you ever have an issue with the metric
system, you should follow it up with your federal MP.
It should be noted however that these heads of power in section 51 are not deemed to be
exclusive to Commonwealth power.
A state government can actually legislate on any of these topics and their laws will be
deemed valid unless of course an inconsistent Commonwealth law is later made invoking
the inconsistency clause set out in section 109.
In section 52 there are several subjects which only the Commonwealth parliament may legislate
upon however, these include where the Australian capital city is, regulation of federally owned
public places and also matters relating to any department of the federal public service.
554 and 55 respectively also declare that any law seeking to appropriate money to the
public service or levy taxes must be limited in its context solely to the purposes of either
appropriation or taxation. So for example a law which would create a new tax cannot simultaneously
create regulations of either lighthouses or marriage, it must concern only the subject
of taxation.
Section 81 of the Constitution treats all money acquired by the Commonwealth as forming
one consolidated revenue fund to be appropriated for the purposes of the Commonwealth in the
manner imposed by the Constitution.
Section 83 provides that no money shall be drawn from the treasury without an appropriation
and that any appropriation must be made by law.
That is a law of the federal parliament.
After a long history of development the High Court determined in the case of PAPE and
Commissioner of Taxation in 2009 that neither Section 81 or Section 54 are in themselves
sources of substantive power. They are merely corollary controls to the exercise of legislative
power.
This subject is another which is fascinating in the jurisprudence that it has so we'll
return to this in more detail during a later episode. Luckily not very soon due to the
fact it's not really focused on as much in constitutional law as it's taught in the
undergraduate level.
However I would say the constitutional law relating to the finances of government and taxation
is extremely fascinating and there is a great deal of argument to be made that the courts
have actually done an extremely poor job in interpreting the Constitution as it relates
to financial matters.
Now at this point having set out the structure of the parliament it's by capitalism, legislative
powers. You're probably expecting things would be wrapped up. However to end this episode
here would really emit a very important aspect of Section 1 of our constitution which defines
the conferral of legislative power in Australia. Namely that the federal parliament shall "consist
of the queen, a senate, and a house of representatives".
So therefore we must not forget that the queen or monarch more generally is a component
also of our legislature as well as our executive branches of government. Unlike in the United
States where the executive and legislative arms of government are separated. In Australia
the two are bound together taking from the UK and Canadian examples. As such the queen
as the digital head of the executive and her representative the governor general hold
a special role within the legislative process. One which is almost never recognised due
to the limited occasions upon which they are invoked.
So according to Section 57 of the constitution we're a disagreement between the senate
and the house of representatives over a piece of legislation paralyses the parliament such
that neither is willing to compromise on amendments to facilitate its passage. The governor general
made dissolve the houses of parliament. This is called a double dissolution as I've mentioned
previously and has been invoked a number of times in Australian history. Most recently
in 2016, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull advised the governor general that the conditions
of Section 57 were met when the parliament couldn't achieve a consensus relating to amendments
of labour and union laws. Should this double dissolution not resolve the dispute the governor
general can then call a joint sitting of both houses of parliament and have the two
houses vote together on the proposal with an absolute majority being required for its
passage. According to Section 58, all laws passed by the parliament subsequently are to
be presented by the Prime Minister to the governor general who acts as a proxy to receive
the queen's ascent. They may also, the governor general, refuse to ascent to a law instead
making recommendations which would be precedent to its later approval. Likewise, the governor
general may also, in very rare cases, should they choose, refuse signification themselves
in deference to the queen's personal signature. Now, the fact that the governor general did
give royal ascent does not always mean that it will be final. The queen, according to
Section 59, does retain a power to disallow or veto by proclamation any law signed by
her representative within one year of it receiving ascent. I would note that this hasn't actually
been utilised by the queen at any time of our history to my knowledge. Section 60 also
sets out that a law reserved for the queen's significations shall not have any force until
the governor general by public speech or addressing parliament or proclamation makes it
known that the queen has approved the law. And this must occur within two years of
passage through Parliament, after which it expires and cannot receive a cent. As such,
these provisions established at the monarch and by extension the executive has a very strong
presence within our legislative process, as all laws require royal approval to be validly
enacted. In almost all cases this means approval by the governor general, acting as the chief
executive. However, it should be noted, consistent with Westminster conventions, that since
a glorious revolution, the monarch must only act with the advice of the Prime Minister.
This means the governor general is appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister,
and when in office by the same convention is only to act on their advice.
The one occasion in which this didn't occur, as previously mentioned, was the 1975
Wittland dismissal that was deemed a constitutional crisis.
So this should give you the impression that by Westminster Convention, therefore,
whether it is in Australia, Canada or the UK, the Prime Minister is for most practical purposes
during good times, the de facto head of both the executive and the legislative branches of
government, given that the chief executive in the de jour sense, either the queen or the
governor general or both, has to follow their advice. This means the Prime Minister
and by extension, their selected cabinet ministers, are directly responsible for both the creation
and enforcement of laws. And that causes a significant centralisation of power within Australia,
as two of the three arms of government are controlled by the exact same group of people.
The advantage which is often cited by those who are politically inclined
to this system in particular, is that it creates a winner-takes-all system.
If you win the general parliamentary election, you automatically control the entire government.
This means it is much easier to begin passing laws and implementing your desired policies
without any wide checks on power. Save maybe in extreme cases for
very limited circumstances as well for the high court invalidating a law on constitutional
grounds, which in Australia is very, very rare. Otherwise, aside from that very unusual and rare
eventuality, you are essentially, if you're elected to be Prime Minister, always guaranteed that a
law once passed will receive the royal assent, and it will be enforced by the executive cabinet,
who are after all, usually people who drafted or instigated the law, and who the Prime Minister
has selected to do so. So we should for a moment consider whether this collusive and more centralised
model is really preferable to restrict separation of powers. So in the US, the executive and legislative
branches are almost completely separate. The president is elected separately from the Congress,
and his cabinet, while requiring the approval of the Senate, are ultimately separate from the
Congress as well. The president has no direct hand in the creation of legislation, while his approval
is required for a bill to become a law, in similar fashion to our Governor-General
giving royal assent. According to Article 1, Section 7 clause 2, the Congress in cases where the
president does refuse their approval, can actually pass the law a second time, and thereby pass his
executive veto. So in cases of a stalemate, the Congress can actually make a law without any executive
approval, unlike for example in Australia, where if the monarch theoretically didn't give their
approval, the law simply couldn't be passed. Now one occasion that this happened in the US was the
civil rights act of 1866, which sought to ensure equality and citizenship for all people born in the
US regardless of race or colour. This was vetoed by President Andrew Johnson. Congress subsequently
overrode his veto, and it was made a law without a presidential signature. For context, the most
vetoes ever given by a sitting US president was by Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt during
the Second World War, who vetoed a staggering 635 bills. In more modern times, things have been
much more resigned. In the sense that President Bush and Obama both vetoed 12 laws each during
their eight years, and President Trump has only vetoed eight so far in his first term.
Now in around 10% of regular veto cases throughout US history, the Congress has overridden
then by passing the law a second time. So really the laws which end up getting vetoed
and obviously not overturned are the ones which are a little bit only fence. The ones where the
Congress only has a slight majority and taking it a second time through the legislative process is either
two-time consuming or simply too difficult. As such, the US system does provide a mechanism by which
Congress can actually bypass the president in cases of a severe stalemate. And this is to be
contrasted, for example, with Australia where if for some reason the governor general didn't want
to sign something, they would either have to be replaced or the law would simply just not happen.
Now of course in practical terms that would never happen in Australia because according to
the conventions I mentioned, the governor general just meant to act on the prime minister's advice
and the prime minister would almost certainly always advise to sign the law. So we're talking about
apples and oranges, but in terms of checks and balances, the US system does provide that separation
with a check and a balance in place to make sure that just because the president says no,
doesn't mean that something won't happen. Now there are also circumstances in the US where a
president may decline to enforce a law. While the take care clause of the US constitution,
which can be found that Article 2, Section 3, clause 5 does require the president to execute the
law even if he disagrees personally with it. If a president does believe that the law is unconstitutional,
there's the chief executive can choose not to enforce it. The dispute usually resolved
by the judicial branch requires the Supreme Court to determine which side is correct.
And in the Supreme Court case of Freitag and Commissioner set out at Vol. 501 of the United States
reports found at page 868 from the year 1991, of course. All four of the justices of the Supreme
Court who addressed the issue as to whether or not the president can simply not enforce a law that
he deems unconstitutional agreed that the president has "the power to veto encroaching laws"
or even to disregard them when they are unconstitutional. And the reason why is because
in the United States there is a belief that the president, as well as the legislature and the
judiciary, has a solemn responsibility to enforce the US constitution. So in cases where the
president believes that the legislature is doing something unconstitutional, it the office
requires the president to actually act on that opinion and do what they think is their
constitutional duty which would be to not enforce that law. Naturally this is dramatic and it always
ends up in some kind of dispute within the courts or some sort of political accommodation being made
though it is a possibility for that to occur. Conversely also in cases where the laws of Congress
are valid so they are constitutional but they do unjustly criminalize someone, the president may
also pardon the person who's been criminalized under article 2 section 2 clause 1. And examples
of presidential pardons coming to the rescue can be seen all throughout the history of the US and
they really do go all the way back to the time of the framers. Specifically during the founding
generation president John Adams created a series of laws which criminalized criticism of the US
government in particular the Sedition Act of 1798. Now many people were fined and imprisoned under
this law for seditious speech by speaking against his administration. The law was actually never
tested in the Supreme Court as to his constitutionality and thankfully so yet the incoming president
Thomas Jefferson regarded it himself as unconstitutional. Because of this he decided to utilize his
presidential power and he pardoned, commuted or rescinded the convictions of over 119 people who
had been punished under the act. In doing so he had protected the First Amendment rights of a number
of Americans. And fundamentally through his example and subsequent repeal of the Sedition Act
revealed that he was in favor of the freedom of Americans under the US Constitution as opposed
to the prosecution for ex-substance.
exercising that freedom. The example which was set by this has been followed
throughout US history and quite recently President Trump had the sentence of
Alice Johnson commuted in 2018 sorry. Now Alice Johnson had been convicted of a
first-time drug offense in 1996 and was sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole. Since her pardon in 2018 she has become an activist for criminal
justice reform particularly to end mandatory sentencing and the drug war. By
now you can probably see the important differences between the two systems of
government. While in Australia and parliamentary democracies like the UK and
Canada there is a winner takes all approach. The United States by its
divisions of power has a much more gridlocked system by design. This makes law
making and enforcement much more difficult. While the parliamentary countries seek
to streamline the law making process the United States seeks to frustrate it
and make it much more difficult so that you have ultimately less laws. The
reason for the difference is really quite ideologically rooted. While in
parliamentary countries the focus has been on the effective exercise of political
power the United States Constitution by its very design is focused on the
limitation of political power to reserve the rights of citizens. Whether you
prefer one or the other will really depend upon your ideas on political
theory. Ultimately though this is an example where political ideology will
intersect with constitutional law and your opinions one way or the other will
be informed based upon your political ideals. So to recap on what we have
covered today in our episode we have gone over the constitutional basis for the
Commonwealth Parliament and its legislative powers. I discussed the Senate it's
rolled within our bicameral system and also its historical predecessors as well
as the House of Representatives and its role its important role within our
and other parliamentary democracies. Aside from the structural facts I also gave
you a brief overview of the powers of the Commonwealth legislature and also
how the monarch and her representative fit into the legislative process. To
wrap up I then contrast that our Westminster Parliamentary model with the
United States Republican system just to give you something to think about going
forward in terms of the wider context of constitutional theory. While we
covered quite a lot today in terms of content it should also be noted that it is
rare in law school that you would get any sort of explanation on this sort of
topic given prior to jumping into the more substantive aspects of legislative
power. No one really does sit down and explain sit down with you and explain the
structure and reasons behind the formation of government. They really just dive
straight into the section 51 stuff. So my hope is that the explanation I've
given in today's episode will make some of those upcoming topics within the
legislative powers subject easier to understand and perhaps has given you a bit
more context to think about them in. So from our next episode we're going to
start discussing some of the key legislative powers of the Commonwealth in more
detail and that's really going to take us over the next three or four
episodes I would say talking about some of the main legislative powers that
the Commonwealth relies upon and also the ones that you study in law school. In
particular on our next episode we're going to be covering the Trade and
Commerce Power which is found in section 51 subsection one. So I hope you
enjoyed today's commencement on Commonwealth legislative powers and I hope
you're prepared for our next few episodes. Please stay tuned for our next one
on Trade and Commerce Power and until then of course please remember to
always keep reading.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
The Australian Constitution establishes a bicameral legislature consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives, reflecting a Westminster system with the Senate designed to protect smaller states from larger ones.
The Senate has equal representation for all states, elected by proportional representation via single transferable vote, with members serving six-year terms and half elected every three years.
The House of Representatives is based on population quotas, leading to unequal electorate sizes, which the High Court has upheld as constitutionally acceptable despite concerns about proportional fairness.
Legislative powers are defined in Section 51, including areas like foreign affairs, trade, and marriage, but are not exclusive, allowing states to legislate unless overridden by inconsistent federal laws.
The Australian system features a close fusion of executive and legislative power, with the Governor-General acting on the Prime Minister’s advice, and the monarch retaining a formal veto power rarely exercised.
Unlike the U.S., where the executive can veto legislation and Congress can override it, Australia’s system allows no such checks, resulting in a "winner-takes-all" legislative process.
The Senate can block supply (budget approval), leading to constitutional crises such as the 1975 dismissal of the Whitlam government, highlighting tensions between branches.
The Australian Parliament inherited UK parliamentary privileges, including contempt of parliament, though these were later reformed by the 1987 Privileges Act to protect free speech and limit judicial review.
Summary:
This episode introduces the foundational structure and powers of the Australian Commonwealth Parliament, establishing a clear framework for understanding constitutional law. The legislature is bicameral, with the Senate representing all states equally to balance larger states’ influence, while the House of Representatives allocates seats based on population, resulting in significant disparities in electorate size that the High Court has deemed constitutionally acceptable. The legislative powers are outlined in Section 51, covering key areas such as foreign affairs, trade, and marriage, though state governments can legislate unless overridden by inconsistent federal laws.
A central feature of the system is the close integration between the executive and legislature, where the Governor-General acts on the Prime Minister’s advice, and the monarch’s formal veto remains largely unused. S. system, where separation of powers includes executive veto and legislative override, creating a more balanced but gridlocked process.
Historical examples, such as the 1975 constitutional crisis, illustrate the political risks of legislative deadlock. The episode also highlights the legacy of British parliamentary privileges, including the controversial power to punish contempt, which was later reformed in 1987 to protect free expression. While the structure appears streamlined and efficient, it centralizes power in the hands of the elected government, raising questions about checks and balances.
This foundational overview sets the stage for deeper exploration of specific legislative powers in future episodes, such as the Trade and Commerce Power.
FAQs
The Australian Parliament is bicameral, consisting of the Queen (as a ceremonial head), the Senate (upper house), and the House of Representatives (lower house).
This structure was designed to protect smaller states from being overshadowed by larger, more populous states, ensuring a balance of power in legislation.
It divides government into three branches—the legislature, executive, and judiciary—with each having distinct roles, though in practice, the legislature and executive are closely linked.
Unlike the UK House of Lords, which has life peers and a largely appointed, non-representative structure, the Australian Senate is elected and has equal state representation with a fixed term and proportional voting system.
If the Senate refuses to approve the government's budget, it can block funding, leading to a political crisis that may result in a double dissolution election, as seen in the 1975 dismissal of the Whitlam government.
Section 51 allows the federal parliament to legislate on specific matters, but state governments can also legislate on those topics unless a conflicting federal law is passed, governed by the inconsistency clause in section 109.
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